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ABSTRACT
“ACCOUNTABLE TO NO ONE”: CONFRONTING POLICE POWER IN BLACK
MILWAUKEE
by
William I. Tchakirides
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2020
Under the Supervision of Professor Amanda I. Seligman

This dissertation uncovers the roots of discriminatory police power in Milwaukee, Wisconsin
and traces Black-led efforts to make the city’s police bureaucracy more accountable to all citizens. It
analyzes the politics of police reform in the century spanning the passage of two state laws that
reconfigured Milwaukee’s law enforcement arrangements. The first (1885) removed City Hall’s
managerial control over the Milwaukee Police Department (MPD). Corporate elites and social
reformers fearful of rising working-class power and moral degeneration in the immigrant-industrial
city lobbied for the statute’s enactment. The second (1984) reversed course, re-empowering nonpolice officials after decades of Black-led campaigns for diverse input, representation, and oversight
within Milwaukee’s white-controlled police bureaucracy. While the 1885 law created a civil service
commission to regulate public safety hiring free of political machine influence, it also gave exclusive
accountability to property-holders and shielded department heads from external supervision—
provisions later targeted by activists. A revision (1911) clarified the power of the city’s public safety
chiefs, granting them indefinite tenure, policymaking authority, and institutional autonomy.
In turn, the MPD fostered an outwardly exceptional status at the height of policing’s
“reform era” (1920s-1950s). This apparent exceptionalism, marked by a value-neutral self-image, was
established around administrative innovations and crime control efficiencies heralded by national
policing experts. It was a dynamic that broadly served white middle-class and corporate interests, as
ii

the MPD’s perceived legitimacy was contingent on biased discretionary practices and surveillance of
labor militants, political-left radicals, the poor, and, increasingly after World War II, Black migrants
seeking jobs and freedom. The department’s exalted status was tied to economic growth and
acculturation programs that criminalized blackness and excused government actions that worsened
segregation and inequality. Aggressive policing in Black Milwaukee compounded related injustices in
public and private sectors, reinforcing racist narratives and uneven policy outcomes. With their
number rising, African Americans confronted mounting instances of unchecked state violence using
tactics like street-level resistance, civic negotiation, direct action protest, litigation, and federal
intervention. Black and allied groups challenged a police power whose racist double-standards
remained a threat irrespective of whether police chiefs employed liberal or reactionary law-and-order
approaches. “‘Accountable to No One’” argues that the MPD sustained its authority by relying on
an impervious blend of legal protections, social customs, and repressive policies that narrowed the
scope of reform proposals intended to limit coercive police power. Racist discretionary practices in
criminalized Black spaces exacerbated deteriorating economic conditions, unduly harming African
Americans and justifying fresh cycles of police abuse. The MPD’s state-sanctioned legitimacy—
backed by the city’s white ethnic majority and a compliant criminal-legal system—maintained Black
Milwaukee’s subordination based on common ideas about policing as a perfectible institution vital to
democratic societies. This view blinded even the most progressive accountability advocates. Still, the
movement garnered procedural reforms, despite struggling to improve the outlook of overpoliced
and underprotected Black citizens, who faced declining public investments in housing, jobs,
education, and healthcare. Meanwhile, police spending, institutional diversity, and police union
protections grew, setting up new barriers to accountability. An overall disregard among liberal
advocates for the economic dimensions of Milwaukee’s policing crisis meant that a recalibrated
MPD continued to uphold a racial-capitalist system that marginalized Black working-class power.
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INTRODUCTION

“The police department has a reputation as a highly professional force that provides efficient service to the citizenry and
gets excellent cooperation in return.”
- John J. McCarthy, Police Magazine, 1981

“Milwaukee has had her share of a carnival of police brutality blood, as gory as can be found anywhere.”1
- James Cameron, Founder of America’s Black Holocaust Museum, 1983

In 1983, America’s Black Holocaust Museum founder and community historian James
Cameron indignantly challenged the Milwaukee Fire and Police Commission (MFPC) in an open
letter, “How can a people be brought to respect a government that constantly oppresses and exploits
them?”2 The nation’s only known racial terror lynching survivor was addressing the civic inaction
that historically greeted police killings of Black people in his adoptive home city. The “oldest police
commission in the United States” was in the process of determining whether the three officers who
ended the life of Ernest Lacy would face professional discipline.3 Before his asphyxiation by police,
James Cameron, “An Open Letter to the Milwaukee Fire and Police Commission Regarding the Ernest Lacy
Complaint,” March 31, 1983, 3, Dr. James Cameron Pamphlet Collection, Milwaukee Public Library, accessed October
31, 2020, https://content.mpl.org/digital/collection/jcameron/id/520/rec/5. James Cameron was the only known
survivor of a racial terror lynching in U.S. history. The incident occurred in Marion, Indiana in 1930 after county sheriff
deputies arrested three young Black men on charges of murdering a white man and sexually assaulting his white
girlfriend. The spectacle lynching was aided and abetted by local law enforcement. A white lynch mob tortured and
hanged Cameron’s peers, Tommy Shipp and Abram Smith. Before nearly being lynched himself by the frenzied mob,
Cameron reported hearing a voice say, “Take this boy back. He had nothing to do with any raping or killing.” The
“sweet,” “feminine” utterance stood out above the cacophonous din of the lynch mob. Stunned and shaken, Cameron
was transferred back into the sheriff’s custody. Authorities moved him to a jail thirty miles south of Marion, where he
awaited a trial. For more on James Cameron’s story, see: James Cameron, A Time of Terror: A Survivor’s Story, rev. ed.
(Milwaukee: LifeWrites Press, 2016); James H. Madsen, A Lynching in the Heartland: Race and Memory in America (New
York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003); Syreeta McFadden, “What Do You Do after Surviving Your Own Lynching?”
BuzzFeed News, June 23, 2016, accessed June 8, 2019, https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/syreetamcfadden/how-tosurvive-a-lynching.
2 Cameron, “An Open Letter to the Milwaukee Fire and Police Commission Regarding the Ernest Lacy Complaint,” 9.
3 Richard Jerome, Promoting Police Accountability in Milwaukee: Strengthening the Fire and Police Commission (Los Angeles: Police
Assessment Resource Center, 2006), 1.
1
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the 22-year-old Black male was stopped, questioned, and arrested for a rape he did not commit.4 His
assailants were white Tactical Enforcement Unit officers with pending police brutality complaints. 5
All three had the support of their police chief, the Milwaukee Police Association, and law
enforcement’s historical “monopoly on legitimate storytelling” at their backs.6 All three had escaped
prosecution on a confounding technicality after an inquest jury ruled in favor of criminal charges in
a police brutality case for the first time in the city’s history.7
Ernest Lacy’s death was the latest in a string of police killings of Black citizens dating back
to the earliest phase of Milwaukee’s “late Great Migration.”8 Each case saw the exoneration of the
officers involved and accountability denied to the families of Black victims, save for a handful of
civil rights settlements that meted out compensatory justice. The city’s virtually all-white police
bureaucracy had a long history of not only denying due process in response to Black grievances
against law enforcement, but in denying the very reality of their claims. If Black complainants
appeared to lack legitimacy, the authority of the police was never questioned.
Formal repudiations by Milwaukee’s police bureaucracy were bolstered by the fact that,
during the first half of the 20th century, influential voices in criminal justice and government agencies

The rape victim was a white woman.
Patricia Worth, The Milwaukee Sentinel, “Brutality Complaint Dismissed,” October 26, 1981, Part 1, 1. The MPD’s
Tactical Enforcement Unit was Milwaukee’s version of “SWAT.” The Los Angeles Police Department’s “Special
Weapons and Tactics” unit was first established after the 1965 Watts rebellion as the nation’s first police unit dedicated
to suppressing “potential urban warfare.” Max Felker-Kantor, Policing Los Angeles: Race, Resistance, and the Rise of the LAPD
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2018), 52-53.
6 On the concept of police holding a “monopoly on legitimate storytelling,” see: Matthew Guariglia, “The Dirty Truth
about Police Departments? They’re Lying to Us,” NBC News, June 7, 2020, accessed June 25, 2020,
https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/buffalo-police-pushed-old-man-said-he-tripped-because-policencna1225881. One of the areas that monopoly was most visible was in the Milwaukee County Medical Examiner
Office’s preliminary determination that Ernest Lacy died of “fright” and not police actions. Bruce Gill and Karen Rothe,
“Fright May Have Caused Man's Death after His Arrest,” The Milwaukee Sentinel, July 11, 1981, Part 1, 1.
7 Milwaukee County District Attorney E. Michael McCann essentially invoked a reverse racism argument when he
convinced the Circuit Court to dismiss an inquest jury’s historic ruling in favor of criminal charges against the officers
because a special medical examiner had intentionally balanced the inquest panel with an even number of Black and white
jurors. That aim for racial fairness—a first on a Milwaukee inquest jury—was warranted given the Medical Examiner
office’s history of conducting white-controlled hearings that inevitably exonerated the accused officers. See: Chapter Six.
8 See: Appendix A. On Milwaukee’s “late Great Migration,” see: Paul Geib, “From Mississippi to Milwaukee: A Case
Study of the Southern Black Migration to Milwaukee, 1940-1970,” The Journal of Negro History 83 (4) (Autumn, 1998):
229-248.
4
5
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counted the Milwaukee Police Department (MPD) as one of America’s most exceptional police
forces—an assessment based on its “professionalism,” administrative innovation, and crime control
efficiency.9 Reports consistently treated Milwaukee “as the ideal in police administration.”10 In turn,
local police bureaucrats typically sided with the presumed validity and legal standing of MPD
accounts of police-Black citizen encounters, which doubled as official narratives of events in
moments of racialized police abuse. That compulsory belief in the MPD’s underlying legitimacy
remained intact even as the department’s strategic approach shifted amid the tumult of “civil rights
insurgency” and white racial backlash in the 1960s.11 In this period, the agency transitioned from an
outwardly progressive crime control ethos—what historians have called “liberal law-and-order”—to
a more reactionary model.12 That the MPD operated objectively, on value-neutral terms, was an
overriding presumption among white police bureaucrats, especially when Black citizens averred
police mistreatment. Time and again, the MPD, MFPC, City Hall, and Milwaukee County District
Attorney’s office met Black airings of police disrespect, neglect, harassment, brutality, detentions,
and surveillance with incredulity. This frustrated complainants, exacerbated issues of mistrust, and
undermined accountability for Black victims of police violence. The system’s contempt and reflexive
backing of accused police officers exceptionalized African Americans as second-class citizens. They
charged the MPD with violating their constitutional rights during police stops, interrogations,

Historian Sidney Harring argues John Janssen was the nation’s first “professional” police chief in the U.S. He cites
specific qualities, including “some notion of advanced, specialized training; a career protected by civil service, with
standards set and enforced internally; some measure of autonomy in decision-making; and official adherence to a valueneutral legal code for guidance in making policy.” The professionalization movement was driven by “nationwide
attempts to strengthen police institutions in dealing with economic crises.” Sidney Harring, “The Police Institution as a
Class Question: Milwaukee Socialists and the Police: 1900-1915,” Science & Society 46 (2) (Summer 1982): 197-221. On
the MPD’s leadership in the “police-community relations movement” of the 1940s, see: Samuel E. Walker, “The Origins
of the Police-Community Relations Movement: the 1940s,” Criminal Justice History (1) (1980): 225-246.
10 Walker, A Critical History of Police Reform, 165.
11 On Milwaukee’s late 1950s and 1960s civil rights movement, see: Patrick D. Jones, The Selma of the North: Civil Rights
Insurgency in Milwaukee (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009).
12 Chapter Two explores “liberal law-and-order” approaches to police administration in detail. On this concept, see:
Naomi Murakawa, The First Civil Right: How Liberals Built Prison America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014);
Felker-Kantor, Policing Los Angeles.
9
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arrests, and beatings. However, police routinely received the benefit of the doubt, both within the
criminal-legal system and across Milwaukee’s white body politic.13 In the aggregate, this dynamic
strengthened a dual law enforcement system that regularly blunted accountability for the city’s
growing Black population. It added to a harmful mix of discriminatory conditions in public and
private sectors ranging from housing to employment, public accommodations to education.
Police accountability, for the purposes of this dissertation, refers to citizens holding law
enforcement agencies responsible for police services rendered (or not rendered), as well as for the
treatment of people by individual police officers.14 It may seem obvious that racism accounts for
why police accountability has proven so fleeting for Black Milwaukeeans. Yet, how racist structures
have actually formed, propagated, evolved, and sustained themselves at the local level presents a
more complex story. In recent years, historians have detailed the central role that police agencies and
crime control policies have played in contouring white supremacy and metropolitan politics, while
also revealing the depths to which anti-Black racism permeates all aspects of organized law
enforcement in America.15 However, few have looked at policing in Milwaukee, or other mid-tier
large cities in the Midwest.16 As elsewhere, the system’s inequities, here, are socially and politically
produced. White MPD officers and administrators, for example, have long relied on racist tropes to
explain lethal police actions against Black persons, either in custody or in the midst of committing a

Today, Milwaukee is a “majority minority” city. Margo Anderson, “Peoples,” Encyclopedia of Milwaukee, accessed June
29, 2020, https://emke.uwm.edu/entry/peoples.
14 Samuel E. Walker and Carol A. Archbold, The New World of Police Accountability, 3rd ed. (Los Angeles: Sage, 2020), 11.
15 On the suburban implications of racialized criminal justice policies in post-World War II America, see: Matthew D.
Lassiter, “Impossible Criminals: The Suburban Imperatives of America’s War on Drugs,” The Journal of American History
102 (1) (June 2015): 126-140.
16 Historians who have researched Milwaukee and local law enforcement’s relationship to the preservation of white
supremacy are few. See: Simon Ezra Balto, “‘Occupied Territory’: Police Repression and Black Resistance in Postwar
Milwaukee, 1950-1968,” The Journal of African American History 98 (2) (Spring 2013): 229-252; Ian Toller-Clark, “From
Breweries to the Super-Max: The Making of Carceral Populism in Metropolitan Milwaukee, 1950-2000” in The
Conservative Heartland: A Political History of the Postwar American Midwest, eds. Jon K. Lauk and Catherine McNicol Stock
(Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2020); Jones, The Selma of the North; Joe William Trotter, Jr., Black Milwaukee: The
Making of an Industrial Proletariat, 1915-1945, 2nd ed. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2006). This dissertation defines
mid-tier large cities as under 1,000,000 people.
13

4

perceived offense. Since at least the 1930s, the conventional press and police department itself has
reported on the “crazed” behavior of Black police brutality victims. This has reinforced white
perceptions of Black criminality and the “violent nature” of African Americans suspected by police
of committing crimes, thus justifying their use of deadly force.17 In turn, the state’s historically whitecontrolled criminal-legal system has backed up police self-defense claims, with county district
attorneys, judges, and inquest juries excusing officers based on the MPD’s own biased chronologies
of events. False or incomplete police testimonials have also fed medical examiner determinations,
which too often omit the actions of officers in favor of obliquely citing health factors.18 These and
other means of abdicating police liability have left the families of Black police brutality victims
feeling powerless to secure justice in the wake of profound losses at the feet of the state. 19
Given the lack of accountability afforded to Black Milwaukeeans—a deficit that applies well
beyond the scope of tragic police killings—it is not surprising that the MFPC’s termination of the
officer most directly responsible for Ernest Lacy’s death felt like a historic moment.20 That a
This was the word choice of a Milwaukee police officer describing Ernest Lacy’s actions as he testified during the
MFPC disciplinary hearing. “Officer Who Saw Lacy's Arrest Testifies,” The Milwaukee Journal, April 20 1983. MPD
officers used similar justifications when relying on lethal force in incidents involving other groups of color and poor
Milwaukee residents. This logic was not solely the preserve of police encounters with African Americans.
18 This was initially the case in the police killing of Ernest Lacy, as one example. Gill and Rothe, “Fright May Have
Caused Man's Death after His Arrest.”
19 After Congress passed the 1964 Civil Rights Act, federal litigation emerged as one of the only recourses available to
Black citizens harmed by police violence. This meant appealing to the U.S. Justice Department for a criminal
investigation or filing a civil rights complaint for compensatory justice. However, the burden of proof has remained
high. Civil rights lawsuits have never resulted in criminal charges being filed against MPD officers accused of brutalizing
Black citizens. Some cases have ended in legal settlements paid out by the city—tax-payer funded sums that, in the last
four decades, have reached in the millions of dollars. The families of numerous police brutality victims have pursued this
option, including the family of Ernest Lacy. Walter Fee and Mark Ward, “Lacy Suit Settled for $600,000,” The Milwaukee
Journal, September 30, 1985, Part 1, 1. Much of the conversation around garnering accountability in the face of police
violence today centers on addressing “qualified immunity”—an esoteric legal doctrine that judges have used since the
1980s to legally shield police officers accused of violating the constitutional rights of citizens. Amir H. Ali and Emily
Clark, “Qualified Immunity Explained,” The Appeal, June 20, 2020, Accessed June 27, 2020,
https://theappeal.org/qualified-immunity-explained/.
20 One notable, if less acknowledged means that police have used historically deny accountability to Black citizens is
“forum shopping.” Upon making arrests, police used their state-sanctioned authority to locate the “forum,” or site of
prosecution (state, city, judge), most likely to lead to strict penalties and also not fall back on them in the guise of a civil
rights lawsuit. The Wisconsin State Committee of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights noted that MPD officers abused
this practice when arresting Black men and women on gambling and prostitution offenses on Milwaukee’s near north
side. Wisconsin Committee to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Police Isolation and Community Needs (Washington,
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972), 51-53.
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grassroots coalition of more than seventy-five organizations demonstrated for the better part of
three years (1981-1983), demanding police suspensions, prosecutions, and firings, no doubt
informed their decision.21 The Coalition for Justice for Ernest Lacy (CJEL) signified the apex of
what had been a long, Black-led struggle for police accountability extending back to the 1920s. It
was a local campaign unsurpassed in scale until 2020’s mass demonstrations against police racism. 22
The dismissal of an MPD officer accused of killing a Black resident was a long time coming in 1983.
The MFPC had just begun acting as “the independent reviewing body” demanded by activists, many
of who first learned about the commission’s public complaint review function in the mid-1960s.23
Remarkably, the MFPC had only heard its first police brutality complaint in 1968, less than a
year after a Milwaukee police officer gunned down an 18-year-old Black college student accused of
“firebombing” a paint store during the city’s 1967 uprising.24 Clifford McKissick’s murder occurred
about a decade after Calvin Sherard and Rev. R. L. Lathan organized Milwaukee’s earliest Black-led
street demonstration for racial justice following a police killing.25 The 1958 police murder of 22-yearMore than seventy-five community groups, many of whom had been engaged in police accountability struggles for
decades, participated in this movement for justice. They demonstrated peacefully in the streets, boycotted shopping
centers, and sat-in the Milwaukee County District Attorney’s office, all the while demanding some form of legal
repercussion for the officers who killed Ernest Lacy. See: Laura R. Woliver, From Outrage to Action: The Politics of Grassroots Dissent (Urbana: The University of Illinois Press, 1993).
22 These demonstrations have echoed national and global protests for racial justice. While the police murders of George
Floyd (Minneapolis, MN), Breonna Taylor (Louisville, KY), Tony McDade (Tallahassee, FL), and other Black men and
women have broadly inspired this mass movement for racial justice, the killing of a Milwaukee Afro-Latino, Joel
Acevedo, by an off-duty police officer in April 2020 has sparked local demands for that officer’s criminal prosecution
and revived grassroots calls to “defund the police.” Genevieve Redsten, “Family of Joel Acevedo Says How Milwaukee
Is Handling Prosecution of Police Officer Who Put Man in Fatal Chokehold is ‘a Disgrace,’” Milwaukee Journal-Sentinel,
June 24, 2020, Accessed July 1, 2020, https://www.jsonline.com/story/news/crime/2020/06/24/joel-acevedo-familyprosecution-of-milwaukee-police-officer-mattioli-weak-george-floyd-attorney/3249589001/; Mary Spicuzza and Alison
Durr, “Protestors Paint “DEFUND THE POLICE,” on Street outside Milwaukee City Hall,” Milwaukee Journal-Sentinel,
July 1, 2020, accessed July 1, 2020, https://www.jsonline.com/story/news/politics/2020/07/01/protesters-paintdefund-police-outside-milwaukee-city-hall/5360939002/.
23 “FPC Finally on Side of Citizens,” The Milwaukee Courier, November 4, 1978, 4; Barbara Dembski and Monroe Walker,
“Filing Complaint Is a Course in Bureaucracy,” February 27, 1975, Part 1, 1, 12; Milwaukee Fire and Police Commission
Meeting Minutes, May 19, 1966, Box 138, Folder 30, “Police Department, July-September 1966,” Records of Mayor
Henry W. Maier Administration, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, Milwaukee Series 44, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
Archives.
24 Barbara Dembski and Monroe Walker, “Filing Complaint Is a Course in Bureaucracy,” The Milwaukee Journal, February
27, 1975, Part 1, 1; “US Probe Asked by Groppi during McKissick Rites,” The Milwaukee Journal, August 7, 1967, Part 2,
1.
25 Black middle class leaders, at the behest of City Hall, attempted to call off Sherard and Lathan’s “prayer protest”
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old Daniel Bell sparked the city’s Black freedom movement against the inequities of “Jim Crow
North,” as African Americans, white and Latinx allies demanded equality in housing, employment,
education, public accommodations, the criminal justice system, and other arenas through protest
campaigns that lasted well into the 1980s.26
To say that the MFPC moved slowly on adjudicating grievances registered against the MPD
is an understatement. Between 1972 and 1981, the MFPC decided only 41 of 247 complaints filed
against the MPD.27 Customarily, the department handled complaints against officers internally.28
Investigations of alleged misconduct, particularly against Black residents, led to lost statements,
mutual distrust, and the occasional threat or act of retaliation against accusers. The police complaint
review system favored officers, propped up racial injustice, and induced fear among Black citizens.
None of this was unique to Milwaukee. The city reflected a national crisis of police
legitimacy that directly affected African Americans. Historians point to several factors in explaining
the lack of accountability Black men and women have experienced. First, the United States has a
four hundred year record of treating Black lives as disposable, beginning with America’s brutal
system of racial slavery.29 Second, U.S. policymakers have consistently isolated Black accounts of
police mistreatment from “issues of individual rights and the state’s conception of the citizenry.”30

march because, as historian Patrick Jones has written, they “felt uncomfortable with the group's strident rhetoric,
confrontational style, appeal to the large working class, migrant population, and overall challenge to their status in the
community.” They feared poor Black dissent in the streets and how it would reflect upon the entire Black community.
See: Patrick D. Jones, “‘Get Up Off Your Knees!’: Competing Visions of Black Empowerment in Milwaukee during the
Early Civil Rights Era,” in Neighborhood Rebels: Black Power at the Local Level, edited by Peniel E. Joseph, 45-65 (New York:
Palgrave MacMillan, 2010) 52-53.
26 Brian Purnell and Jeanne Theoharis, with Komozi Woodard, eds., The Strange Careers of the Jim Crow North: Segregation
and Struggle outside of the South (New York: NYU Press, 2019).
27 Gregory D. Stanford, Barbara Dembski, and James Romenesko, “If You Feel You’ve Been Mistreated…,” The
Milwaukee Journal, July 26, 1981, Part 1, 10.
28 Until the MFPC hired the city’s first “Community Relations Specialist” in 1967, the commission relied exclusively on
the MPD’s own investigators to probe misconduct allegations.
29 Christopher Lowen Agee, “Crisis and Redemption: The History of American Police Reform since World War II,”
Journal of Urban History (2017), 2. On the violence and historical legacies of Black enslavement, see: “The 1619 Project,”
The New York Times Magazine (August 2019), accessed June 9, 2020,
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/08/14/magazine/1619-america-slavery.html.
30 Agee, “Crisis and Redemption,” 2.
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Third, white authorities have cast police racism and violent behavior as either an administrative
problem or the actions of lone bad actors, not matters intrinsic to policing itself. Finally, police
reforms, especially those materializing against the backdrop of the post-World War II civil rights
movement and federal efforts to tamp down urban unrest, have served to expand police authority,
budgets, militarization, and entanglements in virtually every aspect of public and private life.31 They
have done so to the detriment of historically “overpoliced and underprotected” communities of
color, which still face an inordinate share of invasive, costly, and destructive police attention.32
To that end, liberal Democrats have been as guilty as the most conservative Republicans in
fomenting America’s policing crisis and fabricating the nation’s carceral state.33 Since the 1960s,
bipartisan federal reforms have enlarged police authority, amplifying violence in minoritized urban
spaces. Police reform has done little to address racist police discretion and its unchecked function in
BIPOC (Black, Indigenous, People of Color) communities reliably starved of good-paying jobs,
economic resources, adequate healthcare, equitable schooling, and protection from crime.34 Thus,
many observers on the progressive-left hold that the state has never appropriately answered the
racialized police violence that has long ravaged urban neighborhoods alongside the interpersonal
crime resulting from under-addressed poverty, uneven resource allocation, and neoliberal budget

Elizabeth Hinton, From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime: The Making of Mass Incarceration in America (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 2016); Murakawa, The First Civil Right; Steve M. Gillon, Separate and Unequal: The Kerner
Commission and the Unraveling of American Liberalism (New York: Basic Books, 2018).
32 Trotter, Black Milwaukee, 118.
33 The liberal Democratic administration of Lyndon Johnson, for example, created the Office of Law Enforcement
Assistance in 1965 after the Watts Uprising. This initiated processes of federal investment in local criminal justice
planning as part of the administration’s War on Poverty and America’s subsequent War on Crime. That platform
advanced procedural reforms that further legitimized police power and strengthened police capacities to answer social
ills, temper Black dissent, and crack down on “disorder” erupting in racially segregated, under-resourced, and
disproportionately neglected urban spaces. See: Hinton, From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime; Murakawa, The First
Civil Right.
34 Historically, police officers have held the non-binding latitude to decide among a range of actions, such as issuing a
warning, writing a ticket, or making an arrest, when policing these low-level offenses. This police “discretion” was not
widely recognized before the 1960s. Society merely viewed the police as serving a “ministerial” function, enforcing laws
according to the ordinances written by legislative bodies. Larry E. Sullivan and Mari Simonetti Rosen, eds., “Police
Discretion,” Encyclopedia of Law Enforcement, Volume 3 (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2005), 337.
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austerity. Rather, expanded police power has reinforced Black peoples’ supposed criminality and
intractability. Such “narratives of racial difference” continue to undergird denials of police
accountability today, if in a more racially “colorblind,” less overt fashion.35
Historical explanations for the dearth of police accountability experienced by Black citizens
remain incomplete. For one, they have yet to account for temporal and regional variations in how
powerful white citizens, police agencies, and state actors have collaborated to manufacture—
through law and custom—the fundamentally racist ideas that support structures of police legitimacy.
These ideas have served to undercut official liability for those undergoing racialized police
mistreatment. “‘Accountable to No One’” helps fill that void. It tracks how the Milwaukee Police
Department has made and remade its durable authority and perceived legitimacy, substantively and
symbolically, over the course of a century. This project does so in service of better understanding
why police accountability has proven so elusive for Black victims of police violence and allied
citizens championing freedom from police repression in one Midwestern city.
As such, it also traces grassroots efforts to secure justice for Black men and women for
whom law enforcement has violated their rights and to redefine the terms of police power so that it
better serves democratic ends. As recent episodes of racialized police violence and organizational
calls to defund the police in 2020 suggest, reform-minded approaches to transforming Milwaukee’s
police bureaucracy have never curbed police racism, even as Black representation, input, and
oversight on the police force has increased. A major reason why is the power that narratives of
police legitimacy hold in the public imagination and the persistent belief that, even among many
police brutality victims and accountability activists, law enforcement is perfectible as an institution.

Jacqueline Jones, A Dreadful Deceit: The Myth of Race from the Colonial Era to Obama’s America (New York: Basic Books,
2013), xi. Equal Justice Initiative founder Bryan Stevenson often refers to the “narrative of racial difference” that
emerged from racial slavery in America. See: Equal Justice Initiative, “Segregation in America,” accessed June 20, 2020,
https://segregationinamerica.eji.org/report/. On racial colorblindness, see: Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, Racism without Racists:
Color-Blind Racism and the Persistence of Racial Inequality in America, 5th ed. (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017).
35

9

Through “procedural” reforms, most assume, policing can work effectively for all people. 36 This
project documents how liberal reforms around police discrimination and accountability have served
to expand so-called “legitimate” police power as a means of remedying deep social and economic
inequities. In truth, those inequities are reproduced by an increasingly unfettered capitalist system
well-defended by law enforcement agencies like the Milwaukee Police Department.

Project Overview
This dissertation holds that the lack of accountability afforded to Black citizens exposed to
police violence in Milwaukee is rooted in Progressive Era developments that go back as far as the
1880s. Then, African Americans in the city numbered just three to four hundred residents.37 State
laws passed in the interest of landed professional and business elites to stabilize public safety and
ensure the MPD’s outward neutrality lie at the heart of Milwaukee’s lax accountability structures and
the department’s racially discriminatory function. These reform statutes, in addition to outlining the
parameters of the MPD’s “professionalization,” affirmed law enforcement’s service at the behest of
the industrial-capitalist order.38 Two state measures passed in 1885 and 1911, respectively, signified
patrician responses to a series of social, economic, and political crises. These dilemmas threatened to
disrupt Milwaukee’s traditional hierarchies of class, culture, and power.39 Economic recessions,

As sociologist Alex Vitale has written, “procedural justice” is problematic because it falsely “assumes that the police
are neutrally enforcing a set of laws that are automatically beneficial to everyone.” Alex S. Vitale, “The Answer to Police
Violence is Not ‘Reform.’ It’s Defunding. Here’s Why,” The Guardian, May 31, 2020, July 6, 2020,
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/may/31/the-answer-to-police-violence-is-not-reform-itsdefunding-heres-why.
37 Campbell Gibson and Kay Jung, “Historical Census Statistics on Population Totals by Race, 1790 to 1990, and by
Hispanic Origin, 1970 to 1990, for Large Cities and Other Urban Places in The United States,” Population Division,
Working Paper No. 76, U.S. Census Bureau, February 2005, 113.
38 Police professionalization is generally credited to the reforms implemented by August Vollmer, who led the Berkeley
Police Department between 1905 and 1932. Among Vollmer’s reforms were putting officers on bicycles, motorcycles,
and cars; creating the first police school, advancing crime laboratories; using polygraph machines; seeking collegeeducated recruits “specially trained for fighting crime”; and offering competitive salaries and pensions. Sarah A. Seo,
Policing the Open Road: How Cars Transformed American Freedom (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2019), 66-68.
39 The Wisconsin policing statutes amended Milwaukee’s City Charter. Milwaukee was the only municipality in the state
whose charter, rather than the Wisconsin legislature, determined police regulations. Matthew J. Flynn, “Police
36
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strikes, political machine corruption, perceived moral decay, and police-involved clashes among
immigrant laborers and capitalist defenders encouraged white Progressive Era reformers to fortify
the MPD. Through the state legislature, the city’s middle-class and corporate establishment solidified
the department’s legitimacy and social control function under the authority of an independent police
chief.40 They did so in the face of ascendant populist and socialist workers parties. These parties
aimed to gain leverage over a police regime that violently broke strikes, criminalized laborers, and
mishandled immigrants, especially those who displayed progressive-left political views. Reform was
tied to the re-assertion of a capitalistic, growth-oriented police power, which operated to the
detriment of poor and toiling people.41 The MPD was never “a value-free institution,” or one that
“evolved naturally from common social problems.”42
The first Progressive Era statute (1885) created a four-member public safety board vested to
hire police and fire chiefs, as well as appoint, promote, and discipline personnel.43 The law removed
the city’s police and fire departments from Milwaukee’s ward-based spoils system, installed new
employment safeguards, and established lifetime tenure for public safety chiefs, whom the MFPC
could only remove “for cause.”44 The commission was the first civil service board of its kind in the
country. However, one of its legacies would be the illusion of impartiality, as the part-time mayor-

Accountability in Wisconsin,” Wisconsin Law Review 1131 (1974), 1133.
40 Sidney Harring notes that police in the late 19th century supported, along with other municipal institutions, “the
reproduction of capital” in cities. Police departments provided “important social control and welfare services and
generally supervised the quality of urban social behavior.” Harring, “The Police Institution as a Class Question,” 199.
41 Elite calls to professionalize the MPD were rooted in “respectable” citizens’ anti-Labor sentiment. Police reform in
Milwaukee originated in “the class struggle and the bourgeoisie’s need to maintain social order.” Harring, “The Police
Institution as a Class Question,” 220.
42 Harring, “The Police Institution as a Class Question,” 219.
43 Chapter 378, “Laws of Wisconsin,” April 14, 1885, 1251-1255. This dissertation’s framing of the “Progressive Era”
relies on a longer historical scope. On the periodization of the “long Progressive Era,” see Robert D. Johnston, “The
Possibilities of Politics: Democracy in America, 1877 to 1917,” in American History Now, Eric Foner and Lisa McGirr,
eds. (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2011), 96-124.
44 Previously, incoming mayoral administrations would fire the existing police chief and all personnel, with the intent of
bringing in politically loyal members who would help raise money for the machine by collecting graft at the ward level.
See: Sidney L. Harring, Policing a Class Society: The Experience of American Cities, 1865-1915, 2nd ed. (New York: Haymarket
Books, 2017).
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appointed body rubber-stamped the prerogatives of Milwaukee public safety chiefs, while holding
few trials on citizen complaints. The 1885 law also expanded the size of the MPD by nearly fifty
percent and outlined its organization and operating procedures.
In 1911, a statutory revision further clarified the power of fire and police chiefs, authorizing
them to “regulate” and “prescribe rules” for their departments, “control all books, records,
machines” and other property.45 Milwaukee’s Common Council approved annual budgets. Yet
elected officials rarely crossed police chiefs, who came to wield immense sway among white ethnic
voters. The 1911 law provided that only “reputable freeholders,” or property owners, could register
police complaints with the MFPC.46 The right to accountability was thus tied to property, i.e. a
complainant’s class status. This undermined the ability of poor and low-income residents to seek
redress in response to police misconduct—an arrangement that lasted until Black civil rights activists
challenged the freeholder clause in the late 1960s. Finally, the 1911 statute expanded the MFPC
from four to five members.47 In sum, the legislature entrusted lifetime-appointed public safety chiefs
to devise strategies, regulations, and enforcement procedures. They did so at the general behest of
social and economic elites, free of outside interference or any serious legal threat from the people
receiving an inordinate share of police attention. Over the course of the 20th century, that
increasingly meant poor and low-income Black and Latinx migrants and their descendants.48
With its legitimacy established, the MPD emerged as an early pioneer in the national police
professionalization movement of the early-to-mid-20th century. Chapter One explores how it

“Chapter 586,” Wisconsin Session Laws, 1911,” July 8, 1911, 758-760. This became a point of contention in later
decades when federal courts and investigators attempted to review police files.
46 The MFPC was also empowered to hear complaints from police and fire personnel. “Chapter 586,” 754.
47 This expansion mattered for Milwaukee’s Socialist Party during its brief period of full control over city government in
1910-1911. Mayor Emil Seidel was able to add two Socialist Party members to the MFPC, given it more control over
police disciplinary actions. Harring, “Police as a Class Question,” 217.
48 The bulk of Latinx residents in Milwaukee are of Mexican and Puerto Rican descent. Joseph A. Rodriguez and Walter
Sava, Latinos in Milwaukee (Chicago: Arcadia Publishing, 2006); Sergio González, Mexicans in Wisconsin (Madison:
Wisconsin Historical Society Press, 2017).
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cultivated and sustained an elite reputation. The department’s independent status so politicallyinsulated its chiefs that only six served from 1888 to 1984. Their immunity enabled them to set an
internal culture and administration that emphasized strict regimentation and institutional autonomy.
These factors in turn engendered insularity and encouraged an “us-against-them” mentality during
street-level enforcement.49 Police chiefs set the MPD’s strategic direction and reform agenda, which
emphasized order maintenance and racial and class containment in ways that bolstered the interests
of powerful white business, middle-class professional, and propertied elites. A narrative of policing
exceptionalism coalesced around the MPD’s innovative reform practices and inferred crime control
efficiency. Most notably, the federal Wickersham Commission singled out Milwaukee in 1931 as “a
city free from crime…where the criminal is speedily detected, arrested, and promptly tried and sent
on his way to serve time.”50 The father of police professionalism, Berkeley Police Chief August
Vollmer, even cited the MPD’s “strong in-house training program” in the Wickersham Commission
report. During World War II, the department became one of the first to instruct officers on
addressing “minority problems” and produced a guide on “race and human relations.” 51
The MPD’s exceptionalism narrative evolved in policing’s “reform era.” In Milwaukee, this
period was bookended by the legislature’s passage of the above statutes and the appointment of the
MPD’s final “chief for life,” Harold Breier.52 The narrative elevated the stature of the city’s police

Before African Americans emerged as a primary target for the MPD after World War II, it was working-class white
European-American radicals and socialists who represented the MPD’s most discernible antagonists. See: Harring,
Policing a Class Society.
50 “Wickersham Report on Police,” The American Journal of Police Science 2 (4) (July-August, 1931), 339.
51 Walker, A Critical History of Police Reform, 135; Joseph T. Kluchesky, “Police Action in Minority Problems,” 1, “Police
Brutality General, 1954-1955,” Papers of the NAACP, Part 18, Special Subjects, 1940-1955, Series C: General Office
Files: Justice Department-White Supremacy; The Milwaukee Police Department, “A Guide to Understanding Race and
Human Relations,” 1952, Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
52 Historian Robert Fogelson identified two major waves of police reform in America. The first lasted from about 1890
to 1930 and the second from 1940 to 1970. See: Robert M. Fogelson, Big City Police (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1977). Chapters One and Two explore Milwaukee’s police reform era in depth. The city’s narrative of policing
exceptionalism impacted other groups of color seeking accountability, including Mexican-Americans, Puerto Ricans, and
Native Americans. However, this project focuses on African American experiences. They composed the largest racial
minority population in Milwaukee and a disproportionate share of police brutality cases. Black citizens also took a lead
role in challenging police power in the 20th century. Still, they hardly engaged in this struggle alone. As much as possible,
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chiefs, conferring political influence and solidifying a common sense about the department’s
assumed value-neutral authority. In turn, Milwaukee’s white ethnic majority placed a premium on
the MPD’s celebrated reputation. Policing and the politics of crime control nourished local
constructions of white racial identity, buttressing the MPD’s legally formulated professionalism. 53
In the Depression-era 1930s, Milwaukee’s narrative of policing exceptionalism crystallized in
tandem with and fed off of hardening white racism. As the city’s Black industrial proletariat took
shape, so too did the prejudices of white workers, homeowners, parents, and shopkeepers. White
racial antagonism manifested in labor, schoolyard, and neighborhood disputes, and among white
patrolmen called on to police status offenses in public spaces inhabited by both low-income and
middle-class Black residents. However, it was during World War II that confrontations around social
demographic change, the allocation of taxpayer resources, juvenile delinquency, and crime
transitioned into racially demarcated, police-mediated struggles. In this period and after, the MPD’s
exceptionalized leadership, service, and innovation converged with a politically contested, highly
racialized politics of metropolitan “growth.”54
Chapter Two focuses on this progression. Urban (re)development, population management,
and police reform became entangled in the 1940s and 1950s, as Milwaukee experienced a “late Great
Migration” of southern Black workers and families.55 In response to increasing Black movement,
white civic leaders called on the MPD, as well as trusted Black middle-class elites, to enforce the
city’s racial, class, and gender boundaries and temper opportunities for social disorder. Police

“‘Accountable to No One’” attempts to cite where racial and class unity was present in the movement for police
accountability. On Harold Breier and his life, career, and influence, see: Ronald H. Snyder, “Chief for Life: Harold Breier
and His Era” (Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2002).
53 On how policing shaped processes of white identity construction in the postwar city, see: Timothy J. Lombardo, Blue
Collar Conservatism: Frank Rizzo’s Philadelphia and Populist Politics (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2018).
54 Eric Fure-Slocum, Contesting the Postwar City: Working-Class and Growth Politics in 1940s Milwaukee (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2013). On the MPD’s “exemplary,” albeit mythologized, service reputation, see: George Kelling, Policing
in Milwaukee: A Strategic History (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2015).
55 Geib, “From Mississippi to Milwaukee.”
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“boundary work” was self-reinforcing and integral to sustaining the MPD’s narrative of policing
exceptionalism.56 It supplied the human assets required for police administrators to test out crime
control initiatives, further justifying policing’s existence, as well as the racially imbued data needed to
project effective order maintenance in and around Milwaukee’s segregated “Inner Core.”57
Enforcing racial borders through aggressive discretionary policing not only enabled the MPD to
manufacture consent, boost its image, and reinforce dominant narratives about Black criminality, but
it also informed how law enforcement navigated issues of internal accountability. The more that
police safeguarded the traditional order through formal policies and informal discretionary practices,
the more socially isolated, institutionally inviolable, and inward-facing the department became.
African American population growth, hostile white resistance to Black urbanization, and
political struggles over access and resources limned Milwaukee’s shifting postwar terrain. So too did
the placations of white liberals and established Black professionals. The latter were concerned about
what expanded Black poor and working-class migration meant for their tenuous position vis-a-vis
the white power structure. Liberals responded to what W. E. B. Dubois called “the problem of the
color line” by advocating acculturation to a white-prescribed milieu.58 And they did so in relation to
a budding “conservative counterrevolution.”59 Like postwar liberalism, Cold War geo-political,
social, and economic market-based imperatives shaped metropolitan conservatism. Racial
conservatives and liberals alike blamed low-income Black residents for urban problems, largely

As Stuart Schrader argues, police “boundary work” served as “a key part of how police approached themselves,
orienting officers’ accountability mainly to professional standards rather than to broader social forces, actors, and
institutions.” Stuart Schrader, “To Protect and Serve Themselves: Police in US Politics Since the 1960s,” Public Culture 31
(3) (September 2019), 604.
57 Milwaukee (Wis.). Mayor's Study Committee on Social Problems in the Inner Core Area of the City, Mayor’s Study
Committee on Social Problems in the Inner Core Area of the City, Final Report to the Honorable Frank P. Zeidler, Mayor, City of
Milwaukee (Milwaukee: The Committee, 1960).
58 W.E.B. Dubois defined the “problem of the Twentieth Century” as the “problem of the color line.” W.E.B. Dubois,
The Souls of Black Folk (Chicago: A.C. McClurg and Co., 1903), vii, 3.
59 Tula A. Connell, Conservative Counterrevolution: Challenging Liberalism in 1950s Milwaukee (Urbana: University of Illinois
Press, 2016).
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abdicating responsibility for resolving inequality. The former tended to cite inherent traits in
explaining perceived Black inferiority, while the latter condemned cultural behaviors that they
thought resulted from segregation. Neither reckoned with the role that white supremacy played in
maintaining racial hierarchy.
In this context, a triangular struggle for order arose among Black professionals, poorer Black
newcomers, and white people whose politics pivoted around racist notions of Black disorder.60 Most
established Black leaders focused on making incremental civil rights gains through communal selfhelp and negotiations with Milwaukee’s white-controlled political system. This brand of activism
entailed preserving order on the city’s criminalized near north side and projecting Black
“respectability,” which meant convincing recent African American arrivals of the MPD’s legitimacy.
Still, Black professionals knew the department to be an unfair agent of social control. A quick check
on Milwaukee’s crime ledgers showed that police arrested African Americans for non-violent status
offenses, like “vagrancy,” “drunkenness,” and “prostitution,” at an uneven rate. Still, Black
professionals preached accommodation to southern migrants, who were unduly vulnerable to police
violence based on their racial and class status and where they lived. Racial liberals believed poor and
working-class Black people could transcend their subordinate position in the social order through
hard work and lawfulness. As rampant inequality and urban liberalism’s shortcomings grew more
pronounced in the late 1950s and 1960s, some Black professionals began shifting away from appeals
to individual biases and white “hearts and minds.”61 Still, their hesitancy to challenge the racist
designs at the core of the city’s postwar assimilation efforts helped advance the MPD’s narrative of
policing exceptionalism, further calcifying police assertions of legitimacy.

On the triangular struggle, see: Jack Dougherty, More than One Struggle: The Evolution of Black School Reform in Milwaukee
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 52-57.
61 On liberals combatting discrimination by appealing to white hearts and minds in this period, see: Gunnar Myrdal, An
American Dilemma, Volume 1: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy (New York: Harper, 1944), 110.
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Indeed, the MPD played an important role in managing Milwaukee’s postwar “cultural
adjustment” program through an emergent “liberal law-and-order” ethos.62 This approach
simultaneously framed poor and working-class Black migrants as harbingers of disorder and the
police as susceptible to racial bias. But it also positioned law enforcement as capable of redemption
through “human relations” training and other procedural reforms. Police chiefs enacted policies
masked by a colorblind language of value neutrality. Yet, their directives were predicated on
tempering Black political dissent and quashing opportunities for social unrest. Meanwhile, the
MPD’s autonomy and prodigiously white composition ensured that officers would continue to
police as they saw fit. Internal accountability was the prerogative of the police chief and their
subordinates. During this period, Black demands for fair employment and housing conjured violent
white responses and police riots in cities. White Milwaukee parents, property owners, and
powerbrokers all feared racial violence in their city and the potential for heightened Black demands
for justice. Police leaders joined in the “race relations” discourse. Discussions focused on promoting
tolerance and Black self-sufficiency (on white terms), not on ending institutional racism and better
distributing economic resources and equal access to jobs, education, and housing.
The MPD’s Youth Aid Bureau was a shining example of the liberal law-and-order approach,
which updated the MPD’s exceptionalism narrative for the postwar period. The bureau’s goal was to
increase contacts between the police and potentially “delinquent” juveniles—seemingly disruptive
Black and Latinx teenagers, in particular. Marketed as part of a wider human relations agenda, the
bureau helped broaden the MPD’s institutional reach and surveillance capacities.63 It established
early connections between the police, schools, and social service agencies. Black youth saw closer

See: Murakawa, The First Civil Right.
Theretofore, the MPD’s surveillance capacities were best exemplified by the department’s labor-infiltrating and
repressive “Red Squad.” S. Ani Mukherji, “Reds among the Sewer Socialists and McCarthyites: The Communist Party in
Milwaukee,” American Communist History 16 (3-4) (2017), 113.
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police scrutiny and experienced more arrests than their white peers, especially those who socialized
in what middle-class social reformers saw as morally dubious, interracial settings with white women.
Upsurges in racialized police violence corresponded with rising inequality in housing,
employment, and education. Postwar Black population growth coincided with violent forms of
white resistance to social demographic change. When not committing acts of terror against African
American families trying to buy homes beyond the near north side, exploiting Black homeowners
and renters through nefarious real estate and lending practices, or engaging in workplace
intimidation when Black laborers sought union memberships, white Milwaukeeans suburbanized as a
means of social distancing from African Americans. Thousands of upwardly mobile white families
relocated outside of the city in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, taking their tax dollars with them.64 This
created new fiscal emergencies for Milwaukee officials, who had historically balanced the city’s
budget. Corporations began to move too, although Milwaukee’s manufacturing base remained
sizable well into the 1980s.65 White out-migrants claimed a desire for more space, better-funded
schools, and lower taxes, but it was the physical separation from perceived urban ills and their
proximity to criminalized Black residents that drove the exodus.
The racial politics of postwar urban housing policies contributed to “white flight.”66
Outwardly intended to improve the lives of poor and working-class people of all races struggling to
rent and buy homes amid a postwar housing shortage, “urban renewal” and public housing
construction programs exacerbated racial tensions, increased rates of Black poverty, and further

On suburbanization in Milwaukee, see: John M. McCarthy, Making Milwaukee Mightier: Planning and the Politics of Growth,
1910-1960 (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2009); Mark Edward Braun, “Suburbanization,” The Encyclopedia
of Milwaukee, accessed June 30, 2020, https://emke.uwm.edu/entry/suburbanization/.
65 This also ensured that Milwaukee’s small Black industrial proletariat endured in an era of marked deindustrialization
and urban decline.
66 “White flight” from cities had an even greater impact than redistributing population and remaking municipal tax
structures. It shaped conservative political ideologies, hostility towards the federal government, and people’s faith in free
enterprise. See: Kevin M. Kruse, White Flight: Atlanta and the Making of Modern Conservatism (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2007).
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stigmatized low-income families of color. Racism structured the city’s growth-oriented
redevelopment projects, which translated into uneven resource allocation and false promises of
adequate housing for Black families. In turn, the threat of crime became a more pressing issue.
Police and media reports affirmed Black migrant lives as disposable and dangerous in the public
imagination, while simultaneously de-criminalizing illicit white behavior. Milwaukee’s “urban crisis”
was never framed as one of white behavioral maladjustment.67
Black criminalization led to racialized police policies of “close surveillance” and stop,
question, and search tactics that never fully abated.68 Sensationalized violent crimes involving Black
suspects raised public anxieties around discriminatory sweeps. Acts of police brutality accompanied
racial profiling, inspiring mistrust. Black migrants and professionals both felt “overpoliced and
underprotected in their lives and property.”69 Public order enforcement on the near north side,
especially of gamblers, drinkers, drug addicts, sex workers, party-goers, and idle persons pushed out
onto street corners by overcrowding and under-employment, guaranteed a growing catalog of Black
entry into the criminal justice system. Many Black persons who came into contact with the MPD
were young. In 1970, as high as sixty-three percent of the city’s African American population was
under 21 years old.70 Police authorized vice in the city’s Black Sixth Ward, while continuing to crack
down on presumably amoral and illicit behavior that violated middle-class sensibilities. Police-Black

Using historian Thomas Sugrue’s framing, the “urban crisis” refers to the local impact of several economic, racial, and
political shifts that occurred in the mid-20th century U.S. The urban crisis was a consequence of “two of the most
important, interrelated, and unresolved problems in American history: that capitalism generates economic inequality and
that African Americans have disproportionately borne the brunt of that inequality.” Thomas J. Sugrue, The Origins of the
Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 5.
68 As Simon Balto observed in research on Milwaukee and Chicago, such racialized policing tactics predated the 1960s
and subsequent decades. See: Balto, “Occupied Territory”; Simon Balto, Occupied Territory: Policing Black Chicago from Red
Summer to Black Power (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2019).
69 Race superseded class, as Milwaukee’s white-controlled law enforcement system often refused to observe intra-racial
class distinctions, much to the chagrin of Black professionals lumped in with the city’s “criminal element.” Trotter, Black
Milwaukee, 118. “Repression and negligence” were the “constitutive features” of the social contract between Milwaukee’s
whitewashed police force and its Black population. Balto, “Occupied Territory,” 232.
70 This figure is based on the 1970 census. Carl Hamm, “Milwaukee Police Department: Civil Service and Pension Case
Study,” Police Foundation, August 15, 1971, 4, Box 1, Folder 16, “Greater Milwaukee Conference on Religion and
Urban Affairs, Police Brutality, 1971, 1983-1984,” Joan McManus Papers, 1970-2003, UWM Manuscript Collection 267.
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citizen altercations occasionally resulted in violence, even death. As such, the “contradictory
character” of policing in “Bronzeville” revealed the narrative of policing exceptionalism’s mythic
dimensions and racist double standards.71 Phrases like “police professionalism” and “community
relations” signified pointless euphemisms for coercive police practices of racial control.
Resistance to the MPD’s presumed legitimacy took competing forms. Struggles for police
accountability gained intensity as racialized police violence became more commonplace. Black youth
confronted white patrolmen in crowd control situations, some harnessing their collective power to
free peers apprehended by the police.72 On the other end of the spectrum, umbrella coalitions led by
middle-class professionals prioritized police-Black community relations improvements and
negotiated for procedural change with receptive white City Hall allies. For example, around 1957,
the Milwaukee Urban League’s Lapham-Garfield Neighborhood Association began seeking ways to
mitigate crime and police oppression by working with liberal city officials to more responsibly police
the Sixth Ward’s mix of rental, public housing, and homeowner occupied properties.
Inter-generational, regional, and class conflicts occasionally divided younger, more militant
Black working-class leaders from the community’s old-guard. The 1958 police murder of Daniel Bell
was a major turning point in the city’s Black-led struggle for police accountability.73 Younger
working-class activists championed direct action protest and making visible demands for justice in
response to the Louisiana migrant’s death; more conservative professionals advocated a go-slow
approach. The latter continued to back the acculturation of southern migrants unfamiliar with Jim
Crow North’s social expectations. Organizational leaders called for more Black police recruitment as
a means of resolving police abuse and neglect, as the MPD employed few African American officers.

Bronzeville was the self-determined, culturally resilient world African Americans carved out for themselves on the
near north side within Milwaukee’s white supremacist confines. Robert S. Smith, “African Americans,” Encyclopedia of
Milwaukee, accessed May 28, 2020, https://emke.uwm.edu/entry/african-americans/.
72 See: Balto, “‘Occupied Territory.’”
73 See: Jones, The Selma of the North.
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While racial accomodationists temporarily won the battle, their pacifying solutions proved untenable
by the 1960s. As Milwaukee’s postwar civil rights insurgency took shape, the city’s Black population
soared, and white racism, backed up by police violence, intensified.
Addressing police brutality took center stage in the mid-1960s, as a younger generation of
activists refused to accept police mistreatment and the assumed cultural deficiencies used to justify
Milwaukee’s racist acculturation program. Organizations like the Citizens Anti-Police Brutality
Committee (CAPBC), the focal point of Chapter Three, challenged the inconsistencies of the MPD’s
exceptionalism narrative. They advocated reform proposals in response to racialized police violence
and called for direct action when demands went unmet by police bureaucrats. While the group fell
into the common habit of framing abusive officers as individual “bad apples” in need of discipline,
rather than indicators of a wider systemic problem, they brought police brutality to the forefront of
the city’s burgeoning civil rights movement. The CAPBC took Black police misconduct complaints
to white fire and police commissioners, who predictably upheld the status quo by pointing to the
MPD’s exemplary reputation. In navigating Milwaukee’s police bureaucracy, the CAPBC initiated a
process of discovery that divulged the legal underpinnings of police power and the extent to which
the MFPC was capable of reviewing police brutality cases and meting out justice on acceptable
terms. The group also learned about the 1911 “freeholder” clause that prevented most Black
residents from filing police complaints and initiated efforts to revise the board’s review process. 74
When the CAPBC brought case descriptions from Black police brutality victims before the
commission, they saw firsthand how the MFPC reflexively shored up police legitimacy and chilled
dissent through bureaucratic inertia. As the commission denied the reality of Black police brutality
grievances in 1964, two families filed the city’s first federal police brutality lawsuits.

Milwaukee’s only Black alderperson, Vel Phillips, worked towards revising the City Charter to allow qualified
“electors” to file grievances with the MFPC in 1968.
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That police violence became a civil rights issue in postwar Milwaukee was contingent on
national developments—namely, the “rights revolution” occurring in the U.S. criminal-legal system,
the legislative gains of the Black freedom struggle, and a series of uprisings against police violence
and white supremacy in segregated Black enclaves like Harlem, North Philadelphia, and Watts. 75
Such events facilitated political openings for Black police accountability advocates in Milwaukee to
articulate reform demands, lest the city devolve into its own episode of civil violence. With racial
inequities enduring after the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and 1965 Voting Rights Act, it
became more apparent to young Black activists and movement veterans alike that non-violent civil
disobedience alone would not mitigate the essential disposability of Black life. Greater access and
opportunities to participate in a structurally unfair, if nominally colorblind society were not enough
to address the harmful legacies of Black enslavement, labor conscription, terrorization, political
disfranchisement, wealth extraction, and communal plundering.76
Even still, Milwaukee’s political system moved slowly to address racism. Some Black
organizational leaders wondered if their city would be the next to burn. Most held out hope for civic
negotiation and peaceful protests. Meanwhile, whiteness and policing grew more closely linked in
the civil rights era. White neighborhood groups, citizen leagues, and even police wives organized
counter-protests and letter writing campaigns that revealed deep-seated anger over Black calls for
reform. They defended the MPD and its chief, Harold Breier, using racist language to describe what
they saw as unruly invaders making false claims about their admirable police force. They also offered
flimsy pronouncements of white crime victimization. White grassroots advocacy for the MPD
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reinforced long-standing ideas about police legitimacy and the department’s exceptionalism, while
undermining the city’s Black-led struggle for police accountability. No white elected officials were
willing to put their political careers on the line to champion a racially charged issue that most white
constituents rejected. The MFPC acted as a firewall to protect police power. Its members were
directly connected to a white south side political organization that backed the police chief and
sympathetic political candidates, including Mayor Henry Maier and most of the Common Council. 77
Police brutality—name-calling, harassment, physical abuse, and killings—added to a
constellation of discriminatory policies and practices that delineated Black life on Milwaukee’s north
side. Unheeded Black frustrations with abusive officers, combined with the area’s squalid living
conditions, eventually led to civil unrest in Summer 1967. Chapter Four traces that unrest and its
aftermath. Milwaukee police bureaucrats worked to fortify police power without actually attending
to law enforcement’s role in stimulating the urban crisis and ignoring the pleas of Black
accountability activists. The violence snowballed from a fairly routine incident of police harassment
and intimidation against Black youth after a social event. Rather than force a productive moment of
racial reckoning, the multi-day “civil disturbance” encouraged police and city officials to doubledown on harsh, invasive tactics against poor and working-class Black citizens on the near north side.
The autocratic Chief Breier took a reactionary law-and-order stance, energetically suppressing any
apparent Black dissent and various modes of political and civil rights activism on the left. Coupled
with Mayor Maier’s decision to impose a spatially (racially) restrictive curfew and call in the state
National Guard, police easily suppressed a comparatively minor “long hot summer” rebellion.
Maier and Breier emerged as folk heroes to fearful white residents across the metropolitan
area. Firm in their belief that civil violence required a forceful response, they rejected the findings of

The “south side” section of Milwaukee was the city’s primary seat of white supremacist power and reaction. Jones, The
Selma of the North, 181-185.
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the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders in 1968. That federal committee, appointed
by the liberal Johnson administration following the eruption of hundreds of urban uprisings, named
white racism and systemic discrimination as root causes of civil violence, in addition to “subversive”
and “anti-American” Black Power militancy.78 Yet, the administration felt the political pressure of
looking tough on crime. It shelved most of the commission’s proposals and moved forward on
passing a bipartisan Safe Streets Act in 1968 that introduced huge federal expenditures and
investments in law enforcement, police militarization and “community relations” projects meant to
improve the police image and preserve order.79 Mayor Maier concurrently blamed suburban
municipalities and civil rights insurgents for racial inequities. “Agitators” were the instigators of
unrest, not racist police tactics. He embraced federal funding to shore up police power, designating
the MFPC as the city’s grant coordinating agency. Yet new friction emerged between Chief Breier
and City Hall around the intervention of federal research teams looking to document what occurred
in 1967. Breier tightly guarded his department’s independent political status, feeding its growing
isolation from overpoliced communities, institutions concerned about crime, and elected officials.
More civil violence transpired, as the Milwaukee NAACP Youth Council (YC) led two
hundred straight nights of protest for an open housing ordinance between September 1967 and
April 1968. Thousands of angry white supremacists confronted a diverse cohort of peaceful
protestors, who numbered in the hundreds. The mayor and Common Council did little to address
decades of racist policies, other than offer a toothless “War on Prejudice.”80 Breier distinguished

The commission did not frame rebellions against police violence and racial injustice as “a form of political speech,”
which historians do today. Daniel Geary, “What the Kerner Report Got Wrong about Policing, the Perils of
Romanticizing 1960s Liberalism,” Boston Review, May 19, 2016, accessed October 26, 2020,
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Office, 1968);
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himself from his liberal law-and-order predecessors by rejecting “community relations”
improvements as a solution for building trust with neglected Black citizens and upholding order in
their segregated, resource-depleted communities. He shunned the civilian review board concept and
offered tired excuses on why the MPD employed few Black officers. The department conducted
internal inquiries for the MFPC when the public filed complaints, denying accountability. While a
city-backed committee recommended an oversight body that went beyond the scope of the MFPC
in 1968, the Maier administration dismissed the proposal. Police accountability advocates pressured
the mayor and Common Council to hire a “Community Relations Specialist” to focus on “minority
recruitment,” promote community relations, and assist in the complaint review process. However,
Breier undermined the specialist’s effectiveness on reviewing complaints and recruiting Black
personnel by offering little support. The MPD continued to flex its state-sanctioned authority,
though it was more socially detached than ever at a time when federal authorities sought better
coordination and cooperation from municipal police agencies. Washington D.C. looked to
modernize the police function in the wake of 1960s urban upheavals—a process that included both
weapons/technological enhancements and ensuring civil rights compliance.
While Breier’s reactionary law-and-order approach contradicted aspects of the bipartisan
War on Crime, he still applied for federal Law Enforcement Assistance Administration block grants
to fund computer equipment and hardware upgrades. These helped police respond to crime more
efficiently and forcefully. The city and MFPC, meanwhile, applied for federal money to fund
community relations programs and minority police recruitment, which Breier disdained. The chief
scoffed at emerging preventive, or “proactive” crime control philosophies that were gaining traction
in the 1970s. He eschewed procedural reforms that, he thought, appeased leftist political agitators.
For Breier, there was no flawed police image to improve, no illegitimacy to correct. And he enjoyed
ample white community and political support to back up his opinions. The “bad” people in his
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city—a conflation of civil rights activists and street criminals—needed to learn harsh lessons as a
result of their disruptive behavior. Chief Breier’s reactionary law-and-order approach reciprocally fed
off of the gaining militancy of Black-led campaigns for racial justice. Primary targets of police abuses
were Black Power groups like the NAACP Youth Council and Milwaukee’s Black Panther Party
chapter.81 The MPD’s Tactical Enforcement Unit was purposely outfitted to suppress “subversive”
political organizing activities and demonstrations. The “Tactical Squad” presented a dramatic foil for
Black and allied accountability advocates seeking to improve police oversight.
Chief Breier’s bellicose leadership during what historians have called the “long 1970s” (19691984) was a double-edged sword.82 His racial conservatism and reactionary law-and-order ethos
obstructed Black freedom movement objectives. But the chief’s fervent dismissal of community
relations programs and procedural reforms also obscured the fact that liberal law-and-order policing
functioned as a tool for racial and class suppression. It reproduced inequality by criminalizing the
Black poor and citing their potential for disruptive behavior.
Nonetheless, the policing of decades past generated liberal nostalgia. Police reformers and
accountability advocates, Black and white, believed in the possibility of a more socially enlightened
version of law enforcement—one that resembled the height of the MPD’s exceptionalism era in the
1940s. This was predictable, given Chief Breier’s autocratic leadership and his overtly racialized law
enforcement strategies. The violence that the MPD inflicted against minoritized people and the poor
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in the 1960s and 1970s strengthened reformist convictions. The sitting chief cut an obvious target.
His twenty-year tenure overlapped with a complex and conflicting period that saw both the
expansion of civil rights protections and the growth of an ever more punitive criminal justice system,
which disproportionately targeted poor and working-class BIPOC citizens.
As Chapter Five details, police accountability groups and sympathetic elected officials
mobilized against Breier’s unchecked power in the years following the 1967 civil disturbance. They
did so via street protests, federal court filings, and political lobbying. These efforts chipped away at
his unbridled authority. Black Power organizations—fed up with the false promises of urban
liberalism and its failure to address economic problems—urged “community control” of the police
and other municipal services. Their demands grew louder in the wake of a series of racialized police
killings that occurred between 1972 and 1975. A rising neighborhood stabilization movement,
frustrated by institutional and social fragmentation, also organized at the community level in this
period. Community associations became a powerful interest group, especially on matters of crime
control and police accountability. Discontented rank-and-file police were active as well. The
Milwaukee Police Patrolmen’s Protective Association (MPPPA) decried their chief’s strict internal
regulations and unwillingness to budge on “community relations” improvements. The MPPPA
aimed to safeguard officers who worked in “high crime” areas. As such, they pushed to expand the
rights of police by striking, collectively bargaining, and lobbying in Madison. The MPPPA
challenged Breier’s stringency, despite his routine defense of officers accused of brutality.
Black, Latinx, and women officers confronted the MPD’s strictures and the failure of
Milwaukee’s police bureaucracy to adequately comply with federal civil rights decrees. They utilized
the anti-discrimination provisions of the 1964 Civil Rights Act to advance workplace rights, then
sued in response to recruitment, assignment, and promotions violations. Integration persisted as a
reform demand among progressive-left and liberal activists. Meanwhile, national study committees,
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the U.S. Civil Rights Commission, and the U.S. Department of Justice clarified the statutory matter
at the heart of Milwaukee’s police accountability struggle. Through legal actions and investigations,
the federal government and community-based organizations further exposed the anti-democratic
rule of Milwaukee police chiefs and pushed to limit their authority by empowering City Hall.
Consequently, in 1977, the Wisconsin legislature revised the 1911 statute that outlined police power
in Milwaukee and gave the MFPC approval to annually review new rules set by public safety chiefs.
They also imposed term limits on future department leaders, excusing the still politically influential
Breier.83 Nonetheless, a more diverse body of state representatives was now answering the reform
calls of accountability advocates, police union leaders, and neighborhood groups.
Chief Breier’s reactionary law-and-order ethos was under threat in the 1970s, but the fight
was far from over. As Chapter Six recounts, the police chief’s capacity to oversee the MPD’s racist
law enforcement practices and virtually all of the department’s internal operations endured into the
1980s. However, around the same time that the Wisconsin legislature passed its first reform bill,
revising police rule-making authority, an important development emerged. In 1978, a former
patrolman who was party to the 1958 police killing of Daniel Bell came clean to a far-reaching police
coverup. The revelations sparked fresh accountability protests and a civil rights lawsuit. A campaign
to “oust Breier,” who was Inspector of Detectives in 1958, collected thousands of signatures and
activists demanded further legislative changes.
Then, in 1981, Milwaukee Tactical Squad officers brutalized and asphyxiated Ernest Lacy—a
23-year-old Black man wrongfully stopped, interrogated, and arrested for a rape he did not commit.
A major campaign for justice coalesced that drew in more than seventy-five local organizations. Led
by Black Power activists Howard Fuller and Michael McGee, the Coalition for Justice for Ernest
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Lacy spent two years struggling to get the Milwaukee County DA to file criminal charges and, when
that failed, for the MFPC to discipline the officers responsible for the young man’s death. Chief
Breier intimidated demonstrators and had a visible presence at rallies—then the largest in the history
of Milwaukee’s Black-led struggle for police accountability. Calls renewed for the MFPC to remove
Breier. The political will for administrative action reached new heights, as Milwaukee’s racial
demographics markedly shifted. The city was on course to become a “majority minority” city in the
next millennium. In 1984, state lawmakers passed what became known as the “Breier Bill.” Senate
Bill 56 finally transitioned police rule-making authority to the MFPC. Along with Breier’s sudden
retirement that Spring, the firing of the officer who suffocated Lacy, and the passage of a state law
requiring police to administer first aid to arrestees in need, Milwaukee’s Black-led movement for
police accountability gained significant victories.
Still, a fundamental question persisted after 1984: could policing itself be made “legitimate”
for everyone, especially now that police power was more evenly distributed? A sign pointing to “no”
was that government had invested millions of dollars in expanding law enforcement and penal
control as a solution to economic and social problems, ignoring white supremacy and class
exploitation in the process. Disproportionately funding the state’s punitive arm to suppress rising
fears of street crime drew taxpayer dollars away from funding social welfare, healthcare, jobs, and
education. Conservative Republicans and “tough on crime” Democrats identified social welfare
provisioning as wasteful public spending after the 1960s and vilified BIPOC citizens who relied on it
to survive. Increasingly, the state turned to private, market-based solutions to help solve problems
that, for much of the 20th century, were at least partially addressed by the federal government.
Civil rights advancements ironically intersected with political and economic restructurings in
the late 20th century to negatively impact poor and working-class families of color. Deteriorating
economic conditions in hyper-segregated cities like Milwaukee, civic neglect, and revanchist
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neoliberal policies aggravated metropolitan inequality further. Punitive responses seemed like the
only viable solution to intensifying drug and gang-related crime. Despite substantive reform gains,
police accountability victories coincided with the erosion of Black Milwaukee’s tenuous industrial
foothold. Police power was restructured, yet deindustrialization, domestic budget austerity, and the
onset of a national mass incarceration crisis have helped facilitate Wisconsin’s status as the most
racially punitive state in the U.S.84 Racism, under the aegis of colorblindness, persists in Milwaukee.
A revised liberal law-and-order policing narrative upholds the virtues of the “thin blue line,” while
positioning the city’s Black poor as no less condemnable and criminogenic than in past decades.

Historiography
“‘Accountable to No One’” is a history of the entwined forces that sustain cycles of police
reform, resistance, and repression. It focuses on one municipality: Milwaukee, Wisconsin. 85 As such,
it joins a torrent of recently published scholarship that aspires to trace the lineage of America’s
immense and discriminatory criminal justice system; the social, economic, cultural, political, and legal
implications of policing and punishment for people living in the U.S.; and law enforcement’s vital
place within frameworks of “carcerality.”86 Concurrently, this project engages with histories of Black
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migration, urbanization, activism, and confrontations with white supremacy.87 Some of the works
categorized as “long civil rights movement” history have integrated law enforcement—its inflictions
of racialized state terror and denials of accountability to African Americans and other groups of
color—as a prime obstructer of Black freedom.88 While these studies have addressed policing’s
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1910-1963 (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1996); and Kimberley L. Phillips, African American Migrants, Community, and
Working-Class Activism in Cleveland, 1915-1945 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1999). On Black community
formation and resistance to white supremacy in the post-World War II period, see: Arnold R. Hirsch, Making the Second
Ghetto: Race and Housing in Chicago 1940-1960, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998); Sugrue, The Origins of
the Urban Crisis; Robert O. Self, American Babylon: Race and the Struggle for Postwar Oakland (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2005). Historians have also examined the long history of Black suburbanization. See: Andrew Wiese, Places of Their
Own: African American Suburbanization in the Twentieth Century (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004).
88 Jacqueline Dowd Hall argued in 2005 that the narrow “classical phase” of the Civil Rights Movement (CRM) taught in
textbooks, recounted in media, memorialized in public spaces, and “distorted and reified by a New Right bent on
reversing its gains” concealed a more expansive, complex, and dynamic history of Black struggle against white
supremacy—one that extended beyond the limits of the South; included women’s voices and leadership; was locally
rooted; stretched back to the Left-Labor alliances of the 1930s; and was far more radical than liberal or conservative
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Leadership Conference (New York: William Morrow, 1986). Conversely, the “long civil rights movement” scholarship
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impact on Black strivings for racial equality and self-determination, policing has rarely served as the
main locus of analysis.89 With the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement’s ascendance in the 2010s,
following a succession of high-profile, in many cases video-recorded police and vigilante murders of
Black men and women, this emphasis shifted. A growing number of social and political historians
began considering the pivotal role of law enforcement in perpetuating systems of inequality and
injustice in cities. They connected it to the broader history of punitive American state building.90
reinterpreted the CRM as a more radical, often militant struggle deeply committed to democratic principles across the
U.S. This literature has positioned the Black freedom movement as a temporally and geographically expansive struggle,
connected to localities beyond the South and time periods not commonly associated with “civil rights.” It has featured
the powerful voices of women leaders and delves into complex and gendered organizational dynamics. Notable
examples include: Robin D.G. Kelley, Hammer and Hoe: Alabama Communists during the Great Depression (Chapel Hill: The
University of North Carolina Press, 1990); Evelyn Brooks Higginbotham, Righteous Discontent: The Women’s Movement in the
Black Baptist Church (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994); George Lipsitz, A Life in the Struggle: Ivory Perry and
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American Women in the Civil Rights-Black Power Movement (New York: New York University Press, 2001); Peter B. Levy,
Civil War on Race Street: The Civil Rights Movement in Cambridge, Maryland (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 2003);
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Leonard M. Moore, Black Rage in New Orleans: Police Brutality and African American Activism from World War II to Hurricane
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Lastly, “‘Accountable to No One’” locates Black Milwaukee’s struggle for police liability within a
growing corpus of scholarship that examines how issues of race, class, gender, and sexuality have
intersected with 20th century struggles over housing, education, employment, public
accommodations, urban development, and people’s right to access public services and resources in
Milwaukee.91 In doing so, it charts the role law enforcement has played in shaping popular
understandings of race, crime, and (in)security. Indeed, matters of race and policing have contoured
this history in largely unaccounted for ways. Policing has always been central to the making and
remaking of urban policy in Milwaukee and remains as urgent today.
Much of the new policing history that informs this dissertation starts from the discipline’s
gaining recognition that Black mass incarceration is the civil rights dilemma of our age—what legal
scholar Michelle Alexander famously referred to as the “New Jim Crow.”92 As such, “‘Accountable
to No One’” is one of many “carceral studies” that have answered Heather Ann Thompson’s call
for historians to “think critically about mass incarceration and begin to consider the reverberations
of this never-before-seen phenomenon.”93 As of this writing, more than 2.2 million people live

#BlackLivesMatter to Black Liberation (New York: Haymarket Books, 2016); Barbara Ransby, Making All Black Lives Matter:
Reimagining Freedom in the Twenty-First Century (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2018).
91 Examples include: Trotter, Black Milwaukee; Jones, The Selma of the North; Dougherty, More than One Struggle; Connell,
Conservative Counterrevolution; Andrew Witt, The Black Panthers in the Midwest: The Community Programs and Services of the Black
Panther Party in Milwaukee, 1966-1977 (New York: Routledge, 2007); Fure-Slocum, Contesting the Postwar City; Bill Dahlk,
Against the Wind: African Americans and the Schools in Milwaukee, 1963-2002 (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2010);
James K. Nelsen, Educating Milwaukee: How One City’s History of Segregation and Struggle Shaped Its Schools (Madison:
Wisconsin Historical Society Press, 2015); Frank Aukofer, City with a Chance: A Case History of Civil Rights Revolution
(Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2007).
92 Alexander, The New Jim Crow. Alexander emphasized the racially discriminatory policing of drug-related crime under
conservative presidential administrations in explaining the historic rise in America’s prison population and the criminal
stigmatization of young, poor Black men. Her thesis is not without critics, who cite, for instance, an under-appreciation
for Black professional and middle class attitudes towards crime control and punishment, an incomplete accounting of
mass incarceration’s historical origins, and how this racialized punitive caste system affects other groups of people, such
as Latinx and American Indian populations. See: James Forman, Jr., “Racial Critiques of Mass Incarceration: Beyond the
New Jim Crow,” New York University Law Review 87 (April 2012): 101-147; Michael Javen Fortner, “The ‘Silent Majority’
in Black and White: Invisibility and Imprecision in the Historiography of Mass Incarceration,” The Journal of Urban History
40 (2) (February 2012): 252-282.
93 Heather Ann Thompson laid out the imperatives for further historical analysis of mass incarceration in a
groundbreaking 2010 article. Heather Ann Thompson, “Why Mass Incarceration Matters: Rethinking Crisis, Decline,
and Transformation in Postwar American History,” The Journal of American History 97 no. 3 (December 2010), 703–704.
Indeed, some historians had already begun the work of identifying mass incarceration’s historical antecedents,
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under some form of penal confinement in the U.S.94 In 2015, another 7.2 million lived “on
probation, on parole, or under a deportation order,” adding to the grim statistics.95 In fact, what is
known today as the U.S. has long stood as a global exemplar in “human caging,” dating back to the
earliest days of European settler colonialism in North America.96 Scholars have found that
Wisconsin itself proportionally incarcerates more Black people than any other state in the union,
with most imprisoned, jailed, and detained African Americans hailing from Milwaukee and Southeast
Wisconsin.97 The state’s high rate of Black incarceration has resulted in a series of collateral,
compounded outcomes for African Americans, including both the formal and perceived “mark” of
criminality and cyclical exposure to an inordinate level of police monitoring, arrests, harassment, and
brutality.98 Wisconsin’s racialized criminal justice disparities reflect Milwaukee’s stark inequities,
hyper-segregation, and conservative racial politics.99 This dissertation helps move local stakeholders

particularly as they related to systems of slavery, racial control, and punishment in the Reconstruction and Redemption
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and Finding Work in an Era of Mass Incarceration (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007). On Black Milwaukeeans
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towards a fuller understanding of why Milwaukee is such a unique carceral site.
“‘Accountable to No One’” joins a profusion of contemporary studies on metropolitan
policing, all of which frame the emergence of America’s carceral crisis as one that transcends
conventional political binaries. Historians have detailed how bipartisan policy decisions throughout
the New Deal-Great Society era—not post-1960s crime rates, as previously thought—accounted for
mass incarceration’s historic rise and its sharp racial imbalances.100 Law enforcement has always
played a decisive role in advancing the country’s racialized carceral regime, since the police function
as “the enforcement arm of the racial capitalist state.”101 Much of the new policing history has
countered a once emergent backlash thesis, which stressed white conservative political responses to
street crime and 1960s civil unrest over mutual liberal desires to neutralize Black dissent and
safeguard capitalist structures.102 That Democratic and Republican actors alike initiated the “major
punitive turn in American policy and culture” in the wake of the nation’s postwar civil rights
revolution and “Great Uprising” undercuts simplistic liberal narratives of racial progress.103 Still,
scholars have disagreed about when precisely the infrastructure for the modern carceral state was
first laid. Some underscore federal choices in the 1960s; others highlight local dynamics from earlier
decades.104 This study joins those emphasizing the discretionary policing of northern Black urban
Work on policing, prisons, and other mechanisms of the carceral state has, as Charlotte Rosen observes, “disrupted
tight narratives of partisan culpability,” revealing a complex political project of bipartisan making. Charlotte Rosen,
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102 On the backlash thesis, see: Michael W. Flamm, Law and Order: Street Crime, Civil Unrest, and the Crisis of Liberalism in the
1960s (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005).
103 Heather Ann Thompson and Donna Murch, “Rethinking Urban America through the Lens of the Carceral State,”
Journal of Urban History 41 (5) (2015), 751. Levy, The Great Uprising.
104 While some historians have emphasized liberal responses to urban Black dissent in the 1960s as the genesis of federal
carceral state formation, others have pointed to “the shifting nature of local-level policing in the decades before.” See:
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spaces and residents in the early 20th century as a fundamental driver of Black criminalization, white
ethnic de-criminalization, and, in turn, Black mass incarceration.105 Nowhere have these dynamics
played out more clearly than in Milwaukee: the “worst city for black people to live” in America.106
The urgency of today’s carceral crisis and the onset of BLM has encouraged a growing
number of historians to investigate American law enforcement’s roots as a white supremacist,
capitalist-serving enterprise.107 This study is no different. Organized policing’s very existence in the
U.S., beginning in the 1830s, has long been predicated on elite white needs to fill jails and prisons
with mostly Indigenous, Black, and Brown people for a range of social, economic, and political
purposes. All have served to uphold the nation’s dominant system of racial capitalism—from the
need to harness cheap, disposable labor, to silencing political dissent, to removing a supposedly
dangerous “criminal element” from redeveloping cities. White editorialists, social scientists, and
politicians used 19th century systems of policing and punishment to legitimate Black criminality as
the 20th century approached. They relied on allegedly colorblind crime data to argue that granting
African Americans citizenship was a mistake, as they supposedly signified a criminal race. Statistics
attributed the criminality of white ethnics, on the other hand, to socialization factors. As Khalil
Muhammad has argued, the statistical language that emerged in the context of rising Black migration
to northern cities is “the glue that binds race to crime today as in the past.”108 This played out in
Milwaukee as well, where racialized police repression converged with class and political dynamics
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racists to northern progressives.” Muhammad, The Condemnation of blackness, 1-4.
105

36

shaped by the city’s large, foreign-born, non-English speaking European population. White Anglocapitalist interests converged with those of the white working-class to establish an urban terrain
characterized by racial resentment for the growing number of African Americans moving to the city.
The new policing history far exceeds the scope of earlier interrogations of U.S. law
enforcement written in the wake of 1960s and 1970s social upheavals. These works largely addressed
municipal policing with an eye towards explaining its class control imperatives, the origins of law
enforcement’s service function, processes of police professionalization, and how departments
underwent “reform” by separating from ward-based political machines.109 Much of the recent work
on policing differs in its attention to, most notably, Black and Latinx agency and calls to center the
voices of those who have decried police violence and challenged racist narratives supported by law
enforcement. Indeed, as these studies and “‘Accountable to No One’” reveal, organized resistance to
police brutality was a major element of the Black freedom struggle. Newer histories also diverge in
their framing of municipal police power as a force that actively shapes and expresses urban policy. 110
This dissertation is in part an institutional history of how police power in Milwaukee was
made manifest and communicated locally by both law-and-order police administrators and rank-andfile officers. It is also an exploration of how excessively policed and neglected African Americans
have defied police authority through political negotiation, peaceful protest, and physical resistance.
Liberal and conservative law-and-order frameworks reinforced a political consensus around policing
that positioned it as a necessary service for reducing conflict and making society safer for capital
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The University of Chicago Press, 2020); Christopher Lowen Agee, The Streets of San Francisco: Policing and the Creation of a
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accumulation and market-based consumption. While many Black residents were deeply concerned
about issues of crime and safety in their own racially segregated neighborhoods, poor services
rendered by overwhelmingly white, discriminatory, and brutal police regimes only amplified their
anxieties. Regardless, Black professionals called on political leaders, including a growing number of
Black elected officials, to both hold the police accountable and get tougher on crime.111
As such, Black residents consistently demanded police reform over time. Policing historians
have illustrated how law enforcement methodically used its political and discretionary authority to
undermine civil rights movement gains and demands for police reform in the mid-20th century—
namely the establishment of civilian review boards, the hiring of minoritized police officers, and the
implementation of “community relations” units.112 Rather than heed federal calls to enhance police
responsiveness and improve safeguarding, law-and-order police chiefs promoted racial instability
and generated insecurity within segregated Black and Latinx communities by aggressively policing
poverty and competing modes of dissent. All of this fed a retributive law enforcement system that,
beginning in the 1960s, federal and state actors promised would become more democratic and
community-oriented. Instead, expansions of police power reproduced harms and discriminatory
outcomes for millions of poor, middle- and working-class Americans of color. Many of these works
also shed light on the ideological diversity found within local campaigns for police reform.
Intersections of gender, sexuality, and other identities have further complicated this history.
Recent scholarship on urban morals enforcement and vice policing in cities—often in service of
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protecting the interests of economic growth, white middle class elites, and capital accumulation—
has emerged as a growing sub-genre. Historians have analyzed in vivid detail how the policing of
Black and Latinx youth, Native American populations, sex workers, LGBTQ+ residents, petty
gamblers, houseless people, disabled folk, and other individuals pushed out onto the margins of
conventional society by a range of discriminatory forces have contributed to racist, classist, sexist,
and ableist criminalizing narratives.113 Examinations of gender, in particular, and its relationship to
policing and the carceral state has added much needed depth to a field that often centers the
experiences of male actors. As Kali Gross argues, Black womanhood brought its own unique set of
political exclusions and criminalization. African American women were, since the colonial period,
“not entitled to the law’s protection,” while also unable to “escape its punishment.”114
Finally, “‘Accountable to No One’” is informed by recent scholarship on the imperial origins
of the police professionalization movement and the interwar and wartime transmissions, or border
crossings, that occurred among military police abroad and “civilian” police forces at home.115 Several
influential Progressive Era police chiefs and administrators served in the Spanish American War, for
example, fighting imperial missions in colonial states like the Philippines and Cuba. They brought
back to the U.S. new policing techniques developed overseas to track down guerrilla insurgents and
impose social control among ostensibly rebellious indigenous populations. Communications tactics,
training, and patrol methodologies imbued the professionalization movement that MPD chiefs
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embraced from the 1910s through the 1930s.116 This process continued in the post-World War II
era, when military police in the Office of Public Safety worked to prevent “subversives” from
provoking insurgent campaigns in “Third World” countries susceptible to Communist influence. 117
The federal state helped advance counter-insurgent policing capacities in at least fifty-two countries.
Such efforts set the stage for greater police militarization efforts after the 1960s. The federal
government delivered military-grade weaponry and gear to police around the globe as it waged the
Cold War. This weaponry was deployed in cities, as police agencies engaged in the War on Crime
and War on Drugs. Veterans brought strategies, know-how, and arms home to municipal police
departments working to suppress political dissent and social upheaval. The federal government
established channels for local police forces to apply for military-grade hardware. Contrary to what
criminologists and policing experts have argued, law enforcement never had a “golden age” free of
coercive, militarized, racist policing models. The U.S. state always directed law enforcement against
perceived outside agitators, incendiary elements, and criminalized groups of color.

Challenging the Kelling Thesis
From a historical perspective, Milwaukee provides an ideal case study for how elite white
constructions of police legitimacy have worked to undermine and narrow Black demands for
accountability in response to endemic police violence. The narrative of policing exceptionalism
analyzed throughout this dissertation undergirded and legitimized the city’s white-controlled police
bureaucracy in, what scholars have identified as, the “reform era” in U.S. policing.118 In turn, the
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MPD’s self-reinforcing mythologies have defined a white hegemonic racial politics, common
understandings of public safety, and highly raced and classed ideas about urban criminality and
disorder.119 While this study does not evaluate crime as a specific unit of analysis, per se, it does take
the phenomenon seriously as one that shapes individual choices, “quality of life” perceptions, and
public fears about health and the well-being of families, property, and communities.
Still, this project does not see crime as detached from the larger processes of racial capitalism
that have begotten uneven social and economic terrains or police behaviors that are proven to
inflame inequitable urban conditions. Reform era policing in Milwaukee, and its relationship to
assorted processes of crime control and order maintenance, has had a veiled national reach that this
study only begins to unearth. That reach into the U.S. crime and policing discourse is reflected in the
work of a criminologist well-regarded in national policing circles, yet also heavily criticized by
policing’s sharpest opponents. For better or worse, he has had an outsized influence on the telling of
Milwaukee’s law enforcement history, in addition to formulating best practices for cities wanting to
address matters of public safety.120
George Kelling implicated his hometown’s story of race and policing in the larger conceptual
framework he and criminologist James Q. Wilson introduced in their consequential, if statistically
misleading 1982 article: “Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety.” 121 Wilson and

“White fixations on the specter of Black crime,” as Simon Balto argues, encouraged and reinforced the overpolicing
and underprotection of comparatively poorer African American citizens and urban spaces. Balto, Occupied Territory, 128.
120 Kelling’s account of Milwaukee’s policing history has become a dominant narrative. It is an incomplete one at best, as
it diminishes the role police themselves have played in structuring ideas about public safety, shaping urban policies,
applying racialized enforcement double-standards, and framing patterns of crime and criminality according to factors of
race, class, and gender. George Kelling, “Milwaukee Police Department,” Encyclopedia of Milwaukee, accessed June 15,
2020, https://emke.uwm.edu/entry/milwaukee-police-department/; Kelling, Policing in Milwaukee.
121 James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling, “Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety,” Atlantic Monthly
(March 1982), 29–38. In 2001, Bernard Harcourt debunked Broken Windows theory, finding that “disorder,” as Kelling
and Wilson subjectively conceived it, had little bearing on crime. See: Bernard E. Harcourt, Illusion of Order: The False
Promise of Broken Windows Policing (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 243. Broken Windows theory, as
Bench Ansfield argues, was particularly specious because Kelling and Wilson “manipulated and distorted the findings of
prior studies to call forth a racialized image of urban decline, one that marshaled broken windows to stoke fears about
the future of the US urban landscape.” Bench Ansfield, “The Broken Windows of the Bronx: Putting the Theory in Its
Place,” American Quarterly 72 (1) (March 2020): 104.
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Kelling’s provocative theory called for the hyper-enforcement of low-level behavioral
misdemeanors, like graffiti writing, littering, panhandling, public urination, and selling untaxed
cigarettes—crimes on the level of the public order offenses white police officers unduly arrested
countless Black citizens for during the MPD’s era of assumed exceptionalism.122 Broken Windows
theory holds that minor violations, if left unchecked, raise neighborhood fears of disorder and breed
more serious violent crime. Therefore, the concept calls on police to crack down on nuisance
offenses, so as to alleviate community anxieties and mitigate injurious harms.123 Under Broken
Windows, home and business owners—the “good,” “orderly” residents—signified “the natural
representatives of the ‘community.’”124 While the theory’s authors framed Broken Windows as a
race-neutral project, its application in cities has buttressed historically racist policing practices and
logics that aggressively target, control, and detain BIPOC people, the working poor, and groups
living on society’s margins.125 The implications are serious. Broken Windows policing has helped fuel

Wilson and Kelling viewed Broken Windows as an updated version of the “community watchmen” approach of the
19th century. Wilson and Kelling, “Broken Windows,” 9.
123 The goal is to “concentrate less on catching criminals and more on enforcing informal neighborhood norms of
behavior.” Samuel Walker, “‘Broken Windows’ and Fractured History: The Use and Misuse of History in Recent Police
Patrol Analysis,” Justice Quarterly 1 (1) (1984), 78.
124 Stuart Schrader, “Defining Key Policing Terms,” Stuart Schrader professional website, June 15, 2016, accessed June
24, 2020, https://stuartschrader.com/blog/defining-key-policing-terms.
125 Sarah Childress, “The Problem with ‘Broken Windows’ Policing,” PBS Frontline, June 28, 2016, accessed June 21
2020, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/the-problem-with-broken-windows-policing/. In practice, Broken
Windows policing has enhanced “the collective punishments of communities already under siege,” burdening the
working poor with fines and fracturing already strained relationships with law enforcement. The logic of Broken
Windows, historians Jordan Camp and Christina Heatherton argue, has served to “locate disorder within individuals, offloading liability onto the bodies of the blamed.” Jordan T. Camp and Christina Heatherton, “Introduction: Policing the
Planet,” Policing the Planet: Why the Policing Crisis Led to Black Lives Matter, Jordan T. Camp and Christina Heatherton, eds.
(New York: Verso Books, 2016), 3. Broken Windows has contributed “tremendous intellectual energy to the wars on
crime and drugs in the early 1980s” and subsequent decades. Anne Gray Fischer, ““Land of the White Hunter”: Legal
Liberalism and the Racial Politics of Morals Enforcement in Midcentury Los Angeles,” The Journal of American History 105
(4) (March 2019), 884. The theory relies on a false premise of universally accepted police authority and neutral public
understandings of crime and disorder, criminals and disorderly people. It is at once an “ideological” and “political”
project. While Broken Windows presents as racially colorblind, it has resulted in a grossly disproportionate level of stops,
searches, fines, and arrests of people of color. That racialized groups, particularly African Americans, are seen by Broken
Windows advocates as having a greater propensity to commit illicit offenses, while also being the primary victims of
street crime is passed-off by the theory’s supporters as “mere statistical inevitability.” Camp and Heatherton,
“Introduction: Policing the Planet,” 6. Broken Windows conflates racial criminalization with spatial representations of
disorder, ensuring that it remains largely confined to minoritized urban communities and commercial thoroughfares
frequented by people of color. As Camp and Heatherton have argued, Broken Windows is an “expression of
neoliberalism at the urban scale”—one rooted in conservative notions of personal responsibility and the belief that
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America’s mass incarceration crisis, exacerbating racial disparities throughout the criminal justice
system.126 It has devastated Black lives in Wisconsin, which, as recently as 2014, incarcerated the
highest percentage of African American men in the U.S.127 Despite operating under a different
organizing ethos—proactivity instead of reactivity—Broken Windows policing has essentially
supplanted one discriminatory law enforcement approach for another.
Milwaukee’s story of policing exceptionalism rests at the heart of the “imagined community”
of preventive order maintenance policing envisioned by Kelling and Wilson’s Broken Windows
theory.128 This dissertation contends that its purported outcomes, “a sense of order and civility,”
promised a return to the idealized city of the late criminologist’s youth.129 This was an era of
Milwaukee’s history when “social controls” and white ethnic conceptions of neighborhood safety
intermingled with a virtually all-white police function. That function was invested in mitigating crime
in mostly white communities, shutting people of color out of such spaces, and sanctioning illicit
behavior in the overpoliced and underprotected Black neighborhoods where the MPD funneled vice
and illicit activities. Through the policing of blackness, as well as assorted racial, gender, and sexual
boundaries, reform era patrolmen regenerated disproportionate Black arrest and incarceration rates.
This reinforced white presumptions of Black criminality and disorder in ways that harmed African
Americans’ overall prospects for accountability.130 Kelling came of age as Milwaukee’s narrative of

“good” people are obligated to protect their neighborhoods from the “bad.” Broken a Windows “has normalized a shift
in state capacities away from the production of social goods and towards “security” concerns produced in their
absence.” Camp and Heatherton, “Introduction: Policing the Planet,” 2-4.
126 Rather than preventing serious crime through the policing of minor behavioral offenses, thereby limiting
incarceration, the order maintenance approach has acted as “a supplement that feeds into and itself produces a dramatic
increase in detentions, arrests, and criminal records.” Harcourt, Illusion of Order, 6.
127 See: Toller-Clark, “From Breweries to the Super-Max”; Pawasarat and Quinn, “Wisconsin’s Mass Incarceration of
African American Males.”
128 On the concept of an “imagined community,” which initially referred to concepts of nationalism, see: Benedict
Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism, rev. ed. (New York: Verso, 2006).
129 Wilson and Kelling, “Broken Windows,” 9.
130 Kelling’s thesis undervalues the agency of police departments themselves, whose function as street-level arbiters of
harm and conventional white middle class norms help maintain racial capitalism and systems of oppression at the local
scale. Save for the top police administrators who have devised reactive crime-fighting strategies that eschewed his
idealized version of crime prevention (like Police Chief Harold Breier), Kelling’s social control thesis frames the police as
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policing exceptionalism crested in the 1940s and 1950s—a moment when “the neighborhood was
great” and his family “moved around freely and still felt safe.”131 As he has written, “this relatively
benign world ended in the 1960s when crime, the fear of crime, and urban disorder exploded in
Milwaukee and so many other cities across the country.”132 Kelling’s wistful framing of public safety
prior to a noted uptick in the city’s Black population in the 1950s and 1960s served a symbolic
function in his research and consulting projects, which advanced Broken Windows policing in
partnership with significant law enfacement agencies in major U.S. cities.133 Ergo, Milwaukee and its
era of policing exceptionalism looms larger in the story of race, policing, and public safety than is
commonly understood, partly because of how convergences of white supremacy and law
enforcement have informed one prominent scholar’s “colorblind,” value-neutral ideas about order,
social control, and community.
neutral historical agents. The police are acted upon by social, economic, and political forces, but never the influencers of
disparate urban conditions, which have reinforced processes of racial criminalization and disorder in Black communities.
Consequently, Kelling’s argument advances a misleading logic of police legitimacy that continues to hold devastating
consequences for Black citizens and other minoritized groups. Rationales that elevate policing as a primary solution to
community health and safety issues are only now being reckoned with by cities in a serious way, due to the organizing
work of grassroots police accountability activists.
131 George Kelling was born in 1935. His family lived on N. 27th St., on Milwaukee’s west side until he was six years old.
For most of the 1940s, the Kellings resided on N. 47th St., across from the Parklawn public housing project on the city’s
northwest side. The local housing authority located that complex on the suburban fringes because of white fears about
racial integration. Kelling concedes that his “entry into criminal justice” work was directly tied to Milwaukee, as were his
perceptions of law enforcement. As a young college graduate in the late 1950s, he worked at a juvenile detention center
and as a probation officer in Minneapolis. Kelling completed a Master’s in Social Work at UW-Milwaukee. In 1960, he
was hired as Assistant Superintendent of Juvenile Detention for Milwaukee County. He briefly left for Minnesota again
between 1963 and 1965 to “oversee childcare and social work at a children’s psychiatric facility.” Kelling, by his own
account, then returned to Milwaukee to teach corrections courses at UW-Milwaukee’s School of Social Work. He
became more interested in policing during this “era of civil rights and anti-war protests,” when the “police were highly
visible and controversial.” Kelling claims to have worked with the Commandos, whom he describes “a militant civil
rights group,” while also consulting for Milwaukee’s police union—something he would continue to do sporadically over
the years. Kelling, Policing in Milwaukee, 10.
132 Kelling attributes the order maintenance of his youth more to community-based and institutional “social controls”
than to reform era policing strategies. Kelling, Policing in Milwaukee, 8-9. One might infer that Kelling meant Black
“crime,” a largely white “fear of crime,” and Black “urban disorder,” given the city’s racialized discourses and the
segregated geographies of 1960s civil violence. Moreover, white pundits, city officials, and news reporters routinely
linked blackness and illicit behavior in public forums. See: Simon Ezra Balto, “‘Occupied Territory:’ Police Repression
and Black Resistance in Postwar Milwaukee, 1950-1968,” The Journal of African American History 98 (2) (Spring 2013): 229252.
133 Former New York City and Los Angeles police head Bill Bratton called Kelling, “the most profound influence on
American policing in the last 40 or 50 years.” Sam Roberts, “George L. Kelling, a Father of ‘Broken Windows’ Policing,
Is Dead at 83,” The New York Times, May 15, 2019, accessed June 23, 2020,
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/15/obituaries/george-kelling-dead.html.
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Kelling’s conceptualization of policing in Milwaukee reifies a problematic account of law
enforcement that indirectly enshrines anti-blackness and reinforces a white supremacist-capitalist
framework of metropolitan history. It also legitimizes policing as the primary solution to urban ills.
This dissertation challenges the thesis of Kelling’s final book, Policing in Milwaukee. In it, he argues
that an “erosion in social control” exposed the inadequacies of reform era policing, causing a crisis
of police legitimacy in the 1960s that demanded resolution through enhanced order maintenance
and “community policing” strategies.134 Despite the police department’s vaunted status as a national
reform leader in the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s, Kelling contended that the MPD was ill-equipped to
preserve order in the 1960s and 1970s without previously established social controls in place. 135 He
noted that such constraints—cultural institutions, familial networks, built environments—had
balanced the police department’s response-oriented crime control program. Urban disorder

“Police legitimacy” refers to the “acceptance of police authority by the public.” Walker, “‘Broken Windows’ and
Fractured History,” 84. “Community policing” is a post-1960s law enforcement strategy embraced by Kelling that calls
on law enforcement agencies to form “police-driven partnerships that put additional resources at their disposal and win
the cooperation of community leaders.” Through routine, “friendly” contacts with neighborhood residents, the police
are supplied with “low-level” information and “security assistance” that operates in service of disorder “pacification.”
Scholar Kristian Williams argues that “community policing” is an important aspect of the police’s “domestic
counterinsurgency program.” Kristian Williams, “The Other Side of the COIN: Counterinsurgency and Community
Policing,” Interface 3 (1) (May 2011), 91-92.
135 According to Kelling, the main flaw of reform era policing, in Milwaukee and elsewhere, was its emphasis on
responding to crime via rapid response, random automobile patrols, and detective work rather than preventing crime
through neighborhood foot patrols and implanting trusted police in communities to help residents solve problems.
Reform era policing isolated law enforcement, he argued, from the very people they were called on to “protect and
serve.” Kelling advocated a return to “Anglo-Saxon policing,” whereby “conspicuous officers…embedded in small
geographic areas,” or beats, prevented crime “through police presence” and discretionary, proactive order maintenance.
Kelling, Policing in Milwaukee, 16-17. Although the MPD was considered a national exemplar of reform era policing
throughout the first half of the 20th century, Kelling argues that the department’s exemplary approach was only effective
so long as “police operated within and as part of communities and neighborhoods where informal social control
provided a foundation for their efforts.” Kelling, Policing in Milwaukee, 56. Those informal social controls—families,
schools, businesses, community institutions—in his view, started to break down in the mid-1950s. This process
accelerated during the reign of Milwaukee’s most autocratic and overtly racist police chief, Harold Breier, in the 1960s
and 1970s. The erosion of community-driven social controls, Kelling argues, converged with a police administrator who
rejected his predecessors’ openness to improving “community relations” and the department’s public image, creating a
worst case scenario that mandated strategic revision. Milwaukee Police Chief Joseph Kluchesky (1936-1945) led in the
national “community relations movement,” which introduced human relations training, increased contact between police
and Black leaders, and the recruitment of Black officers in the 1940s. Police-Black community relations also deteriorated
under Breier, who rejected external government interference and scrutiny. A detective culture predominated at the
expense of beat patrol. Breier’s reactionary approach and strict regulation encouraged line officers to unionize and
demand greater workplace rights. Kelling, Policing in Milwaukee: A Strategic History, 54.
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proliferated when these constraints dissolved and the MPD was left randomly patrolling and seeking
out crime rather than proactively working with upstanding community partners to prevent daily
public order violations. Therefore, a new strategy was needed that integrated the police into
Milwaukee’s shifting social fabric to better maintain order and reduce public fears.136
From a tactical perspective, Kelling disagreed with the near-term goals and strategic practices
of reform era policing.137 However, its end result of racialized poor and working-class suppression,
on terms favorable to white middle and business class interests, was consistent with Broken
Windows policing outcomes.138 Kelling’s rationale is deceptive, in part because he argues that
Milwaukee’s postwar crisis of police legitimacy was centered not on the racist and violent behavior
of the police but on administrative inefficiencies and the city’s ostensibly deteriorating social fabric.
While he rightly observed that existing law enforcement models increasingly struggled to control
crime after World War II, raising public fears about “disorder,” he also laid most of the blame on a

This logic influenced Kelling’s consultancy on the hiring of Milwaukee Police Chief Edward Flynn in 2007. In
Kelling’s view, hiring Flynn, a disciple of Broken Windows style “problem-oriented” policing, restored the MPD to its
rightful crime prevention focus. See: Kelling, Policing in Milwaukee.
137 Some scholars argue that Kelling misevaluated reform era policing regardless. Samuel Walker, for example, argues
that Kelling and his co-authors exaggerated the “depersonalization” the police and their “crime control orientation”
from the 1930s-1960s. Walker, “‘Broken Windows’ and Fractured History,” 88.
138 Reform era and Broken Windows policing strategies have shared commonalities, despite the former focusing largely
on crime control and the latter on reducing “perceptions of disorder.” Both approaches relied on public investment in
police services, an expanded law enforcement presence on the streets, and common assumptions about police legitimacy
to succeed. Each has functioned to maintain the existing racial and class order, re-inscribing police authority as a means
of guaranteeing the dominant hierarchy. The primary goal of reform era policing was responding to crime efficiently,
resolving it after the fact. That meant random patrols, answering service requests, effecting arrests, and closing cases.
Perceptions of order mattered because they allegedly generated communal stability and residential investment in helping
police monitor illicit behavior. When it came to reform era policing, some departments were better than others at
clearing cases. Kelling points to reform era policing’s overall inefficiency at resolving crime, but also points out that the
MPD was better at doing so than most departments because of the city’s neighborhood-level “social controls” and its
“law abiding population.” Kelling, Policing in Milwaukee, 52-53. Reported crime statistics drove this process, faulty and
police-manufactured as they were, which also justified law enforcement’s existence. For Kelling, attenuating public fears
about crime was as critical as responding to crime because, as he argued in his research on foot patrols in Newark, NJ,
neighborhood perceptions of disorder correlated with actual crime rates. See: Police Foundation, The Newark Foot Patrol
Experiment (1981), 5. As a policy program, Broken Windows is profoundly racialized and has further criminalized
blackness and poverty. It did so more implicitly through a racially coded language and geography of “disorder” that, as
one scholar argues, “positioned itself as racially neutral, even progressive.” The broken windows themselves were a stand
in for a range of material and embodied “disorders.” Ansfield, “The Broken Windows of the Bronx,” 119. By relying on
a 1969 social scientific study conducted in the predominantly Black and Puerto Rican South Bronx, it was clear who
Wilson and Kelling inferred to be “disorderly.” Wilson and Kelling, “Broken Windows,” 3.
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breakdown in “norms and social controls.”139 This “unwittingly” emanated from “new social
policies” enacted by liberal policymakers after World War II, disrupting established networks of
crime control and order maintenance in Milwaukee neighborhoods. Kelling even suggested that
postwar “cultural and legal changes,” including the juridical fruits of the Black freedom movement,
served to uphold the rights of individuals at the expense of communities, thereby producing an
environment susceptible to the spread of crime and disorder.140
As “‘Accountable to No One’” makes clear, the “golden age” of public safety that Kelling
alludes to was not the lived experience of many poor and working-class Black Milwaukeeans.141
What may have felt like an extended period of social tranquility backed up by benevolent policing for
white citizens in the 1940s and 1950s was also one of racialized police control, violence, and neglect
for many “others.”142 The perceived social controls of Kelling’s youth were fashioned by white
supremacist ideas, policies, and structures.143 Kelling’s memories of an idealized public safety
landscape overlooked racist, often violent encounters among white police, resistant white residents,
Kelling, Policing in Milwaukee, 47-48.
Kelling, Policing in Milwaukee, 56. George Kelling directly advised police chiefs on the implementation of Broken
Windows-style “community policing” in these cities. See: George L. Kelling and Catherine M. Coles, Fixing Broken
Windows: Restoring Order and Reducing Crime in our Cities (New York: Free Press, 1998).
141 Bryan Wagner, Disturbing the Peace: Black Culture and the Police Power After Slavery (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 2009), 202. See: Trotter, Black Milwaukee, 118.
142 The MPD fulfilled long-standing obligations to white middle and business class concerns, administering social control
among those living on society’s margins, particularly Black migrant workers viewed by whites as prone to disorder and
criminality. On the roots of protecting elite middle class and corporate interests in Milwaukee, see: Sidney L. Harring,
“The Police Institution as a Class Question: Milwaukee Socialists and the Police, 1900-1915,” Science & Society 46 (2)
(Summer 1982): 197-221. Despite being identified by the federal government, policing experts, and national media as a
leader in police professionalization from the 1930s to the 1960s, the MPD disproportionately stopped, arrested, and
initiated violent clashes with African American residents. According to Kelling, police professionalization meant
“bureaucratization, civil service, centralized command-and-control, pre- and in-service training, and tenure for police
chiefs.” This began with the passage of the 1885 state law establishing the MFPC and then the hiring of Milwaukee’s
first reform chief, John Janssen, in 1888. Kelling, Policing in Milwaukee, 51-54, 56, 67. The “community relations”
movement of the 1940s focused more on quelling dissent, Black and Brown youth crime, and interracial mixing than
instilling procedural justice and better safeguarding all residents through policing. The improvement of the police image
was the ultimate goal. See: Chapter Two.
143 Moreover, the 19th century “Anglo-Saxon tradition” of policing that Kelling elevates as a strategy worth returning to
serves no “conscious purpose of fighting crime or serving neighborhood needs.” That police derived legitimacy from
meeting the desires of neighborhood residents was, as Samuel Walker argues, “highly romanticized.” Walker adds:
“Urban neighborhoods were not stable and homogeneous little villages nestled in the city. They were heterogeneous,
and the rate of geographic mobility was even higher than contemporary rates.” Walker, “‘Broken Windows’ and
Fractured History,” 87.
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and Black migrants struggling for survival, rights, and access.144 African Americans’ undue
vulnerability to police discrimination and brutality in the Great Migration period and the MPD’s
unchecked discretionary power revealed the shortcomings of reform era approaches well before
Kelling’s alleged breakdown of social controls in the 1960s.145 Black Milwaukeeans did not need to
experience the displacement and disfranchisement caused by urban renewal and freeway
construction, for example, to know that reform era policing was deficient in providing them
communal security. Well before the 1960s, Black youth challenged police policies of “close
surveillance” and aggressive order maintenance tactics.146 Black professionals confronted white
perceptions of the police as colorblind and efficient crime control agents, pointing out enforcement
double-standards and decrying pervasive police brutality. Activism and street-level resistance
exposed how the MPD engendered disarray in Black and interracial spaces through biased policies
and unchecked violence. Hardly neutral arbiters of morality and justice, police fueled and acted on
ingrained ideas about race and class as they patrolled Milwaukee’s near north side. Because, in
Kelling’s view, reform era policing focused on responding to crime rather than crime prevention, the
MPD was ill-equipped to handle the perceived breakdown of social controls brought on by postwar
liberalism and the cultural/civil rights revolution. If anything, however, racist police discretion
worsened in the context of the 1960s civil-rights revolution because activists specifically targeted
racialized and coercive law enforcement. The police actively made civil rights demonstrations, as
well as the neighborhoods that activists lived in and organized in, less safe.147

See: Trotter, Black Milwaukee, 118.
Conversely, Kelling argues police work was “routine and non-discretionary” in the reform era. Kelling, Policing in
Milwaukee, 55. This is inaccurate. See: Walker, “‘Broken Windows’ and Fractured History.” Anti-Black police racism
manifested in a number of forms, from verbal insults and harassment, to fines and arrests, to physical beatings and
death.
146 See: Trotter, Black Milwaukee, 118; and Chapter One.
147 While Kelling is correct that postwar growth policies like urban renewal and highway construction displaced
thousands of Black residents, worsening patterns of inequality and disrupting living conditions for African Americans
relegated to Milwaukee’s segregating north side, he overstates and distorts the impact of the civil rights revolution in
explaining the origins of its public safety crisis. Most notably, Kelling discounts the saliency of race in law enforcement
144
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Overall, Kelling’s narrative discounts the role of the police in furthering disorder in poor and
working-class urban spaces of color.148 In fact, the state’s expansion of police power as a response to
Black political dissent and rebellion in the 1960s—as opposed to doubling-down on federal antipoverty measures—exacerbated existing racial inequities, amplified a sense of confusion in Black
enclaves, and further aggravated aspects of the postwar urban crisis. It was not an “across-the-board
decline in social control in neighborhoods, schools, and even families” or “increasing public disorder
created by the presence of the mentally ill and petty offenders” that revealed the deficiencies of
reform era policing.149 Rather, policing itself—empowered by federal cash infusions, new computer
technologies, enhanced statistical record keeping, military-grade equipment, and broadened
surveillance capacities—served to inflate crime rates.150 Policing created new means of effecting
arrests, and reinforced long-standing perceptions of Black criminality. Although Kelling rightfully
observed that “American criminal justice was riddled with racism,” he never provided a full analysis

already, and the roles of police actions and white ethnic resistance to, for example, the building of racially mixed public
housing and efforts to integrate all-white neighborhoods. Kevin D. Smith, “From Socialism to Racism: The Politics of
Class and Identity in Postwar Milwaukee” Michigan Historical Review 29 (1) (Spring, 2003), 3. While Kelling notes that
racial discrimination impacted Black lives in the 1950s and 1960s, and touches on some key moments in Milwaukee’s
civil rights history, he largely fails to probe how policing itself undermined Black citizenship claims and reproduced racial
inequality. In Policing in Milwaukee, Black citizens rarely encountered racist policing before the 1950s. As a result, Kelling
elides earlier modes of resistance, such as the activism of the Sixth Ward Law and Order League in the 1930s. While he
contends that “racism’s influence on the growth and development of the Milwaukee Police Department…was profound
and undeniable,” he never fully explains how racism structured MPD policies. Kelling, Policing in Milwaukee, 57. Mistrust
between police officers and Black residents intensified after World War II, largely because of discriminatory policing
practices that targeted north side African Americans. See: Balto, “Occupied Territory.”
148 The police, in Kelling’s summation, behaved as neutral state actors above the fray of local politics. Instead, politicians
answered Milwaukee’s assorted postwar crises—a housing shortage, unmanageable automobile traffic, declining mental
health facilities, “injustices to juveniles,” school segregation, and more (as identified by Kelling)—through liberal
policies, like slum clearance and urban renewal, public housing and highway construction, court-ordered busing and
juvenile justice reform, the decriminalization of minor offenses and the deinstitutionalization of the mentally ill, and the
centralization of local government agencies. These combined efforts, Kelling argues, weakened social controls and
community-based institutions, leading to rising crime rates in Milwaukee and other cities. Kelling suggests that
Milwaukee suffered a crisis of liberalism, not unchecked police violence, arguing in favor of the conservative trope that
family and community structures broke down as a result of liberal policies. Such policies and their outcomes had the
hardest impact on poor Black youth, whom Kelling and other conservative criminologists have positioned as susceptible
to immoral behavior and criminal activity. Kelling, Policing in Milwaukee, 57.
149 Kelling argued these forces proved “too stimulating for youthful predators,” causing an explosion in reported street
crimes that police agencies were ill-equipped to resolve. Kelling, Policing in Milwaukee, 67.
150 Police crime reporting is loaded with “problems, biases, and imperfections.” Balto, Occupied Territory, 67-68. In turn,
conventional media outlets elevate and normalize “police rhetoric and logic by often reporting in terms constructed by
the police.” Felker-Kantor, Policing Los Angeles, 6.
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of how law enforcement materialized Black criminality and spawned inequality.151 Policing was,
instead, perfectible through proactive, problem-oriented, “community policing” reforms and the reestablishment of the social controls of his youth.152 This dissertation rejects this framework.

Internal racism, Kelling writes, “substantially interfered with the ability of police to deal with neighborhood and
community problems,” but his evidence remains disconnected from a police mission that was fundamentally predicated
on upholding the interests of white middle class and corporate elites.
152 Kelling’s main argument in Policing in Milwaukee it that the “community policing” movement he helped advance in the
1970s, 1980s, and 1990s effectively restored law enforcement’s proactive, community-supported crime prevention
mission. When he consulted on Milwaukee’s hiring of Police Chief Edward Flynn in 2007, Kelling was, in his view,
restoring the MPD to its rightful crime prevention focus. Kelling, Policing in Milwaukee: A Strategic History.
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CHAPTER ONE
Manufacturing the Narrative of Policing Exceptionalism
“In Milwaukee, you’re safer on the streets than in any other big city of its size. Violence is
rare, police efficient, criminals uncoddled. How does Milwaukee do it?”1 So began the lede in a
September 1964 article in U.S. News & World Report on the virtues of the Cream City’s prized
criminal justice system. “Efficient” policing, “tough” prosecution, “swift and sure” court judgments,
among other factors, combined to make Wisconsin’s largest city “one of the most law-abiding” in
the country.2 The other main ingredient, according to Mayor Henry Maier, was the cooperation of a
“settled and stable population.”3 Consequently, the whole citizenry, “men, women, and
children…have come to be accepted as an arm of law enforcement.” Each Milwaukee Police
Department (MPD) officer “has a thousand pairs of eyes,” he added. Residential cooperation and
surveillance augmented a community-wide project of crime control and order maintenance.4 “We
like to have an omnipresent force of policemen on the streets,” noted Inspector Raymond Dahl
approvingly.
About three hundred words into the piece, the author broached the subject of race. While
the article barely conveys it, race had become a more contentious issue in Milwaukee ever since

“How One City Keeps Its Streets Safe,” U.S. News & World Report, September 28, 1964, 68.
The other factors mentioned in the article were “alert newspapers,” “good schools,” an “absence of tenement-type
slums,” and its “comprehensive” network of parks. “How One City Keeps its Streets Safe,” 68.
3 In truth, census data shows that Milwaukee’s population was anything but “settled and stable” in the mid-1960s.
Milwaukee’s African American population alone was in the process of growing from 62,458 in 1960 to 105,088 in 1970.
Meanwhile, the city lost 70,200 white residents in that same span. The city’s total population loss nearly quadrupled from
1970 to 1980, at 80,887 residents. A loss of 138,752 white residents in that span was offset by a gain of 41,852 Black
residents and nearly 25,000 Latinx residents, or “Hispanic Origin.” Campbell Gibson and Kay Jung, “Historical Census
Statistics on Population Totals by Race, 1790 to 1990, and by Hispanic Origin, 1970 to 1990, for Large Cities and Other
Urban Places in The United States,” U.S. Census Bureau, Population Division, Working Paper no. 76 (February 2005),
Table 50. “How One City Keeps Its Streets Safe,” 68.
4 As Inspector Raymond Dahl claimed, “people in this town are willing to give information to the police, willing to be
witnesses.” “How One City Keeps Its Streets Safe,” 68. “Order maintenance law enforcement” is an approach to
policing municipal offenses that civic elites and morally upstanding citizens viewed as threatening to the conventional
public order of a given locale. The approach was racialized and often targeted poor and working-class members of nonwhite groups for petty offenses like vagrancy, public drinking, and disorderly conduct. Christopher Lower Agee, “Crisis
and Redemption: The History of American Police Reform since World War II,” Journal of Urban History (2017), 2, 4.
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World War II and the expanded availability of industrial jobs ushered in an extended period of Black
migration to the city. “It is safe to walk the streets at night in Milwaukee,” the writer assured readers.
“Although the Negro population is sizable, there have been no serious racial disturbances.” 5 The
racist implication was clear in this statement. Even with all of these Black people coming to live
among the city’s white citizens, crime rates were stable, order was preserved. In addition to
normalizing whiteness, the author made a distinction between Milwaukee and other U.S. cities
grappling with civil unrest in the summer of 1964. African Americans across the urban North,
frustrated by chronic police abuse and discriminatory housing, employment, and educational
structures, were challenging their imposed second-class citizenship through a series of uprisings that
saw Black citizens confront the “occupying” police forces who were, as James Baldwin wrote about
Harlem two years later, “the hired enemies of this population.”6 In turn, conventional media outlets
seemed on the hunt for effective policing models that projected an alternate image to “race riots”
and racialized urban disorders. One might argue they aimed to reaffirm the legitimacy of the police,
balancing “law-and-order” and the “procedural justice” then encoded in New Deal liberalism.7 In

“How One City Keeps Its Streets Safe,” 68-71. Milwaukee had not fully avoided “racial disturbances” during the postWorld War II period. While they did not occur on the scale of Harlem or North Philadelphia’s uprisings in 1964,
multiple “near riots” occurred among white police patrolmen and Black youth in the dozen years leading up to Harold
Breier’s 1964 appointment as police chief. That Black youth were being routinely watched, stopped, questioned,
harassed, and, in many cases, forcefully commandeered and arrested reflected broader feelings of racialized insecurity
and anxiety during the Cold War 1940s and 1950s. On the “near riots” that took place between white patrolmen and
Black youth in 1950s Milwaukee, see: Bernard Toliver and Joseph Himden, “Research in Police-Community Relations in
Inner-Core Area, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 1959–1960” (Master’s thesis, University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee, 1961);
Simon Ezra Balto, “‘Occupied Territory:’ Police Repression and Black Resistance in Postwar Milwaukee, 1950-1968,”
The Journal of African American History 98 (2) (Spring 2013), 245. On Cold War racial fears in Milwaukee, see: Kevin D.
Smith, “From Socialism to Racism: The Politics of Class and Identity in Postwar Milwaukee” Michigan Historical Review 29
(1) (Spring, 2003): 71-95. For a national study on this topic, see: Elaine Tyler May, Fortress America: How We Embraced Fear
and Abandoned Democracy (New York: Basic Books, 2017), 1-6.
6 James Baldwin, “A Report from Occupied Territory,” The Nation, July 11, 1966, accessed July 5, 2020,
http://www.thenation.com/article/report-occupied-territory/.
7 On Congress’ efforts to shore up the ability of police departments to administer law-and-order, see: “Law
Enforcement Assistance Act of 1965, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary United States
Senate,” U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1965. Historian Michael Flamm has described “law and order”
as “a new issue” that “emerged at the forefront of political discourse” in the 1960s as local and national conservative
forces addressed what they saw as New Deal-Great Society liberalism run amok. However, in Wisconsin at least, the
phrase had a longer history. “Law and order leagues” concerned about the influence and dangers of immigrant vice and
crime emerged as early as 1913, suggesting a much longer history of fear-driven tough on crime approaches in U.S. cities
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truth, fearful white citizens and politicians, in Milwaukee and elsewhere, employed law-and-order as
a euphemism to describe their desires for racial and class containment.
In framing the relationship between race and public safety, Milwaukee police bureaucrats
quoted in the above article failed to account for how law enforcement itself engendered feelings of
insecurity, animosity, and mistrust among Black citizens through the MPD’s “omnipresence” and
neglect of service in African American spaces.8 Poor, jobless, and under-employed Black adults, as
well as young people, articulated their own anxieties around navigating the city’s Sixth Ward streets. 9
An “attitude study” conducted in 1965 with both Black and white residents living in and around
Milwaukee’s “Inner Core” highlighted this racial discrepancy.10 Black respondents felt that their
neighborhoods got policed less effectively than exclusively white neighborhoods. A preponderance
cited the police as “disinterested,” “prejudiced,” “brutal,” and focused on “petty things.” How
African Americans saw an officer’s race mattered too, with a larger percentage citing white
patrolmen as “mean,” biased, and disrespectful.11 Conversely, white respondents were more likely to
describe white officers as “afraid” of working in Black neighborhoods and “not strict enough with
Negroes.” They observed “increasing crime” and “tension” in racially mixed communities and
expressed “fear” about disorder at a higher rate.12
Taken together, the 1964 U.S. News & World Report piece and 1965 attitude study implied a

undergoing social demographic change. “Fail to Censure Janssen on Vice,” The Milwaukee Sentinel, May 2, 1913, Part 1, 1.
Michael W. Flamm, Law and Order: Street Crime, Civil Unrest, and the Crisis of Liberalism in the 1960s (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2007), 1.
8 “Black Milwaukee” borrows from historian Trotter’s parlance in describing the socio-economically diverse world of
African-Americans in the city. Joe William Trotter, Jr., Black Milwaukee: The Making of an Industrial Proletariat, 1915-1945,
2nd ed. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2006), 118, 285.
9 The Sixth Ward was a municipal voting district encompassing the vast majority of the city’s African American
population. Trotter, Black Milwaukee, 118.
10 The attitude study was conducted in October 1965. It was commissioned by The Milwaukee Journal Co. It divided the
north side into three sections: “Upper Core,” “Middle Core,” and “Lower Core.” “Attitude Study among Negro and
White Residents in the Milwaukee Negro Residential Areas,” Bisbing Business Research, Green Bay, Wisconsin, 1965,
Wisconsin Historical Society, accessed August 19, 2019,
http://content.wisconsinhistory.org/cdm/ref/collection/tp/id/71332.
11 “Attitude Study among Negro and White Residents in the Milwaukee Negro Residential Areas,” 94.
12 “Attitude Study among Negro and White Residents in the Milwaukee Negro Residential Areas,” 89.
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racial disjuncture around policing in 1960s Milwaukee. Each suggested that understandings of the
MPD’s efficacy in preserving order, controlling crime, and safeguarding the city were incomplete
and disconnected from harsh truths faced by countless Black Milwaukee residents—namely that
policing in the city too often manifested as a racist enterprise. In this view, Milwaukee’s all-white
police bureaucracy was blind to the role that its virtually all-white police force played in instigating
racial discontent, in a place that historically privileged and prioritized whiteness. Furthermore, police
bureaucrats refused to see how the MPD’s own policies and discretionary practices fomented social
discord, indirectly proliferated crime, and hardened perceptions of Black criminality.13
This chapter begins the process of interrogating Milwaukee’s racial disjuncture around public
safety in the 20th century, exploring how it has characterized diverse experiences with local law
enforcement over time. It argues that the separation between how white and Black citizens
perceived the MPD in the 1960s is actually rooted in a narrative of policing exceptionalism that first
gained traction in the 1910s and 1920s, before flowering in full bloom in the 1930s and 1940s. This
narrative holds that the Milwaukee Police Department was unparalleled among U.S. law
enforcement agencies in its assumed professionalism, willingness to innovate, and effectiveness at
controlling crime. As a result, influential white observers in both government and policing circles
conferred a self-reinforcing, meritorious legitimacy upon the department—the legacy of which
remains a significant obstacle to both liberal reformers and abolitionists today.
The MPD’s leadership in the “reform era” of U.S. policing evolved in relation to convulsive
social, economic, and political events that carried profound racial implications.14 These included

Legal scholar Matthew Flynn defines police discretion as “the power of a police officer to decide in a variety of
situations to take action, not to take action, and how to take action. Policies may be made by the command level of a
police department to control that discretion.” Matthew J. Flynn, “Police Accountability in Wisconsin,” Wisconsin Law
Review 9 (4) (1974), 1148.
14 On the “reform era” in U.S. policing, see Eric H. Monkkonen, Police in Urban America, 1860-1920 (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1981); Hahn and Jeffries, Urban America and Its Police; Robert M. Fogelson, Big City Police
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977); Walker, A Critical History of Police Reform.
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World War I, the Great Migration, the Great Depression, and the rise of New Deal liberalism.15 The
MPD’s exceptionalism narrative emerged at a time when Milwaukee’s Black population numbered
less than 10,000, well before the city experienced its “late Great Migration” upon U.S. entry into
World War II. The Progressive Era was not one of racial enlightenment.16 In the early 20th century,
“white rage,” joined with nativist fervor.17 It was powered by new theories of race science that
diminished Black citizenship claims. Escalating forces of white supremacy inflicted mass terror
against Black men and women, and not exclusively in the Jim Crow South, but also in Midwestern
cities, like Milwaukee. One reason that the city’s Black population remained comparatively small in
these tumultuous years was that the MPD strictly enforced “vagrancy” laws against African
American transients and under-employed workers. These laws essentially “made it a crime to be a
certain type of person.” According to historian Risa Goluboff, one did not need to commit an
offense to be arrested; one merely had to look “suspicious,” “dissolute,” or “lacking a lawful
purpose.”18 As white officials affirmed, the MPD aggressively enforced vagrancy offenses against
Black people so as to prevent the violent unrest occurring in nearby cities with much larger Black
populations, such as occurred in Chicago in 1919. However, they were also acting in accordance
with racist white manufacturing and trade union prerogatives meant to undermine Black industrial
employment gains and labor competition. In 1931, this system of vagrancy enforcement contributed

Milwaukee County employment dropped by 44 percent from 1929 to 1932. Kenneth Germanson, “Workers’
Movements,” Encyclopedia of Milwaukee, July 10, 2020, https://emke.uwm.edu/entry/workers-movements/.
16 Milwaukee’s Black population mushroomed in the post-World War II period, from a population of around 10,000
residents in 1945 to more than 105,000 by 1970. While the number of white, or European ethnic Milwaukeeans
increased from 578,177 in 1940 to 675,572 in 1960. That number contracted to 605,372 in 1970 and has continued to
shrink ever since. Campbell Gibson and Kay Jung, “Historical Census Statistics on Population Totals by Race, 1790 to
1990, and by Hispanic Origin, 1970 to 1990, for Large Cities and Other Urban Places in the United States,” Population
Division, Working Paper No. 76, U.S. Census Bureau, February 2005, 113. Paul Geib refers to Black movement to
Milwaukee from the 1940s to the 1960s as a “late great migration,” given that the total number of Black migrants to the
city during this span far exceeded that of previous decades. Paul Geib, “From Mississippi to Milwaukee: A Case Study of
the Southern Black Migration to Milwaukee, 1940-1970,” The Journal of Negro History 83 (4) (Autumn, 1998), 231.
17 Carol Anderson, White Rage: The Unspoken Truth of Our Racial Divide (New York: Bloomsbury, 2016).
18 Risa Goluboff, Vagrant Nation: Police Power, Constitutional Change, and the Making of the 1960s (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2016), 2.
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to a policing regime that drew plaudits from the U.S. Justice Department, which lauded the MPD
for having “speedily detected, arrested, and promptly tried” all criminal suspects.19 The federal
government even recommended the department’s first-of-its-kind Police Training School to other
countries, bolstering its elite public status.20
Milwaukee’s narrative of policing exceptionalism originated in statutes passed during the
“long Progressive Era.”21 In the late 19th century, white Protestant social reformers were eager to
“clean up” the ill effects of rapid industrialization, expanded immigration, and machine politics in
the city.22 Concurrently, elite business interests demanded greater control over the political power of
organized labor.23 The MPD provided the most readily available and powerful means for reformers
and manufacturers to impose order over what they viewed as the worst outcomes of immigrant
working-class ascendancy. To ensure that police served their class-based interests, these groups
lobbied state officials in Madison, Wisconsin to override Milwaukee’s “home rule” of the police. 24
Ready to oblige, the state’s Republican-controlled legislature passed laws that, among other
outcomes, guaranteed police power would remain in the hands of capitalist and middle-class elites
and not the workers parties seeking greater municipal influence. Some, like the Social Democrats,

National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, Report on Police (Washington D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 1931), 3.
20 Police Chief Joseph Kluchesky to Mayor Daniel Hoan, December 12, 1939, Folder 668, “Police Department, 19341940,” Hoan, Daniel Webster Papers, Mss-0546, Milwaukee County Historical Society.
21 On the periodization of the “long Progressive Era,” see Robert D. Johnston, “The Possibilities of Politics: Democracy
in America, 1877 to 1917,” in American History Now, Eric Foner and Lisa McGirr, eds. (Philadelphia: Temple University
Press, 2011), 96-124.
22 This modernizing, reformist impulse among white Protestant middle-class reformers lingered in Milwaukee for
decades. See: Eric Fure-Slocum, Contesting the Postwar City: Working-Class and Growth Politics in Postwar Milwaukee (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
23 Sidney Harring’s work on the policing of class in the Gilded Age and Progressive Era U.S. is essential to
understanding these political dynamics around law enforcement in Milwaukee. Sidney L. Harring, Policing a Class Society:
The Experience of American Cities, 1865-1915 2nd ed. (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2017). For studies that
address policing and its relationship to urban class politics in the U.S., see: Marilynn Johnson, Street Justice: A History of
Police Violence in New York City (Boston: Beacon Books, 2003); Matthew A. Guariglia, “The American Problem: Race,
Empire, and Policing in New York City, 1840-1930,” (Ph.D. diss., University of Connecticut, 2019); Sam Mitrani, The
Rise of the Chicago Police Department: Class and Conflict, 1850-1894 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2013).
24 Bethany Harding, “Home Rule,” The Encyclopedia of Milwaukee, accessed September 11, 2019,
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had successfully vied for control of City Hall from 1910 to 1912.
Wisconsin Chapter 586, signed into law in 1911, bestowed lifetime tenure on Milwaukee fire
and police chiefs. It also granted them power to regulate their departments through a centralized
command structure. That law expanded on an 1885 statute, Chapter 387, which established the
Milwaukee Fire and Police Commission (MFPC) as the city’s public safety recruitment, testing, and
disciplinary review board. The MFPC was among the first civil service agencies in America and the
nation’s first independent public safety board.25 It was empowered to hear complaints against police
from registered property owners and to remove public safety chiefs “for cause.” These statutes
effectively insulated the MPD from municipal control and, at least on paper, instituted a quasijudicial oversight structure to ensure proper function of the fire and police departments.
The 1920s and 1930s were pivotal decades in the formalization of the MPD’s exceptionalism
narrative and in the attendant criminalization of blackness taking place across the white ethnic city.
It was in this fluctuating period of both economic excess and downturn that the department became
a national leader in the movement for police professionalism. However, in the eyes of the city’s
small but growing Black population, the MPD was also becoming a more pronounced, increasingly
racialized symbol of oppression. The 1930s, in particular, showed how the narrative of policing
exceptionalism intersected with and built off of evolving white conceptions of racial and class
hierarchy and their assumed relationship to public order, crime control, and safety. Even many white
liberals supported the cultural racism that buttressed the social, economic, and political denigration
of African Americans. The policing of public order and morals offenses reinforced that prejudice.
Milwaukee was not a racially democratic city, even under the leadership of its renowned
Other historians have argued that Philadelphia liberals established the nation’s “first independent civilian review
board” in 1958. That board, too, consisted of mayoral appointees who heard public complaints, could order
investigations, and served in a quasi-judicial capacity. They also claim it was the “longest lived,” despite Milwaukee’s
having been founded seventy-three years earlier. Eric C. Schneider, Christopher Agee, and Themis Chronopoulos,
“Dirty Work: Police and Community Relations and the Limits of Liberalism in Postwar Philadelphia,” Journal of Urban
History (2017), 3, 5.
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Socialist mayors.26 In this period, elite social reformers crusading against “immoral” vice activities
joined in the nationwide process of rendering Black criminality distinct from illicit white poor and
working-class behavior. And yet, it is also in this moment that Milwaukee’s small, but growing Black
middle-class first challenged what many in the city’s Bronzeville community saw as the racialized
policing of urban vice.27 A Black professional-led organization, the Sixth Ward Law and Order
League (SWLOL), presented an alternative to the all-white Citizen’s Law and Order League and its
morals enforcement of vice activities. The latter primarily concerned itself with illicit gambling and
sex work, particularly in the city’s increasingly Black near north side area. The former targeted
racially discriminatory policing of Black citizens and spaces.

The Statutory Roots of the MPD’s Exceptionalism Narrative
Understanding Milwaukee’s racial disjuncture around policing in the 1960s means first
excavating the city’s unsettled class politics near the turn of the 20th century. Milwaukee’s class
politics gave shape to the legal formation of the city’s police bureaucracy—the MFPC, MPD, City
Hall (Mayor’s office and Common Council), and Milwaukee County District Attorney’s office.
Knowing this provides a deeper sense of how the state structured police reform and mechanisms of
redress in the event of police misconduct, as well as why these tools have historically proven so
difficult to access for poor and working-class Black citizens experiencing police violence. In a period
of heavy industrialization and uneven wealth accumulation, immigration and working-class
suppression, fiscal surplus and economic depression, Milwaukeeans immersed themselves in, to
borrow historian Robert Wiebe’s verbiage, “the search for order.”28 Establishing control of the
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police was crucial to setting social and class boundaries and, thus, delimiting power.
White corporate and professional elites suppressed competing working-class interests by
strengthening their grip on law enforcement. While race may not appear to be a discernible factor in
the efforts, it is important to note that racial categories were still being sorted out. Policing played a
role in this process.29 Social and economic elites organized industrial cities like Milwaukee around
what scholar Cedric Robinson termed “racial capitalism.”30 Race has remained inextricably linked to
urban development in the U.S. The statutes analyzed in this chapter not only concentrated police
power in Milwaukee, but, over time, helped to confirm racial power in the city. With their passage,
the MFPC gained the authority to determine who got hired onto the MPD. Meanwhile, the police
chief not only wrote and enforced police department regulations, but also decided who was to be
promoted or chosen for specialized squads. In other words, they determined who would monitor
“subversive” activities among poor and working-class people, union leaders, and progressive-left
politicians. This was real power, and it was thoroughly racialized. Policing, as historian Matthew
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Guariglia argues, helped European ethnics “lead their communities into whiteness.”31 Accessing law
enforcement was essential to the larger “project of racial state building.” By the mid-20th century, the
MPD was predominantly staffed by men of Irish, German, and Polish ancestry.32 The department’s
apparent whiteness afforded social and economic mobility to European immigrants and their
descendants through civil service employment. Save for a handful of token appointments, that same
mobility was denied to Black and, later, Latinx citizens—really until the civil rights insurgencies of
the 1960s and 1970s.33 Anti-Black racism facilitated “the formation of a more consolidated
whiteness.”34 The MPD led this charge when police officers used their discretion to determine who
constituted a criminal and who did not. The Progressive Era police laws and their practical effects,
i.e. police professionalization through a civil service system, aided in normalizing public conceptions
of racial difference. Police choices, informed by individual biases about who was “good” and “bad,”
carried value across the civic landscape. The MPD’s racialized discretion was the bedrock of the
narrative of policing exceptionalism.
Milwaukee’s police bureaucracy was rooted in turn of the century campaigns to reform local
police authority so that it better served the interests of wealthy white manufacturers and professional
elites. These powerful entities struggled to impose “order” in the midst of the city’s rapid industrial
expansion in the late 19th century. Manufacturing growth transformed Milwaukee’s social and
economic life, in addition to its “ethno-cultural” geography.35 Ethnic, cultural, and religious identities
guided political affiliations across Wisconsin and the Northwest Territory.36 A corporate-backed
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Republican Party machine ascended in Milwaukee during the 1870s, achieving near parity with its
Democratic rival. Social and religious traditions continued to inform party affiliation, but this
relationship became tenuous amid industrialization, new and expanded immigration, and sundry
economic crises. Democrats and Republicans alike failed to meliorate economic depressions, like the
Panic of 1893. Thereupon, the two-party dynamic shifted. Third parties emerged, organized around
a more “class-conscious, issue-oriented brand of politics.”37 Milwaukee’s gaining industrial foothold
and foreign-born population shaped the city’s germinating working-class consciousness.38 Populist,
Progressive, and Socialist parties entered the electoral system after the 1870s; municipal politics
became more competitive, with voters growing fervent in their partisan loyalties. The Democratic
and Republican parties formed coalitions to challenge the rise of socialist and workers parties. In the
process, class became the crucial fault line that divided the city’s politics.39
Explosive industrial development, economic panics, and population changes meant new
demands for existing municipal services, including law enforcement. How the city delivered policing
services became a visible source of tension. In the 1880s, leaders of industry and commerce joined
middle-class, mainly Protestant social reformers concerned about the role of law enforcement in
managing class and socioeconomic status across a rapidly transforming urban terrain. These groups
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lobbied the Wisconsin legislature, then controlled by Republicans, to insulate the MPD from both
the threat of working-class political control and the corrupting influence of ward-based political
party machines. Manufacturers and social reformers wanted greater flexibility to, respectively, call
upon the police to crush labor rebellions and enforce vice ordinances. Corporate leaders were
anxious about rising workers parties and labor militants disrupting the flow of manufacturing and
commerce. Strikes grew more common and violent in the late-19th century. Workers parties appealed
to newly arrived Southern and Eastern European immigrant groups, as well as existing German
residents. Meanwhile, elite social reformers believed that only by decoupling the police from City
Hall would Milwaukee’s volatile social landscape be stabilized, immorality and corruption eliminated.
With a population of over 150,000 by the mid-1880s, Milwaukee was the only city in
Wisconsin designated as a “city of the first class” by the state legislature. However, Madison exerted
significant control over Milwaukee, determining its property and corporate tax structures, its welfare
services, and the functionality of its fire and police departments. While city officials advocated for
home rule, power in Milwaukee remained divided among Wisconsin legislators, City Hall, the
Milwaukee County Board of Supervisors, and a handful of local commissions.40
Ever since the state formally elevated the MPD in 1855 from preceding “marshal,”
“constable,” and “night watchmen” systems, frequent mayoral turnover and patronage appointments
had bred corruption. This led to ineffective public order enforcement.41 Police chiefs, who
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historically served at the behest of City Hall, were beholden to party directives.42 Machine politicians
called on the MPD to collect graft. Incoming mayors replaced police chiefs at will and handpicked
subordinates. Whoever generated the highest vote totals earned the job. After the appointment of
new chiefs, “the whole police force would quit…knowing that otherwise they would be fired.”43
Once in office, police chiefs faced the “constant fire of the party out of power.”44 The city
appointed eight different police chiefs from 1855 to 1885.45 High turnover led to poor service and
stifled internal development. This challenged the public’s ability to secure police accountability, or
“fair and effective police services.”46
Corporate and social elites advocated for a more stable, independent MPD that would no
longer be subject to the whims of the political party in power. But they also wanted a police force
capable of suppressing disorderly behavior, particularly in vice districts, and of turning back
working-class power, especially strikes. Workers parties were cultivating political strength through
Milwaukee’s Federated Trades Council (FTC). In 1882, they briefly won control of City Hall from
Republicans, forging a coalition with Democrats after a violent cigar-maker’s strike.47 “Responsible
citizens” answered this in 1884 by pushing for a civil service law in the state legislature that would
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eliminate the city’s “spoils system,” which determined who received public safety positions. Attorney
Jerome R. Brigham led this reform charge, essentially drafting the bill that later passed a Republicancontrolled legislature in 1885. “Chapter 378 of the Laws of 1885” was, according to former MFPC
chairman William Gore, the first statute in the U.S. to “institutionalize the concept of civilian
oversight of the police.”48 The law, which amended the City Charter, authorized Milwaukee mayors
to appoint fire and police commissioners to overlapping four-year terms.
While the terms of police power in the city would be clarified further by state legislators in
1911, the 1885 law fundamentally changed the structure of police leadership in Milwaukee. The
four-person MFPC was never to feature more than two members from the same political party. The
measure directed the commission to set rules and regulations for selecting, appointing, classifying,
and promoting all public safety personnel. However, it had no supervisory authority over the MPD’s
operations.49 The MFPC was authorized to hire and discharge public safety employees by a
unanimous vote, including chiefs. The statute only gave mayors power to suspend a fire or police
chief “for cause,” at which point the commission would hold a review hearing to recommend for or
against termination.50 Consequentially, the law granted fire and police chiefs indefinite lengths of
tenure, meaning they could potentially serve for life. The legislature approved Chapter 378 two years
after the U.S. Congress passed the Pendleton Act, which “transformed the nature of public service”
in American by instituting civil service.51 The law included a safeguard for rank-and-file officers,
protecting them from the re-shuffling of personnel based on economic strains.52 Jerome Brigham
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served as one of the first four MFPC members appointed by Mayor Emil Wallber, a fusion ticket
Republican who won by consolidating the working-class German vote.53
Milwaukee’s first “chief for life,” John Janssen, set the terms for the city’s narrative of
policing exceptionalism during his record thirty-three years at the helm of the MPD (1888-1921). He
did so by expanding police power and, thus, raising the department’s legitimacy in the eyes of
everyday people. In the process, the German-American chief helped usher in U.S. policing’s “reform
era,” also known as the “professionalization movement.” Janssen took full advantage of the
authority granted to him by the state.54 He established a centralized, tightly-controlled police agency.
Janssen was detail-oriented, known to work long hours. He was also a strict disciplinarian, who
expected obedience from all officers. To ensure that police personnel guarded Milwaukee’s streets
effectively, Janssen ordered beat patrolmen to report to supervisors at least once an hour using “call
boxes” that he had installed throughout the city.55
Chief Janssen grew Milwaukee’s police force dramatically during his lengthy tenure, from
181 to 649 officers. He also secured a number of pay increases for police personnel, with
competitive wage scales. Other reform innovations introduced by Janssen included a fingerprint
system (1907), motorized ambulances (1910), motorcycle patrols (1910), traffic enforcement (1914),
the nation’s first police band, and a police parade intended to boost the MPD’s image and showcase
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its state-sanctioned authority.56 The “Czar,” as Janssen became known, established the MPD’s first
district system, when he opened a south side police station in 1891. Janssen also founded one of the
first regular police training programs in the U.S. An ostensibly forward-thinking police academy
would, over time, become a hallmark of the department’s narrative of policing exceptionalism.
While Chief Janssen was formally non-partisan, he understood that his authority derived
from, as historian Sidney Harring writes, “the bourgeois political system.”57 That was who the MPD
ultimately served. The proudly anti-union, strike-quashing chief embodied the elite vision for
independent police power outlined in the 1885 statute. Janssen disdained the socialist politics of
Milwaukee’s working-class and scorned Social Democratic leaders publicly. 58 In 1911, Janssen told
the city’s first Socialist Party mayor, Emil Seidel, to “go to hell.” Seidel had called for the chief to
resign after authorizing brutality against women garment workers while they were on strike.59 Janssen
refused to step down.
The chief allegedly maintained a “black box” filled with “incriminating data” on city officials.
He was prepared to make this data public if they interfered with the MPD’s affairs. In key ways,
Janssen was a forerunner to police chief Harold Breier’s autocratic reign from 1964 to 1984. Both
men kept close tabs on local politicians, as well as poor and working-class people they saw as
disruptive to the status quo. Each was insular, secretive, and loathed anyone who challenged their
authority, especially progressive-left “agitators” and “radicals.” Janssen and Breier both employed
strict discipline against rank-and-file personnel who violated department regulations. Still, the former
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used his discretion to protect high-ranking officers who collected graft and served his direct needs.
One city official referred to Janssen as the “Prussian bulldozer” for how he closed in on crime.60 But
the chief was also selective about which laws his men enforced. He tolerated a good measure of
corruption and vice. During most of Janssen’s tenure, Milwaukee stayed a “wide open town.” Vice
was largely siloed by the MPD into a single downtown district. With the support of the five-term
Democratic Mayor David Rose, Janssen restricted saloons, gambling halls, and prostitution to the
Third Ward.61 Affluent residents and out-of-towners regularly visited the “high-class red light
district” on River St.62 Business men participated in vice activities, and profited from them as well.
Eventually, social reformers looked to indict Chief Janssen and Mayor Rose on gambling and
corruption charges. The chief of police protected the city’s vice district at the same time that he
“directed a crusade” against ancillary working-class “stall saloons,” brothels, and dives.63
When Milwaukee’s Socialist Party briefly won full control over city government in 1910, it
looked to clamp down on vice and corruption as part of a broader public health initiative. The
Socialist Party’s victory encouraged a more strained relationship between the MPD and City Hall.
The party saw the police department as a generally repressive force that was against working-class
interests. Nevertheless, police rank-and-file officers were municipal workers; they, too, deserved
reasonable wages, working conditions, hours, and time off. Milwaukee Socialists hoped to emphasize
the service-oriented aspects of policing, using patrolmen to check in on residents and businesses.64
Mayor Seidel advised Chief Janssen to inspect sanitation conditions, stop truancy, and regulate
factory smoke. Much to his chagrin, the MPD’s function remained order maintenance, protecting
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property, interfering with trade union activities, and aggressively breaking strikes. Janssen rebuffed
Socialist Party demands and made end-runs around the mayor via state representatives.65
It was in this period that Wisconsin’s legislature, controlled by Progressive Republicans,
revised the 1885 policing statute.66 Again, corporate and middle-class elites responded to rising labor
militancy and the Socialist Party’s ascendance in City Hall. Chapter 586, passed in 1911, made it
easier for the MPD to “break” work stoppages, which were becoming more frequent. The law
consequently deepened animosities between the department and Socialist leaders. The latter
considered vice, which Janssen openly tolerated, as worthy of close policing.67
Milwaukee’s Socialist Party was reformist. Its interests resembled liberal Democrats and
Progressive Republicans more than radical workers parties.68 The Socialist Party advocated for
policies that restricted corruption, regulated utilities, granted workers economic relief, and paid
down municipal debt. But they also embraced Milwaukee’s conservative trade union politics, which
tended to look down on unskilled laborers. Socialist Party co-founder Victor Berger, the first
Socialist elected to the U.S. House of Representatives (1910), set the party’s tone and direction. This
included racist proclivities.69 For example, local Socialists refused to advocate for Black workers and
welcomed racially restrictive covenants that relegated African Americans to inferior housing stock.70
Berger believed that the city’s working-class politics should emphasize an evolution within
capitalism, not its destruction. The party rejected the Marxist view that a revolutionary “cataclysm”
For example, Janssen appealed to the state legislature not to expand the MFPC from four to five members, which it
ultimately did. He also asked lawmakers to grant him the right to appeal suspensions and dismissals of officers by the
MFPC in court. Harring, Policing a Class Society, 97-99.
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Stevens, “Victor L. Berger,” Encyclopedia of Milwaukee, accessed July 6, 2020, https://emke.uwm.edu/entry/victor-lberger/.
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would birth socialism “in a pure and finished form.”71 Milwaukee Socialists also legislated on labor
demands through traditional government channels rather than seeking workplace confrontations
with hostile manufacturers. This further distinguished them from radical progressive-left parties.
Still, Chief Janssen’s MPD was hostile towards Socialist Party demonstrators and campaign
workers, who struggled to make the department operate on their behalf. The 1911 statute prevented
a Socialist-controlled City Hall from halting the MPD’s repressive anti-worker practices. In turn,
policing remained “a powerful weapon in the class struggle.” The MPD’s state-sanctioned autonomy
and ostensibly “value-neutral ideology” shielded it from political interference.72
Chapter 586 did not merely serve as a mechanism to quell working-class power. It also
strengthened the MFPC. In an apparent compromise with Social Democrats in Milwaukee, the state
legislature expanded the MFPC from four to five members, doing so against the wishes of Chief
Janssen. Mayor Seidel could now appoint a Socialist Party commissioner as a tie-breaking vote.
The law also authorized the commission to hear both disciplinary appeals and civilian complaints
made against officers or public safety departments. If a chief discharged, suspended, or reduced the
rank of an employee, the MFPC served as a quasi-judicial board of appeals.73 Previously, the
commission only appeared at citizen complaint hearings held by the MPD “in an oversight
capacity.”74 The MFPC’s revised statutory function now read:
In cases where duly verified charges shall be filed by any reputable freeholder…
setting forth sufficient cause for the removal of any member of either of said
departments, including the chiefs or their assistants, it shall be the duty of such
board to immediately suspend such member or officer and cause notice of the filing
of such charges…and to set a date as herein provided for the trial and investigation
Tula Connell, The Conservative Counterrevolution: Challenging Liberalism I 1950s Milwaukee (Urbana: University of Illinois
Press, 2016), 25. Milwaukee Socialists’ political focus may have associated them with “progressive urban governance,”
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of such charges…The board shall decide by a majority vote whether the charges are
sustained. If sustained the board shall immediately determine whether the good of
the service requires that the accused shall be removed, suspended from office
without pay for a period not exceeding sixty days or reduced in rank. If not sustained
the accused shall be immediately reinstated without prejudice…75
The 1911 statute was not a democratic measure. The state only authorized “reputable
freeholders,” or property owners, to file complaints against the police. This ensured that the MFPC
rarely heard Black grievances, particularly as the city’s African American population grew in postwar
decades. As historian Simon Balto has observed, “the extreme poverty of many African American
victims of police repression compounded the frustration they felt with the police department.” 76
Entrenched poverty and discriminatory lending made it difficult for Black families to purchase the
homes needed to file police grievances. Most complainants of color did not own property. The law
systematically barred thousands of Black renters, youth, and transients, all of who were overly
vulnerable to police misconduct, from obtaining justice.
Few Black migrants knew about the MFPC’s oversight function, or that property
qualifications precluded lawful complaints. The city did not publicize the commission’s oversight
role. When Black complainants did own property or had a complaint filed on their behalf by a
registered freeholder, the MFPC’s standard practice was to refer grievances to MPD district stations
for investigation, which rarely resulted in discipline. Despite Chapter 586’s democratic allusions,
most poor and working-class residents had no legal basis to disrupt a law-and-order regime that
principally safeguarded manufacturing, professional, and propertied interests. The law’s requirements
implied that a hierarchy of rights and privileges existed that benefited white landed citizens above all.
Democratizing Milwaukee’s police bureaucracy, therefore, was not simply a matter of changing
public perceptions of what equal citizenship entailed, but about further revising the statute that
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authorized police officials to so readily deny accountability.
More significantly, however, Chapter 586 clarified the powers enjoyed by Milwaukee public
safety chiefs. Notably, the statute eliminated the mayor’s ability to suspend fire or police chiefs “for
cause,” locating that power with the Fire and Police Commission.77 This language was important, as
it conferred even greater authority onto public safety chiefs who now enjoyed “full independence
and life-time tenure.” By and large, public safety chiefs enjoyed the support of the MFPC, whose
members served in a part-time capacity. For most commissioners, the appointment was a prestige
position that required little involvement. They tended to rubber stamp the police chief ’s
prerogatives.78 The law granted public safety chiefs power to “regulate” and “prescribe rules” for
their departments, including full “custody and control of all books, records, machines, tools,
implements, of every kind.”79 They were directed to “preserve” the “public peace” and enforce “all
laws and ordinances.” The police chief was solely responsible for the “efficiency and general good
conduct of the department.” Responsibilities became more contested as public complaints of police
brutality, neglect and abuse of power accelerated in the postwar and civil rights eras. Because
Milwaukee’s city charter had no language forcing police chiefs to obey City Hall’s orders, the
potential for a contentious relationship stayed ever-present.80

Politics, Class, and Race
With Chapters 387 (1885) and 586 (1911) on the books, Milwaukee moved ahead of the
curve on a sweeping national project of police professionalization. From the Progressive Era
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through the mid-1930s, the MPD cultivated an international reputation for technical innovation,
strategic foresight, and effective crime control. Freed from outside interference and term limits, the
department institutionally blossomed from 1888 to 1936 under the guidance of just two police
chiefs: John Janssen and Jacob Laubenheimer.81 The city’s first and only Socialist police chief,
Joseph Kluchesky, followed from 1936 to 1945.82 He introducing reforms characterized by the
“liberal law-and-order” politics of the World War II era. Alongside infrastructural upgrades
advocated for by Socialist Party mayors in waste disposal, water management, street lighting, and
parks beautification, the MPD’s crime fighting capacities contributed to Milwaukee’s vaunted status
as “the healthiest large city in the nation.”83 Accurate or not, this was the story that police
bureaucrats came to tell themselves about the department and what many residents, mainstream
press outlets, and public commentators increasingly understood to be true.
Well into the 1950s, academic researchers characterized the MPD as a pioneering law
enforcement agency.84 The department, in this view, helped modernize policing during what criminal
justice scholars have referred to as policing’s “reform era.”85 From the 1920s through the 1950s, the
MPD garnered national accolades, including being singled out by the National Commission on Law
Observance and Enforcement, a federal committee that researched crime and policing in the U.S.
towards the end of Prohibition (1931). In 1939, Chile’s Popular Front government verified that the
MPD’s reputation carried across continents; it inquired about sending three federal officers to
To put this in perspective, Chicago appointed twenty-one General Superintendents or Police Commissioners during
Chief Janssen and his successor Jacob Laubenheimer’s forty-eight years running the MPD. Samuel E. Walker, A Critical
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Milwaukee’s Police Training School to learn about traffic management and law enforcement
education.86 As the U.S. News & World Report story shared at the outset of this chapter demonstrates,
positive national reporting on the MPD lasted well into the 1960s.87
And yet, Milwaukee’s narrative of policing exceptionalism was forged during the same early
20th century decades that saw troubling narratives of racial difference and white supremacist
coercion intensify. White powerbrokers in the city gradually linked the movement, behavior, and
attitudes of Black men and women more closely to urban disorder, illicit vice activities, and juvenile
delinquency.88 They did so despite many white people’s co-participation in vice and crime. Processes
of Black criminalization were by no means unique to Milwaukee. Throughout the Progressive Era,
white middle class citizens in positions of institutional and academic authority condemned blackness
as distinct from poor and working-class white immigrant behavior. Many did so on the same
biological basis used to justify racial enslavement and post-Emancipation systems of Black penal
control, like the “convict lease” system.89 By the New Deal 1930s, Progressive Era reformers were
doing so on cultural grounds. Ostensibly well-meaning social scientists, intellectuals, and liberal
reformers, as historian Khalil Muhammad has argued, led in justifying Black racial inferiority and
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legitimizing the specialized treatment African Americans received from municipal institutions, like
the police.90 Women’s clubs, the Catholic Church, medical experts, and social scientists all had a hand
in working to address conditions “known to foster crime and criminals.”91
Overwhelmingly white police regimes based order maintenance practices on racialized crime
discourses that exonerated white behavior, while criminalizing Black comportment. The statistics
police collected in comparatively poor, racially segregated Black urban spaces and vice districts
helped generate criminalizing narratives.92 Consequently, the selective discretion of white officers on
patrol in these areas fueled racially biased outcomes: higher rates of Black arrests, brutality, and
death at the hands of the police. Law enforcement did so, one historian writes, “by distorting the
reality and perception of crime”—misrepresentations that blended into the perceived truth of
Milwaukee’s narrative of policing exceptionalism.93 While there was some accuracy to the MPD’s
exalted professional reputation, at least from the perspective of technical innovation, it clearly came
at the expense of African American oppression.
Milwaukee police chiefs symbolized the MPD’s vaunted national standing. Longtime Socialist
Mayor Daniel Hoan (1916-1940) placed veteran detective Jacob Laubenheimer’s name before the
MFPC in 1921 to lead the department just before Chief John Janssen died that year.94 The MPD’s
new administrator was not only commended for maintaining a low crime rate throughout his fifteen
year tenure, but also for implementing a proto-version of what criminologists came to refer to as
“community policing.”95 Laubenheimer’s approach to crime control relied on citizens assuming “to
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an unusual degree, a responsibility for the maintenance of public order.”96 However, the department
never fully turned away from Janssen’s more reactionary and anti-labor model. The consolidation of
police authority under a unitary chief aided Laubenheimer in further expanding the MPD’s budget,
garnering resources, and increasing the number of sworn personnel.97 He began a pension system
for retired officers and, like his predecessor, fought to increase rank-and-file salaries.
Structurally, Laubenheimer re-organized the MPD’s Detective Bureau; modernized the
department’s record-keeping and crime tracking systems; and established early medical, traffic, and
identification bureaus. In 1922, he opened one of the nation’s first dedicated police training
academies.98 There, new recruits and veteran officers learned about the laws they enforced; “effective
wrestling and jiu-jitsu holds;” “marksmanship;” and how to “hunt down criminals,” administer first
aid, and “handle their jobs with courtesy and tact.”99 Laubenheimer founded the Milwaukee Police
Training School because, as he said, “uniformed policemen, especially the traffic officers” had been
“condemned in a bombardment of complaining letters, delegations, and newspaper editorials, for
their abusiveness and insolence.”100 An aspect of the training was “acquainting” police with the
district attorney’s office, the local court system, and the county morgue.101
In December 1930, Laubenheimer instituted an early radio communications division within
the MPD, a hallmark of reform era policing.102 Radios helped facilitate rapid police responses to
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crime. Dispatch operators could now communicate directly with squad cars, allowing them to
quickly address reported offenses and make arrests. In turn, the department emphasized a rapid
response approach, while de-emphasizing preventive beat patrol strategies.103 Nevertheless, MPD
officers remained “ubiquitous” on the city’s streets, especially during Prohibition and the Great
Depression Era of the 1920s and 1930s. Police militarization was part of the department’s response
orientation. It’s important to recognize that the MPD’s militarization was not ushered in during the
1960s as a response to Black political dissent, but rather in the 1930s as a reaction to white labor
militancy. Under Laubenheimer, the MPD added high-powered rifles, machine guns, and armored
squad cars to its advanced weapons arsenal.104 Captain Floyd McGuire’s trainings incorporated
lessons in shooting and handling “sub-machine guns,” “tear gas bombs,” and “personal combat.”105
This expansion of police strength added to the MPD’s training procedures and revised bureaucratic
and communications structures. All of these largely internally generated reforms, funded by city and
state government, fortified public perceptions of police legitimacy.
As Chief Laubenheimer led the MPD deeper into law enforcement’s reform era, the
department’s exceptionalism narrative hardened. But it did so alongside both interpersonal and
institutional racism. Anti-Black discrimination was, in part, fed by rising economic anxieties and
fears among white working-class ethnics over interracial job competition. Since the late 19th century,
Black migrants had been leaving the Jim Crow South in ever higher numbers. Civic leaders and white
residents in Milwaukee expressed apprehension about Black in-migration during the 1910s, 1920s,
and 1930s. Some presumed that Black movement spelled not only economic peril for white
industrial workers, but a latent criminal threat. Despite the depths of racist white terror being
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inflicted upon Black men and women, not only across the U.S. South, but nationally, many white
residents subscribed to racist stereotypes of African American migrants as deviant and disorderly.
Racial bigotry and fears about Black migration were woven into local politics. Coming on the
heels of “Red Summer” in 1920, Mayor Daniel Hoan ran for a second term on a “law and order”
platform.106 Nearby Chicago had just experienced one of the nation’s deadliest race riots in history. 107
Hoan was determined to uphold Milwaukee’s self-proclaimed status as “the most peaceful city in the
entire world.”108 While Milwaukee did not experience a riot itself, white residents feared racial
violence could reach their city’s limits. That anxiety lingered for years. Milwaukee NAACP President
Edward Thomas, for instance, was arrested and charged with attempting to “stimulate a race riot” in
April 1921. He had placed two photographs of racial terror lynchings inside a street facing window
of the civil rights organization’s headquarters, visible to passersby, so as to raise awareness and spark
public conversation. A crowd of Black spectators gathered around the images and discussed their
contents. Police dispersed the crowd, confiscated the pictures, and sent them to the City Attorney’s
office.109 Tempering opportunities for dissent mattered far more than reckoning with the problem of
the color line for white officials.
Although Milwaukee’s Black population would see its most extensive growth after World
War II, a comparatively small Black community had formed in the city by the 1920s. The western
Great Lakes region proved to be an attractive destination for thousands of African American
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refugees, most fleeing white racial exploitation or searching for better-paying jobs outside of the Jim
Crow South. While most Black folk moving to the region settled in Chicago, some continued north
to Milwaukee. Here, they hoped to secure a social and economic foothold. Discriminatory rental and
real estate markets forced early Black newcomers to inhabit an established “red light district” on the
northern edge of downtown known colloquially as “Little Africa.” Progressive reformers called this
section “the badlands,” based on its scattered taverns, brothels, and gambling dens.110 Segregation
ensured Black peoples’ spatial isolation from more affluent white ethnic groups. Black migration was
connected to immigration and labor dynamics. Restrictive federal immigration laws slowed Southern
and Eastern-European settlement in Milwaukee during World War I and the 1920s. The unexpected
shortage of unskilled labor encouraged the recruitment of Black workers on cheap contracts.
Immigration quotas helped to more than double the city’s Black population, from 980 residents in
1910 to 2,229 in 1920.111 By 1930, more than 7,500 African Americans called Milwaukee home.
Black migrants worked for meager wages in meatpacking plants, leather tanneries, metal foundries,
and construction sites. While only nineteen percent of Black men in Milwaukee held industrial jobs
as of 1910, that number rose to almost eighty percent by 1930.112 Though under-skilled and
vulnerable to firings in times of economic uncertainty, a distinct Black industrial “proletariat”
formed in the late 1910s and 1920s.113
Amid this expanded Black migration, white Protestant nativism threatened Milwaukee’s
ethnic diversity.114 White power brokers, mostly of German and “Anglo-Saxon” descent, determined
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that Italians, Greeks, Slavs and other Central and Eastern European groups were failing to
acculturate, or “melt,” into the city’s social fabric. Their anxieties were rooted in xenophobic fears
that Eastern Europeans harbored anti-American beliefs and values, or were Bolshevik sympathizers
eager to undermine their patriotic way of life. Civic leaders instituted assimilation programs in
schools and corporate workplaces. English lessons and civics courses brought thousands of Central
and Eastern European immigrants into Milwaukee’s conventional social order, as well as its thriving
industrial economy. The assimilation programs foreshadowed how white officials and social service
providers, as well as some Black professionals, would respond to African American migration after
1940. Long-standing narratives of racial difference that tied blackness to criminality formalized in
academic journals and social scientific literature during the first few decades of the 20 th century.
White scholars inhibited African Americans from treading the same path to “whiteness” as Eastern
and Southern European immigrants, establishing racist justifications for excluding Black men and
women from the benefits of full citizenship.115 White fears around cultural “others” grew
increasingly racialized in the pre-World War II period.
Few exhibited anti-blackness more overtly than the resurgent Ku Klux Klan of the 1920s.116
Chapters surfaced in this decade far beyond the South, including in Wisconsin, a former Union state
and key Underground Railroad terminus.117 The white nationalist organization, initially established in
1865 during the early days of Reconstruction, included many white sheriffs and lawmen in its ranks.
Despite Mayor Hoan’s claim that the Klan would “find Milwaukee a hotter place to exist than in
Hades itself,” a Klavern formed on W. Kilbourn Ave. in 1921.118 Black residents cheered the Socialist
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mayor for stating that “police would make short work of anyone advocating violence.” 119
Nonetheless, Milwaukee’s Klavern featured 4,400 members in 1924. Dedicated to the “faithful
maintenance of white supremacy, they ranged from Freemasons to Socialists and exhibited a
“contempt for Catholicism.”120 Milwaukee’s Klavern fit into a larger white supremacist project.
Numerous “sundown towns,” for example, dotted Wisconsin’s landscape in the 1920s and
subsequent decades. These all-white communities, save for a few token Black families, restricted
African Americans and other racial minorities by “force, law, or custom.”121 The Klan’s Nativist
actions served as a precursor to the formation of more buttoned-up, if barely less racist
conservative organizations in the post-World War II period, like the John Birch Society.122
While it appears that most Black Milwaukeeans evaded the overt anti-blackness embodied by
the Klan, white racism nevertheless influenced many aspects of Black life. African American
workers were “last hired and first fired” amid economic downturns and experienced rampant
discrimination in the housing market and in public accommodations.123 Black male and female
domestics, industrial laborers, and middle-class professionals lived in close proximity, often in
unsanitary conditions.124 Most lacked affordable or accessible housing options. Residential
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segregation resulted from white collusion in real estate, finance, and homeowner’s associations. The
passage of discriminatory zoning ordinances, the use of racially restrictive housing covenants, and
the enactment of biased federal housing policies all contributed to the city’s worsening racial
apartheid. As Milwaukee’s growing Black community moved slightly north from downtown,
segregation and ethnic succession proceeded on a block by block basis. Many white homeowners
were simply unwilling to share residential space with Black families. They framed their hesitancy in
economic and culturally racist terms. To their benefit, white folk were more financially, legally, and
socially equipped to move out of Milwaukee’s aging core and, in the 1930s and 1940s, took
advantage of federal housing and Veterans programs to do so.125 Still, a good many white residents
retained homes and apartment buildings within the city’s African American community, some
renting to Black tenants and families at exorbitant rates.
In the context of hardening residential segregation on Milwaukee’s near north side, Black
families cultivated an array of institutions that served community needs, from churches and
newspapers, to fraternal associations, banks, and improvement organizations. The Milwaukee
NAACP (f. 1915) and Urban League (f. 1919) branches played a role in working to build racial parity
and Black resiliency through tactics of civic negotiation, liberal accommodation, and legal
intervention. Black churches served as community pillars and meeting hubs.126 These institutions,
among others, disseminated racial uplift, facilitated dialogues with white city officials and business
leaders, and addressed civil rights concerns.
In time, Milwaukee’s Black middle class also advocated for better police-community relations
and the hiring of Black officers to patrol in the Sixth Ward. The need for Black police representation
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grew more urgent in the 1920 and 1930s. Adequate police protection on the north side was at a
premium, especially given the area’s poorer living conditions and the MPD’s selective tolerance of
vice. The Wisconsin Enterprise Blade, a Black-run newspaper, responded to the alleged molestation of
a Black women in the area by editorializing on the need for “A Colored for Detective” in 1925. 127
Biased policing undermined Black safety, both from white patrolmen who allowed crimes to occur
and from police officers who occasionally inflicted violence on residents. Chandler Owen, a visiting
Black socialist writer, reflected on law enforcement’s sharpening double-standards and
underprotection in Milwaukee’s Bronzeville neighborhood: “In the Negro section, dives are allowed
to run wide open, gambling houses are not suppressed and places of ill repute are prevalent.”128
Meanwhile, vice is “suppressed in other parts” of the city. Chief Laubenheimer responded, accusing
Owen of “exaggerating” and playing up his outsider status.
Nevertheless, the MFPC authorized the employment of the city’s first Black police officer in
1924.129 Judson Walter Minor, Jr. moved to Milwaukee from Brunswick, Georgia in 1918, part of the
first wave of Black migrants venturing from the largely rural-agricultural South to the urbanindustrial North.130 He entered Milwaukee’s labor market as a skilled worker, trained in masonry at
Tuskegee Institute.131 Minor harbored expectations of making a decent living, raising a family, and
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giving back to his community. In 1924, the MPD was almost all German and Irish American. Black
residents numbered just a few thousand and had zero police representation. Upon his appointment,
Minor wasted no time testing out his authority. He arrested a disgruntled white bridge operator,
allegedly drunk at the switch. The white man was shocked at being arrested by a Black officer, a
verboten act in the South.132 He berated Minor, earning a disorderly conduct charge.
The encounter was not the patrolman’s last with an antagonistic white citizen. Minor faced
the Klan’s wrath directly while on patrol in a confrontation that suggested some white Milwaukeeans
expected white citizens to keep order in their communities; the only “legitimate” policing was white
policing. In 1925, Minor arrested a 45-year-old “Klansman,” Henry Henning, for disorderly conduct
in Bronzeville. The self-avowed “charter member of the Lone Star Klavern” approached the Black
officer while drunk, reportedly exclaiming, “I don’t like Koons [sic], Kikes [sic] or Katholics [sic],
especially in uniform.” A judge gave the “disorderly” man a minor fine and he was freed the next
day—a show of judicial restraint less readily available to Black arrestees apprehended on
misdemeanor offenses.133 Minor’s encounter illustrated the depths of interpersonal racism that some
white residents subjected Black citizens to in public, as well as what Black officers could expect to
face in the white supremacist city. Moments of evaded justice like this one surely informed Minor’s
decision to leave the police force after only a few years of service.134 This indicated that on-the-job
racism had the power to shape Black police attrition rates, a pattern that became more discernible as
Black officers got hired in larger numbers after World War II.135
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Policing, Industrial Labor, and Racism
Black police hiring, token as it was, played into the MPD’s developing narrative of policing
exceptionalism. However, the department’s status as an independent, innovative and effective crimefighting agency would be brought to its height by the U.S. Justice Department. The federal
government engaged in its first large-scale study of crime and law enforcement in America from
1929 to 1931. That study positioned the MPD as the nation’s model law enforcement agency,
arguing that “no other city has such a record.”136 Consequently, the city’s narrative of policing
exceptionalism was more firmly established in the eyes of a broad public and the city’s police
bureaucracy.
President Herbert Hoover formed the eleven-person National Commission on Law
Observance and Enforcement in 1929, tasking it with investigating policing conditions and the
causes of crime across Prohibition America.137 Former Attorney General George Wickersham
chaired the group, which set out to research, analyze, and make recommendations.138 The
“Wickersham Commission” aimed to modernize criminal procedure across the U.S.. It followed in
the tradition of civilian-led investigatory bodies from the Progressive Era, which gathered
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information on urban problems, including police abuse, and made recommendations, such as the
expansion of civilian oversight.139 For eighteen months, the Wickersham commission studied
policing and lawlessness in the U.S. In 1931, it issued a series of reports, headed by its “Proposals to
Improve Enforcement of Criminal Law in the United States.”140 Many local police administrators
rejected the commission’s recommendations based on “longstanding traditions of local jurisdiction”
and opposition to the establishment of a nationalized police system.141
The federal government’s findings exposed the ingrained nature of police violence,
especially around practices of the “third degree.” The third degree, according to the commission,
meant “the employment of methods which inflict suffering, physical or mental, upon a person, in
order to obtain from that person information about a crime.”142 Despite legal restrictions against its
use, federal investigators found that aggressive behavior among patrolmen, detectives, and
prosecutors was common nationwide. Law enforcement organizations responded by denying this
finding and the International Association of Chiefs of Police demanded a counter-investigation.143
Racist police actions were not, apparently, a primary research concern for Wickersham and his
colleagues, as they failed to systematically account for distinctions in how police achieved forced
confessions among white and Black suspects. But they did note that “third degree practices were
particularly harsh in the case of Negroes.”144 The commission’s analysis of the third degree was
narrow in that it relied only on legal evidence. It excluded, as historian Nora Krinitsky writes, the
“violence that may have occurred in other police-civilian interactions.”145 This suggests that
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discretionary abuses of police power were even more widespread.
The Wickersham Commission cited “the short term of service” of police administrators as
“the chief evil” underlying any public “loss of confidence” in law enforcement. Milwaukee was the
exception. Because Wisconsin law afforded public safety chiefs lifetime tenure and independent rulemaking authority, the MPD was presented as a brilliant example of police professionalism.146 Since
chiefs in other cities were subjected to “arbitrary dismissal,” and felt compelled to protect their “own
patrons,” the “interest of the public” got neglected. Other departments had, the commission
reported, failed “in the prevention, detention, and prosecution of criminals.”147 Milwaukee,
conversely, was “cited as a city free from crime…where the criminal is speedily detected, arrested,
and promptly tried and sent on his way to serve his time.”148 Because “no control over the chief is
even attempted by the politicians,” they are able to “act independently, freed from the dictation of
politics.” August Vollmer, regarded as the father of the police professionalization, extolled the
“refreshing” organization of law enforcement in Milwaukee. He claimed the city’s police chiefs were
“amply protected by legal enactments.”149 Such recognition confirmed for city officials, the MFPC,
and everyday citizens that Milwaukee’s police force was indeed exceptional. A legacy of this federal
recognition was that public calls for police reform became a political “third rail.” City officials dared
not challenge the MPD or, more specifically, the police chief ’s insulated authority, lest they risk being
voted out of office in an upcoming election.
Closer scrutiny, however, shows that all was not ideal for the department according to the
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commission’s report. It stated that Milwaukee was not immune to the bootlegging, gambling, and
the vice typical of the Prohibition era. The MPD denied this claim. Nonetheless, shortly after the
commission gathered its data on policing in the city, Chief Laubenheimer said his department was
opening “a concerted drive against gambling dens.”150 Much of the MPD’s renewed attention on
vice would be focused on the increasingly Black near north side, where police now funneled and
selectively enforced vice. More rigorous morals enforcement joined existing police crackdowns on
radical labor actions, especially those planned by groups outside of the trade union movement. For
example, Chief Laubenheimer instructed roughly two hundred officers, ten armed with machine
guns, to put-down a street protest organized by the local Communist Party in March 1930.
“International Unemployment Day” demonstrators, “communists and ‘red’ agitators,” had instigated
a riot, according to The Milwaukee Sentinel, battering police, onlookers, and motorists.151 Alternatively,
Communist Party newsletters blamed the police and mainstream dailies for fomenting a counterinsurgent disturbance. The MPD’s “Red Squad” arrested fifty-one protest participants. Officers
identified Communist leaders as co-conspirators and charged them with “incitement to riot.” Other
arrested people received “vagrancy” charges. Police identified foreign-born “aliens” and subjected
them to deportation. Laubenheimer unilaterally banned Communists from holding “future meetings,
demonstrations, and parades.”152 Despite the city’s best efforts “to jail, deport, and discredit the
Communists,” historian S. Ani Mukherji writes, “jobless workers flocked to Milwaukee’s
Unemployed Councils in the early 1930s” amid dire economic conditions.153
Police hostilities towards Black citizens throughout the 1920s and 1930s intersected with
anti-Black labor dynamics perpetrated by white employers and unions. White workplace aggression
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ebbed and flowed according to national economic, social, and political factors, such as the Great
Depression, the federal government’s New Deal response, and conservative anti-Communist
anxieties. Largely relegated to unskilled positions, Black laborers earned meager wages based on
discriminatory pay scales. They had access only to the least desirable jobs at the lowest-paying firms.
Racist white employers and trade union attitudes prevented Black upward mobility. Negative
stereotypes about Black workplace habits pervaded on shop floors. Unions discriminated through
“exclusionary clauses, rituals, or by [establishing] separate all-black locals.” Despite proclaiming his
distaste for segregation, Mayor Hoan supported racially separate unions.154 Conversely, Black
professionals called for integrated labor confederations and workplaces. As Black migration
increased, police aggravated the city’s economic racism. MPD actions matched the social attitudes of
the broader white society. In 1923, for example, during a period of relative prosperity, the
department clamped down on poor Black migrants seeking industrial and service jobs. 155 Detectives
arrested thirty-nine Black men on vagrancy charges in a single raid. Twelve had employment and
money on hand; they successfully beat the charge. However, a white judge informed twenty-seven
others that Milwaukee had no use for “their kind.”156 The judge sentenced the men to ninety days of
labor, echoing the Jim Crow South’s inhumane exploitation of the 13 th Amendment’s involuntary
servitude loophole. Their forced labor was to be followed by expulsion from the city.
Entwined issues of race and class that conceivably threatened to crack the MPD’s narrative
of policing exceptionalism in the 1930s only fortified it. Racial attitudes and class affinities
progressively superseded the department’s occupational loyalties to manufacturing and social elites.
Despite class-based grievances among white industrial employees and the police—who were
As Hoan stated, he did so “in theory.” Trotter, Black Milwaukee, 55.
Still, industrial production did moderately recede between 1923-1924. Victor Zarnowitz Business Cycles: Theory, History,
Indicators, and Forecasting (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 229. This was also a period of national immigrant
exclusion that saw rising Black migration to Milwaukee. The Milwaukee Urban League estimated the city’s Black
population at 5,000 in 1923. Trotter, Black Milwaukee, 58.
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historically charged by business leaders with defending capitalist interests—both parties found
themselves accessing a shared racial identity founded on white supremacy and the dignity of bluecollar work. Black labor competition repelled white industrial workers, who engaged in wildcat “hate
strikes” meant to restrict them from joining an instable local economy amid the Great Depression.157
The 1934 Wehr Steel Strike provided an early, conspicuous example of the informal
partnership between white blue-collar workers and police in undermining Black labor competition.
It was, according to historian Joe Trotter, the “first clear-cut case of racial violence in the city’s
industrial labor market.”158 The conflict started when white Wehr Steel Machine Shop employees
struck to gain recognition of their newly formed American Federation of Labor (AFL) union.159
White workers did not inform their Black counterparts at the plant of recent union organizing.
When the company responded to the labor action by bringing in Black strikebreakers, white workers
and police attacked them for crossing the picket line. In one instance, white officers and workers
overturned a carload of Black men approaching the plant. The foundry’s owners called on the MPD
to defend the Black workers they hired to keep the business running, as well as to protect their
property and maintain order. Instead, the police crossed their own occupational allegiances and
engaged in a brutal act of racial oppression.160 Mayor Hoan responded to the strike by pushing for
the Boncel ordinance (1935). The act authorized either the mayor or police chief to shut down
manufacturing plants when they refused to negotiate during labor conflicts, of which 107 occurred
in 1934.161 The city may have had little specifically to say about the brutality police inflicted upon
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Black strikebreakers, but the ordinance nonetheless targeted the violence on display.162
To be sure, the Wehr company was as racist as white workers who joined with police to
attack Black strikebreakers. Like most other Milwaukee manufacturers, Wehr hired non-union Black
workers to save money.163 Depressed wage structures equated to higher profits for the business.
When labor disputes ended, corporations like Wehr fired their temporary Black workers. They
considered them cheap labor, only capable of finishing marginal jobs.164 Black industrial workers
performed the hot, dirty, dangerous work that white employers believed them naturally “suited
for.”165 At the same time, Wehr sought to undermine the power of white labor organizations. Plant
managers warned Black personnel not to join the AFL union. Black workers saw this as an effort to
remove them from the city’s industrial plants. Black laborers themselves were not against organizing.
During the 1934 strike, Milwaukee NAACP President Joseph Dorsey joined with the Milwaukee
Urban League (MUL) to unionize Black workers. This stood against company protocol, as Wehr had
made a rule to avoid the formation of non-company unions. Aside from a handful of Congress of
Industrial Organizations locals, the city’s trade unions refused Black membership. While the
attractiveness of Chicago as a destination was likely the prevailing factor, employer and union
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discrimination against Black workers contributed to Milwaukee’s low Black migration totals before
World War II. After 1934, established Black professionals and working-class migrants collaborated
more deliberately to organize Black workers and address economic discrimination.166

Vice Policing and the Sixth Ward Law and Order League
As racial segregation on Milwaukee’s north side hardened during the Great Depression,
discriminatory policing grew more conspicuous. The MPD’s renewed focus on vice crime amid the
recession initiated a gradual turn away from monitoring white poor and working-class behavior and
towards more concerted surveillance of poor and working-class Black behavior. This was especially
the case after the department began directing vice away from the River St. area and more towards
non-white spaces, like Black sections of the Sixth Ward. The River St. district once brimmed with
bars, gambling, and sex work in the early 20 th century, attracting an inter-state clientele. However,
white middle-class reformers lobbied state officials to pass regulatory morals laws and pressed law
enforcement to funnel vice away from downtown. In turn, the MPD increasingly pushed vice into
Bronzeville. There, police regulated prostitution and gambling, specifically the neighborhood’s
“policy racket.”167 Police vice regulation was selective and lasted well into the post-World War II
period, when social reformers demanded ever stricter morals enforcement amid a national “juvenile
delinquency” crisis. Outwardly, reformers presented this shift as one that benefitted Black migrants.
In the 1940s and 1950s, the MPD increasingly staked its reputation on how well it preserved order
on the near north side. The department frequently “collided with the growing open-air socializing
and drinking of the sixth ward.”168 Black migrants suffered from a dearth of adequate housing, jobs,
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and recreational opportunities, forcing them to congregate on city streets. Accordingly, police
patrolmen and Morals Squad officers looked to challenge Black residents for control of the streets.
The result was more tumultuous police-Black community relations.
The MPD was known to use a heavy hand when regulating vice, especially in Black spaces.
Milwaukee’s small but well organized Black middle class decried the department’s aggressive
treatment of “juvenile offenders apprehended on Walnut St.,” Bronzeville’s main artery.169 They
rejected associations of criminality with blackness, while protesting against entwined issues of
economic racism, employer and union discrimination. As Milwaukee NAACP leader James Dorsey
responded to the Milwaukee Woman’s Club’s 1940 vice crusade, “Give our people work and there
won’t be any ‘policy.’”170 Black professionals like Dorsey did not approve of gaming per se but saw a
lack of opportunity for the city’s nearly 10,000 Black inhabitants to earn a living. Speaking at a
community symposium, undertaker Emmet Reed, Jr. noted that the Sixth Ward policy racket
supplied jobs to some two hundred Black citizens “as [number] writers and in other capacities.”171
Discriminatory employment double-standards converged with racist ideas about the policing of
Black space. These shaped policy choices; City Hall encouraged order maintenance policing at the
behest of white social reformers. Economic racism compelled Black residents into taking vice work
and engaging in activities that corrupt police officers were willing to overlook for a cut of the action.
Economic improvements and structure of access and opportunity, as opposed to police
empowerment, would have made a difference for Black families. Sometimes they did. For instance,
Milwaukee brothels, some of which relied on the labor of Black sex workers, closed after the federal
government provided Black women with Works Progress Administration jobs. 172 Mayor Dan Hoan
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understood these economic dynamics. In 1925, he advocated for reducing an investment in one
hundred fifty new patrolmen to fifty officers as a cost-saving measure. City Hall then reinvested the
savings ($2,000 per patrolman) “towards the maintenance of playgrounds and social centers.”
Consequently, he argued, Milwaukee was able to maintain its reputation as “the crimeless city.” 173
With a brief end in Socialist mayoral leadership during the 1940s, the wartime economic boom, and
the racial hysterics that joined increasing Black migration, order maintenance policing received even
more vigorous support in the 1940s. Police answered the demands of white social reformers
concerned about Black crime, while allowing gambling activities, bingo, horse racing, church raffles,
and policy, to survive in adjacent white communities.174
Policing vice was, of course, not new in Milwaukee. Civic boosters, social reformers, and
other elite white professionals challenged working-class leisure pursuits and games of chance as early
as the late 19th century. Vice enforcement was ethnically selective. It helped lead to reforms like the
Progressive Era policing statutes and the MPD’s turn towards professionalization. After passage of
Chapter 586 in 1911, the MPD responded to another potent social reform drive to eliminate
“disorderly” behavior and to impose law-and-order in the city’s vice districts. Milwaukee was a
“pioneer” in community-based law-and-order policing well before the term connoted a backlash
against Black-led social protests and racial militancy.175 A “Law and Order League” formed in 1912
that sought to rid the city of “vice,” “immorality,” and “white slavery,” particularly near the
Milwaukee Auditorium.176 Law and order leagues spread nationally during the Progressive and

Mayor Daniel Webster Hoan to Milwaukee Metropolitan Committee on Crime Prevention, “Prevention of Crime,”
October 3, 1937, 2-3, Folder 668, “Police Department, 1934-1940,” Hoan, Daniel Webster Papers.
174 Trotter, Black Milwaukee, 202.
175 “When City Was 57 Years ahead of Its Time,” The Milwaukee Journal, November 15, 1970, Accent 2.
176 After police shut down the River St. vice district in 1911 at the behest of the Socialist Party in control of city
government, houses of ill-fame moved two blocks west. On “white slavery, see: Livia Gershon, “White Slavery and the
Policing of Domestic Life,” JSTOR Daily, December 21, 2017, accessed August 13, 2019, https://daily.jstor.org/whiteslavery-policing-domestic-life/. “Progressive,” white middle-class women looked to “protect” working white women
“from predators and from their own behavior.” The Mann Act (1910) recently banned the interstate transport of women
for sex work or any other “immoral practice.” The recently formed Federal Bureau of Investigation enforced the law.
173

93

Prohibition Eras.177 Milwaukee’s first “morality” league “favored the closing of all disorderly
houses.”178 Defending (white) women’s virtue was a key organizational directive. The group’s
chairman called for “prohibiting women from entering saloons” and making it “unlawful” for them
to “accept employment as cabaret singers.”179 The League criticized Chief Janssen’s vice
enforcement. In an early example of a police chief invoking the MPD’s exceptionalism narrative to
ward off critics, Janssen argued that he policed “the cleanest city morally on the globe, and the
government reports show that.”180 This initial law and order league, if short-lived, challenged police
to do better at controlling purportedly licentious behavior in Milwaukee. Vice reform took on new
resonance in the 1930s, as white civic boosters and morals crusaders endeavored to modernize the
mostly working-class industrial city and organize it more faithfully around managerial growth
imperatives.181 A renewed, more reactionary Citizens’ Law and Order League took on vice and
traffic violators, as well as political radicals, Communists, and other presumed agitators. 182
As the criminalization of vice in Milwaukee progressed in the mid-1930s, characterizations
of morals crime grew more racialized and, thus, associated with black migration and the threat it
seemed to pose to the city’s traditional white order. Portrayals of vice crime in newspapers, among
white civic leaders and anti-gambling reformers gave shape to racist ideas about Black vice
participants and, by extension, poor and working people living in Milwaukee’s developing
Bronzeville neighborhood. While most Black professionals also saw vice as immoral, denigrating,
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and potentially dangerous to community health, that did not mean they accepted overpolicing of the
Sixth Ward as a remedy.183 The violence of the 1934 Wehr Steel Strike demonstrated to many Black
residents where local police stood on interwoven matters of race and class and revealed who was
considered worthy of police protection in the eyes of white power brokers. Organizing against police
violence marked an opportunity for intra-racial class solidarity among established Black
professionals and poorer migrants filtering into the area. There was economic incentive, as the
former relied on the latter to make a living, selling goods and services in a racially segregated urban
market. Despite increasing class frictions, professional and working-class Black residents had a
mutual interest in community survival.
The 1934 Wehr Steel Strike preceded one of the first documented instances of organized
Black resistance to police brutality in Milwaukee. Not long after white police officers joined white
workers in pummeling Black strikebreakers in 1934, MPD Vice Squad officers began cracking down
on the Sixth Ward’s illegal “policy racket” at the behest of white social reformers.184 Law
enforcement allowed low-stakes gambling games to proceed as long as they were contained to
specified districts. Indeed, it was a lucrative pursuit for some officers as well, as Black “numbers
runners” were known to pay off beat patrolmen to avoid arrests or harassment.185 However, such
practices became muddled when social reformers demanded crackdowns on illicit gaming in
Milwaukee’s Bronzeville community. After city officials obliged, police sprang into action. Class
status did not matter for Black participants and others congregating in the vicinity of policy wheels.
One consequential incident, in particular, made this clear. In August 1935, white undercover
officers engaged in racially discriminate stop and frisks in the city’s Black district, “promiscuously
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padding and searching orderly Race citizens.”186 One apprehended person, Robert Johnson, was
“accosted by two plainclothesmen” while walking at N. 6 th St. and W. Galena. After he protested a
white man’s rummaging through his hand bag, he was told, “Shut up, you all should be dead…if I
had my way you wouldn’t walk the streets.” The officer “struck him a heavy blow on the jaw, almost
knocking him to the ground.” While on the floor, another officer kicked Johnson so hard that he
required medical attention. White Vice Squad members reportedly committed other brutal acts
throughout the Sixth Ward’s racially contained confines.187
Robert Johnson’s experience of police terror encouraged the short-lived formation of
Milwaukee’s first Black-led police accountability organization in September 1935. Whereas the city’s
white Citizens’ Law and Order League focused on public order offenses and demanded a more
assertive police presence to control misdemeanor infractions and “morals” violations, the Sixth
Ward Law and Order League specifically addressed the growing issue of racialized police brutality
and its relationship to diminished neighborhood security in Bronzeville. James Dorsey, an African
American attorney and Milwaukee NAACP president, helped spearhead the interracial group’s
formation. The league was middle class, professional in makeup. H. B. Kinner, the Black owner and
operator of the Alberta Villa hotel, served as its president.188 By their very existence, the SWLOL
confronted the idea of a value-neutral police power, and they did so right as the MPD was
burnishing its exceptional reputation among national policing experts and federal officials. Still, the
developing narrative of policing exceptionalism had a powerful influence on how this specific group
of “respectable” Black male leaders went about challenging the racialized police violence in their
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community. Because of their precarious status within Milwaukee’s racial and class order, they had to
act according to the social and political terms set by white officials. In part, that meant embracing a
“bad apple” logic that castigated individual officers with ostensibly malicious intent, and letting the
city’s larger, “exemplary” policing system off the hook. Nevertheless, the SWLOL ushered in a
history of Black Milwaukee residents struggling for police accountability that lasts to the present day.
The Sixth War Law and Order League’s first community meeting revealed the significance of
police brutality as an issue during a period that some scholars have referred to as a “golden age” of
socially enlightened law enforcement professionalism.189 A crowd of residents “from all walks of
life” filled the pews of St. Mark A.M.E. Church on the city’s north side for the SWLOL’s initial
gathering. “Almost the entire colored population of Milwaukee turned out,” the New York Age
reported, along with “prominent” white residents, to discuss “intolerable” acts of police brutality by
the MPD’s Vice Squad.190 Among the attendees were white city and county representatives known
for championing the needs of Black constituents. The Johnson case was the centerpiece of the
meeting.191 A resolution was unanimously adopted calling for the dismissal of “one particular officer
because of his brutal actions.” As Johnson recounted his attack before the crowd, he noticed one of
the officers who brutalized him was standing in the back of the church in a show of intimidation;
the man’s presence nearly “provoked a disturbance,” but “order was immediately restored.” 192
Among the meeting’s outcomes, a committee was appointed “to file petitions of protest and prepare
complaints against instances of police brutality.”193 However, it was “definitely made clear” that “the
protest” only targeted “certain members of the force”—“the roughneck element which has recently
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succeeded in gaining admission to the department.”194 The MPD, “which has long been reputed to
be one of the most efficient in the country,” participants attested, was not framed as the cause of the
public’s anger. Police legitimacy was affirmed; what Black residents demanded was more culturally
responsive and anti-racist policing.
The Sixth Ward Law and Order League attempted to secure justice for Robert Johnson and
others brutalized by the MPD’s Vice Squad in recent raids. Members knew about the legal recourse
offered by the MFPC, which was prescribed by the 1911 statute. Importantly, they were
“freeholders” and could file lawful complaints. Under the auspices of the SWLOL, Johnson
submitted a complaint against his attackers on September 12, 1935.195 The grievance formally
charged two MPD officers with “assaulting and reviling” Johnson.196 Dr. P. Jay Gilmer, an SWLOL
member, also filed a police brutality complaint for himself.
What happened next with Robert Johnson’s case demonstrates the farce of Milwaukee’s
police accountability system and the extent of the MPD’s power when citizens filed grievances
against officers. With seemingly no recourse, Johnson dropped his complaint against Vice Squad
officers Vaughan Bennett and Lewis Wagner. Police had arrested “a woman friend” of Johnson’s
“on charges that she stabbed another negro woman,” according to Attorney James Dorsey. At the
Milwaukee Safety Building, accompanied by Dorsey, Johnson told a deputy police inspector that he
was “willing to do anything to keep this woman out of trouble.”197 He agreed in a statement,
according to the Deputy Inspector, to drop his brutality complaint if the woman was freed. 198 The
MPD saving face was apparently more important than garnering justice for an alleged stabbing
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victim.199 Regardless, the department had manipulated the system to its own benefit, a dropped
police brutality charge.
However, the SWLOL, backed by two liberal white politicians—Sixth Ward Alderman
Samuel Soref and County Supervisor George Herrmann—continued to press their complaint that
police had engaged in a campaign of “intimidation and coercion”200 on the near north side. The
league filed a formal grievance against Bennett and Wagner. In it, they argued that law enforcement
“induced” Johnson to relent from his claim by making a “deal” to dismiss unrelated charges against
Ms. Haywood, an associate he wanted to help. The commission called for witnesses to the alleged
act of brutality, stalling the case for two more weeks. At a hearing on October 17, Johnson himself
failed to appear. According to one newspaper account, he was afraid he would be “run out of town”
by the police.201 “Over the head of Police Chief Laubenheimer,” the MFPC eventually suspended
Officers Louis Wagner and Vaughan Bennett for sixty and thirty days, respectively.202 The process
worked, for the time being, likely because two white politicians had backed up the SWLOL’s claims.
Alderman Soref told the commission that after Robert Johnson registered his complaint, there were
other instances of police “abuse” committed against Black citizens in his district.203 MPD
administrators deflected this criticism, charging the alderman with playing politics.204 The
department rejected all allegations that police brutality occurred while conducting gambling sweeps.
As Soref and Herrmann’s support of the SWLOL implies, struggling for police
accountability for African Americans in Milwaukee has always been an interracial struggle, at all class
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levels. Not all white social reformers readily accepted the racist ideas about Black life and culture
that increasingly fueled policing strategies and outcomes. White allyship around racialized police
violence and the MPD’s institutional bias exposed cracks in the department’s budding
exceptionalism narrative. As Mrs. Angelo Cerminara, of the Milwaukee Women’s Club asserted in
1930, “The common belief that the Negro is more criminal than the white person has no foundation
in fact.”205 She acknowledged that racist perceptions of Black criminality informed police behavior
and the disproportionate rates of arrest that helped build outward perceptions of crime control
efficiency. “Because police officers share this belief, Negroes are more liable to arrest than whites.”
Moreover, as Cerminara continued, “The higher rate of discharges of Negroes as compared with
other race groups…proves that many of the arrests are unwarranted.” Police faced little social or
professional risk in surveilling and stopping Black citizens. In fact, they were encouraged to arrest
“vagrants,” a legal term applied to seemingly idle poor and working-class peoples. If a suspected
vagrant was Black, the likelihood of arrest appeared to increase. As Cerminara notes, criminality in
Wisconsin was “painted in darker colors” than deserved. 206 Because their number was still relatively
small, Black citizens constituted “less than one third of one percent” of state prisoners in “corrective
institutions.” That was soon to change, as racialized police violence and discrimination became more
commonplace in the 1930s and 1940s. This followed national trends. While white vigilante terror
against African Americans declined after World War II—a result of anti-lynching campaigns and
Black migration out of the Jim Crow South—police brutality increased.207
Against this backdrop of intensifying conflict among industrial employers, Black residents,
white blue-collar workers, and police in the 1930s, elite white civic interests continued to build on
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the MPD’s popular narrative of policing exceptionalism. The Citizens’ Bureau of Milwaukee, a
group comprised of powerful corporate and institutional leaders, cited five reasons why their city
was regarded among the safest in the nation in 1937. For starters, it featured “a law abiding
population.”208 The group mentioned Milwaukee’s low number of itinerant workers, arguing it led to
fewer major crimes than in large rail hubs like Chicago or Detroit. During the Great Depression,
“transient vagrants” in Milwaukee were subject to “speedy justice.”209 As mentioned above, in the
case of the twenty-seven Black laborers convicted on vagrancy charges, such enforcement was often
racialized, particularly in times of economic strain. The second reason cited for Milwaukee’s
exceptional status was the MPD’s foot and motor patrols, which covered a minimal forty-four
square mile of city lands.210 Third, police chiefs served long terms, freed by state law from political
interference. As outlined above, this meant police administrators were, save for committing an
egregious offense, accountable only to themselves. Fourth, the courts supported and cooperated
with law enforcement, meaning quick and warranted detection of crimes, along with prompt trials
and sentencing. The courts reinforced the authority that the MPD derived from state law, and
backed up the department in all cases. Finally, aside from “voluntary salary contributions,” police
expenditures remained funded by city government during the Great Depression, even as other
budgeted areas suffered reductions and city workers got paid in scrip.211 The Citizens’ Bureau basked
in the glow of the National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement’s findings six year
earlier, which affirmed for white social and economic elites the virtues of police reform. The
Progressive Era policing statutes produced lengthy, consistent terms of service by MPD chiefs,
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rendering Milwaukee “a city free from crime.”212 Meanwhile, Black citizens were beginning to
experience something very different in their encounters with police.213

Conclusion
The administrative independence that the Wisconsin legislature afforded Milwaukee police
chiefs in the long Progressive Era enabled them to set the terms of police power without political
interference. These laws mattered for Milwaukee’s Black-led struggle for police accountability, as
they authorized the institutional freedom that police chiefs relied on to pursue racially differential
policing tactics unchecked. The MPD took on the personality, outlook, and priorities of chiefs, only
six of which served between 1888 and 1984. The statutes’ civilian review components, if underutilized by the MFPC and restricted to property-holders, instilled the promise of oversight. Yet, the
commission’s quasi-judicial review function was not broadcasted to the residents most vulnerable to
overpolicing and underprotection. Commissioners, more often than not, co-signed decisions made
by police chiefs and mayors. This process undermined accountability and neutralized the potential
for meaningful civilian oversight.
The legislature manufactured the MPD’s national position as innovative, reform-oriented,
and efficient at controlling crime. That exceptional status was reinforced by public assumptions

“Milwaukee’s Police Department,” 4.
Reported crime did trend down in the mid-1930s. The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) uniform crime
reporting showed that Milwaukee had the “least number of known major crimes” in 1937. The FBI also reported the
city had the “lowest major crime rate” per 100,000 people of the nation’s twenty-six largest cities. The following year,
reported crime fell to half of the city’s 1930 rate. Arrests on non-traffic offenses decreased 16 percent from 1934 to
1937. According to the Citizen’s Bureau, per capita increases in police spending helped support Milwaukee’s diminishing
crime rate. Police salaries were set at $2,040 per patrolmen by 1937. This rate increased after five years of service. Thirtyseven officers patrolled each square mile of occupied space in the city on average. This rate increased from 28 officers
per square mile in 1920. It was not difficult to read between the lines in terms of where the Citizens’ Bureau wanted to
see expanded police power directed. “All parts of the city should receive proper police protection. The amount needed,
however, depends largely on the population density and the character of the people.” Without identifying race or class
explicitly, one might presume that the Citizens’ Bureau was advocating for greater police attention to be directed towards
the city’s Sixth Ward vice district. It was the densest section of Milwaukee and its increasingly Black population routinely
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about law enforcement as an intrinsically noble and legitimate pursuit, in addition to federal actors,
like the Wickersham Commission. No one in Milwaukee’s police bureaucracy, save for the Socialist
Seidel administration in the early 1910s, attempted to amend the terms of police power in the early
20th century. In turn, the MPD occupied an elevated space in the civic imagination. It also became a
firmer part of Milwaukee’s white cultural identity. Despite its insulation, law enforcement was an
inherently political project, much as it was elsewhere in the U.S. The MPD served the dominant
social, cultural, and economic hierarchies established by white middle- and business-class elites. It
was institutionally separated from City Hall, but not Milwaukee’s increasingly racialized class politics.
Moreover, individual police officers themselves undermined the idea of an objective, valueneutral police function. Patrolmen were socially conditioned to act on biased views. They harbored
common assumptions about race, class, and gender that reflected the ethnically segmented
communities they hailed from. Most were descendants of German, Irish, and Polish immigrants,
who trod a well-worn path to whiteness and social acceptance—first through patronage
appointments, then civil service.214 When a Black officer, Judson Minor, was hired onto the MPD in
1924, discretionary policing diverged based on his vantage point. It was a short-lived experiment,
with another Black officer not hired until 1932.215 The ample discretion that white officers harnessed
to maintain order and control crime permitted them to conduct the racialized boundary and violence
work that white powerbrokers saw as necessary to preserve the status quo and moral order.
In the first several decades of the 20 th century, Milwaukee underwent a process of
recalibration on matters of class and race. It was a period marked by European immigration and
working-class suppression, Black in-migration and racial suppression. The city’s evolving working-

It is because of the availability of civil service jobs and access to political power that historian Nell Irvin Painter
disagrees with Noel Ignatiev argument that Irish had to become white. She argues, they always were white. Painter, The
History of White People, 388.
215 Calvin Moody was the second Black police officer appointed by the MFPC. “First Negro to Draw Police Pension,”
The Chicago Defender, June 13, 1957, 10.
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class consciousness informed questions of racial identity, especially as a distinct Black proletariat
formed in the city alongside a Black middle class. Black community formation and development
converged with white professional class moralizing and nativism. Both forces translated into antiBlack racism. The Great Depression and New Deal economy of the 1930s only strengthened the
city’s racial and class boundaries. Social taboos emerged around the presumably immoral behaviors
of Black residents living on Milwaukee’s segregated near north side. However, Black middle class
residents and workers cultivated a world of their own in Bronzeville, regardless of the MPD
funneling most of the city’s vice into the community. African Americans were the most likely
citizens to experience police aggression based on their low position in the city’s racialized cultural
order. They also lived in segregated spaces where police disparately enforced public order laws, like
vagrancy, prostitution, gambling, and drunkenness. White middle-class reformers advocated for the
MPD to crack down on such offenses, despite some also professing an affinity for the plight of
Black workers and families. White-led institutions, employers, unions, and residents strove to limit
African American population growth out of fears of economic competition, but also anxieties about
racial mixing, “race riots,” and the perceived immorality of Black migrants.
The MPD’s internal growth and development became entwined with the racial resentments
that many white blue-collar and professional workers exhibited towards the city’s comparatively
poorer Black migrant population. White patrolmen policed boundaries of race, class, gender, and
sexuality on discretionary terms, which often devolved into race-based harassment and brutality.
Order maintenance policing in Bronzeville reinforced commonly held white assumptions about
blackness and criminality, racial inferiority and disorder. Cyclical patterns of poverty, crime,
surveillance, and arrest implicating Black migrants, transients, laborers, and youth established a
popular logic about who was deserving of police attention and who was not. Racial containment, not
safety and service, demarcated the policing of blackness. Public order enforcement on Milwaukee’s
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near north side limited African Americans’ quality of life and sometimes threatened them directly.
Such policing informed a growing sense of isolation from the state and reinforced social, economic,
and political disadvantages. This dynamic only worsened after the 1930s. Because of the perceived
threat that expanded Black migration and population growth posed to white understandings of
labor, class identity, and citizenship in the 1940s and 1950s, African Americans garnered more
intensive police attention and abuse. The larger the city’s Black population became, the more that
white observers depicted Black people confined to inner city communities as sources of immorality
and danger. Targeting the aggressive enforcement of public order laws and revising how Black
spaces got policed became a driving impetus for accountability advocates going forward.
Bolstering the administrative hand of Milwaukee police chiefs made garnering effective
oversight more difficult for citizens. State lawmakers showed faith in the MPD to self-regulate and
adhere to a self-prescribed set of rules and ethics. Yet it did not consider how racism historically
structured policing. The state surmised that the MFPC would arbitrate disputes related to discipline
and misconduct. Intradepartmental regulations mattered. Police chiefs vigorously enforced rules
among officers. But when it came to the word of poor and working-class Black citizens charging
white personnel with brutality, the latter received the benefit of the doubt from supervising officers,
the MFPC and criminal-legal system. Investigations into misconduct fell to the MPD itself. Police
grievances often disappeared into the law enforcement bureaucracy. Rarely did they result in justice.
Within this set of power relations, Milwaukee police cultivated meanings, policies, and practices that
benefitted their interests at the expense of anyone demanding accountability. In a racially partitioned
city that increasingly criminalized poverty and blackness, police empowerment ran counter to
African American needs and rights.
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CHAPTER TWO
Liberal Law-and-Order in Milwaukee
Applications of “liberal law-and-order” by the Milwaukee Police Department (MPD) in the
1940s and 1950s reinforced the city’s burgeoning narrative of policing exceptionalism, while
concurrently shielding the department’s biased function in poor and working-class Black spaces.1
The combined effect was the narrowing of institutional accountability for African Americans
increasingly aggrieved by police violence, as well as the shoring up of middle class perceptions of the
MPD’s state-sanctioned legitimacy. This served to render Black complaints of police racism and
mistreatment all the more dubious to white police bureaucrats in City Hall and the Milwaukee Fire
and Police Commission. Correlated developments that germinated locally in the Depression-era
1930s, but hastened amid the wartime emergency undergirded the MPD’s turn to liberal law-andorder: accelerated northern Black migration, largely to work in urban defense industries; eruptions of
civil violence in cities around issues of race, class, and policing; an uptick in crimes related to youth
misbehavior; and intensifying anti-communist fears over domestic political subversion.
Despite being cloaked in a high-minded language of procedural justice, liberal law-and-order
was a culturally racist project. Its adherents framed issues of morality, crime, and public safety in
paternalistic terms that singled out Black people, especially migrants, as susceptible to disorder and
criminality. In this way, it diverged from the overtly racist explanations of racial conservatives.
Instead, liberal law-and-order treated racism as “erratic,” “irrational,” and “baseless.” As scholar
Naomi Murakawa argues, “correcting” racism within this framework entailed “criminalizing ‘private’

On “liberal law-and-order,” see: Naomi Murakawa, The First Civil Right: How Liberals Built Prison America (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2014), 29-31; Max Felker-Kantor, “Liberal Law-and-Order: The Politics of Police Reform in
Los Angeles,” Journal of Urban History (2017), 3. Michael Flamm was one of the first historians to interrogate the politics
of law-and-order as a concept in his research on the 1960s. Michael W. Flamm, Law and Order: Street Crime, Civil Unrest,
and the Crisis of Liberalism in the 1960s (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007). On the national police-community
relations movement, see: Samuel E. Walker, “The Origins of the Police-Community Relations Movement: the 1940s,”
Criminal Justice History (1) (1980): 225-246.
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acts” and “modernizing carceral machinery to increase procedural protections, decrease
discretionary decisions, and insulate the system from arbitrary bias.”2 A long-term outcome was the
creation of “colorblind” institutions, which failed to account for racism as “a systemic problem
rooted in specific social practices and pervading relations of political economy and culture.”3
Liberal law-and-order surfaced in Milwaukee, as it did nationally, out of white political fears
about Black and Latinx dissent during World War II. Federal demands for urban pacification amid a
series of “race riots” in manufacturing cities joined growing calls to address white vigilante terror,
which belied America’s democratic self-image at a time when the country was looking to define itself
against fascist and communist governments abroad. As such, liberal law-and-order was centered on
making police agencies more value-neutral, procedurally fair, and proactive as peacekeepers, in
addition to being more accessible to a wider range of middle class community stakeholders.
Between the 1910s and 1930s, the MPD achieved a global reputation for crime control
efficiency, innovation, and professionalism. It earned that reputation despite ongoing clashes with
striking workers and radical political parties, as well as mounting charges of discriminatory policing
by African Americans. Two police chiefs—Joseph Kluchesky (1936-1945) and John Polcyn (19451957)—revised and extended the MPD’s elite status among powerful national observers, policing
experts, and local constituents. By employing new administrative reforms, such as introducing a
“race and human relations” training course (1945), founding the Youth Aid Bureau (1946), and
establishing a Police Aide program (1952) that directed high school students towards law
enforcement careers (and away from delinquency), the MPD emerged as a national leader in the
“police-community relations movement.”
However, the MPD’s exceptional, or differential treatment of Black residents was part and
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parcel of maintaining its rank atop the U.S. policing ladder. Expanded Black migration to Milwaukee,
and the assumed potential for African American youth, workers, and the poor to foment social
disorder, violent crime, and political agitation in the traditional white ethnic metropolis gradually
became the MPD’s main focus in the late 1940s and 1950s.
Liberal law-and-order was an imperfect political project—one that struggled to shift the
behavior of law enforcement officers and measurably reduce tensions in the postwar city. It was a
shallow institutional response to much deeper historical issues of white capitalist hegemony and
policing’s essential objective of racial and class control. While it expanded police power, most
administrators and rank-and-file officers rejected liberal law-and-order approaches in the moment,
arguing that their agencies should play, at best, a minimal role in addressing “the underlying
economic and social causes for racial tension.”4 Liberal law-and-order advocates, conversely, saw a
vigorous role for police in advancing social and economic stability in service of crime prevention.
The MPD’s espousals of liberal law-and-order tried to answer the stark racial demographic changes
brought on by the war. In large part, its police chiefs responded to growing ethnic white anxieties
around the threat of Black mobility, job competition, and the prospects of interracial encounters.5
Many white residents feared how the city’s growing African American population would impact their
privileged status within the civic hierarchy based on historically ingrained racist assumptions.
As such, the MPD’s embrace of liberal law-and-order converged with the postwar city’s

International Association of Chiefs of Police, Bulletin no. 5, “Civil Disorders and Other Emergencies” (July 1945), 2-5.
On the phrase “law enforcement liberalism,” which is basically interchangeable with “liberal law-and-order,” see:
Lombardo’s Blue Collar Conservatism. An important distinction, however, is that the law enforcement liberalism detailed by
Lombardo in the 1960s appeared more focused on identifying political avenues for police accountability in the 1960s as
a means of guaranteeing racial pacification. Timothy J. Lombardo, Blue Collar Conservatism: Frank Rizzo’s Philadelphia and
Populist Politics (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2018), 51-52, 60.
5 The MPD vigorously enforced racial boundaries, sometimes forcibly removing white women from Milwaukee’s Sixth
Ward area. Barring interracial fraternization and sex was a top-down directive. That is, until young white women told the
police that they had a constitutional right to socialize with Black citizens. “You’d be surprised how many white girls
come into the Sixth Ward area…We used to stop them and chase them home. But we can’t do that anymore. They stand
on their constitutional rights, and they are right. We cannot legally do anything about it.” “Polcyn Given Added Police,”
The Milwaukee Journal, November 12, 1952.
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white supremacist racial and class politics, encouraging a volatile social climate and eventual turn
towards a more reactionary version of law-and-order as Milwaukee’s Black population grew in the
1960s.6 A citywide emphasis on racial acculturation, at the expense of racial justice, informed this
trajectory. In the 1940s and 1950s, the MPD selectively embraced colorblind rhetoric and policies
geared towards bringing acculturated Black citizens more firmly into the department’s ambit of
order maintenance policing; racial pacification was the intended effect.7 It did so without
relinquishing its state-sanctioned authority or the MPD’s primary task of defending Milwaukee’s
white-prescribed social, economic, and political hierarchies. Consequently, the MPD embraced
liberal law-and-order principles at the same time that many of the department’s line officers
denigrated Black life and culture as fundamentally backward and criminogenic. Their discretionary
actions took the form of harassment, intimidation, and brutality. The rising, disproportionate
number of police stops, arrests, and detentions of African Americans in this period reinforced Black
Milwaukee’s racial derogation in the eyes of white city officials and residents, and was amplified in
the conventional press, creating a cycle of Black criminalization that ostensibly mandated further
police attention. Liberal law-and-order policing, therefore, helped to exacerbate racial disparities
more than it instilled equal enforcement.
The approach simultaneously supported and relied on Milwaukee’s wider project of Black
“cultural adjustment” to succeed. The MPD was responsible for ensuring that cultural adjustment
played out in an orderly fashion at street level. To prevail, it required Black middle class buy-in.
Black-led organizations and welfare agencies, such as the Milwaukee branches of the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (MNAACP), Urban League (MUL), and Young

This transition is explored in subsequent chapters. Shaping Milwaukee’s changing racial and class politics in the 1960s
were also the procedural civil rights revolution in the federal courts and the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which
outlawed explicit discrimination in the U.S.
7 “Cultural adjustment” refers to the formal process of acculturating Black, Latinx, and other migrants of color to the
city’s white European social, economic, and political conventions after World War II.
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Women’s Christian Association (MYWCA), lent the enterprise legitimacy.8 Black professional leaders
worked with white police administrators, city officials, and other municipal power brokers to mollify
seemingly unruly Black migrants and temper their presumed criminality. Public assumptions of
Black migrant criminality grew in relation to urban crime reporting and in reaction to a series of
racially charged police-Black citizen encounters that garnered press attention. Black middle class
leaders also looked to educate Black migrants on appropriate, or “respectable” behavior in the white
ethnic city. For some, cultural adjustment was an appropriate means of racial uplift—one that also
elevated their own civic and political standing with white officials. Yet, Black middle class
professionals also found themselves in the precarious, often frustrating position of having to
embrace white cultural norms, while also being asked by City Hall and liberal organizations to keep
watch over poor and working-class Black conduct. This expectation resulted primarily from white
assimilationist racism and, in part, civic responses to mounting street crime and episodes of policeBlack community violence on Milwaukee’s near north side.
Efforts to build equity for poor and working-class Black migrants through cultural
adjustment, such as they were, failed. The adjustment program refrained from promoting white selfreflection and, thus, allowed systemic racism to proceed uninterrupted. White liberals in power and
select members of Milwaukee’s Black middle class viewed racism as rooted in individual behaviors.
They, and other liberal voices throughout the country, believed that racial assimilation best resolved
issues like neighborhood overcrowding, employment discrimination, housing segregation, and police
violence. Following the widely accepted logic of Swedish economist Gunnar Myrdal’s book An
American Dilemma (1944), they saw racism as a social formulation, not a power construct. White

Other social welfare agencies in Milwaukee included the Mayor’s Commission on Human Relations, the Young Men’s
Christian Association, the Department of Municipal Recreation, the County Park Commission, the Housing Authority,
the Department of Public Welfare, and Ministerial Associations. “Findings and Recommendations on the Welfare of
Negroes and the Urban League,” 1-2, Box 155, Folder 1, “Human Relations (July-December, 1949),” Carl F. and Frank
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bigotry resulted from the physical isolation, or “ghettoization,” of people of color. Black
residents—in truth, forcibly confined to under-resourced, overcrowded, and environmentally
hazardous enclaves—theoretically developed pathological behaviors as a result of their separation
from white people. For liberal scholars like Myrdal, racism existed within individual hearts and
minds. It could be eliminated through integration, cultural conformity, and “acquiring the traits held
in esteem by the dominant white Americans.”9 White Milwaukee officials, including Chiefs
Kluchesky and Polcyn, emphasized fixing Black behavior ahead of addressing the economic
underpinnings of racial inequality. Policing, therefore, helped engender disparate outcomes, while
reinforcing narratives of racial difference. Racist ideas about Black life and culture bolstered the
notion that Black people and spaces required exceptional police treatment.
Another impact of Black movement to Milwaukee was heightened white middle class
anxieties around Black leisure-time pursuits and their supposedly nefarious influence. Activities like
gambling, club-going, and house partying in the Sixth Ward carried the threat of interracial intimacy
and an increase in public disorder.10 Despite numerous white citizens engaging in the same activities,
business and political leaders viewed Black leisure as a threat to modernization. Illicit Black behavior,
they surmised, posed a hazard for the city’s “growth” agenda and a social threat to its white middle
class sensibilities. Black migrants had limited political power to respond to racist accusations.

Myrdal argued that a “creed” united American citizens in an enduring quest for liberty, justice, and fair treatment. That
“creed” upheld racial pluralism and encouraged coexistence. It required white Americans to recognize their shared
responsibility in devising solutions to “the Negro problem.” Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and
Modern Democracy (New York: Harper, 1944), 928. However, Myrdal downplayed how systemic racial barriers reproduced
and compounded poverty, joblessness, and crime in predominantly Black urban neighborhoods. In his review of An
American Dilemma, Ralph Ellison observed that white scholars too often function as racial surrogates, as if black people
“do not exist in the real world at all” and get caught up in “moral conflict” over control rather than in building “a
democracy in which the Negro will be free to define himself for what he is and…for what he desires to be.” Ralph
Ellison, “An American Dilemma: A Review,” 1944, Teaching American History, accessed January 11, 2015,
http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/an-american-dilemma-a-review/.
10 The Sixth Ward refers to a political district of the Milwaukee Common Council. In 1940, 82.9 percent of African
Americans lived in the Sixth Ward. 10.4 percent lived in the adjacent Tenth Ward, on the Sixth Ward’s southern border.
Joe William Trotter, Jr., Black Milwaukee: The Making of an Industrial Proletariat, 1915-1945, 2nd ed. (Urbana: University of
Illinois Press, 2006), 176.
9

111

Milwaukee’s white ethnic majority held sway over elected officials, who continued to act on the
behalf of white constituents when making decisions on matters like housing construction, urban
renewal, and commercial redevelopment. Meanwhile, the MPD continued to safeguard the white
middle and business class interests that established its exceptional status in the 1910s, 1920s, and
1930s, while bringing the white working-class more firmly into the fold as citizens worthy of
protection. Police order maintenance was increasingly tied to monitoring poor and working-class
Black comportment. In turn, perceptions of who deserved police protection grew more racialized.
Thousands of white workers and families supported racist housing policies that funneled poor and
working-class Black migrants into Milwaukee’s aging, overcrowded, under-resourced inner city. Many
of the same people took advantage of federal programs that subsidized suburban access, home
ownership, and middle class security after the passage of New Deal housing reforms. In doing so,
they barred African Americans from treading the same well-worn path to economic stability and
freedom to pursue the “American dream.”
Black middle class residents, too, expressed uncertainty about what the movement of
seemingly low-skilled, comparatively poorer Black migrants meant for their tenuous social relations
with white residents and the connections they had forged over decades with white Milwaukee
officials. Black in-migration challenged the racial identity of a city that historically privileged white
labor, business interests, property owners, and families, as well as the class-based identities of
segmented Black professionals, who relied partially on the patronage of segregated Black workers.
As Milwaukee’s Black population mushroomed after the Second World War, an ever more fraught
“triangular struggle for order” emerged among established Black leaders, recent migrants, and white
residents of diverse class backgrounds. This triangular struggle—aggravated by the city’s deepening
racial apartheid—challenged the MPD’s capacity for carrying out liberal law-and-order strategies and
threatened the department’s ability to project police power as racially-neutral or rooted in liberal
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criminal justice imperatives. Rising social tensions, poverty, and reported crime on Milwaukee’s near
north side meant that police resources were directed towards this rapidly segregating area. Police
power became ever more predicated on the efficiency with which law enforcement imposed social
control and effected arrests in the city’s Black neighborhoods. Because white MPD administrators
afforded their overwhelmingly white officer corps ample discretion in police-citizen encounters,
both racialized police violence and Black resistance to aggressive order maintenance policing became
more pronounced. Many poor and working-class Black folk resisted their second-class treatment at
the hands of the police. Youth crowd disruptions of MPD apprehensions, for example, served as a
vital mode of defiance. Black youth challenged the central tenet of liberal law-and-order that
African American juveniles possessed latent criminality. 11
Nevertheless, African American professionals’ opinions on Black migrant criminality stayed
mixed. Old-guard leaders debated how best to assuage rising police-Black civilian tensions without
sacrificing precarious relations with white politicians in City Hall. They could only restrain the
intensifying anger and frustration of a growing number of working poor residents for so long. Intraracial class dynamics began to shift after a white patrolman shot and killed an unarmed Black
migrant, Daniel Bell, in 1958.12 The killing raised the stakes of whether the community would take
direct action to challenge white police abuse. Competing strands of Black political activism surfaced,
setting up dual crises of police legitimacy and Black community leadership. Meanwhile, white civic
officials were more concerned about defusing racial tensions than ensuring justice for a grieving
family and irate citizens. While a lasting movement for police accountability had yet to coalesce, the
basis for its organization over the course of the next two decades materialized. African American
leaders in Milwaukee’s civil and human rights community hoped to re-assert the terms of police
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power under a liberal law-and-order framework in the throes of mounting Black dissent.
Milwaukee’s narrative of policing exceptionalism was showing weakness, as more Black citizens
decried police violence. They posed a legal and institutional danger to a police bureaucracy whose
order maintenance prerogatives depended on the MPD’s image as a beacon of law enforcement. At
the dawn of the 1960s, liberal law-and-order had lost much of its legitimacy among African
Americans.

Law Enforcement Liberalism
In the aftermath of World War II, liberals in Democratic president Harry Truman’s
administration avowed that America’s existing criminal justice machinery required modernization,
rationalization, and strengthening “in the name of racial progress.”13 Domestic and international
imperatives contributed to liberal desires for police reform. Racialized police violence and “race
rioting” gripped U.S. cities in the midst of wartime mobilizations and the attendant population shifts
of the 1940s.14 In this period, Americans paradoxically challenged fascism, genocide, and
communism abroad while tolerating racial terror lynchings, police brutality, and prison exploitation
at home, particularly in the Jim Crow South. Black civil rights activists and Popular Front allies on
the Left exposed these incongruities.15 In turn, the Truman administration ordered the formation of
the President’s Committee on Civil Rights (PCCR) in 1946 to investigate and report on the
“disturbingly high” incidence of violence committed by white criminal justice workers and citizens
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against groups of color. “Evils,” such as “violent physical attacks” on “members of minority
groups,” the use of “third degree methods to extort confessions,” “brutality against prisoners,”
“unwarranted arrests,” “unduly prolonged detentions,” and “search and seizure power” had finally
caught the eye of federal officials as a national problem. 16
Before World War II, “race rioting” was largely characterized by white mobs attacking Black
and Latinx residents with limited police intervention.17 In the 1940s, self-defense against police
violence in segregated racial “ghettos” became the “race riot’s” defining feature. 18 As historian Stuart
Schrader contends, such conflicts “were not only a problem at home, they had the potential to bring
about intergroup clashes of a different order” abroad.19 Racial violence could undermine U.S.
influence with non-white foreign allies, lending international enemies “effective propaganda.”20
Municipal police regimes, therefore, needed better training and tactics to prevent and combat
domestic racial unrest, lest it threaten “Cold War civil rights” imperatives.21 A handful of police
reformers active in the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) surmised that law
enforcement had to rein in policies that explicitly endorsed racial hierarchy. Police social control
tactics had long emphasized “race management,” in tandem with class control. But at a moment of
Axis defeat and European imperial decline, preserving domestic racial hierarchies threatened the

The U.S. courts, according to the committee, were also behaving antagonistically towards Black citizens and
undermining their civil rights. As the Truman Committee phrased it, “different standards of justice” produced “unjust
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Committee on Civil Rights (Washington, D.C.: Government Publishing Office, 1947), 25-29.
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potential of U.S. Leadership abroad. The federal state prepared to lead a global system of sovereign
nations after the war, organized around principles of economic and political development.
Eliminating racism at home became “a geopolitical necessity.”22
To combat the racialized “lawlessness within police departments,” the PCCR called for their
liberalization. They argued that U.S. police forces should proactively recognize and adhere to
existing civil rights laws and colorblind ideas of equality. Embedded in the panel’s ambitious set of
recommendations was federal support for state and local governments in administering civil
sanctions against police brutality and mob violence. The committee advocated for the improvement
of state and local police coordination with the U.S. Justice Department’s Civil Rights Division.
Members called on police forces to defend civil rights laws and create “new police training
programs” that “indoctrinate[d] officers with an awareness of civil rights problems.” The PCCR
looked to ensure “proper,” race-neutral police treatment of citizens “arrested and incarcerated in
local jails.” It also suggested raising police salaries, so departments could “attract and hold
competent personnel.” Finally, the committee recommended passage of a federal law “specifically
directed against police brutality and related crimes.”23 This liberal push for procedural police justice
and fairness at the federal level meant raised expectations for accountability among vulnerable local
populations threatened by discriminatory policing, abuse and neglect.
While the PCCR’s final report, To Secure These Rights (1947), influenced liberal efforts to

Liberal understandings of inter-group relations became axiomatic in the police-community relations movement of the
1940s. Federal agencies, like the CIA, also worked with state and local police departments to export the movement’s
liberal ideals abroad, going so far as to train international defense forces on how to “serve and protect” Americanism
and the new global capitalist order. Schrader, Badges without Borders, 28. Anti-communist liberalism, as outlined in texts
like Gunnar Myrdal’s An American Dilemma, provided a framework for police-community relations proponents seeking to
rid police departments of bias. Myrdal’s influential tome held that racism could be overcome by appealing to individual
hearts and minds and relied on colorblindness to solve the problem of prejudice.
23 The federal statute, the Committee stated, “should enumerate such rights as the right not to be deprived of property
by a public officer except by due process of law; the right to be free from personal injury inflicted by a public officer; the
right to engage in a lawful activity without interference by a public officer; and the right to be free from discriminatory
law enforcement resulting from either active or passive conduct by a public officer.” To Secure These Rights, 156-158.
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reform policing and the nation’s wider criminal justice system in response to the urban uprisings of
the 1960s, it landed with a thud in Congress. Long-standing political divisions within the Democratic
Party over race and civil rights blocked the committee’s recommendations from seeing federal
enactment. Reactionary Cold War fears over the global containment and domestic infiltration of
Soviet Communism amplified those divisions. However, the report also disappointed most racial
progressives, who believed the PCCR had not gone far enough to prevent “the larger system of
racial violence” described by groups like the National Negro Congress and Civil Rights Congress in
the 1930s.24 In failing to address racism from a systemic vantage point that accounted for racist
economics and policy, the committee merely “framed ‘the crime problem’ as a subset of ‘the Negro
problem.’” This helped advance the conservative logic that “racial liberalization” of the law and
federal support for civil rights had a “criminological effect” on Black citizens.25 Coming from
different directions, northern liberals and reactionary southern Democrats aligned on the belief that
“state-recognized civil rights” and Black criminal behavior were connected.26
The criminal justice reforms outlined by the PCCR embraced the New Deal’s most
democratic impulses. It placed a discernible focus on expanding human rights through procedural
fairness. The committee reflected the gaining civil rights demands of African Americans, as well as
the political imperatives of the nation’s emergent position as a global superpower. However, as
Black Studies scholar Naomi Murakawa persuasively argues, the Truman Committee functioned

As progressives on the left argued, To Secure These Rights “depoliticized” private white lawlessness and police complicity
as it related to extralegal violence. The committee disconnected white vigilante violence and police collusion from a
racist criminal justice system that continued to link blackness to criminality. It separated the worst, most visible aspects
of racist violence perpetrated by white citizens, such as racial terror lynchings, from the nation’s larger carceral
machinery.
25 In other words, civil rights activism required equal criminal punishment. This included Black resistance to overlyaggressive order maintenance policing in racially changing cities like Milwaukee. In that city, the conservative view of
postwar civil rights enforcement came into sharper focus during the civil rights insurgencies and counter-insurgencies of
the 1960s, as Police Chief Harold Breier blamed Black-led demonstrations for the city’s rising crime rate, while also
rejecting liberal law-and-order’s more egalitarian pretenses.
26 Northern liberals saw improved civil rights enforcement, or liberal law-and-order, as a solution to urban disorder,
while southern Democrats saw the expansion of civil rights as a cause for sustained discord.
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within “a specific grammar of racism.” That syntax began from the position that racism itself was an
inherent “misconception,” or “an emotional misfire.” Liberal Democrats held that bigotry was
“seemingly lodged in individual police officers,” who were “afflicted by stereotypes and
irrationalities.”27 Police chiefs who subscribed to liberal law-and-order, therefore, aimed to diminish
the capacity for “bad apples” to “contaminate” an otherwise virtuous policing mission. That mission
was focused on preserving social order and protecting the “first civil right of citizens,” or “the right
to safety and security of the person,” in a procedurally just and colorblind fashion.28 They never saw
their “progressive” departments as drivers of racial inequality or injustice. Liberal law-and-order was,
chiefly, a project of police order maintenance and social control. As this chapter contends,
understanding the “grammar of racism” that liberal law-and-order trafficked in is essential to
understanding why police accountability has proven so elusive for African Americans in Milwaukee.
The PCCR drew on the existing efforts of reform-minded police chiefs and liberal advocates
to control racial unrest and improve police-community relations in postwar cities undergoing
dramatic social and economic changes. Milwaukee played a role in this process, helping to spearhead
the national police-community relations movement of the mid-1940s. The city’s police chief, Joseph
Kluchesky, emerged as a leading advocate for police-community relations.29 Under his guidance, the
MPD experimented with and applied liberal law-and-order principles. Kluchesky expounded on

Jordan T. Camp and Christina Heatherton, “How Liberals Legitimate Broken Windows: An Interview with Naomi
Murakawa,” in Policing the Planet: Why the Policing Crisis Led to Black Lives Matter, Jordan T. Camp and Christina Heatherton,
eds. (New York: Verso Books, 2016), 228. In the above interview, as well as in her own text, The First Civil Right (2014),
Murakawa makes the point that post-World War II crime policy was not simply about racial conservatives pushing for
more aggressive policing, prison expansion, and longer sentences for criminal offenders. Racial liberals, too, “aimed to
build the bias out of the criminal justice system with more procedural rights, more guidelines, more formal protocols in
everything from arrest to sentencing calculations.” Policing the Planet, 229-230.
28 To Secure These Rights, 20; Murakawa, The First Civil Right, 2-3. There is, of course, nothing wrong with police attempting
to meet expectations of democracy and to eliminate prejudice within the workplace and criminal-legal system on its face.
However, that the U.S. was founded on and governed around a system of racial capitalism—from the earliest
enslavement of West Africans in the 17th century to the coercion of Freedmen into debt peonage after Emancipation to
punishing Black bodies and exploiting them through convict lease systems and the mass incarceration crisis of today—
has remained a lingering problem.
29 Walker, “The Origins of the Police-Community Relations Movement,” 234.
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existing theories about police-minority relations and the importance of exercising colorblind
strategies and internal regulations that respected civil rights law. American Council on Race
Relations (ACRR) staff member J. E. Weckler and Wilmette, Illinois Police Chief Theo Hall first
warned in 1944 that “new job opportunities for members of minority groups…competition among
workers for war-scale consumer goods, housing, transportation, recreation” might lead to “increased
antagonism between racial, religious, or national groups.” Police departments had the “heavy and
complex burden” of both “maintaining civil rights and public order.” While they could not “control
or solve the basic causes,” it was, Weckler and Hall argued, incumbent upon them to work with
other city agencies to address “the broad problems related to housing, recreation, transportation,
and so on.” Not doing so meant “deaths and injuries, extensive property destruction, and severe
damage to public morale.”30
Chief Kluchesky incorporated these liberal suppositions about social control, interagency
cooperation, and “protecting every citizen’s civil rights” through “strict neutrality” into Milwaukee
police academy trainings. His overarching goals were to proactively defuse inter-group tensions,
prevent opportunities for civil disorder, and maintain a positive police image. While Weckler and
Hall called for the establishment of “race relations” units, Kluchesky chose not to pursue this step. 31
In addition to monitoring racial unrest, he paid even closer attention to “juvenile delinquency,” or
the behavior of legal minors who committed crimes, as well as the police department’s vice
containment activities, particularly on the increasingly Black near north side. Kluchesky’s successor,
John Polcyn formalized several of his predecessors liberal law-and-order ideas and initiatives when
he was named to lead the MPD in 1945.32 For instance, Polcyn founded the MPD’s Youth Aid
Weckler and Hall, The Police and Minority Groups, iii.
Weckler and Hall, The Police and Minority Groups, 16.
32 Chief Polcyn began his career with the MPD as a patrolman in 1916. For four years, he served in the U.S. Marine
Corps. That experience shaped, what admirers considered, his “military efficiency, obedience, sobriety, and good
conduct. Prior to serving in the U.S. Marine Corps, Polcyn labored as a railroad worker and as a street car motorman. He
ascended the ranks to sergeant, lieutenant, and captain, before being appointed by the MFPC as chief in 1945. Polcyn’s
30
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Bureau in 1946, published a “race and human relations” training manual in 1951, and established a
Police Aide program in 1952 that aided young people “of good moral character” in beginning law
enforcement careers.33 Police agencies around the country used the MPD’s liberal human relations
training guide to instill lessons about race, order, and community relations.34 Through their strategic
embrace of liberal law-and-order, Kluchesky and Polcyn revised and updated Milwaukee’s narrative
of policing exceptionalism, organizing it more deliberately around a race-neutral framework for
social control. This was central to the wider development of police reform movements and
America’s nascent turn towards police-community relations strategies. The MPD, again, provided a
reform blueprint, as well as a reason for outside observers to consider it among the most exemplary
police forces in the U.S.
Kluchesky’s emergence as a liberal law-and-order chief reflected the Milwaukee Social
Democratic Party’s view in the 1930s that it was “more important to prevent crime than to punish
criminals.”35 He began his policing career as a District One patrolman in 1912, worked his way
through the Traffic Bureau, and was eventually promoted to Superintendent of the Bureau of
Identification in 1928. Kluchesky was the only Socialist ever named chief of police in Milwaukee. He
served as a bodyguard for Mayor Daniel Hoan from 1922 to 1925. Kluchesky’s support for trade
unions did not negate his allegiance to preserving law-and-order. When the MFPC appointed him
chief of police in 1935, he was no less dedicated to order maintenance than Janssen and
Laubenheimer before him. For instance, he ordered the aggressive suppression of street

“vigilant, alert, and efficient” administration of the MPD, his state-sanctioned “independence” and “non-political
policies,” and his “preventive crime measures and constructive social attitudes” earned him the respect of U.S. Senators,
like Estes Kefauver of the Senate Crime Committee, and FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover. “Conferring of Diploma of
Distinctive Public Service,” June 5, 1951, Box 94, Folder 5, “Police Department (1950-1951),” Carl F. and Frank Zeidler
Papers.
33 Civil Service Assembly of the United States and Canada, Personnel News, March 1952, Box 94, Folder 7, “Police
Department (1953-1954),” Carl F. and Frank Zeidler Papers.
34 Milwaukee Police Department, Annual Report, 1955, Appendix, vi.
35 Mayor Daniel Hoan to Minnesota Attorney General Harry H. Peterson, May 28, 1935, Folder 668, “Police
Department, 1934-1940,” Hoan, Daniel Webster Papers, Mss-0546, Milwaukee County Historical Society.
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demonstrations, including a 1938 rally aimed at “a group of Nazi agents, spies, and dupes” around
the Milwaukee Auditorium. Police expressing “Nazi and anti-Semitic sympathies,” reportedly
engaged in “mass arrests, bullying and abuse,” including “several cases of extreme brutality.”36
Kluchesky also lent the MPD’s services to county sheriffs working to put down a strike at the AllisChalmers manufacturing plant led by the Congress of Industrial Organizations in 1939. 37 His racial
politics mirrored the mixed views on race held by members of Milwaukee’s Social Democratic Party;
Kluchesky was no less a product of the white supremacist cultural milieu that shaped his political
counterparts. For years he was a member of the “blackface comedy team” Johnson and Jackson,
which performed at “Socialist Party vaudeville shows.”38
Despite harboring and presenting the culturally racist views of the day, Kluchesky outwardly
championed the improvement of race relations within the police department, and among white
residents and African Americans out of a perceived need for order maintenance. He went so far as
to draft essays on the subject, which were read widely and embraced by other police chiefs seeking
to temper racial conflicts or the potential for unrest in their cities. Following his 1945 retirement,
Kluchesky served as an in-demand public speaker. He delivered lectures on race relations and
juvenile delinquency before organizations like the International Association of Chiefs of Police
(IACP), where he was also a one-time president. Kluchesky also served on the National Advisory
Committee on Social Protection of the Federal Security Agency and worked as a special consultant
for the ACRR.39 For nearly a decade after retiring from the MPD, Kluchesky taught courses at the

The Milwaukee Union Industrial Council, who filed a complaint with the MFPC, demanded, among other calls, for an
immediate investigation of the department and its relationship to Nazi sympathizers and for action to be taken against
those who engaged in brutality. Milwaukee Union Industrial Council to Milwaukee Fire and Police Commission,
November 7, 1938, Box 3, Folder 15, Fire and Police Commission, 1936-1939, Daniel Webster Hoan Mayoral Records,
1909-1987, City of Milwaukee Archival Collection 8, Milwaukee Public Library.
37 Milwaukee City Attorney to Chief Kluchesky, June 13, 1939, Box 6, Folder 4, Police, 1932-1940, Daniel Webster
Hoan Mayoral Records.
38 Joseph Kluchesky biographical narrative, Box 22, Folder 10, “Police Department, 1942-1948,” John L. Bohn Mayoral
Records, 1937-1951, City of Milwaukee Archival Collection 16, Milwaukee Public Library.
39 “Understanding Attitude toward Minority Groups,” International Association of Chiefs of Police Annual Conference,
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Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) National Police Academy.40 His lectures on policecommunity relations further bolstered the MPD’s national standing as an innovative, reformoriented police force. In effect, Kluchesky became one of the most sought after instructors on
liberal law-and-order. National audiences, including the NAACP, applauded his willingness to speak
on “group tensions” stemming from “prejudices against racial and religious minorities.” 41
To ensure that peace was maintained according to a liberal law-and-order ethos, Chief
Kluchesky called on MPD personnel to follow a series of actionable steps. Law enforcement was to
provide citizens with equal protection of civil and property rights and receive complaints with “no
thought of difference.” They were to follow “special procedures” when reporting incidents with
“racial or religious implications.” To “dispel tensions before they result in violence,” he argued
police should reach out to existing community organizations concerned about “racial and religious
matters.” Police personnel had to maintain working relationships with government agencies and
commissions concerned about “inter-group relations.” There was also a need to conduct human
relations trainings with officers, involve specialists in the field, and instruct them on how to
“observe and recognize signs of approaching trouble,” as well as how to handle “mobs, riots, and
other emergency situations.” Rank-and-file officers should report published promotions of
“prejudice against racial, religious and nationality groups” to police administrators for FBI
investigation, and any information concerning hostile groups so that “meetings can be watched
closely” and “proper action can be taken.” Significantly, law enforcement had to work with school
principals to recognize inter-group tensions and call the police as needed. Finally, police
administrators must provide personnel with a complete list of applicable human relations laws and
December 11, 1945; “Police Attitude toward Juvenile Delinquency,” 1940, Folder 669, “Police Department, Chief
Joseph Kluchesky, 1938-1940,” Hoan, Daniel Webster Papers.
40 Alexander B. Elkins, “Battle of the Corner: Urban Policing and Rioting in the United States, 1943-1971” (Ph.D. diss.,
Temple University, 2017), 124.
41 Joseph T. Kluchesky, “Police Action in Minority Problems,” 1, “Police Brutality General, 1954-1955,” Papers of the
NAACP, Part 18, Special Subjects, 1940-1955, Series C: General Office Files: Justice Department-White Supremacy.
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ordinances.42 The civil rights and liberties of individual citizens were to be respected and protected.
Kluchesky essentially formulated a prototypical version of “community policing” that
positioned law enforcement as not only the front-line guardians of life and property, but of
“democracy itself.”43 In doing so, he connected police-community relations, social welfare, and order
maintenance. Building bridges to Black-led community groups, like the MUL and MNAACP,
required buy-in from African American leaders. The chief suggested that police administrators
assign “qualified members of the department to participate in group discussions dealing with
housing facilities, recreational centers, parent-teacher relations, and other projects designed to
improve conditions for the under-privileged.”44 In this way, the MPD was among the first police
agencies to advocate for a broader social function in service of peacekeeping and crime prevention.
As Kluchesky articulated, the police must conduct their duties with “an attitude of genuine sincerity
and understanding, without bias or discrimination.”45 The preservation of law-and-order hinged on
the degree to which police personnel not only tolerated, but looked past ethnic, racial and religious
differences. Only by “maintaining complete impartiality and protecting the civil rights of every
citizen,” could law enforcement build “general trust” in police fairness. That trust was, “in times of
critical tension,” the “only basis” on which police could “expect the cooperation of all groups in the
prevention of disorder.” Fair-minded, face-to-face police interactions with diverse groups was, in
Kluchesky’s view, a preventative cure for the “race riots” occurring across the U.S. in the 1940s.46
Chief Kluchesky lectured police on their responsibility to uphold the rights of all citizens,
regardless of race. Achieving this colorblind vision meant acculturating non-white citizens to white

Kluchesky, “Police Action in Minority Problems,” 3-4.
Christopher Lowen Agee, “Crisis and Redemption: The History of American Police Reform since World War II,”
Journal of Urban History (2017), 5.
44 Kluchesky, “Police Action in Minority Problems.”
45 Kluchesky, “Police Action in Minority Problems,” 5.
46 In 1943 alone, 47 cities reported 242 “racial battles.” Murakawa, The First Civil Right, 27. Thirty-four people died in
Detroit’s “race riot” that year.
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Milwaukee’s established middle class order. City officials expected Black and Latinx migrants—
mostly Mexican and Puerto Rican—to shed their “disorderly” cultural and behavioral traits, which
elite white reformers, business interests, and blue-collar residents saw as at odds with the city’s
dominant order. Kluchesky himself admitted that police were “possessed of prejudices,” just like
other members of the public. At the same time, he argued that police attitudes had to be vested with
“impartiality” to meet policing objectives.47 That the “effectiveness of a police force” was “largely
determined by the attitude of individual officers,” indicated that race relations training should be
thorough, recurrent, and lasting. The MPD enhanced its instructional schedule in the mid-1940s to
include “race and human relations” courses as a response to civil unrest occurring in other U.S.
cities.48 In places like New York, Detroit and Los Angeles, police themselves instigated urban rioting
by inflicting brutality against Black and Brown citizens. Civil violence elsewhere encouraged
Milwaukee elected officials to seek proactive means of easing latent tensions around race, crime, and
law enforcement. To do so, they relied on the MPD’s exceptionalized reform orientation.
In truth, the MPD laid the groundwork for a revised liberal law-and-order approach before
the PCCR began investigating the nation’s criminal justice system. The department’s embrace of law
enforcement liberalism stemmed from its existing “juvenile delinquency” and vice control agenda.
Racial pacification was merely an extension of the department’s established social control program.
The goal, it appears, was to cloak social control initiatives in a cover of racial neutrality so as to head
off civil unrest, align with civil rights law, and preserve the police image in the face of both domestic
and international criticism. For middle class reformers and civic boosters eager to expand economic
growth in Milwaukee, the combination of vice, or morals offenses, and youth crime threatened the
Kluchesky, “Police Action in Minority Problems,” 1-2.
White, Black, and Latinx servicemen vied over urban access and structures of opportunity in cities like Detroit, New
York, and Los Angeles in the mid-1940s. Competition for jobs, housing, and resources occasionally turned violent and
police attempted to forcefully restore order. More than anything, police-community relations served as a euphemism for
racial pacification in the context of mounting urban unrest. Regaining control, not obtaining justice for minoritized
victims of police violence or white vigilantism, fueled liberal law-and-order approaches.
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city’s modernization efforts. Youth crime control became a more critical function in the MPD’s
broader crackdown on immorality and vice; the two were linked. Public order maintenance around
illicit vice and youth crime grew increasingly racialized as the 20th century progressed, especially as
police and white civic actors tied race more closely to poor and working-class life. White
Milwaukee’s deep-seated fears about Black bodies, specifically the presumed sexual lusting of Black
men for white women, lurked beneath the surface of the MPD’s morals enforcement. Consequently,
white anxieties around the taboo of interracial sex undermined the agency’s capacity to instill racial
fairness as prescribed by liberal law-and-order. The MPD, and the city more broadly, was more
concerned about young white women falling prey to or simply congregating with Black men.
Monitoring youth crime had long been on the minds of police officials when the MPD
revised its training procedures to mitigate opportunities for civil unrest in 1944. Chief Kluchesky
established parameters for controlling “juvenile delinquency” as early as 1937, outlining the need for
“a separate division of trained men and women for the handling of children in their contacts with
the police department.” The MPD featured a “juvenile activities, delinquency and crime prevention”
course at Milwaukee’s Police Training School as early as 1938.49 The curriculum’s language was raceneutral. However, it was not difficult to discern when the department referenced Black youth, given
common depictions of Black migrants and the congested inner city streets that systemic white
racism compelled them to occupy.50 As Kluchesky wrote for the FBI’s Crime Prevention newsletter:
Newcomers in a neighborhood are frequently found on the streets at night with
nothing in particular to occupy their minds or bodies…Obviously it is to the
advantage not only of the child itself, but to the police and the community as a
whole, to have these children participate in supervised pursuits rather than to have
The Police Training School was established in the early 1920s under Chief Laubenheimer. “Juvenile Activities,
Delinquency & Crime Prevention,” 1938, Box 6, Folder 4, Police, 1932-1940, Daniel Webster Hoan Mayoral Records.
50 As one historian argues, “the collateral effects of the inner core’s dramatic overcrowding, deteriorating housing stock,
and limited job opportunities was the increased presence of black residents in the city’s public spaces.” Simon Ezra
Balto, “‘Occupied Territory’: Police Repression and Black Resistance in Postwar Milwaukee, 1950-1968,” The Journal of
African American History 98 (2) (Spring 2013), 234; Jack Dougherty, More than One Struggle: The Evolution of Black School
Reform in Milwaukee (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 56.
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them roaming the streets in search of mischief.51
Though not racially explicit, the chief presumed that youthful “newcomers” were
predisposed to crime, or “mischief,” in his description. If left to their own devices, migrant children
would seek out disorderly behavior. The language in police training materials on juvenile
delinquency, while race-neutral, utilized descriptors and contextual markers that revealed when
police meant Black youth. Young people on the near north side had the potential to become “police
problems” if they were not guided towards police-sponsored centers, where they would be kept
under law enforcement’s watchful eye. Otherwise, they might become “delinquent adults.” As
Kluchesky noted, “juvenile behavior in any community” was a “fair barometer of adult behavior.” It
was no surprise to police administrators that “conditions which bring about default in obligations of
adults…reflected in undesirable behavior on the part of their children.”52
To ward off “race riots” similar to those experienced by Detroit in 1942 and 1943,
Kluchesky worked to prevent interracial mixing. Inhibiting social disorder meant ensuring Black
containment in the Sixth Ward and doing all the department could to prevent white residents from
entering the vicinity. Police kept close watch of Black youth. Law enforcement viewed African
American young people as the prime fomenters of unrest. As the FBI’s Milwaukee Field Division
observed in 1943, “youthful Negroes” would “frequently band together in a crowd of from three
hundred to four hundred, especially on weekends, and cause considerable commotion by yelling and
shouting and forcing people off the sidewalks.”53 Through coercion and other means, federal agents
relied on African Americans to surveil their own people. As a Black informant reported to
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52 Kluchesky, “Youth.”
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Milwaukee FBI agents, “if these individuals decided to roam the streets in the white residential areas,
trouble might ensue.”54 Black attorney George Brawley said police threatened white visitors to the
Sixth Ward with vagrancy arrests if they did not exit the district. Black business-owners reported
“many complaints” of white customers being called away from businesses by patrolmen, who
ordered them to leave the area.55 Chief Kluchesky denied these charges before Milwaukee Mayor
John Bohn’s Committee on Interracial Relations, testifying to the department’s adherence to racial
colorblindness. Youth control was interwoven with the liberal law-and-order imperative of racial
pacification. In 1944, Kluchesky called for eradicating bias “from the minds of children.” Young
people, he argued, offered “the most fertile field in which to plant the seeds of understanding and to
uproot and destroy the weeds of religious prejudice and racial hatred.”56 The chief encouraged
Milwaukee youth to participate in Saturday morning classes at the Police Training School, which he
saw it as a crucial preventative measure. The department not only taught young people that their
diversity was “the foundation of American security, growth and progress,” but that they could trust
the police as their “friend.” Improving the police image and instilling trust was at the heart of law
enforcement liberalism. At the academy, young people learned about the police function and
“necessity of maintaining law and order.” “The appeal of patriotism,” Kluchesky noted, was “strong
with children” and must “be effectively utilized.”
Milwaukee police leaders viewed the threat of juvenile crime through a similar racial prism as
illicit vice offenses—gambling, public drunkenness, and prostitution. Milwaukee’s vice markets
flourished in the 1940s and 1950s, as historian Khalil Muhammad once framed it, “under a cover of
blackness.”57 Therefore, vice-related crime threatened the fundamental building block of moral
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order: white middle class families. Police aggressively monitored opportunities for convergences of
youth and vice. The MPD understood unsupervised minors and young adults to be susceptible to
indecency, vice, and related public order offenses. In 1943, the Common Council passed the city’s
first youth curfew ordinance.58 Milwaukee’s police academy featured a course, “Juvenile Activities,
Delinquency and Crime Prevention,” in 1945. For trainees, “police interest in juvenile activities” was
positioned as central to “the larger problem of ‘crime prevention.’”59 Actual arrests of minors in the
1940s matched the department’s emphasis on youth control, particularly during World War II: 7,106
arrests in 1943, 6,501 in 1944, and 6,302 in 1945.60 Most of these were on non-violent traffic or
pedestrian offenses. However, disorderly conduct arrests remained high at 1,582; 1,581; and 1,212 in
that same span. Rising youth crime and attendant middle class fears about moral breakdown
encouraged the MPD to enhance its institutional composition and strategic objectives.
Consequently, it brought thousands of local youth under its purview.
Chief John Polcyn, like Kluchesky, embraced the blend of liberal law-and-order guidance
and long established institutional independence that characterized Milwaukee’s narrative of policing
exceptionalism in the post-World War II era. Speaking before the United Spanish War Veterans at a
1946 conference, during his first year as chief, Polcyn referred to Milwaukee as “the home of law
enforcement,” a city “free of politics,” where police “enforce the law impartially,” and it is
immaterial to law enforcement “what color, creed, or political belief you are.” The MPD, he said,

In July 1943, the Milwaukee Common Council passed a “curfew ordinance” prohibiting all youth under the age of
sixteen from “loitering upon public streets, highways, roads, alleys, parks, public buildings, places of amusement and
entertainment, vacant lots, or any pubs places” from 12:00 p.m. to 5:00 a.m. Any minor under the age of eighteen years
of age was prohibited from visiting, loitering, idling, wandering, or strolling in a hotel, lodging for rooming house
between 10:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m. without a parent or guardian. Between July 1943 and January 1945, 234 juveniles were
arrested for violating the curfew ordinance; 158 were sent to the juvenile detention center; 69 were turned over to their
parents; 17 were released. 155 parents were arrested for violating the ordinance, as well, with warrants issued in 38 of
these cases. Police were called on to connect apprehended juveniles with social centers with the cooperation of parents.
“Juvenile Delinquency Control Program as Operative in the Police Department of the City of Milwaukee, Wis.,” Box 94,
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was “only concerned with individual behavior.”61 Polcyn actualized much of Kluchesky’s vision for
youth control when he established Milwaukee’s Youth Aid Bureau (YAB) in 1946. The YAB
collaborated with other municipal agencies to monitor, rehabilitate, and discipline “juvenile
delinquents.”62 The public education system and MPD partnered to control youth behavior. Law
enforcement was brought into schools by administrators to observe and, if necessary, arrest
disorderly young people. The MPD, Milwaukee County Juvenile Court, and Department of
Municipal Recreation and Adult Education oversaw the “Juvenile Delinquency Control Program.” 63
It should be considered part of the city’s wider cultural adjustment efforts. Juvenile justice agencies
served a specific function within the criminal justice system, with the prevention and rehabilitation
of allegedly criminogenic youth, particularly African Americans, serving as a mutual objective. The

Expecting Spanish American War veterans to partake in the city’s drinking culture, Chief Polcyn assured the them,
“Wherever you meet a police officer, when you get tired of making the rounds of the breweries, he will take care of
you.” Poor and working-class Black residents were offered no such assurances when encountering police while
intoxicated. United Spanish War Veterans, “Proceedings of the Stated Convention of the 48th National Encampment,
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62 A “delinquent child” was defined by the “Children’s Code of Wisconsin” as “any child under the age of eighteen years
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MPD enforced the state juvenile code at street level, apprehending offenders and referring cases to
the city’s juvenile court. Because police were “active throughout the city and familiar with conditions
prevailing in all neighborhoods,” public officials saw them as well positioned “to cooperate with
other agencies.”64
Youth control programs resulted in the unprecedented expansion of discretionary police
surveillance, contacts, and arrests of Milwaukee young people. While overall juvenile arrests had
decreased from wartime highs following the Youth Aid Bureau’s formation, they saw a steady
increase over the course of the 1950s.65 Youth criminal supervision in Milwaukee during the 1950s
corresponded with national patterns, as youth criminal justice supervision grew nationally by roughly
2.5 times from 1949 to 1957.66 While the MPD did not report individuals’ race in tabulations of
youth crime between 1943 and 1956, it did thereafter. Racial disparities in arrests of minors widened
as the postwar era progressed, alongside arrests of Black adults. Despite comprising between 4 and
8.5 percent of Milwaukee’s population from 1950 to 1960, Black men and women comprised
anywhere from 63 to 75 percent of all prostitution and commercialized vice arrests; 58 to 72 percent
of all narcotics arrests; 51 to 82 percent of all gambling arrests; and 31 to 33 percent of all disorderly
conduct arrests in the 1957 to 1960 period. Considering that at the outset of World War II Black
youth represented slightly more than 1.4 percent of Milwaukee’s youth population, they comprised
5.4 percent of all juvenile arrests from 1942 to 1944.67 Detention rates reflected disparities in
enforcement and arrests. Milwaukee House of Corrections records show that Black jailing went up
from 14 to almost 33 percent between 1948 and 1960.68 These numbers signified the high level of
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police attention paid to Milwaukee’s near north side, and the increasingly anxious public discourse
around race, crime, and safety. It is in these years that Milwaukee began trying to police its way out
of a deepening “urban crisis,” well before the 1960s.
Controlling youth crime aligned with the MPD’s contributions to Milwaukee’s “cultural
adjustment” program. Black behavior, criminal or otherwise, was positioned by white civic leaders
and police officials as a function of Black familial and cultural leanings. While City Hall liberals
recognized that inequality made life difficult for Black citizens, they nonetheless pathologized Black
behavior, rarely considering how government policies created differential outcomes and hardened
segregation patterns. In 1952, for instance, a report drafted by the University of Wisconsin School of
Social Work observed that Black migrants were “largely young adults,” often men, who reproduced
at comparatively high rates.69 They moved into a congested “Inner Core” area of the city—its
population characterized by low income, irregular employment, “sub-standard economic status,”
“poor health,” “poor housing,” “dependency,” “low educational attainment,” and “high delinquency
rates.”70 Because these were similar problems, previously confronted by “other new arrivals,” i.e.
European immigrants, liberal committees like the Milwaukee Commission on Human Rights
(MCHR) expected Black newcomers from the South to assimilate. Family and morality was at the
heart of Black cultural adjustment. Black parents, researchers wrote, had “an obligation to provide
for the young people of this community the opportunity to fulfill their desires and needs for social
and cultural growth.” The “influence of the family” was “very important” in explaining “delinquent
behavior.” “Insecure economic and social status coupled with inadequate living conditions” created
a “family climate” that hindered the ability of Black youth to “meet and accept the responsibilities as
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well as the opportunities…put before them.”71 Academic researchers suggested that anywhere
“families of marginal income and social status” resided, “together with inadequate living
conditions,” high delinquency rates resulted, including in white spaces.72
Yet, the MPD concentrated its enforcement strategies on the increasingly Black near north
side. This did not automatically equate to police protection. Black families living there were already
dealing with the social and economic vulnerability that came with systemic discrimination,
experiencing a dangerous combination of overzealous policing and law enforcement neglect. 73
Moreover, youth crime was more complicated than it seemed for many Black citizens. For example,
in 1952 Hillside Terrace public housing residents demanded better police protection in response to
outside youths, non-tenants, “constituting a menace to the welfare and safety” of housing project
residents. Youths inflicted “considerable loss” to property, broke off tree branches, smashed
windows, and engaged in “acts of gross indecency,” tenants reported.74 Black public housing
residents pointed to a “lack of police protection” and “slow response” times as contributing factors.
Their public safety concerns suggested all residents desired to live decent lives, secure in their
“property” and “welfare.” However, the MPD did not administer its services fairly, despite its
colorblind pronouncements. When protection was needed most, too many African Americans found
it lacking. When police encountered “unruly” Black youth, they too often inflicted a “brutal and
heavy hand.”75 The behavioral racism that gave shape to disparate policing in Black spaces undercut
the MPD’s efforts to address juvenile delinquency’s root causes.
White perceptions of Black cultural inferiority, economic deficiency, and inherent criminality
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fueled competing forms of resistance to Milwaukee’s “Negro influx.”76 These ranged from cross
burnings on the lawns of prospective Black home buyers in all-white neighborhoods, to rampant
employment discrimination, to City Hall write-in campaigns from white business-owners and
residents fearful of Black crime waves. Narratives of racial difference lent white perceptions of Black
migration legitimacy, as did racist ideas about interracial intimacy. White homeowners living in the
unincorporated town of Granville, for example, exhibited “strong active resistance” to Black homebuying.77 Business owners voiced fears about losing customers “because of the Negro trade,” as well
as “the safety and welfare of their wives and daughters while…working nights.” Black men posed an
apparent threat to their virile conception of white manhood. Police “overheard discussions
concerning the fraternization of Negro men and white women.” MPD officers warned “physical
violence might erupt from such incidents.” White families living in the Westlawn neighborhood also
expressed fears about the “problem” of “non-white population movement into traditional all white
communities.”78 Rumors swirled that the working-class housing project would be “either 100
percent black or predominantly of Negro occupancy.” A white minister informed the Milwaukee
Human Relations Commission that he would find a private school to send his daughter to, then
argued [white] business owners might have been amenable to hiring “non-white employees who ‘live
in’” the city; that was “quite different from a non-white person living next door as a neighbor.”79
Integration for some white residents was not just a matter of decreasing home values or lost social
prestige, but of perceived safety risks centered on Black criminality.
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White middle class reformers framed racial inequality in Milwaukee as a consequence of
individual conduct and Black ghetto formation. Some middle class elites chalked up racial
disadvantage in employment, housing, and education to interpersonal white bigotry, which gave
shape to poor living conditions and, in turn, Black cultural pathologies and criminal behaviors. The
psychological impact of assimilationist racism within individuals superseded the institutional racism
that produced uneven racial structures and outcomes. As historian Simon Balto has observed,
“rather than indictments of infrastructural non-investment or systematic inequality, rhetorics of
moral failure, personal accountability, and racial responsibility” characterized public debates around
Sixth Ward conditions after World War II.80 As issues of overcrowding, poverty, and crime worsened
during Milwaukee’s postwar housing crisis, an “emergent language of black moral failure” shaped
police approaches to social control and order maintenance. The MPD arrested Black adults and
youth at higher rates than white offenders who engaged in similar activities. Arrests on charges like
“drunkenness,” “vagrancy,” “gambling,” “disorderly conduct,” and “suspicion” rose. Blackness was
condemned and criminalized through the aggressive policing of leisure-time spaces, especially
underground dance parties, jazz performances, and gambling halls.81
Vice control remained a significant concern for white middle class reformers in the 1940s. It
merged with issues around youth crime and Black migration. More vigorous enforcement of vicerelated crime in the Sixth Ward ensured that poor and working-class Blacks experienced
disproportionate police stops, arrests, and detentions. Gambling arrests, for instance, surged during
the wartime years, nearly tripling in 1942 and 1943.82 White middle class reformers linked Black
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gambling arrests to lax parental supervision and the city’s rising juvenile delinquency problem. 83
Organizations like the Milwaukee Women’s Club demanded vigilance from the MPD’s Vice Squad in
the Sixth Ward, especially around its Black-run “policy racket.”84 The MPD fleetingly allowed some
vice activities to flourish on the near north side through the 1940s. Milwaukee’s Black-run policy
circuit was lucrative, and benefitted from police support. While low-level “numbers runners” and
players faced occasional busts, some white patrolmen used their discretion to turn the other way for
pay-offs.85 The sympathies of liberal white reformers for the economic plight of poor and workingclass Black migrants began shifting; the perceived immorality of Black newcomers tested their social
tolerance. Progressive reformers expressed concerns about disorderly Black conduct. Innez Barr, of
the Milwaukee Woman’s Club, worked with the MUL to regulate vice in the Sixth Ward.86 Her efforts
to monitor Black leisure time activities reflected a gaining assimilationist racism that eventually
formed the basis of Milwaukee’s cultural adjustment program. The Youth Aid Bureau supported
white middle class drives to reform Black behavior. Widespread anxieties also emerged around youth
crimes of an interracial nature. Barr and other liberal reformers made connections between Black
gambling, vice, and juvenile delinquency. This joined with FBI surveillance of young Black migrants.
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Federal police in Milwaukee kept a watchful eye on the potential for “wartime urban and racial
unrest.”87
Police underprotection of African Americans, conversely, was the problem for some Black
leaders. Undue vice and public order law enforcement confounded some Black clergy, whom City
Hall liberals expected to help acculturate southern Black migrants. While Black middle class leaders
disdained vice as much as white officials, they believed achieving public safety meant securing more
equitable and discerning law enforcement. In 1948, Rev. W. J. G. McLin requested that Chief Polcyn
provide a reasonable police presence in the Sixth War to curb gambling, loitering, and drunkenness. 88
Businesses that served liquor were concentrated on the near north side, feeding its image as an
immoral space. McLin told Polcyn that Black Milwaukeeans did not participate in vice activities
alone. The white press, he editorialized, unfairly targeted African Americans. “Does the mere
question of color warrant so much extra space?”89 Police tended to ignore Black requests for police
assistance, unless the department faced accusations of wrongdoing or white citizens were involved. 90
White middle class fears about rising moral disorder, juvenile delinquency, interracial
intimacy, and Communism all blended together in the late 1940s and early 1950s. This convergence
tested the MPD’s liberal law-and-order ethos, which called for officers to adhere to racial-neutrality
and fairness in enforcing the law. White anxieties around Black in-migration, the susceptibility of
youth to drugs and seemingly nefarious entertainment, and racialized press accounts supported
notions of criminality among Black juveniles and young adult men. Racially-specific reporting
worked in tandem with location-specific policing of youth on the city’s near north side. According
to the MPD, “police interest in juvenile activities” was “justified” and “vital to the community”
Hill, The FBI's RACON, 160-166.
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because of “its relation to the larger problem of ‘Crime Prevention.’”91 The injection of race into
vice control made Milwaukee’s perceived morals crisis more acute for city officials who were already
concerned about the city’s transitioning racial boundaries and related pernicious influences.
In 1948, lurid press depictions of “Bare Teenage Vice Orgies” among Black teens and young
men and white teenage girls intensified the department’s juvenile control program. Newspapers
made connections to the ascendant popularity of jazz music—a distinctly Black cultural art form
that challenged minstrelsy and racist white interpretations of Black men as smiling, docile
entertainers. One raid, in particular, resulted in the arrest of seven “jazz-mad” white teenage girls
and nine “Negro men and boys,” said to be abusing “marijuana and liquor.”92 In addition to policing
interracial sex, the MPD’s Vice Squad aggressively enforced narcotics laws. Black young adults were
perceived as harbingers of drug abuse in Milwaukee.93 According to police, the girls, all from “good
homes,” admitted “improper sexual relations with the Negro youths.” Four of the Black minors
faced “sex delinquency” charges. The alleged leader of the “thrill ring,” Walter Beach, “deserved a
severe sentence,” according to the Milwaukee County Assistant District Attorney, as he had “no
regard for womanhood.” A judge sentenced the 18-year-old, who had no previous criminal record,
to a two-to-three-year prison sentence at Green Bay reformatory “on charges of carnal knowledge
and abuse of two white girls.”94
A second case stands out for the racialized nature of the public discourse it provoked and
disproportionate number of Black arrests it produced. In April 1950, two concerned white women
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wrote to Mayor Zeidler about a “rooming house” allegedly rented for “immoral purposes” on the
near north side.95 “White girls” exited the premises “in the early morning hours.” The “nuisance”
property was “running wide open, despite repeated complaints.”96 The women were frustrated that
police made numerous arrests at the property, mostly of Black men and women, but not of the
property owner(s). The racialized nature of the “immoral” behavior allegedly taking place
heightened the criminal justice response. This was not merely an issue of commercialized vice
among youths, but of the taboo practice of interracial sex. As Chief Polcyn wrote in a letter to the
Milwaukee County District Attorney, “teenage white girls have been observed frequenting the
premises,” with an “unusual amount of activity and traffic of both white and colored person going
in and out.”97 Subsequent police charges ranged from “disorderly conduct” to “soliciting for
prostitution” to “lewd and lascivious behavior.”98 The rooming house operator was eventually
charged under the “Linley Law,” but not before police racked up a number of arrests.99
Judging by newspaper headlines in 1950, white civic elites saw Communism as every bit as
threatening morally as interracial juvenile sex and prostitution. As the postwar “Red Scare” and
McCarthyism neared its zenith, Wisconsin Communist Party (WCP) leaders challenged the MPD’s
discriminatory policing on the near north side. On April 12, 1950, they registered a complaint with
the MFPC that police were “terrorizing, intimidating, and penalizing” the “legitimate social and
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personal relations” of white and Black citizens.100 The complaint, filed months before the federal
government passed the McCarron Act authorizing police to arrest and detain subversives, was
prompted by the actions of a squad of officers.101 The squad was presumably conducting political
surveillance when it approached a white woman sitting in a parked car after “they observed two
colored men dash” from the vehicle. The woman, WCP secretary Esther Eisenscher, informed
police all was well. Fred Blair, WCP vice-chair, then approached the officers and asked for badge
numbers, which Chief Polcyn says were provided.102 As the squad left, the officers pulled over a
truck for an alleged broken tail light. They then searched the vehicle of Mortimer Altman, “a known
communist,” finding only “posters advertising the appearance in Milwaukee of Mrs. Eslanda G.
Robeson at the Masonic Hall.”103 The MFPC refused to accept the WCP’s discrimination complaint,
arguing they “had to file formal, legal charges before any action could be taken by the
Commission.”104 The officers who supplied badge numbers denied “being in the vicinity” of the
encounter between the squad and WCP members, stating, according to Polcyn, that they “cannot
understand how their badge numbers could have been secured since they had absolutely no contact
whatsoever” with the complainants.105 The WCP’s demand for police accountability went nowhere.
Regardless, their leadership soon went underground.106
Thereafter, Polcyn tightened the MPD’s vice control efforts. In 1950, he issued a directive to
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all personnel: It was “their duty and obligation…regardless of rank or specific assignment, to take
proper action whenever…lewd, obscene or indecent performances” and “strip tease acts” came to
their attention.107 All were fair game for arrest. Those who failed to vigorously police vice and public
order offenses would be “severely disciplined.” As the chief continued. “Milwaukee has always been
known as a clean city with clean entertainment. This Department will leave nothing within its power
undone to keep it so.” For many residents, including one who wrote to Milwaukee Mayor Frank
Zeidler in 1951, it was “common knowledge” that the city had “one of the finest police
department’s in the country.”108 The force’s durable narrative of policing exceptionalism, as well as
the city’s moral order, was on the line.

Policing the Late Great Migration
The MPD’s embrace of liberal law-and-order was shaped by increasing Black migration
during and after World War II. Black Milwaukee expanded from 8,821 residents in 1940 to 62,458 in
1960.109 Black migration, and the mixed responses it generated, encouraged the city’s police
department to enact new trainings on race and human relations that were meant to mitigate
opportunities for civil unrest. However, liberal reforms from on high rarely translated into equitable
police service and protection across Milwaukee’s color line. Poor and working-class Black migrants
grappled with intensifying episodes of police mistreatment as their number grew. Chronic
joblessness, under-employment, and poverty reinforced a perceived need for vigilant policing among
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white city officials and residents, making it difficult for the MPD to live up to its liberal
proclamations of racial neutrality. Opportunities for discretionary police misconduct on the near
north side abounded as the city directed police resources towards Black spaces. Aggressive order
maintenance policing became more noticeable as Black Milwaukee’s population grew and its physical
proximity became more constrained. This produced differential outcomes in the form of undue
fines, arrests, detentions, and “juvenile justice” referrals. Responding to pressures applied by white
social reformers and civic leaders, the MPD cracked down on public order offenses: drunkenness,
vagrancy, and gambling. More serious violent crimes, such as murder, homicide, rape, and assault,
also drew significant police attention. Several violent crimes involving Black criminal suspects in the
mid-1950s were sensationalized in the press, creating a more frenzied atmosphere. Black
criminalization disrupted interracial and intra-racial class dynamics among Black middle class
residents, comparatively poorer migrants, and white liberals. Cultural adjustment was City Hall’s
response to resolving growing tensions around race, crime, and order maintenance.
Historian Paul Geib refers to Black Milwaukee’s expansive population growth as the city’s
“late Great Migration,” given that the bulk of African American migrants arrived later than in other
cities.110 Most Black newcomers to Milwaukee in the 1940s and 1950s hailed from Lower South
states like Mississippi, Alabama, and Georgia.111 Others travelled from Upper South or border states
like Arkansas, Tennessee, and Kentucky.112 Still, some made their way from the Lower Midwest, or
previous migration destinations, like Chicago or Cleveland. Milwaukee’s Black migrant population
was young and largely male.113 African American arrivals encountered a racist world, not all too
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different in attitude and structure from the regions they left behind. Many poor white southern
laborers also joined northward migrations. They added an overtly racist understanding of Black life
and culture to an ethnically diverse white European city whose residents already subscribed to
narratives of racial difference. Like earlier Black migrants, those participating in the city’s late Great
Migration sought economic opportunities and to escape the dehumanization and “white rage” that
coursed through the Jim Crow South.114 Economic opportunities pulled, while white racial violence
and discrimination pushed tens of thousands of refugees north. The pressure of finding better jobs
and freedom joined correlated factors, like improved educational access and secure voting rights.115
Still, Milwaukee, like other northern migration destinations, betrayed a mix of hope and discontent.
The city’s racially divided terrain was at once wholly unfamiliar and eerily recognizable. While not all
Black migrants experienced racial violence first-hand in the South, the threat of physical harm, either
at the hands of white police or white neighbors, shaped Black yearnings for survival in Milwaukee.
Still, with the relative availability of industrial, domestic, and hospitality work, many Black men and
women made the best of their new circumstances.
Patterns of Black settlement in Milwaukee reflected those of other Midwestern cities
attracting Black workers and families.116 Legal and extra-legal acts of discrimination forced migrants
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to live in a spatially-confined area of mixed residential, commercial and industrial lands situated just
north of downtown.117 The federal government condemned Milwaukee’s near north side through
“redlining.” A 1938 Home Owners’ Loan Corporation (HOLC) map, for example, characterized it
as grade “D,” meaning it showed “detrimental influences in a pronounced degree,” a “low
percentage of home ownership,” “very poor maintenance,” “vandalism,” and “an undesirable
population” or “infiltration of it.” The redlined perimeter of the area on federal housing maps
signaled to mortgage lenders that they should refuse loans to area occupants, or otherwise proceed
on “a conservative basis.”118 Black Milwaukee’s territorial limits stretched slightly further north and
west in subsequent decades, as more economically mobile white families, mainly of German and
Jewish descent, departed the near north side for outlying neighborhoods and incorporated and
unincorporated municipalities on the city’s suburban fringes.119 Only ninety Black Milwaukee
families lived in majority white communities as of 1960.120 As the MNAACP reported in 1958, “the
ability to rent outside the accepted Negro community is practically impossible.”121 By 1945, the 135block near north side area was about two-thirds Black. Although sixty-eight percent of the housing
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stock Black families occupied in 1946 was considered to be sub-standard by the state, proud Black
homeowners and renters meticulously cared for the properties they inhabited. Nevertheless, housing
deterioration grew more severe in the late 1940s and 1950s as segregation hardened. This
encouraged civic disinvestment.
The opening of defense jobs to Black workers in the 1940s sparked Milwaukee’s late Great
Migration. Wartime enlistments produced high labor shortages, generating economic opportunities
for Black workers previously shut out of manufacturing positions.122 With white labor shortages and
equipment demands increasing, a greater share of Black workers accessed skilled and semi-skilled
positions. Industrial labor opportunities sometimes served as stepping-stones into civil service
careers, like policing.123 Although racist hiring practices and union discrimination denied Black
laborers industrial employment at the start of the 1940s, wartime necessity and civil rights activism
shifted economic prospects. U.S. entry into World War II invigorated a national Black freedom
struggle. In 1941, the national March on Washington Movement for an end to hiring discrimination
in defense plants augmented the local interracial organizing of the Congress of Industrial
Organizations (1936-1941) and the lobbying efforts of civil rights organizations, like the MNAACP
and MUL, to help establish a Black manufacturing base in the city.124 Although interracial workingclass alliances fractured upon the return of white servicemen, thousands of Black manufacturing
employees maintained their industrial foothold.125 Even with the onset of deindustrialization,
At first, Milwaukee’s defense industries hired Black men only for unskilled work as common laborers, porters and
janitors. Racial discrimination in Milwaukee’s wartime industries held firm until manpower shortages and the threat of
federal contract suspensions for biased corporate hiring practices created new demands for Black labor in 1942 and
1943. Milwaukee’s wartime industries and ancillary businesses catered to defense manufacturers and their employees.
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123 This became even more commonplace after Black freedom movement activists compelled the U.S. Congress to pass
the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The landmark legislation enumerated equal employment and civil rights protections within
workplaces—including police departments.
124 The threat of a mass civil rights demonstration in Washington D.C. prompted the Roosevelt Administration to issue
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147-148.
125 Black Milwaukee Assemblyman Isaac Coggs led the fight in Madison for state-level fair employment practices
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manufacturing remained the bedrock of Black Milwaukee’s labor economy.
African Americans and their liberal allies also waged a national “Double V campaign” for
“victory at home and victory abroad” over anti-democratic forces.126 This struggle impacted liberal
law-and-order’s conceptualization, as it revealed the need to project law enforcement’s institutional
colorblindness to the world. As a rhetorical and ideological struggle that pitted democracy and
freedom against fascism and communism, the Second World War raised questions for Black citizens
about whether defending American values of freedom and liberty overseas would lead to democratic
advances at home.127 The global conflict shined an international light on domestic racism and local
state violence perpetrated against Black citizens, including racial terror lynchings, police brutality,
and prisoner mistreatment. While most white Americans professed an allegiance to the “inalienable
right” to “life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness,” and defended a Constitution that demanded
“equal protection of the laws,” they often condoned the second-class treatment of Black, Brown,
Asian and Native peoples.128 Not just in the Jim Crow South, but in northern cities too, where de
facto housing, employment, and education discrimination only worsened in the context of rising
Black migration. Civil rights advocates in Milwaukee aimed to leverage the war’s geopolitical
implications in struggles to end discrimination in public and private life. In part, that meant calling
attention to the economic plight of Black residents unfairly closed off from the city’s industrial
workforce. They had to “walk a fine line” in doing so, balancing their democratic agenda with the
strict ideological constraints and anti-Communism of the early Cold War period.129 Appearing “un-
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American” threatened to derail Black Milwaukee’s nascent civil rights struggle, just as appearing
racist threatened to hinder liberal law-and-order.
In the midst of global economic and political crises, the federal government worked to bring
organized labor more firmly into the liberal-capitalist order as middle class producers and
consumers. Beginning with the New Deal reforms of the 1930s, the state conferred civic and
fiduciary benefits to citizens that effectively neutralized many of the class-based antagonisms of the
late-19th and early-20th centuries. Concurrently, powerful southern white Congressmen in President
Franklin Roosevelt’s political coalition negotiated to exclude the vast majority of Black families,
agricultural and domestic workers, and returning soldiers from the economic protections and
assistance programs of the New Deal and World War II eras. Most Black Milwaukeeans were
excluded from the opportunity to access postwar largesse. Federal interventions and legislation from
this period, consequently, strengthened the city’s white ethnic working-class majorities, allowing
them to thrive in a strong postwar economy and access middle class benefits. Federal mortgage
programs empowered white workers to move out of the city and into single-family suburban homes.
Freed from the financial burdens of administering public welfare to poor and working-class nonwhite citizens, they readily paid lower property taxes. The growing white middle class relied on
racially restrictive housing covenants, strict zoning laws, and acts of physical and symbolic resistance
to prevent Black families from moving into white communities. The Federal Housing Authority
(FHA) refused to make loans to nonwhite families, viewing them as risky financial investments
based on the physical and economic characteristics of their decidedly poorer neighborhoods.
Back in the city, the common perception among white employers and labor leaders, as well
as members of Milwaukee’s Black middle class, was that southern migrants were exclusively lowskilled workers who could only perform low-wage jobs. In truth, Black migrants had “rich and
varied” employment experiences, working as farmers, retail clerks, grocers, industrial laborers, and
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other occupations.130 In framing migrants as “low-skilled and ‘culturally’ set apart” from the
conventional order, white officials availed themselves the cover needed to treat them as exceptional.
They used narratives of racial difference to justify discrimination. White lawmakers deflected on
issues of racism, positioning southern Black migrants as existing beyond “the normative middle
class.”131
Entrenched segregation ensured pronounced intra-racial class variation in Black Milwaukee.
Poor and working-class Black residents occupied the same residential and commercial spaces as an
existing cadre of Black professionals—many of who moved to the city between World War I and
the Depression-era 1930s. These “respectable” attorneys, clergy, teachers, bankers, doctors, barbers,
retail shop owners, and tavern keepers gave shape to the self-determined, robust entrepreneurial
spirit of “Bronzeville.” By 1952, 167 manufacturing firms employed 4,786 Black workers. 132 Black
professionals, on the whole, made their livelihoods within the near north side by catering to
working-class Black patrons in a racially segmented labor and leisure market. Population growth and
congestion in this area, according to some, led to lower neighborhood standards and property
deterioration, while also encouraging white flight. That Black professionals established businesses,
churches, civil rights organizations, newspapers, social clubs, literary societies, and self-help
organizations was a testament to the community’s resiliency and perseverance in the face of systemic
racial exclusion.133 Members of the city’s white majority also patronized Bronzeville’s taverns, juke
joints, and night clubs. As a result, the MPD’s Vice Squad paid attention to interracial encounters
taking place between Black and white patrons, especially those suspected to be of a “sexual” or
“deviant” nature. While such interactions may not have spurred racial terror lynchings, as was
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common in the South, it nonetheless created cause for alarm among white citizens, thereby
necessitating police action.134 African American migration challenged Milwaukee’s reputation as “a
bastion of Midwestern white middle class morality.”135
Black migration in the 1940s and 1950s engendered a triangular struggle for order on the
city’s racially transitioning north side that held important ramifications for Milwaukee’s narrative of
policing exceptionalism.136 Black in-migration, and the varied responses it generated, challenged
white residents, the established Black middle class, and the growing number of poor and workingclass Black migrants trying to navigate their new urban surroundings. Each viewed their
circumstances from divergent perspectives, anchored in aspirations for survival and respect,
recognition and power in the civic ecology. For the thousands of white Milwaukeeans living in and
around the near north side during this period, that meant preserving existing structures of racial
privilege that benefitted white European ethnics, regardless of class position. Conversely, Black
professionals and working-class migrants operated from marked power deficits. The urban
landscape was rife with barriers to opportunity, sustained by the broader white populace through
varying levels of social, economic, and political complicity. Black people’s limited control over how
they could use and access urban space lent itself to “a constant state of reappraisal, adjustment, and
ultimately improvisational living.”137 As such, conceptions of law-and-order took on diverse
meanings for all three groups, given shape by the level of municipal influence each held in relation
to one another and the substantive weight that an evolving set of anti-Black ideas assumed in the
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public consciousness.
City powerbrokers positioned Milwaukee’s virtually all-white police force at the vanguard of
this triangular struggle. White civic and political leaders tasked the MPD with maintaining order and
preserving established hierarchies on the street. The collective experiences of Black professionals
and working-class migrants reveal the extent to which law enforcement operated at the behest of
white governing and corporate interests concerned with economic growth. White corporate leaders
and politicians were, in turn, granted authority by the professional and working-class constituencies
that comprised the city’s white majority.138 Press depictions of Black criminality and illicit behavior,
particularly crimes of an interracial and sexual nature, elicited white fears, which justified disparate
levels of police attention directed towards Black spaces. 139 Surplus policing in Black spaces meant
African American youth were disproportionately targeted for stops, searches, and arrests. The MPD
used its overpolicing of the near north side to justify continued overpolicing. This dynamic cyclically
primed the latent biases of many white patrolling officers.
Clashes over the policing of urban space mounted as Black in-migration accelerated. White
residential concerns around crime and safety melded with ancillary worries about interracial job
competition, mixed-race social interactions, and the postwar housing crisis.140 Meanwhile, numerous
The latter exhibited deep racial anxieties in response to Black in-migration and the perceived threats that Black
movement posed to Milwaukee’s prevailing social, political, and economic arrangements. For instance, dramatic
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Black residents expressed parallel misgivings about community safety and interpersonal violence
occurring on the city’s near north side.141 Escalating police-community tensions gave the impression
of looming civil disorder, compelling white elected officials to focus more on the behavioral
misconduct of Black youth and the expansion of recreational opportunities as part of the city’s
acculturation agenda. The MUL worked with the Milwaukee vocational school, MPS, and MPD to
support Black cultural adjustment. One of the League’s goals was to create a favorable hiring climate
for recently arrived Black laborers.142 In truth, dismal living conditions, bolstered by intensive real
estate exploitation and the use of racially restrictive housing covenants, narrowed Black
employment, educational, and political prospects. A number of established Black professionals—
who were putatively “adjusted” to the city’s existing racial order—joined the liberal Zeidler
administration in preaching acculturation to Black migrants. Several old-guard African American
leaders retained hope that white Milwaukeeans would accept the city’s growing blackness and
overcome their racist fears to see Black citizens as functional, contributing members of society.
Convergences of race and class undermined Black organizational resistance to white
supremacy after World War II. The “external effects of racism,” Tula Connell argues, intersected
with “the internal dynamics of social and cultural forces that originated within the black community
itself.”143 Currying favor from white politicians and civic leaders was a grudging necessity for Black
professionals. But many also stayed focused on eliminating racial barriers in employment, education,
and housing. The expansion of economic opportunity was a collective objective for Black-led
organizations. Many hoped that acculturation to the status quo would translate into social,
economic, and political power. At the same time, Milwaukee’s Black middle class refused to
Some Black middle class residents positioned Milwaukee’s deepening racial divides as the root causes of disorder, and
were less inclined than white civic leaders and residents to blame the behavioral shortcomings of Black migrants as the
primary impetus for Milwaukee’s postwar urban crisis. Others took a more conservative view that blamed Black
migrants directly.
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compromise its self-worth or Bronzeville’s safety for the sake of new Black migrants. Their
conceivably objectionable behavior might render the community vulnerable to civic neglect, crime,
and aggressive police treatment. The vibrant commercial district along N. 3 rd St. and W. Walnut St.
validated the extent to which African Americans had cultivated “a place of their own.”144 In truth,
the area’s gradual economic decline after World War II had more to do with unrealized political
promises around slum clearance, public housing construction, and urban renewal than rising crime.
Yet, these latter forces supported powerful public narratives of an undeserving Black poor. As the
1950s wore on, the accumulating effect of police violence, civil rights violations, and white racial
antagonism exposed cultural adjustment and racial accommodation to be losing propositions in the
struggle for Black freedom in Milwaukee.
African Americans pushed for police recruitment as part of the city’s “police-community
relations movement” in the 1940s and 1950s. In the Jim Crow South, Black citizens fought to
overcome rigid white supremacist efforts to deny them positions of authority.145 In some northern
cities, like Chicago, token Black police hiring dated back to the 1870s, though officers faced similar
arrest, patrol, and promotional restrictions.146 Black police hiring in Milwaukee was rare, and
remained so throughout the liberal law-and-order era. Before World War II, the department had
This line draws on Andrew Wiese’s phrasing to describe processes of Black suburbanization. Andrew Wiese, Place of
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only ever employed three Black officers.147 When the MFPC hired Felmers Chaney as a patrolman in
1946, he was just the fourth African American serving on the force. Like most of his neighbors
occupying the lowest, most vulnerable rungs of the city’s industrial ladder, Chaney desired more
secure and higher paying work. He grudgingly followed the prodding of his barber and took the
MPD’s entrance examination.148
Bringing liberal law-and-order to life in Milwaukee, for the Black middle class, meant
bringing Black people into the criminal justice system as workers. This served the MPD as well by
reinforcing its legitimacy among African Americans and advancing the liberal notion that policing
was a democratic enterprise. Extant calls for hiring Black officers grew louder within middle class
circles as the civil rights movement gained traction. Desire for Black police protection was rooted in
strivings for equal access, civic opportunity, and community safety. It was more than a job—African
Americans long viewed the safeguarding of Black lives by Black people as a civil rights issue.149
Establishing communities secured by African American officers would, the logic went, help Black
citizens advance economic opportunities, support housing initiatives, and improve access to
recreational and educational resources. Black middle class residents believed Black men made for
better crime fighters because they understood their neighbors’ plight and could earn trust. They
would police “unencumbered by racism” and, in turn, be less likely to harass or abuse African
American criminal suspects. Moreover, Black informants could help solve major crimes, which
Black professionals saw as threatening to community survival. African American police would be
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capable of distinguishing “law-abiding” citizens from the real criminals in the community.150
Milwaukee’s Black middle class desired expanded police protection, but also safeguarding
that was more responsible and accountable in the face of misconduct. Given the MPD’s history of
class-based order maintenance policing, racial discrimination, and political insulation, some Black
leaders were skeptical of overtures from police officials who stressed the improvement of “race
relations” without shifting law enforcement tactics. As racial violence erupted in Detroit in 1943,
Milwaukee’s Black middle class voiced concerns about riot-control and violence prevention. ThenCaptain John Polcyn pledged to the MUL in 1943 that the MPD would provide “fair treatment” to
all Black citizens in the event of civil disruption. Black community leaders trusted Polcyn, pledging
to do their part to support the department’s approach. However, they also prepared for unrest on
their terms. At the direction of the national Urban League, the MUL established an Interracial War
Council (IWC) to ensure adequate safeguarding in the Sixth Ward.151 That August, the IWC hired
four Black Navy police officers to patrol in the community.152 At the same meeting, the Wisconsin
Communist Party called for a mass rally to address police-community tensions, which drew police
surveillance.153
The racist views of white police officials, that African Americans lacked the capacity for
doing police work, contributed to Milwaukee’s low Black officer totals. In 1954, Chief Polcyn told
Mayor Zeidler that despite their “satisfactory” performance, it was “the general consensus” of the
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International Association of the Chiefs of Police that Black officers were “less efficient” and “not as
impartial as the white policeman.” They had “a natural tendency to favor [their] race.” Polcyn
agreed, noting it was “the consensus of opinion of supervisory personnel of this Department.” 154
White police leaders’ view that the department’s few Black officers were biased in favor of their own
race served as a form of racial common sense.155 Still, Polcyn said he, “on numerous occasions,”
asked the MUL, MNAACP, and Black clergymen “to interest themselves in urging young negro [sic]
men of proper character, integrity, and intelligence to make applications for the position of
patrolman.” Apparently the increasingly contested relationship between Black youth and white
police did not factor in his thinking as to why “very few negroes [sic] participate in the Civil Service
examinations for this position.” Black youth exhibited “an apparent lack of interest” in becoming
Police Aides. There is “not much this office can do to promote their interest than what it has already
done,” the chief said.156
Black men were not alone in seeking better job prospects through civil service employment,
or the ability to serve their community. While Black women were not yet eligible to become
patrolmen, some found employment with the MPD.157 In 1946, the MFPC appointed Vernice
Gallimore as the city’s first Black “policewoman,” a classification designated for social workers in
the department’s recently created Youth Aid Bureau.158 The Kentucky native migrated to Milwaukee
via Chicago in 1944 to work in a social work position at the MUL.159 Chief Polcyn had asked Urban
League Director William Kelley if he knew of any qualified women who might want to join the force
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to work with Black youth in a crime prevention capacity. Gallimore served until state law forced her
to resign after the birth of her son in 1956. She looked back fondly on her time with the MPD and
was proud to have made a difference in the lives of Black migrant families.160 Black youth, Gallimore
argued, were “caught up in the web” of the criminal justice system.161
For many African Americans, “repression and negligence” defined police-Black community
relations in Milwaukee.162 The MPD’s self-avowed exceptionalism afforded the department cover as
it “overpoliced and underprotected” Black citizens “in their lives and property.”163 Segregation,
discrimination, and racist ideas about Black life and culture ensured that the vast majority of white
residents did not see how racially differential policing took shape. Moreover, they could justify the
disproportionate level of police attention and resources being directed towards the city’s increasingly
Black, heavily criminalized near north side.164 But it was liberal law-and-order, and its primary
objective of racial pacification through colorblind social control, that legitimized the policing
enterprise to most observers.165 In effect, liberal law-and-order reproduced disproportionate rates of

As Gallimore later recalled, “Working with my people was very fitting and rewarding because we were supposed to
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Francisco. He argues, Black San Franciscans “attempted to balance their interest in compensating for police neglect with
their desire to battle disproportionate police violence.” Christopher Lowen Agee, The Streets of San Francisco: Policing and
the Creation of a Cosmopolitan Liberal Politics, 1950-1972 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014), 146-147.
163 Joe Trotter traces this unfair treatment back to the 1920s. Trotter, Black Milwaukee, 118.
164 As Simon Balto argues: “After years of stereotyping, race-baiting, and frequent reckless reporting by the white dailies,
the powerful and mythical imagery of the violent, pathological, and sexually predatory black man had seeped its way into
the consciousness of many white Milwaukeeans.” Balto, “The Laws of the Land,” 100.
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Black surveillance, stops, and arrests through its emphasis on Black behavior, while using a coded
racial lens. The approach held up the notion that, despite admittedly harsh living conditions, African
Americans who defied Milwaukee’s established social and moral conventions made a personal
choice to evade public order and resist acculturation. This was, ostensibly, a function of their social
condition and economic circumstances. Systemic racism, perpetrated by white policymakers and
private interests, did not really factor into this analysis. Similarly, expressions of white racism—
euphemized as “prejudice”— were themselves individual choices. They were not the poisonous fruit
of existing power dynamics that routinely benefitted “those who call themselves white.”166
Vigorously attending to non-violent public order offenses, like drunkenness, disorderly
conduct, prostitution, and gambling, was at the heart of the MPD’s strategy for preventing civil
unrest, spatially containing crime, and appeasing white middle class reformers and civic leaders.
However, it was violent crime—murder, aggravated assault, rape, and robbery—that really
aggravated white racial fears and justified police over-saturation of Black Milwaukee. Anyone
reading the city’s conventional dailies in the 1940s and 1950s would see that Black criminal suspects,
who were racially singled out in the press, committed most major offenses. Black crime victims,
however, were largely ignored. Black women murder victims, in particular, saw no public campaigns
launched on their behalf for improved communal safeguarding.167 White women did, especially those
who perished as a result of interracial violent crimes.168 While successful efforts were made by BlackJames Baldwin, “On Being White and Other Lies,” 169, The Cross of Redemption: Uncollected Writings, edited by Randall
Kenan (New York: Vintage, 2010). Make no mistake about it, racist letters poured into City Hall from white residents
who clearly differentiated their whiteness from Black migrants. Here is how one letter to Mayor Frank Zeidler began:
“We white people of this area are wondering how long we must accept the indignities, the fears, insults, and crimes
which this element of people are inflicting upon us.” Box 95, Folder 4, “Police Department (1957) (July-Dec),” Carl F.
and Frank Zeidler Papers.
167 Simon Balto notes the case of Rose Travis, a Black woman accused by police of prostitution who was brutally raped
by a white man, Henry Thomas, in 1952. Balto, “The Laws of the Land,” 69.
168 The September 1959 murder of a white woman, Sylvia Fink, by a Black criminal suspect with a history of mental
illness, is a good example. The sensationalized crime saw Fink’s Dineen Park neighbors admit to the press that they were
suspicious of all Black migrants. White aldermen demanded better police protection from the “spread of crime” in Black
Milwaukee. Alderman Clarence Heiden attacked public “relief workers,” of which the suspect, Roscoe Simpson, was
one. Simpson was violently shot to death by police in “a hail of bullets.” Some high profile Black community leaders
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led organizations and white racial liberals in City Hall to remove race as an identifier in The
Milwaukee Journal, ciphered racial language, such as “suspicious,” “disorderly,” and “lazy,” continued
to signal the Black migrant crime threat.169
Milwaukee’s postwar liberal establishment held that the “great masses of Negroes” were
“segregated in ghettos where the standards of personal morality, discipline and responsibility” were
“lower than those in the white world outside.”170 Ghettoization bred, in the MCHR’s view,
comparatively higher rates of criminality. The press amplified this assumption in its crime reporting.
High reported crime rates on the near north side “tended to justify” anti-Black “attitudes and
actions,” even among “people of good-will.”171 Black criminality, therefore, rendered it “extremely
difficult” for people to “view crime statistics in perspective.” Black criminal offenders “predominate
in impulsive, but not in long-range, planned crime,” the commission surmised. White liberals,
therefore, called on “respectable” middle class African Americans to advocate for the cultural
adjustment of southern Black migrants prone to criminality.172 To be accepted by white Milwaukee
meant African Americans had to behave as white citizens presumably behaved—i.e. lawfully. White
liberals saw the “overly harsh attitudes of constituted authority towards nonwhites who commit
crimes against whites,” and the white public’s acceptance of segregation—so long as it confined
Black criminality and “anti-social behavior” to the near north side—as inhibitors of Black cultural
adjustment. It left “a residue” of undermining “habits and attitudes.” Most white liberal reformers
chalked racial discrimination in employment, housing, and education up to interpersonal white
bigotry, which gave shape to poor living conditions and, in turn, Black cultural pathologies and

doubted the veracity of the MPD’s claims that Simpson was the murderer and, at the very least, questioned whether he
needed to die so violently. Balto, “The Laws of the Land,” 91-93.
169 The Milwaukee Sentinel, at this point, did not stop identifying criminal suspects by race.
170 Milwaukee Commission on Human Rights, Annual Report, 1958, 9.
171 Milwaukee Commission on Human Rights, Annual Report, 1958, 10.
172 Those who, “for one reason or another, now occupy positions in the vanguard of progress of the group they
represent,” had to “assist in helping others adjust to a society which offers greater opportunities than formerly and, at
the same time, expects more.” Milwaukee Commission on Human Rights, Annual Report, 1958, 10.
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criminal behaviors. The psychological impact of assimilationist racism in individuals superseded the
institutional racism that engendered uneven racial structures and outcomes. As issues of
overcrowding, poverty, and crime worsened for Black Milwaukeeans during the city’s postwar
housing crisis, an “emergent language of black moral failure” shaped police approaches to social
control and order maintenance.173
Liberal law-and-order required Black middle class buy-in to behaviorally racist assumptions
about urban inequality and criminality to succeed. As the white press, residents, and assorted civic
interests positioned Black migrants from the South and Lower Midwest as ill-equipped for urban life
and foreign to Milwaukee’s normative white moral and cultural aesthetic, they placed the onus for
“adjusting” African American newcomers on established Black professional leaders. It was their
responsibility, not white citizens’, to transcend prevailing white assumptions of Black racial
inferiority. Racist perceptions, in the end, combined with Chapter 586’s “freeholder clause” and the
institutional discrimination of the criminal-legal system to deter adequate redress whenever police
engaged in acts of misconduct or overstepped their legal authority. Black middle class leaders found
themselves caught between disrupting tenuous social, economic, and political connections to City
Hall and defending the collective interests of African Americans for equality. Black middle class
support for liberal law-and-order started to waver when aggressive police responses to crime on the
near north side encouraged profiling and racist generalizations of criminality.
The most extreme forms of white resistance to Black migration were physical attacks and
acts of terror. For example, young white vigilantes hurled a stone through the kitchen window of a
middle class Black family’s recently purchased home on W. Capitol Dr., then burned a cross on their
The MPD arrested Black adults and youth at higher rates than white offenders who engaged in similar activities.
blackness was condemned and criminalized through the aggressive policing of leisure-time spaces, especially
underground dance parties, jazz events, and gambling halls. Balto, “Of Harlots and Hoodlums,” 9. As Balto observes,
“rather than indictments of infrastructural non-investment or systematic inequality, rhetorics of moral failure, personal
accountability, and racial responsibility” characterized public debates around Sixth Ward conditions after World War II.
Balto, “The Laws of the Land,” 25.
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front yard.174 The Black family dared to move beyond the Sixth Ward’s prescribed racial boundaries.
Police eventually arrested five white youths with apparent Ku Klux Klan ties. The discourse around
this explicit hate crime reflected Milwaukee’s triangular struggle for order. It spoke to how race
operated and competing forms of racism thrived in the segregated, socially conservative city. 175
White public officials responded out of both sides of their mouths. “Ku Klux Klan methods will not
be tolerated in this community,” Milwaukee County’s District Attorney commented. Neither would
“mob violence, either against white or colored people.” This suggested an equal power dynamic, or
that discrimination went both ways. However, Black Milwaukeeans committed no reported acts of
mob violence against whites. A white judge called out “prejudice” as “the greatest problem I think
we as Americans face,” but still absolved the white aggressors of guilt, contending they were in fact
victims of discrimination.176 Black leaders revealed their own knotty racial and class position. Rev.
W. J. G. McLin promised to “take up the problem” of white violence with white politicians.
However, he also denounced poor Black migrants. “If they were a hoodlum family, like some of our
folks, I would be opposed to this sort of tactic…I would not come to their defense.” Because of the
aggrieved family’s class position, they earned the right of a proper Black middle class defense. Such
behavioral racism on the part Black professionals reinforced notions of poor and working-class
Black criminality.
Panicked white residents wrote scores of racist letters to City Hall in the 1950s. Some
delivered their critiques in terms of taxes and the denial of “white civil rights.” White folk, one
disgruntled resident complained, lawfully abided by “fire regulations.” Why should they have to pay

The couple and their two young children, among the first African Americans to move into the area, were eating
dinner at the time.
175 After the racial terror incident, no white neighbors visited the Black family “to express sympathy or disclaim
knowledge of the affair.” The family told police no white neighbors had protested their presence in the six weeks
between the time they signed a contract to purchase and when they moved in. However, their real estate agent said they
reportedly received fifteen complaints from white residents. “Burning Cross at Negro Home,” The Milwaukee Journal,
August 18, 1952, Part 2, 1.
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higher taxes to support poor southern “negroes” who “send for all their relatives” and “occupy the
entire house from basement to attic.”177 “How would you like to live in a block surrounded by
Negro families,” another “taxpayer” asked Mayor Zeidler. These communications poured in from
white north side business-owners, too. Some, remarkably, denied their “prejudice” before engaging
in racist diatribes.178 It was clear many white citizens not only saw Milwaukee’s growing Black
population as culturally backward or immoral, but as an undeserving, unacceptable tax drain on the
city. While liberal white politicians refused to defend racist white proclamations, they worked to
protect Milwaukee’s whiteness when they positioned it as a cultural standard for Black conformity.
An especially tense year for race and policing in Milwaukee was 1952. Police reported
twenty-six murders, roughly half committed by African American suspects. Despite the city
featuring one of the lowest violent crime rates in the U.S., those involving Black suspects amplified
white racial fears about Black migration.179 One triple homicide especially shocked residents.180 In
November 1952, a Black migrant from Alabama who suffered from paranoid schizophrenia, shot

Anonymous to Zeidler, September 7, 1952, Box 155, Folder 5, “Human Relations (July 1951 - October 1952),”
Zeidler Papers; Anonymous to Zeidler, October 8, 1952, Box 155, Folder 5, “Human Relations (July 1951 - October
1952),” Carl F. and Frank Zeidler Papers.
178 For example, one person wrote: “We are not prejudiced, but living amongst these kind of people is like living in the
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do at four o’clock in the afternoon…we are going to move out of this city where people have to put up with this sort of
thing, not once or twice, but almost continuously…This is no police complaint. It is a mere statement of fact, regarding
the true conditions existing in this neighborhood since it has become predominantly colored. There are several colored
stores or shops around here but we notice they don’t pick on or bother their own race; that they prefer to torment us
white people. If the tables were turned and the same thing happened to them they’d scream about racial prejudice and
probably get action quicker than we could.” Box 94, Folder 7, “Police Department (1953-1954),” Carl F. and Frank
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than their white neighbors.” Balto, “The Laws of the Land,” 72, 93-94.
180 Clorise Walls had recently been hospitalized at a U.S. Army mental hospital. Chief Polcyn to Mayor Zeidler,
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and killed a white dry-cleaner owner, his wife, and an employee.181 The seemingly arbitrary, no doubt
ghastly murders encouraged many white people to see Milwaukee’s growing Black presence as the
cause of a rash of criminal activity. While white residents committed a greater share of overall
violent crimes, the discourse in the mainstream press and among civic officials remained profoundly
racialized—stories of violence “centered largely on white victims and black culprits.”182
In the aftermath of these murders, Chief Polcyn requested and, in time, received more
resources and personnel to direct towards the near north side. It was “in the colored section,” he
remarked, that eighty percent of major crimes, including “aggravated assaults, murder, rape, and
burglary,” occurred. There, he directed “five times as much manpower” than in other districts.183 As
Polcyn informed Mayor Zeidler, “violent crimes can only be prevented by greater numerical strength
of the Milwaukee police force, as has been frequently brought to the attention of our local legislative
body.” The MPD’s 1953 budget request included fifty additional patrolmen and two additional
squad cars “to cope with the rapidly rising incidents of serious crimes.” While responsibility for the
1952 murders, Polcyn said, rested with military officials who released the perpetrator from a mental
hospital, tempering the city’s crime panic required the unidirectional adjustment of Black and Latinx
residents and respect for law-and-order. The MCHR should “bring about the cooperation of the
colored people and other minority groups, particularly the Puerto Ricans, in educating them to be
obedient to the laws and ordinances,” and “to conduct themselves in such manner as to be
acceptable to society, impressing upon these people the necessity of respecting all rights, including
property rights and moral rights of the individual, and practicing good citizenship.”184 While Polcyn
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November 10, 1952, Part 1, 1.
182 Balto, “The Laws of the Land,” 94.
183 The Sixth Ward already had “65 foot patrolmen, squad car men and sergeants” assigned to the area. “Polcyn Given
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attributed “Negro crime,” in part, to “concentration of population” and “poor housing,” he also
cited “Communist infiltration,” particularly efforts to “get to the kids—-15 to 21 years-old,” and
“migration from the South.”185 Milwaukee manufacturers, the chief argued, posted local billboards
attracting Black labor. New arrivals were evidently ill-equipped for northern life and became “drunk
with freedom.” Conversely, established Black Milwaukeeans, were “peace loving” and “acclimated;”
“more cooperative with police;” and took “pride in a crime free community.”
Because people arrived to the city via automobile and bus, rather than train, it was difficult
to immediately apprehend and turn back allegedly criminal newcomers. This had been the
department’s modus operandi in the 1920s and 1930s, when it first began to vigorously police vagrancy
laws against African American newcomers.186 Some white civic leaders in the Milwaukee
Metropolitan Crime Prevention Commission (MMCPC) echoed the chief’s concerns about the Sixth
Ward’s over-population, but also said Black newcomers were “prone” to commit violent crime. The
mainstream press reported the most alarming white perspectives on crime, further racializing the
panic. For instance, The Milwaukee Sentinel speculated that Black residents might be plotting a “race
war” against white citizens.187 In response, the liberal Mayor Zeidler blamed Sixth Ward crime on
“real estate interests,” their “opposition to slum clearance” and commercial “exploitation of white
reaction to Negro invasion of white neighborhoods.”188 He called for a MMCPC and MPD
investigation “to formulate a policy to deal with the [crime] problem” that had support from both
Black middle class and white civic leaders.
The 1952 murders and resultant crime discourse put Black professional leaders on the
defensive. Not everyone agreed how to proceed. Some seventy-five Black residents met at Calvary
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Baptist Church shortly after the murders to discuss crime perceptions and realities. Local clergy
invited police administrators to help identify solutions and defuse racial tensions. Attendees
expressed many opinions—most centered on calls for greater police attention in the Sixth Ward.
Police officials were happy to oblige. As Inspector Hubert E. Dax responded, “I don’t believe your
good people should resent our putting more policemen in this area.189 We all know it is good police
work to put the men where they are needed. An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.”
Some Black professionals bought into class-based arguments that blamed poor migrant behavior,
including that of southern white migrants. Attendees pledged to reduce crime and invest “morally
and financially” in the city’s human relations commission. But they also called on Milwaukeeans of
all races to “reject rumors and hysteria in discussing the [crime] problem.”190 Others called for a
“dispassionate study of crime and tensions.”191 The answer to police discrimination and the
condemnation of Black migrants, in their view, was not resistance but participation in the electoral
system and formal negotiation with white leaders in service of police-community relations.
When Black organizational leaders Ardie Halyard (MNAACP), William Kelley (MUL),
Robert Starms (Northside YMCA), and James Dorsey (MNAACP) met with the MMCPC and police
administrators in December 1952, they rejected the notion that they were responsible for Black
migrant behavior. As Halyard commented, “The Negro does not feel it is his responsibility to be

“A Calm Survey of Crime Urged,” The Milwaukee Journal, November 14, 1952.
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responsible for every other Negro.”192 MNAACP leaders rejected links between blackness and
criminality. “This crime wave is not a racial problem, and it should not be considered so by the
public. All efforts to inject the racial angle into it should be rejected.” Halyard argued that Black
representation was needed in City Hall. If most crimes were confined to Milwaukee’s Black sections,
then Black politicians should be making decisions about the next course of action. She cited a lack
of understanding on the part of white ethnics. Other Black professionals testified to structural
factors that engendered insecurity. Rising crime stemmed from a “dense population restricted to a
small area of poor and limited housing,” as well as a lack of recreational outlets and good-paying
jobs. “The good, bad, and indifferent all share the same barrel,” MUL chair William Kelley affirmed.
While these factors largely resided beyond the MPD’s control, they demonstrated the extent to
which cultural adjustment only worked when economic racism was addressed in tandem with
personal responsibility. Newspapers fanned the flames of social discontent in their view, making
issues of overcrowding, inadequate housing, a lack of employment opportunities, and limited
recreation worse. Some Black leaders pointed to the MPD’s whiteness as the problem. Reverend W.
J. G. McLin suggested that rather than expanding the white police presence, the MFPC should
appoint “more Negro policemen in this area.” He also called out real estate “block busting” as a
contributing factor.193 White real estate agents appealed to white racial fears, persuading
homeowners to sell at a discounted rate. They then marked up home prices for prospective Black
buyers.194
Nonetheless, other powerful, conservative voices existed in Black Milwaukee. Some middle
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class leaders, fed up with Sixth Ward moral decay, called for more rigid policing. Pastor T.
Theophilus Lovelace, for instance, argued it was “embarrassing to pass one of these taverns, with
the crowd standing out there half drunk and cursing…We need police vigilance, and the police
should arrest anyone using profane language on the street. We need stiffer laws.” Lovelace
demanded a punitive response, exclaiming that youthful offenders arrested multiple times should
not be “turned back to the community.” Rather, they should be “put out of circulation.” 195 The allwhite MMCPC welcomed Lovelace’s criticism of Black residents who complained about unfair press
coverage. Black parenting and migrant propensities for drunkenness, loitering, and swearing, he
believed, contributed to the entire Black community’s moral degeneration. Lovelace did not see
aggressive policing as a problem, but rather the solution to “a dangerous and maddening situation.”
His willingness to defend law-and-order policing “reinforced white city leaders’ claims that Blacks
were to blame for crime.”196 Despite his own admission that white discrimination in the form of
“bad housing, prejudices and injustices” created an untenable situation for poor and working-class
Black folk, Pastor Lovelace joined the MPD and establishment liberals in blaming African American
newcomers for social ills. Well into the 1960s, police bureaucrats pointed to conservative Black
middle class charges of Sixth Ward moral decay to counter Black allegations of police misconduct.
Liberal law-and-order and the triangular struggle for order between white residents, Black
professional leaders, and recent migrants continued to intersect in the mid-1950s. In addition to
heightened racial anxieties over civil unrest, long-standing white fears about miscegenation and
Black criminality merged when four white women were reportedly raped by Black male suspects.
The alleged sexual assaults sparked mass police searches, arrests, and interrogations on the near
north side from July 1956 through January 1957. Detectives rounded-up at least 260 Black men for
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questioning, instilling “feelings of terror” in Black Milwaukee.197 As historian Erica Metcalfe has
observed, police restricted “the social space” of Black men, “treating their movement as a threat and
criminal act.”198 Police officials warned Black men to “stay off the streets at night” to avoid
profiling.199 Discriminatory MPD sweeps elicited criminal charges on a host of unrelated, less-serious
offenses—from traffic violations to loitering to marijuana possession. Chief Polcyn justified mass
racial profiling as a necessary precaution to ensure women’s safety. The Milwaukee Journal editorialized
that “the attackers’ Negro coloring just happened to be the leading clue for identification…It is
undeniably a distinctive feature. If the men had been slant eyed, or red haired, or one-legged, that
would have been the clue.”200 Newspapers engaged in racial double-standards when covering the
assaults. Because the alleged assailant was Black, the crime made front page headlines. The Journal
and Sentinel both played on racist tropes, treating Black men as “hyper-sexed deviants with an
insatiable appetite for white women.”201 Alternatively, violence committed against Black women,
particularly sex workers, received scant coverage. Polcyn was clear about the role that newspapers
played in supporting the MPD’s order maintenance agenda. “The well-being of a police department
depends a great deal upon the press and their ability to keep the law in public favor.” 202 Good
relations with the press affirmed the MPD’s positive image and countered Black middle class
charges of racial double-standards in policing. Sensational headlines justified racist police policies.
The 1956 sexual assault cases aggravated Milwaukee’s triangular struggle for order. Eager to
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hours” was subject to a stop and questioning. “Freed as Rape Suspects, 10 Held in Other Cases,” The Milwaukee Journal,
January 7, 1957, Part 1, 1.
200 “Police Only Doing Duty,” The Milwaukee Journal, January 14, 1957, Part 1, 12.
201 Balto mentions a January 1, 1957 case in which a white 15-year-old girl was raped by two white male teenagers. It was
“buried” on page 28 of The Milwaukee Journal and did not even appear in The Milwaukee Sentinel. Balto, “The Laws of the
Land,” 79-80.
202 John Keith Pope, Police Press Relations: A Handbook (Fresno: Academy Library Guild, 1954), 154.
197

166

appear cooperative, yet unwilling to accept mass profiling, MNAACP leaders met with police
administrators in January 1957. They demanded the MPD show “more discrimination” in whom
they stopped and questioned, referring to deserving Black criminals as opposed to “respectable”
Black citizens. The MNAACP’s Fred Hickman, Dale Phillips, and C.L. Golightly argued “race
relations were being seriously disturbed,” that “police were violating civil rights.”203 Still, they
emphasized that “no one wants this cleaned up more than [Black Sixth Ward residents].” White
police administrators insisted that “the same police tactics would be used in any section of the city.”
In addition to affirming the colorblind status of police regulations, Polcyn encouraged Black leaders
to administer their own brand of social control among migrants—to “police themselves…be your
brother’s keeper.” Such admonitions suggested it was the responsibility of Black middle class leaders
to police poor and working-class Black behavior, while also implying a dual standard of protection.
Moments like this, where police actions resulted in racist generalizing, exposed cracks in the MPD’s
liberal law-and-order approach.
Criticism of how the MPD handled the 1956 rape investigations prompted additional
community meetings among Black leaders, police administrators, and elected officials.204 Again,
Chief Polcyn rejected Black middle class requests for the MPD to distinguish law-abiding African
Americans from lawless individuals when engaging in stops, interrogations, and arrests. Polcyn
insisted that their charges of police overreach only encouraged “the lawless elements of the Negro
race to commit crimes.”205 Threatening the MPD’s image as a race-neutral arbiter of justice, in this
view, undermined the ability of Black residents to garner accountability, while also generating more
Black criminal activity. Polcyn’s focus remained on Black behavior; he refused to consider Black
middle-class feelings of being disrespected as tax-paying citizens. That said, the MPD had Black
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professional allies who directed the public discussion away from immediate concerns of police bias.
Robert Taylor, a Black Republican candidate for Wisconsin’s State Assembly, for example, blamed
violent crime on the limited recreational outlets for Black youth, not police actions.206 It was Black
people themselves who were most afraid of lawlessness on the streets. Black criticism of police bias,
in Taylor’s view, was unfounded. More than anything, the police round-ups were a threat to Black
business owners’ ability to earn revenue. The Milwaukee Defender, a Black newspaper owned by Mary
Ellen Shadd, clarified that Black middle class residents were “highly incensed” about the sexual
assaults in general. Anxious about further racial stigmatization, Shadd initiated an effort to gather
information on the alleged rapes of the white women. Responding to “many letters from Negroes
deploring the attacks,” her newspaper editorialized that “the vicious behavior of a few criminals”
threatened the “good race relations” built over a decade.207
Achieving racial pacification through Black cultural adjustment called for police
administrators and established Black leaders to agree to a social compact. Liberal law-and-order
required both conceptual and practical buy-in to work. When unruly Black behavior tested police
legitimacy, MPD officials called on middle class African Americans to help them alleviate poor and
working-class Black dissent. Doing so obscured the truth of discretionary policing across
Milwaukee’s near north side, where the racial biases of white police officers were hard to rein in. As
the MPD said itself before the U.S. Civil Rights Commission in 1960, “police officers are human
beings, subject to personal prejudices and reactions, there is no doubt that some officers manifest
racial prejudice in performing their duties.”208 The Black middle class was as a critical hinge in
maintaining the status quo. Yet, they wavered between two consequential choices as Milwaukee’s
Taylor had recently lost an election to represent the Sixth Ward in the Wisconsin State Assembly.
“Negro Paper Spurs Rape Case Reward,” The Milwaukee Sentinel, January 11, 1957.
208 Law enforcement responses to a U.S. Commission on Civil Rights questionnaire on the administration of justice in
Wisconsin showed that local police agencies saw “no discrimination by police officers or court personnel.” This
contradicted statements that prejudice was an inherent aspect of police work. “Wisconsin,” Report to the Commission on
Civil Rights (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1961), 670.
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policing crisis deepened in the 1950s: defending their shared racial interests with a comparatively
poorer, younger Black migrant population and aspiring to, what many in the community saw as
interracial class interests cultivated over the course of decades. The latter held out hope for
expanded social and economic Black power, albeit on white liberal terms. The social compact bent
in the 1940s and 1950s, but it did not break. It was challenged by serious episodes of racial profiling,
police crowd control, youth surveillance, and a senseless episode of lethal police violence in 1958
that pushed some Black community leaders to the brink of civil disobedience. Racial pacification
prevailed because Black middle class leaders were committed to the MPD’s liberal law-and-order
vision and the cultural adjustment program espoused by City Hall. They too desired social control
during a period social and economic disruption. This triangulation meant grassroots organizing for
police accountability would be delayed until the 1960s.
Racially charged altercations between crowds of Black teenagers, young adults, and white
officers on the near north side exacerbated Black ideological and class divisions throughout the
postwar era. Such confrontations challenged white Milwaukee’s preconceived notion of policing
exceptionalism. Black crowd resistance to the MPD’s “close surveillance” of the Sixth Ward’s
“problem element” posed a threat to liberal law-and-order and the department’s professed racial
neutrality.209 Lacking a viable mechanism for accountability in the face of intensifying police
violence, Black poor and working-class youth confronted racialized order maintenance tactics
directly because they saw no alternative. Between 1952 and 1955, the near north side experienced at
least eleven incidents of Black crowd resistance against the MPD.210 In some cases, youth under
arrest tried to escape the grasp of white patrolmen with the assistance of surrounding spectators.
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Police and crowd members suffered injuries, “lacerations and contusions.” The crowds ranged in
size from seven to several hundred people. At least twenty-seven arrests were made, mostly of
young Black men. These crowd retaliations signified “a rich layer of community resistance to the
police” and remains under-appreciated in Milwaukee’s long history of civil rights struggle.211
University of Wisconsin researchers wrote that Black crowd resistance to police arrest
stemmed from miserable neighborhood conditions— “congestion, poor housing, and low economic
status”— as well as a lack of “wholesome commercial recreation.” This led to “manifestations of
lack of respect for police authority.”212 Alternatively, police administrators cited “aggressive or
socially unacceptable personal behavior, particularly arguments, fights, and intoxication.” Analysts
stopped short of questioning police policies, like close surveillance, or the discretionary choices of
individual patrolmen. They were keen to point out that police were “the only white persons”
involved, meaning the department met its liberal law-and-order goal of preventing unrest between
Black and white civilians. That distinction mattered, as it was white officers who signified white
racial control to Black residents.213 They were not only visible symbols, but white supremacy’s most
active agents. More episodes of crowd resistance occurred as the decade progressed. The MCHR, in
1957, argued that the further deterioration of police-Black community relations was a function of
how policing manifested in the Jim Crow South. Black migrants carried “anti-police feelings’” north
and projected them onto Milwaukee’s ostensibly colorblind officer corps.214 It was inconceivable, in
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the commission’s view, that the MPD could engage in a similar project of racial coercion. The
department’s exceptionalism, its self-avowedly just intentions and crime control efficiency, overrode
the aggressive order maintenance function perceived by a growing number of Black residents.
Although more and more Black professionals did not view the MPD as evenhanded, most
believed mutual trust could be established. The Lapham-Garfield Neighborhood Council (LGNC)
formed under the auspices of the MUL to “secure more understanding and trust” between police
and Black residents. The umbrella organization coalesced in the wake of the MPD’s rough handling
of Black youth. Despite citing numerous systemic factors, this sizable cohort of human rights
advocates, Black middle class leaders, and racial liberals did not cite police brutality as an explicit
issue.215 However, they called police “frisking” of African Americans “often unfair and
unjustified.”216 The council also targeted the lack of Black representation on the Mayor’s Advisory
Committee and Milwaukee Metropolitan Crime Committee, as well as City Hall’s ignorance of crime
and safety issues facing Black residents.
Milwaukee further institutionalized liberal law-and-order and cultural adjustment against the
backdrop of deteriorating police-community relations late in the late 1950s. Frank Zeidler,
Milwaukee’s last Socialist mayor, commissioned a study to research “social problems in the Inner
Core area” in Fall 1959.217 The “Zeidler Committee” formed in response to “group demonstrations
against the police.” However, the liberal cohort also hoped to situate police-community conflict and
Black misbehavior within a broader context of dangerous social and economic conditions. 218 Some
of these were poor infrastructure, housing exploitation, and overcrowding, but the committee also
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blamed Black families, adults, and youth for their own problems.219 Housing “the major portion of
the non-white population…those who are economically deprived or socially unacceptable
elsewhere,” the near north side’s “unoriented newcomers to the community” were “incapable of
meeting the complex demands of successful urban life.”220 Researchers did not criticize police
aggression or the surveillance practices that were central to liberal law-and-order as causal factors.
Near north side youth merely lacked sufficient outlets “for constructive use of energy” and needed
“improved recreational facilities.” Aging housing stock, absentee landlordism, concentrated poverty,
excess taverns, high traffic, and street congestion exacerbated a worsening urban crisis. The “sheer
compression of people, forms a basic cause of group interference” with police “in the performance
of their duties.”221 Black migration was the culprit, as the area seemed fixed in “a constant state of
transition.”
The Zeidler Report called for a “concerted effort to spend funds to remedy educational and
cultural deficiencies in people who live in the core area.” In other words, the ills facing Black
residents stemmed from the community’s own behavior, as well as a lack of “understanding between
cultural groups.” The report condemned Black residents for not understanding how policing works.
The “ignorance of police procedures on the part of residents is another source of
misunderstanding…a small segment of the population…is antagonistic toward the police.” 222 City
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Hall liberals absolved the MPD of engendering racially differential policy outcomes, regardless of its
own admissions that patrolmen conveyed racial animosities. While the MPD rulebook called for
“treating all persons alike, regardless of race, color, religion or nationality,” the police-community
relations study committee noted that individual patrolmen “exercised poor judgment on
occasions.”223 Black interviewees argued “some individual police officers show racial prejudice…law
enforcement is stricter in this area.”
The truth was far worse. As the cover-up of a 1958 police murder revealed, police racism ran
deeper than sporadic lapses in personal judgment and “bad apple” moments of prejudice.
Institutional racism within managerial decision-making shielded the racial bigotry of white officers
and protected them when necessary. The MPD leveraged the independent authority and freedom
from municipal oversight granted by the 1911 policing statute at the expense of economically and
politically vulnerable Black families who were unable to garner formal accountability when officers
engaged in misconduct. Still, according to the Zeidler Report, police had “an impossible burden” of
enforcing the law across an urban terrain that bred “crime and social disorder.” Addressing only the
behaviors and individual bigotries of both white and non-white citizens would resolve the “hidden
forces at work in a deteriorating environment” and replace them with “forces for good.” Poverty,
the report continued, created a high demand for public services and welfare assistance, which was
expensive for the city. It reflected a “loss of unrealized human potential.” Making matters worse,
white taxpayers were moving out of Milwaukee in droves. “Total community action” to ameliorate
“the physical and social problems” was needed. Therefore, the Zeidler Committee proposed urban
renewal to augment the sustained acculturation of migrants of color to the conventional order.224
“Committee on Police-Community Relations, “Report on Police-Community Relations in the Inner Core,” 1, Mayor's
Study Committee on Social Problems in the Inner Core Area of the City Milwaukee, Wisconsin, March 18, 1960;
Caffrey, “The “Core” Report,” 12.
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The 1958 police killing of unarmed Daniel Bell, mentioned above, remains the most
consequential act of police violence in Milwaukee’s history. Not only did it represent “the signal
shot” that ushered in the city’s postwar “civil rights insurgency,” but it laid bare underlying forces of
institutional racism that grassroots activists are still confronting today—biased all-white inquest
juries; district attorneys overly sympathetic to police officers “pursuing a felon;” little-to-no citizen
input on police rule-making; and media accounts that focus almost exclusively on the assumed
violent behavior and criminality of a Black person shot dead by law enforcement.225 The Bell case
revealed the entrenched racism that permeated Milwaukee’s all-white police bureaucracy—the details
of which only came into view after one of the complicit officers confessed to the truth in 1978. 226
The tragic circumstances of Bell’s death, the mixed community responses it generated, and the
troubling details of how police conspired to hide the truth about the murder illustrated the
challenges Black residents, migrant families in particular, faced in securing formal accountability for
police mistreatment.
It is worth recounting the specifics of Bell’s murder because, in many respects, it sparked
Milwaukee’s Black-led movement for police accountability. On the night of February 2, 1958, two
white motorcycle patrolmen pulled 22-year-old Daniel Bell over for a broken taillight. Likely fearful
that he would receive yet another citation or arrest for driving without a license, Bell fled. When
police caught up to him, one officer, Thomas Grady, fatally shot the Louisiana native from a
reported distance of, at first, just under twenty-four feet and, after revising his story, six feet.
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According to police reports, Bell ignored the patrolman’s warning shots and calls to halt. The
officers said he was holding a knife in his right hand, and that he lunged at them with the weapon
before curiously yelling out, “You sons of bitches will never catch me, I’m a hold-up man.” The
police version of events was a lie. Bell’s family immediately suspected foul play after watching news
reports of his death.227 The officers fabricated a story before detectives arrived. It became the official
version of events and police administrators reported it at news conferences. Patrolmen Grady and
Krause reinforced Bell’s assumed criminality, claiming he matched the description of an armed
robbery suspect. They provided enough circumstantial evidence for an all-white inquest jury,
handpicked by the Milwaukee County Sheriff, to rule in favor of “justifiable homicide.” Twenty
years later, Krause testified in court that Grady made his true intentions clear that night: he set out
to “arrest some niggers.” Soon after ending Daniel Bell’s life, Grady purportedly commented to
Krause, “He’s just a damn nigger kid anyway.”228
After an all-white inquest jury ruled that motorcycle patrolman Thomas Grady had “made a
lawful arrest” and “acted in self-defense” when he shot-and-killed Daniel Bell, roughly 450 African
American residents participated in a mass meeting to determine how the Black community would
respond. Multiple factions emerged, offering divergent views over who was at fault for Bell’s death
and the role of police power in Black spaces.229 Mt. Zion Church Pastor T.T. Lovelace, who initially
called the killing a “dastardly attack,” blamed the “unruly” behavior of Black migrants. Their
disrespect for law and order, in his view, “created in the general populous disgust, shame and fear.”
Lovelace preached moral betterment, placing the onus for change on Black migrant families rather
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than white officials. Meanwhile, Democratic Assemblyman Isaac Coggs stated that he could “not see
any justifiable reason why a man running from a police officer has to be shot in the back.” Still, he
warned street protests were not the answer: “You can protest the way the district attorney asked the
questions, at election time.” The Bell killing “added friction” to police-community relations efforts,
according to the LGNC. Black residents shared feelings of police neglect and mistrust. “There is
evidence of a lack of understanding between [near north side] citizens and the police.”230
Black labor organizer Calvin Sherard, on the other hand, charged officers with using
discriminatory intent when they pulled Bell over for a broken taillight on that snowy February night.
He and Reverend R. L. Lathan, of New Hope Baptist Church, demanded Thomas Grady’s
termination, incredulous that an all-white inquest jury found him innocent in just ninety minutes.
While Lathan expressed support for the MPD in general, calling it “one of the best” in the U.S., he
argued at a March community meeting that some officers were “dishonest” and “backsliders.”231 The
minister called for moral retribution and for Black citizens to vote and “elect men of integrity and
justice.” Sherard, himself a recent arrival, formed the Citizen Committee to Protest the Case of
Daniel Bell in 1958. He and collaborators in the newly formed Crusaders Civic Social League did so,
in part, to awaken indifferent Black clergy and middle class leaders to the MPD’s racialized
enforcement double standards. The League aimed to challenge the disinterest of white city officials.
In objection to the inquest jury’s verdict, Sherard and Lathan announced a “protest prayer
march” and rally at MacArthur Square in front of the Milwaukee County Courthouse on March 23.
Assemblyman Coggs supported the demonstration, commenting “there is no difference between
shooting Dan Bell in the back than killing Emmett Till in Mississippi.”232 Sherard and Lathan hoped
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to attract an interracial crowd numbering in the thousands. However, they called off the event at the
behest of respected Black community leaders. Some bought the MPD’s line that Bell was a criminal,
justifiably shot by Grady in self-defense. Others refused to mobilize Black dissent out of fear of
disrupting tenuous political relations with City Hall. Milwaukee NAACP members, including the
city’s only Black alderperson (and woman), Vel Phillips, talked Lathan and Sherard out of leading the
demonstration.233
The truth of Daniel Bell’s murder would not have surprised many poor and working-class
African Americans, given their responses to University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee researchers Bernard
Toliver and Joseph Himden. Black citizens told the researchers that police patrolmen were “more
strict in the inner core than elsewhere in the city.”234 Some “manifested racial prejudice” and were
prone to “question and arrest for minor infractions, such as Jay-walking or loitering.” MPD policies
of “close police surveillance” led to “questioning and even arrests” of many law-abiding citizens.
Patrolmen engaged in “unnecessarily severe questioning for minor offenses or behavior,” according
to some Black citizens. This was typically preceded by indignant and paternalistic language, like
calling Black men “boy.” Resident testimony implied that the MPD did not follow its own liberal
law-and-order regulations of treating all people fairly, in a colorblind manner. Black spaces and
residents were condemned by white rank-and-file officers and police officials as criminally
exceptional and in need of more stringent control. Toliver and Himden afforded police the excuse
of “cultural misunderstandings.” White patrolmen were unaware of the “role” that “loitering” and
“fun-seeking” evidently played in Black life.
The analysis of postwar academic researchers subscribed to a dominant liberal perspective
that relied on behavioral and cultural explanations for why some groups struggled to survive in cities
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and others did not. In pathologizing Black behavior, Toliver and Himden, for example, failed to
account for how discriminatory police directives supported overcrowding or promoted a lack of
recreational and employment opportunities. In explaining why some African Americans collectively
resisted police, they rejected the notion that white officers themselves might be carrying out unjust
policies informed by racist ideas. Conversely, Black crowd resistance was explained as a matter of
individual ignorance, “intoxication,” and “fear of the consequences” of arrest. 235 They concluded
that “mutual understanding” through continual education would resolve Black crowd resistance to
police arrest. The goal was to ensure “a better atmosphere of law and order,” not to seek justice for
overpoliced and underprotected Black citizens.236

Conclusion
In the 1940s and 1950s, Milwaukee police chiefs revised aspects of the MPD’s instructional
practices, organization, and approach to social control to correspond with national liberal law order
prerogatives: more closely observing civil rights laws, ensuring procedural justice, adhering to racial
colorblindness, and strengthening relations with middle class leaders of color. This was, in large part,
meant to improve the police image and to project to outside observers that U.S. policing was fair
and impartial. The MPD instituted “race and human relations” trainings, created a Youth Aid
Bureau to better manage youth crime, and hired a few more Black officers. As a result, the
department emerged as a leader in the police-community relations movement, with its chiefs earning
commendations for their innovation and foresight. City leaders and police bureaucrats positioned
the MPD as an unbiased mediator of racial antagonism and conflict. They did so amidst great social,
economic, and political change, most notably the acceleration of Black in-migration from the South
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and Lower Midwest. Milwaukee police administrators collaborated with other municipal institutions
to help facilitate liberal social engineering programs in response to Black population growth. This
effort, in effect, revolved around acculturating African American, and later Latinx migrants, to the
city’s traditional, white-prescribed middle class cultural milieu.
The colorblind, or race-neutral, principles at the heart of liberal law-and-order converged
with Milwaukee’s white assimilationist racism. That convergence deepened as Black migrants moved
into the city in greater numbers during the late 1940s and 1950s. Although liberal law-and-order
seemingly operated according to principles of racial fairness, the MPD did not operate in an
equitable society. Individual officers were not free from individual biases and “race and human
relations” training only went so far in shifting racial perspectives. Economic racism and the systemic
outputs of racial capitalism guaranteed that criminal justice policies would continue to target
disproportionately poor communities of color, relegated to segregated urban enclaves on the
margins of industry and downtown commerce. Class-based, behavioral racism amplified the
perceived need for expanded police resources and personnel to monitor and contain Black
Milwaukee.
Anti-Black racism weakened the MPD’s nominally progressive institutional advances.
Policing reflected the city’s increasingly fraught racial politics, which worsened against the backdrop
of expanded Black migration and racist white reaction. Despite its best efforts to establish new
training procedures, draft race-neutral regulations, and work with Black community leaders to
reduce opportunities for civil unrest, the MPD engaged in policies and practices on the near north
side that rationalized Black life and culture as, if not criminogenic, then in need of “close
surveillance.”237 Police played a critical role in a “cultural adjustment” program rooted in behavioral
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racism. The program was intended to alleviate pathologized Black behavior and bring minoritized
groups more firmly into the city’s white prescribed order. Racist ideas about Black life and culture
informed racially disproportionate policing outcomes, with Black citizens experiencing inordinate
stops, interrogations, detentions, and uses of force. Liberal law-and-order’s practical application only
exacerbated a developing crisis of police legitimacy and further undermined the ability of Black
residents to garner accountability.
Established Black middle class elites, too, exhibited their own fears around the in-migration
of poor and working-class Blacks from the South. These feelings translated into a sustained
commitment to racial uplift, but also expressions of intra-racial class prejudice that showed the
extent to which Black Milwaukee was not a monolith. Indeed, Black migration exacerbated a
triangular struggle for order among Black professionals, southern Black newcomers, and assorted
white interests, which helped undermine opportunities for institutional accountability as police
repression worsened. Established Black professionals engaged in their own forms of behavioral
discrimination when addressing physical and moral conditions on Milwaukee’s congested near north
side. Some overtly criminalized, or morals-shamed poor and working-class Black residents in tandem
with racist white actors. Others embraced racialized assimilationist prerogatives. Milwaukee’s Black
middle class denounced “radicalism,” specifically Communist Party organizing, which police viewed
as subversive and a contributor to Black political dissent and civil unrest. Members of the Black
middle-class worked to distance community leaders from charges of “anti-Americanism.”
Liberal articulations of racism and the criminalization of poor and working-class Black
people challenged the MPD’s ability to uphold Milwaukee’s white middle-class reputation for moral
rectitude. The city’s narrative of policing exceptionalism became more contingent on social control
and discretionary order maintenance policing in comparatively poorer, civically neglected Black
spaces. In the process, the police department struggled to keep up appearances of racial equity that
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were central to liberal law-and-order as a strategic approach. Black middle-class buy-in to cultural
adjustment waned in the 1950s. Troublesome police decisions and violent racial conflicts among
African Americans and white police fractured an already precarious relationship. These included the
widespread profiling of hundreds of African Americans in response to violent crimes; charged street
confrontations between Black youth and white patrolling officers; and the controversial police killing
of Daniel Bell in 1958. Declining Black perceptions of police legitimacy forced the department and
Milwaukee’s wider police bureaucracy into an increasingly defensive posture in the 1960s.
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CHAPTER THREE
Police Accountability Activism as Civil Rights Insurgency
Police brutality signified the worst of the “us-versus-them” mentality that characterized
police-Black community relations in 1960s Milwaukee.1 What was true about police violence in the
Cream City was true of other metropolitan areas undergoing pronounced racial demographic change
and economic restructurings in the post-World War II period. City governments were compelled to
manage worsening inequality as affluent and middle-class whites suburbanized and forced Black
migrant workers and families to live in increasingly segregated central city neighborhoods. Police
were called on to enforce social control and Milwaukee’s virtually all-white police department often
did so with abrasive attitudes and a heavy hand. To a growing number of poor and working-class
African Americans, the city’s widely heralded narrative of policing exceptionalism—the idea that the
Milwaukee Police Department (MPD) impartially enforced the law while promoting sound
community relations in service of efficient crime control—seemed terribly artificial. Black citizens
felt progressively more vulnerable to crime and became concerned about how white police
patrolmen and detectives utilized their ample discretion to forcefully monitor, control, and respond
to the behavior of Black youth and under-employed workers at the expense of overall community
safety.2 They feared for the security of their children and the livelihoods of their families, particularly
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was not limited to homicides and beatings, but also unlawful arrests, the use of threatening and abusive language, racial
slurs, sexual exploitation, racial profiling, and police “complicity in drug-dealing, prostitution, burglaries, protection
schemes, and gun smuggling.” Police brutality was also the “lack of justice available to black defendants in the courts.”
Leonard Moore, Black Rage in New Orleans: Police Brutality and African American Activism from World War II to Hurricane
Katrina (Baton Rouge, LA, 2010), 1. On Milwaukee, see: Simon Ezra Balto, “‘Occupied Territory’: Police Repression and
Black Resistance in Postwar Milwaukee, 1950-1968,” The Journal of African American History 98 (2) (Spring 2013), 248.
2 Police discretion is the freedom that individual officers enjoy to act according to their own judgment during specific
policing encounters and interventions. Discretion is the defining feature of policing. It can mean the difference between
issuing a warning, delivering a citation, effecting an arrest, or engaging violently in response to a perceived threat. Trevor
Jones, “Discretion,” Dictionary of Policing, edited by Tim Newburn and Peter Neyroud (New York: Rutledge, 2008), 82;
Stuart Schrader, “The Global Policeman Will Always Shoot People,” Foreign Affairs, January 13, 2020, accessed January
14, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/01/13/united-states-iran-suleimani-killing-police-the-global-policeman-willalways-shoot-people/.
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as Milwaukee’s African American population mushroomed in the 1960s.3 Furthermore, they worried
about civil violence touching-off as a result of increasingly tense police-Black citizen encounters.
The latent rage of Black young people locked out of America’s postwar riches and locked into its
segregated “ghettos” contributed to widespread anxiety and unrest.4
Fed up with “the increasing fear of harassment, illegal arrests, not to mention brutality,”
Black political leaders and civil rights advocates in Milwaukee began mobilizing around policing
issues more deliberately.5 In challenging police brutality and the city’s rapidly deteriorating policeBlack community relations, they forged a fresh movement for police accountability. Participants did
so within the context of expanding national civil rights and Black Power struggles, urban rebellions,
and federal amplifications of police power. Black police accountability advocates and allies made
direct connections between the MPD’s unchecked, often abusive discretionary authority and the
rampant discrimination that permeated the city’s employment, education, housing, and commercial
sectors. They argued that law enforcement served to protect the racial boundaries of an outmoded
civic order—one that positioned Black men and women as second-class citizens, denying them full
rights and access to the fruits of American democracy. This chapter spotlights the exertions of
Black police accountability advocates and allies to garner a fairer law enforcement system in
Milwaukee at a moment of intensifying civil rights insurgency, national unrest, and racial backlash. It
traces a series of grassroots coordinating efforts, formal negotiations, and demonstrations conceived
around the goals of ending police brutality and addressing the lack of institutional accountability
afforded to African Americans and other racialized populations vulnerable to overpolicing and

Milwaukee’s African American population expanded from 20,454 residents in 1950 to 62,458 in 1960, then to 105,088
in 1970. In the process, the city’s Black community became younger, poorer, and more decidedly working-class.
4 Mitchell Duneier, Ghetto: The Invention of a Place, the History of an Idea (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2017).
5 Lloyd Barbee, “Citizens’ Anti-Police Brutality Committee,” Box 21, Folder 9, “Citizens’ Anti-Police Brutality
Committee, 1964-1965,” Milwaukee MSS16, Lloyd A. Barbee Papers, 1933-1982, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
Archives.
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underprotection.6 This chapter contends that police accountability advocates engaged in a dual
process of testing and discovery across Milwaukee’s law enforcement arena in the mid-1960s that
clarified the underpinnings of local police power and better revealed its differential applications.
Through a combination of civic engagement and non-violent direct action protests, groups
like the Citizens Anti-Police Brutality Committee, Human Relations Coordinating Council,
Organization of Organizations (Triple O), and Milwaukee NAACP Youth Council (YC) learned
more about the existing impediments to cultivating a responsive and just policing system. Some of
those hindrances were legal, like the property requirement barring most poor and working-class
African Americans from filing a formal complaint against the MPD with the Milwaukee Fire and
Police Commission (MFPC). Others were political and stemmed from a traditional racial order that
was designed to benefit white working, middle, and upper-class residents. For example, elected
officials were reluctant to embrace an independent civilian police review board because, as one white
voter surmised, “they would handcuff our police department with countless unfounded and invalid
claims of the old Communist slogan of ‘police brutality.’”7 Police accountability advocates tested
and discovered the legal and political boundaries of police oppression, learning where the system
could bend and where it was fixed. They looked to effect change and raise the MPD’s legitimacy
with Black residents in the context of national civil rights gains, as well as the onset of urban
rebellions against systemic racism, beginning with Harlem in 1964.8 The passage of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act presented a legal pathway to combatting police civil rights violations and further outlined

Joe William Trotter, Jr., Black Milwaukee: The Making of an Industrial Proletariat, 1915-1945, 2nd ed. (Urbana: University of
Illinois Press, 2006), 118.
7 Lawrence Galezewski, “Congratulations to Chief Breier,” The Milwaukee Journal, March 25, 1969, Part 1, 18.
8 When uprisings broke out in 1964 and 1965, cities asked to reproduce the MPD’s human relations training guide. The
department delivered more than 30,000 copies of the manual to outside police departments since it was introduced in
1952. The guide read: “The average citizen’s respect for the authority of society is dependent upon the degree to which
that authority is impartially exercised.” Ronald H. Snyder, “Chief for Life: Harold Breier and His Era” (Ph.D. diss.,
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2002), 130; “Police Here Understand Race Relations: Dahl,” The Milwaukee Journal,
October 6, 1965, Part 3, 1.
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institutional discrimination. Meanwhile, the liberal Warren Court’s Mapp (1961), Gideon (1963),
Escobedo (1964) and Miranda (1966) decisions ushered in what many police officials saw as “a frontal
constitutional assault on their authority, expertise, and discretion.”9 This wider context helped shape
the direction of police accountability advocacy in Milwaukee, as well as the outcomes of civic
negotiations. However, it was really local political dynamics—municipal, county, and state—that
determined whether the city’s Black-led police accountability movement or countervailing forces that
supported a white supremacist status quo would prevail in dictating the terms of police power.
The salience of social, political, and class diversity within Black Milwaukee and its
organizational networks remains an important theme in this chapter. A diverse range of ideological
perspectives characterized Milwaukee’s budding police accountability movement and civil rights
insurgency. Not everyone seeking to reform or more radically transform the city’s police bureaucracy
agreed on tactics and outcomes. Black Milwaukee’s historically fragmented class politics persisted in
the 1960s, undercutting the formation of a more unified front in addressing racialized police
violence and issues of police legitimacy. Where police accountability advocates found the most
common cause was in their shared desire to prevent civil unrest and establish a more equitable
policing system that, in the process of maintaining order, treated all people with dignity and respect,
regardless of racial or class background. Still, those willing to name police brutality and challenge it
directly, either by working through the system or applying pressure via civil disobedience at street
level, drew sharp rebukes from white liberal, moderate, and conservative actors; some Black
community leaders joined them. White civic officials and everyday residents enjoyed a far healthier,

As legal historian Risa Goluboff argues, the Supreme Court moved from a flat preoccupation with guilt or innocence
to making sure procedural justice and civil rights law was carried out across the criminal-legal system. Mapp v. Ohio
established the rule that illegally obtained evidence could not be used in court. Gideon v. Wainwright ensured that states
would provide criminal defendants charged with serious offenses an attorney if they could not afford one. Escobedo v.
Illinois ruled that criminal suspects had the right to a present attorney during police interrogations. Miranda v. Arizona
required law enforcement to warn arrested people they had the right to remain silent and the right to an attorney. Risa
Goluboff, Vagrant Nation: Police Power, Constitutional Change, and the Making of the 1960s (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2016), 199-200. Walker and Archbold, The New World of Police Accountability, 45.
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more responsive and protective brand of law enforcement. Therefore, they were not willing to
relent, let alone reform policing without a fight. Likewise, some old-guard Black professionals were
not prepared to relinquish their class power within the city’s segregated system.
As this chapter illustrates, Milwaukee’s virtually all-white police bureaucracy refused to hear
Black charges of police brutality in the mid-1960s, or at least listen sympathetically when Black
residents or their interlocutors recounted narratives of police misconduct. If the MPD, MFPC, and
City Hall did not flatly deny the existence of police brutality, then they abdicated any responsibility
for proposing meaningful solutions. While some white public officials attempted to advance narrow
reform proposals meant to curtail extra-legal or abusive police transgressions, the truth was they had
little choice but to follow the guidance of Harold Breier. State law granted the police chief lifetime
tenure and final rule-making authority—thus, full control over police discretion and internal
investigations. Again, police accountability advocates were just now discovering the full weight of
that authority. At the same time, Chief Breier actively undermined Milwaukee’s most visible
advocates for a revised policing system. The MPD engaged in targeted press denunciations, hostile
encounters, and, increasingly, counter-insurgent campaigns of harassment, intimidation, and arrest
against civil rights organizations. These actions are discussed in greater detail in the next chapter.
The department’s capacity for reactionary law-and-order was supported by a powerful white
backlash against the city’s insurgent Black freedom movement. Thousands of white residents
believed in the MPD’s narrative of exceptionalism and Chief Breier was content with leveraging
decades of goodwill generated by his liberal law-and-order predecessors when it suited him.10

That said, it should be noted that previous police chiefs, indeed, led the MPD at a time when Black Milwaukee was
smaller and more easily (or less noticeably to white residents) managed through racist order maintenance policing and
“close surveillance” tactics. Racial conflicts between white police and Black residents had intensified by the mid-1950s.
But they were successfully contained before any mass civil violence could break out. To be clear, African Americans in
the immediate postwar period did resist police mistreatment—overpoliced Black youth in particular. However, they did
not collectively channel their deepening frustration with and mistrust of the MPD into coordinated, organizational
activism. While their protestations denoted an important mode of grassroots dissent, they lacked the numbers and
institutional support of the 1960s generation. Black middle-class leaders, meanwhile, were more organized institutionally.
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Mobilizing Against Police Brutality
As the sun rose on the morning of June 21, 1964, a woman observed four young men
peering into car windows on Milwaukee’s near west side. She called out to the group, but they
dispersed. The youths, all Black, reconvened near the intersection of N. 15th St. and Wells. The teens
admittedly stole some fishing rods, two tackle boxes, and tubes of hair cream from a parked
vehicle.11 While walking south on N. 15th St., a police cruiser approached. Alarmed by the cruiser,
they dropped the items and fled. One of the patrolmen exited the oncoming squad car and gave
chase, drawing his revolver as he ran. Maneuvering between houses, three of the boys successfully
traversed a picket fence. The pursuing officer caught up with the fourth, whose leg had gotten
caught in the barrier.12
What transpired next made for disputed testimony in the first federal police brutality lawsuit
filed in Milwaukee’s history.13 According to William Coates, white patrolman Arthur Young pulled
him down from the fence, lifted him up from the ground, and struck him on the head with his
service weapon, “causing a deep scalp wound.” The officer proceeded to punch Coates in the
stomach, walked him over to his parked squad car and forcibly bent the young man over the
vehicle’s trunk, tightly holding his right arm behind his back. “You better start talking,” Young
instructed, before shoving Coates onto the backseat. Officers reportedly called the 14-year-old a
“Black nigger,” “bastard,” and “trash,” as they questioned him in the cruiser about the theft. “I smell

However, they still supported racial acculturation and accommodation well into the 1960s, despite raising issues of
differential policing. See Chapter II; Balto, “Occupied Territory.”
11 The youths confessed to stealing these items.
12 Officer Arthur Young testified in court that he took his service weapon out of its holster because he was nervous he
would lose it as he ran.
13 The plaintiffs sought monetary damages under “Section 1983” of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, a section of the law
frequently invoked in cases of alleged excessive police force. Micah Schwartzbach, “What Is a “Section 1983” Lawsuit
against the Police,” NOLO, accessed April 8, 2019, https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/what-is-a-section-1983lawsuit-against-the-police.html.
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animal blood,” driver Gordon Hessel allegedly remarked. When the youth asked for a towel to wipe
the blood streaming down his face, he said an officer replied, “Wipe your head with your shirt.”14
According to police testimony, William Coates never resisted arrest. He complied when
questioned about the assumed robbery and location of his accomplices. Belying the myth that
cooperation with the police necessarily resulted in fair treatment or due process, Coates said one of
the white patrolmen struck him twice more, this time in his right eye, as the other drove to find
another suspect. When the police found Michael Thomas, the plaintiffs’ affidavit said an officer
punched him “repeatedly with a closed fist,” before placing him under arrest. After transporting him
to District One station, a patrolman allegedly hit the 14-year-old again in the chest and stomach,
then threw him onto a table, cutting his lip, before striking him multiple times on the neck and back.
Further violence ensued, both at the station and again in the squad car as Young and Hessel left to
round up additional suspects.
The excessive use of police force Coates and Thomas recounted was far more common on
Milwaukee’s near north and west sides than either the MPD or the city’s white majority cared to
admit. That same week, Jerry Holland experienced a similar episode of police aggression when he
was stopped by a white patrolman for jaywalking across N. 3rd St. The officer, Holland said, took
umbrage at the 13-year-old’s refusal to empty his pockets on command.15 He arrested him, pulled
him over to a police call box, and summoned a squad car from nearby District Five station.16
Milwaukee Star publisher Ken Coulter witnessed two patrolmen pummel the youth, then push him
into a cruiser.17 Coulter trailed the vehicle to the District Five station at N. 4 th and Locust St., joined

“CORE Lawyer to Prosecute First Milwaukee Police Brutality Case,” The Milwaukee Courier, August 8, 1964, 1; Thomas
and Coates v. Young and Hessel, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, No. 64-C-203 (1964).
15 Holland was carrying some cash. He feared the officer might take his money.
16 Milwaukee beat patrol officers, starting in the 1880s, used neighborhood call boxes in districts to report specific crimes
to police headquarters. Initially, the public could also use the communication devices to summon police. Rachel Morello,
“What’s the Story with Milwaukee’s Police Call Boxes?” WUWM, March 23, 2018,
https://www.wuwm.com/post/whats-story-milwaukees-police-call-boxes#stream/0.
17 The Star’s offices were located nearby on N. 3rd St. (present-day Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Drive). The Black-run
14

188

by Holland’s mother. The officers made little effort to conceal their racism on the drive: “I’ll have
you in a cage swinging like a monkey,” one apparently said. Such dehumanizing comments were not
isolated to rank-and-file “bad apples,” but echoed the verbiage of recently appointed police chief,
Harold Breier. “Any breakdown in law and order can turn any community into a jungle,” Breier told
reporters in 1964.18 More name-calling and “slaps” followed. The quick arrival of Holland’s mother
at District Five station may have prevented a more severe in-house beating.19 He was released with a
date in Milwaukee Children’s Court and a jaywalking ticket—one of many petty citations unevenly
dispensed to Black citizens; these also helped to fund public safety expenditures. State violence, such
as that committed against Holland, has always been “more than a problem of rogue cops—it was an
institutional problem.”20 Racialized violence perpetrated by the state transcended policing. Assorted
actors within Milwaukee’s criminal-legal system—from elected officials and the Milwaukee County
District Attorney to Milwaukee County Circuit Court judges and the MFPC—routinely minimized
Black concerns around crime, safety, and law enforcement. Institutional racism and segregation
ensured that Black citizens remained vulnerable, not just to a disproportionate share of urban
dangers and illicit activities, but also to police mistreatment and neglect.
A cohort of Black community leaders and select white allies concerned about the protection
of civil and human rights formed the Citizens’ Anti-Police Brutality Committee (CAPBC) in August
1964 to address racial inequities across the law enforcement arena. Labor leader Calvin Sherard
organized the ad hoc committee in direct response to the police beatings of William Coates, Michael

newspaper routinely reported on allegations of police brutality committed against African Americans. It played a critical
role in publicizing Milwaukee’s emergent Black-led movement for police accountability.
18 “Baiting of Police Called Problem,” The Milwaukee Journal, December 10, 1964, Part 1, 21. Numerous white authorities,
citizen’s groups, and commentators referenced poor, predominantly Black urban neighborhoods in the postwar period
as “jungles,” often in reference to the assumed lawlessness and cultural degradation of their Black migrant inhabitants.
Milwaukee Commission on Human Rights, Annual Report, 1957, 3.
19 Holland’s injuries required hospital attention, probably adding economic injury to physical pain. No charges were filed
against Holland in Children’s Court. “Brutality,” Milwaukee Star, August 15, 1964, 12.
20 Clarence Taylor, Fight the Power: African Americans and the Long History of Police Brutality in New York City (New York: New
York University Press, 2018), 6.
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Thomas, and Jerry Holland.21 The group coalesced to reform the criminal-legal system at the point
of police-civilian contact, when law enforcement employed its discretion in a ways that ranged from
reckless directives to brutal treatment.22 Recalibrating the terms of police discretion, in this sense,
carried the potential for improved police-community relations and crime control, the easing of
simmering tensions and the elevation of police legitimacy. While the CAPBC was not the first Blackled organization that focused on the improvement of police-community relations in Milwaukee, it
was the first to dedicate its energies towards resolving the police department’s brutalization of
African Americans.23 Unlike the Sixth Ward Law and Order League of the 1930s or the LaphamGarfield Neighborhood Association of the 1950s, the committee emphasized police misconduct and
the role that law enforcement played in eroding neighborhood safety. From 1964 to 1965, it helped
advance the city’s growing police accountability movement. Above all, the CAPBC worked to enact
swift changes on the MPD by compelling police bureaucrats to limit the likelihood that police
officers could ever act violently while on patrol in Black spaces, responding to crimes involving
Black suspects, or answering service calls requested by Black citizens.
The CAPBC positioned itself as both a protest organization and “negotiating committee”—
one that operated “independent of the city administration.”24 The interracial committee was
essentially reformist in that it did not deny the legitimacy of policing as an enterprise. 25 Its members,
instead, saw the MPD as a flawed, if perfectible civic agency capable of meting out law enforcement
properly, i.e. without bias and in ways that served all residents. Unlike white city officials, police

Sherard believed these cases of police brutality would ultimately result in disciplinary action against the officers
involved. “Committee Formed to Investigate Police Brutality Charges.”
22 Lloyd Barbee, “Citizens’ Anti-Police Brutality Committee,” Box 21, Folder 9, “Citizens' Anti-Police Brutality
Committee, 1964-1965,” Lloyd A. Barbee Papers.
23 Historian Joe Trotter traces this “contradictory” relationship back to the early Black migrations of the World War I
era. Trotter, Black Milwaukee: The Making of an Industrial Proletariat, 118.
24 “Brutality,” Milwaukee Star, August 15, 1964; “Police Brutality Probe by Outsiders Rejected,” The Milwaukee Journal,
September 10, 1964, Part 1, 22; “Ban Police Bias, New Group Asks,” The Milwaukee Journal, August 23, 1964, Part 2, 13.
25 Few police accountability organizations actually did so in this period.
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administrators, and even many Black middle-class leaders in the 1940s and 1950s, the CAPBC did
not blame poor African Americans for the MPD’s over-zealous policing and the comparative
underprotection it afforded Black residents. The committee saw officers who engaged in police
brutality as contributing forces to a fraying social fabric. This was a fresh perspective within Black
Milwaukee human rights organizations. African American professionals historically considered the
MPD a fair arbiter of “right” and “wrong”—a rather neutral agency that existed above the messiness
of urban politics. Conversely, the CAPBC argued that the police department “created any distrust”
that existed between a growing Black migrant population and law enforcement “by insisting on
being prosecutor, judge, jury, and executioner.”26 This critique was, at the time, unheard of in a city
that had long prided itself on its crime control efficiency and community-minded policing strategies.
The CAPBC represented the vanguard of Milwaukee’s struggle for police accountability at a
critical juncture in America’s civil rights and policing history. Outbreaks of civil violence in northern
cities, which began occurring shortly after Congress passed the 1964 Civil Rights Act, transformed
municipal discourses around race, policing, and human rights. In this context, the CAPBC
articulated a reform vision that reflected both the urgency of Milwaukee’s advancing Black freedom
movement and the rising anxieties that urban rebellions engendered. The committee did so well
before the city wrote its own chapter in the “long hot summer” of 1967.27 Sparked by episodes of
racialized police brutality and swirling rumors of police violence, these politically charged conflicts
suggested widespread Black dissatisfaction with the economic racism embedded in urban liberalism.

“Statement of the Citizens’ Anti-Police Brutality Committee before the Milwaukee Police and Fire Commission,
January 21, 1965.”
27 The press, political leaders, activists, and scholarly observers simultaneously describe the episodes of civil violence that
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They also reflected the limits of federal civil rights laws that did little to directly alter the day-to-day
inequities experienced by Black families hemmed into racially segregated urban enclaves. For the
CAPBC, securing a more equitable level of police service and protection was part and parcel of
preempting civil violence. Its members were wary of what Harlem’s August 1964 uprising meant for
Milwaukee’s growing and disproportionately poor Black community. Near north siders faced a
similar set of discriminatory socio-economic and socio-political constraints as Black Harlemites.
Drawing on more than a decade of intensifying racial discord between white patrolmen and Black
youth, the CAPBC’s activism around tempering police-Black community conflict implied that
Milwaukee’s foray into the “Great Uprising” of the 1960s was not inevitable.28 Some CAPBC
members observed the city’s troubling policing dynamics and their potential for unrest as early as the
late 1950s. However, demands for change were tempered by established Black middle-class leaders
as concerned about rankling the community’s white liberal benefactors as pursuing justice.
Unwilling to wait and see if Milwaukee would be the next city to burn, metal finisher, labor
organizer, and civil rights activist Calvin Sherard spearheaded the CAPBC’s formation in August
1964. As he argued then, “such a committee is a necessity…if we don’t want to experience a Harlem
right here in Milwaukee.”29 Sherard was among the first Black leaders in the city to advocate for
non-violent civil disobedience as a response to police brutality. He embodied the shift taking place
among civil rights organizations after the 1958 police murder of the unarmed Black migrant Daniel
Bell. It was after a white police officer shot-and-killed the 22-year-old Louisiana native that Sherard
made a name for himself in local social justice circles. In the process of organizing the community

Peter B. Levy, The Great Uprising: Race Riots in Urban America during the 1960s (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2018). White city officials and police bureaucrats had plenty of opportunities to recognize and reform the city’s racially
differential law enforcement arrangements. They could have chosen to attack the root causes of racialized civil violence:
white anti-blackness and the residential segregation, educational inequities, disinvestment, employment discrimination,
joblessness, and poverty it facilitated. As Black police accountability advocates and allies discovered, Milwaukee’s
criminal-legal system was actually working as planned; it supported a racial politics that preserved white hegemony and
the dictates of racial capitalism.
29 “Committee Formed to Investigate Brutality Charges,” The Milwaukee, August 14, 1964, 1.
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against police violence, the Georgia native moved segments of Black Milwaukee from its restrained
politics of racial accommodation to a more confrontational approach. Sherard’s articulations of
solidarity for the adverse economic conditions facing poor and working-class Black migrants shaped
a militant protest politics and his subsequent efforts to secure Black civil rights through boycotts and
street protests. Despite the availability of low-level manufacturing jobs in Milwaukee, the city
presented Black newcomers from the South and Lower Midwest with a hostile, discriminatory
terrain.30 That meant frequent encounters with an overwhelmingly white police force.31 As an
industrial laborer and recent migrant, Sherard understood first-hand the routine disrespect,
harassment, and brutality that white officers meted out against African Americans.
The CAPBC’s formation embodied more than a decade of Black resistance to police
violence and grassroots organizing around public safety. Since arriving in Milwaukee in the mid1950s, Calvin Sherard made economic justice central to his political analysis.32 Identified by one
historian as “the father of Black working-class militancy in Milwaukee,” he mobilized pickets and
“don’t buy where you can’t work” campaigns directed against discriminatory retailers who catered to
Black clientele.33 Sherard did so as co-founder of the Crusaders Civic and Social League in 1959 and,
after 1960, as president of the Milwaukee chapter of A. Philip Randolph’s Negro American Labor
Council. Most Black labor and civil rights advocates who joined Sherard worked alongside him at
Milwaukee’s American Motors Company plant. The Crusaders and MNALC critiqued what they saw
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Sherard,” The Milwaukee Journal, March 6, 1964.
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as the limitations of urban liberalism for advancing civil rights. The organization framed middle-class
advocacy for racial accommodation as an insufficient tactic when it came to securing economic
justice for poor and working-class African Americans. The Crusaders became an outlet for
demonstrating against workplace discrimination, in addition to police misconduct. Black community
historian Reuben Harpole once called Sherard “the Malcolm X of our city.”34 The label fit.
Milwaukee’s NAACP branch even considered him “too radical” to join its board.35 When a “near
riot” erupted between white police and Black youth outside a rock concert in 1960, Milwaukee’s
“Malcolm X” told a community meeting: “Get up off your knees! There’s a time for praying and a
time not to pray…These folks out here are hurting us. Let's go march!”36 Sherard was one of the few
Black leaders in the city advocating for street protests in the early 1960s.37
The CAPBC’s agenda, as its name suggests, centered on the pressing issue of police
brutality—an “all-encompassing” force for African Americans in the postwar period.38 As such, the
group endeavored to end racialized police violence through a combination of civic negotiation, legal
redress, and direct action protest. It pursued these ostensibly divergent tactics with varying degrees
of success. To make its case before white police bureaucrats, the committee fused existing liberal
law-and-order concepts popularized during the World War II era, such as expanded “human
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relations” training for police officers and the recruitment of more African Americans to patrol Black
districts, with strident demands that reflected the urgency of the current civil rights moment, such as
psychological evaluations of new police hires.39 In carrying out its agenda at public meetings with
white police bureaucrats, the CAPBC exposed structural forces that, for decades, had undermined
police accountability for African Americans. These included intra-racial class tensions, the
institutional hubris of white city officials who bought into Milwaukee’s narrative of policing
exceptionalism, and the state law that barred most Black citizens from filing grievances with the
MFPC. Learning about and then bringing Chapter 586 (1911) to light for a wider Black public eager
to curtail police abuse and neglect of service was an important legacy of the CAPBC and a key
development in the city’s police accountability movement.
The committee positioned itself as a liaison between vulnerable African Americans and the
city’s police bureaucracy. Black Milwaukee, while growing rapidly, remained small compared to other
large northern cities at roughly 10-12 percent of the total population. Consequently, forming
alliances with white elected officials mattered if the CAPBC was to shift local police procedures in a
meaningful way. However, in highlighting police brutality as a civil rights issue, the committee
diverged from the conciliatory responses of Black clergy and old-guard middle-class leaders when
police-Black community tensions led to racial violence. While the CAPBC believed in negotiating
with City Hall to effect change, they also embraced non-violent, direct action protest. In other
words, the CAPBC combined middle-class civil rights leaders with the gaining militancy of a
younger generation of Black freedom fighters. Historians should consider the committee as a driver
of the movement’s insurgent turn and a critical voice in framing police violence within the broader
nexus of racial injustice. The CAPBC’s advocacy conferred a measure of institutional cover when

This dissertation defines Milwaukee’s police bureaucracy as the Milwaukee Police Department, the Milwaukee Fire and
Police Commission, and City Hall, or the Mayor’s office and Common Council.
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younger Black activists engaged in civil disobedience. In this way, they bridged generational,
socioeconomic, and ideological gaps within the local freedom struggle.
Since the 1910s, the Milwaukee Urban League (MUL) and Milwaukee NAACP (MNAACP)
represented the city’s civil and human rights leadership. These moderate-led organizations relied on
deferential negotiations with white city officials to advance modest Black social, economic, and
political gains. In the process, they accepted white espousals of acculturation. Increasing Black
migration, hardening racial segregation, and staunch white resistance to Black civic and marketeconomic entry rendered cultural adjustment strategies untenable by the mid-1960s. Calvin Sherard
and Lloyd Barbee—the two most radical CAPBC voices—signaled the shift away from
acculturation. They helped direct Milwaukee’s civil rights establishment toward tactics of civil
disobedience and litigation as effective means of addressing racial injustice. While the CAPBC drew
scorn from MUL and MNAACP officials—both organizations were loath to upset their tenuous
foothold in Milwaukee’s “white power structure”—they nonetheless elevated the city’s gaining crisis
of police legitimacy within Black-led organizations.40 The struggle for police accountability was,
therefore, not merely about compelling white power brokers to come to terms with Milwaukee’s
dual law enforcement system. Mitigating racialized police violence also meant convincing established
Black leaders to reconsider their own political identities and class-based interests in service of aiding
a comparatively poorer and vulnerable Black migrant community. While some middle-class leaders,
indeed, held that embracing a more confrontational protest politics was necessary in building a just
society, many continued to advocate for cultural adjustment policies. These more conservative-to-

Discussed in more detail next chapter, the Common View, a collective organized following the eruption of civil
violence in Milwaukee in 1967, referred to elected white political leaders in the city as the “white power structure.” The
group’s description was apt, considering that only one African American served on the Common Council. And, aside
from scant representation on the Milwaukee Commission on Community Relations, Black and Latinx citizens were
consistently bypassed for appointments to public agencies that worked on issues of race and policing. Common View
Group, “Statement to the White community,” Box 6, Folder 7, “Administrative Subject Files, Common View Group,
1967,” Milwaukee Urban League Records, 1919-1979, Milwaukee Mss EZ, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Archives.
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moderate Black voices were content with blaming southern migrants for Black community ills. And
they embraced the MPD’s existing order maintenance approach. In key respects, the “triangular
struggle for order” among Black professionals, recent Black arrivals, and assorted white interests
endured.41
With or without the full support of all moderate racial liberals, CAPBC members laid out the
principles of what would become the committee’s seven-point reform program soon after their first
meeting.42 The group reflected the desire of Black leaders for a measure of community control over
police decision-making. The CAPBC platform demanded the immediate dismissal of any officers
found to have engaged in “racial or religious bias.” The committee called for expanded human
relations training for District Five personnel and the recruitment of more Black officers, especially
youth, onto the MPD.43 At their second meeting, the CAPBC added “an honest reappraisal” of the
police department’s “human rights practices,” psychological screenings of officers assigned to
majority Black districts, and a prohibition on “the employment of racial bigots” to their platform.
Lloyd Barbee, the committee’s legal counsel, drafted the initial policy statement presented to city

As the previous chapter lays out, intensive Black movement from the South and Lower Midwest produced a triangular
struggle for order in Milwaukee among existing Black residents, assorted white interests, and newer Black migrants.
While he does not frame it as “a struggle for order,” historian Jack Dougherty references “the triangle formed by Whites,
established Blacks, and Southern newcomers during the postwar migration.” Jack Dougherty, “African Americans,
Rights, and Race-Making,” in Perspectives on Milwaukee’s Past, Margo Anderson and Victor Greene, eds. (Urbana:
University of Illinois Press, 2009), 143.
42 The CAPBC held its first meeting on August 21, 1965 at St. Matthew C.M.E. Church. The convocation brought out
an interracial “cross-section of the community.” Reverend B.S. Gregg was nominated to chair the group and served as
its spokesperson in negotiations with city officials. The middle-class Black leader was well-respected by Mayor Maier,
provided necessary financial support, and offered St. Matthew C.M.E. Church as a meeting site. Sherard chaired the
CAPBC’s protest arm, or “Action Committee.” Civil rights attorney Lloyd Barbee, fresh off of being elected to
Wisconsin’s Assembly, volunteered as legal counsel. Barbee evaluated citizen reports of police misconduct and
determined the legal basis for filing lawsuits against brutal officers. F. Marvin Hannah chaired the CAPBC’s “Case
Committee,” which documented instances of police brutality. Former nun and civil rights activist Marilyn Morheuser
served as secretary, playing a vital organizational role. Lastly, Ken Coulter’s Milwaukee Star helped document the group’s
efforts, publicizing instances of police brutality. In some cases, police brutality victims walked directly into the Star’s N.
3rd St. headquarters right after experiencing an attack. “Cop Rips Jacket off 14-year-old,” The Milwaukee Star, December
19, 1964, 1. Northcott Neighborhood House Director and Organization of Organizations founder, Reverend Lucius
Walker, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee sociologist Hugo Engelmann, Dr. William E. Finlayson, a respected medical
doctor and community leader, and MUSIC Vice Chair Earl Calvin also participated in the first CAPBC meeting.
“Statement of the Citizens’ Anti-Police Brutality Committee.”
43 “Ban Police Bias, New Group Asks,” The Milwaukee Journal, August 23, 1964, Part 2, 13.
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officials. The committee looked to relay their concerns about “muscle-happy officers” directly to
Chief Breier.44 At a public meeting, Barbee called for citizen instruction on their rights in police
interactions and asked that local social scientists “assist in communicating to both officials and the
general public the damage accruing from police brutality.” He also called on elected officials to
pressure the MPD “to cease its double standards and protection of cowards in uniform who
intimidate.” Everyday citizens, Reverend Gregg added, “had a role to play as well in reporting
misconduct as soon as it occurred.” If negotiations with City Hall faltered, the CAPBC insisted that
“direct action should follow.”45
The committee’s call for increased Black representation on the MPD was a core demand of
Milwaukee’s police accountability movement.46 The city’s lone Black Alderperson, Vel Phillips, had
argued in 1962 that hiring more African American police officers would help shield Black
constituents from undue police harassment and abuse, while more effectively protecting them from
crime.47 Speaking before the MFPC and Police Chief Howard Johnson, she argued that racial biases
existed in the MPD. Giving voice to the less than thirty-five Black officers on the force, Phillips
targeted the department’s promotion policies. In response, the MFPC dismissed her claims. 48
Nevertheless, Phillips’ voice on this issue was notable; it marked the first time an elected Milwaukee
official connected the MPD’s whiteness to the racially disparate treatment of African Americans. 49
Black middle class leaders, including recent migrants, assumed that African Americans were better
suited to meet the needs of Black communities and better respect Black citizenship rights. They held
that Black officers would enforce the law with greater impartiality. Whether or not African American

“May Ask Chief Breier to Fire Biased Officers,” The Milwaukee Courier, August 29, 1964, 1.
“May Ask Chief Breier to Fire Biased Officers.”
46 Calls for the hiring of Black police in Milwaukee dated back to the 1920s. See Chapter I.
47 Phillips was also the only woman serving on the Common Council at the time.
48 “Police Policy Ruled Not Racially Biased,” Milwaukee Journal, January 24, 1963, 6.
49 “Ald. Phillips Discrimination Charges are out of Line,” Box 138, Folder 27, “Police Department, 1962-1963,” Records
of Mayor Henry W. Maier Administration, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, Milwaukee Series 44, University of WisconsinMilwaukee Archives.
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police operated more fairly was an open question, as the community had limited data to rely on.
There were few real-world examples to parse through, especially in Milwaukee, where token Black
police employment was the norm. “As long as the hiring of Black officers remained a distant
dream,” legal scholar James Forman Jr. has argued, “there was no way to test any theory about the
changes they would bring to law enforcement.”50 The hiring of African Americans continued to be
seen as a viable reform option to alleviate the mistrust powering the near north side’s evolving crisis
of police legitimacy well into the 1980s.
After the Harlem uprising in July 1964, and subsequent episodes of civil unrest in Jersey
City, NJ and Rochester, NY, Black middle-class leaders in Milwaukee shared concerns about civil
violence touching off in their own city. Speaking before a national Urban League assembly, branch
director Wesley Scott said Milwaukee was “on the verge of much that has happened elsewhere.”51
North Side YMCA director Robert Starms, likewise, noted the “acute” frustrations of young Black
men aged twenty-one to twenty-five, many of who were unemployed or struggling to maintain
employment. Black youth were dropping out of high school at comparatively high rates, and also
looking to support their families. This “ten percent” of the community, Starms reasoned, was
“likely” to engage in civil violence if given a reason. Corneff Taylor, the Executive Secretary of the
Milwaukee Commission on Community Relations (MCCR), argued that civil violence was more
“situational.” However, he too saw that Milwaukee was suffering from many of the same underlying
causes of civil unrest: unemployment, housing discrimination, and inequitable schooling. That said, a
number of Black middle-class elites insisted the MPD’s human relations capacities were sound, “in
spite of the conduct of a few officers.” Against a national backdrop of escalating civil unrest, the

The benefits seemed obvious enough. Hiring Black patrolmen was a path towards civil service employment, economic
advancement, and political power. It also held the potential for enhancing community control, more effectively resolving
crime in predominantly Black spaces, and better maintaining neighborhood stability. James Forman Jr., Locking Up Our
Own: Crime and Punishment in Black America (New York: Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux, 2017), 80.
51 “Scott Fears Riots Here,” The Milwaukee Journal, August 5, 1964, Part 2, 1.
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MPD issued its own statement: “law and order” would prevail in Milwaukee, regardless of the socioeconomic issues facing “different population groups.” The police department assured Black leaders
it would act impartially “as agents of the law and of the government—not as men.”52
The above warnings sparked vigorous debate within the Milwaukee Commission on
Community Relations in the summer of 1964. So too did the formation of the CAPBC that year, the
committee’s charges of racialized police violence, and the federal civil suit that was filed by the
families of William Coates and Michael Thomas.53 MPD Chief Harold Breier argued the MCCR
“should back the Police Department” against the CAPBC’s, in his view, unfounded charges.
Attacking police would “destroy the power that can protect [citizens] from the forces of evil,” Breier
intoned. The chief clearly saw the CAPBC as a threat to his executive authority and the institutional
independence that undergirded the MPD’s reputed exceptionalism in the arena of crime control
efficiency. Fortunately for Breier, the MCCR expressed little desire to depart from his zero sum
perspective, at least in the years and months that preceded the outbreak of civil violence in 1967.
Some members questioned the CAPBC’s “negative attitude” towards police-community relations.
One commissioner, for example, implied that the CAPBC was a militant organization that had lost
legitimacy after separating from moderate white parishioners at St. Elizabeth Church.54 Corneff
Taylor warned his MCCR colleagues—all Maier appointees—that the CAPBC formed as a
“vigilante-type operation.” They should “protest loudly and long” its approach to police reform. 55

“Starms Hears Rumblings of Milwaukee Race Riots,” The Milwaukee Star, August 15, 1964, 1.
The MCCR was appointed by the mayor and served on his behalf. It acted as the City of Milwaukee’s civil rights
watchdog and as an occasional clearinghouse for public discrimination complaints. Chief Breier was a member, but
rarely attended meetings unless they directly involved the police department. “Milwaukee Commission on Community
Relations, Executive Committee Meeting,” September 3, 1964, 3, Box 45, Folder 21, “Commission on Community
Relations, June - December, 1964,” Records of Mayor Henry W. Maier Administration, Milwaukee, Wisconsin,
Milwaukee Series 44, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Archives.
54 Reverend Charles Hammer, St. Elizabeth’s pastor, was an early co-chair of the CAPBC, volunteering to lead the
organization alongside Reverend B.S. Gregg. However, he left the committee after Chief Breier and one of his
lieutenants paid the white cleric a personal visit. “Milwaukee Commission on Community Relations, Executive
Committee Meeting,” September 9, 1964, 5.
55 “Milwaukee Commission on Community Relations, Executive Committee Meeting,” September 9, 1964, 5.
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Although it sought to distance itself from the CAPBC, the MCCR did acknowledge that the
MPD’s controversial actions on the near north side presented a public relations challenge that could
lead to disorder. Black perceptions of police illegitimacy and the looming threat of unrest forced the
commission to concede that Milwaukee needed a revised police complaint procedure. One MCCR
member went so far as to suggest the city establish a “police civilian board” to “handle complaints
against the Police Department.”56 Breier, on the other hand, vigorously opposed the concept,
arguing complaints “should be referred to the department for investigation by trained personnel.”
The MCCR countered that they should be present to “determine substance” on all police complaints
and whether referrals were necessary for internal investigations or finding “some other means of
handling the complaint.” Essentially, these deliberations resulted in Breier establishing a revised
“Internal Affairs Bureau” (IAB).57 The IAB’s creation ensured that all investigations into citizen
complaints against the police would remain under the chief’s purview. The move gave the
appearance of reform, but did nothing to empower the MCCR or non-police agencies. Its purpose,
according to the chief, was to interrogate complaints made against officers, to look into possible
derelictions of duty, and to supervise background checks of police candidates. In the end, Breier
largely utilized the IAB to investigate possible rules violations committed by police personnel. It was
rarely employed to investigate civilian allegations of police misconduct. The IAB inevitably served as
a powerful mechanism for an autocratic chief to tighten the reigns of his authority and to expand
local police power.

Limits of Reform
The CAPBC’s efforts to reconstitute police rules and oversight through civic negotiation

“Milwaukee Commission on Community Relations, Executive Committee Meeting,” October 1, 1964, 2.
The IAB was previously known as the “Investigations Bureau.” Breier staffed the bureau, at least in its first
incarnation, with two detectives, a detective sergeant, and a stenographer.
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highlighted the limitations for police accountability advocates seeking substantive change through
formal municipal channels, where the priority remained upholding traditional power arrangements
and ensuring racial pacification. Deflection, subterfuge, false promises, the proposal of study
commissions and other forms of deferred action comprised the toolkit of white police bureaucrats
when responding to Black demands for accountability. Established relationships between old-guard
Black professionals and white public officials helped preserve existing racial and class hierarchies of
authority. The CAPBC’s engagement with Milwaukee’s all-white police bureaucracy in 1964 and
1965 revealed the powerful influence of the city’s existing narrative of policing exceptionalism.
Segregation ensured that most white residents were blind to the MPD’s racial containment and order
maintenance practices on the near north side. More constructive forms of policing in white urban
spaces affirmed the political currency of the police department’s exceptionalism narrative. “High
crime” Black areas received sufficient police attention, while white neighborhoods merited more
responsive police safeguarding. As such, the MPD received the benefit of the doubt from white
elected officials, the MFPC, and community organizations, who were increasingly anxious about
Black law enforcement proposals. Milwaukee Circuit Court judges, too, almost always supported
police actions, particularly in cases involving civil rights activists. They often conflated Black
movement activism with criminality. White police leaders and the Milwaukee County District
Attorney, meanwhile, defended police discretion and framed the MPD as a noble agency committed
to defending law-abiding (white) Milwaukeeans from the (Black) criminal element. If shining a light
on racialized police misconduct felt like an uphill battle for groups like the CAPBC, then advancing
substantive change must have felt like scaling a mountain.
The CAPBC first attempted to meet with Chief Breier to discuss ways of improving policeBlack community relations in August 1964. Breier had scheduled a meeting with the committee in
early September. “The lines of communication are always open to my office to any responsible
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committee,”58 the chief said. “Responsible,” in this context, meant deference to police authority and
subservience to “law and order.” As such, the MPD refused the CAPBC’s entreaties once it became
clear the committee was pursuing litigation, in addition to greater civilian control over police
functions in response to police brutality. Publicly, Breier argued that he could not meet with the
group because his schedule was “too heavy.” The chief defended his patrolmen and rejected the
premise of police brutality, arguing that the department sufficiently processed brutality charges.59
Under the MPD’s internal review system accused officers investigated their own alleged
wrongdoing.60 External review, civilian or otherwise, was off limits in Breier’s view. He told the
MCCR that September that “he wouldn’t care to have anyone else making an investigation or
second guessing” his officers.61 Complying with Breier’s calls for subservience was not acceptable to
Calvin Sherard. He responded to Breier’s refusal to meet with the CAPBC, arguing that “actions by
police officers are detrimental to the image of the whole department.” Something had to be done
about “the alleged beatings of Negro children by police officers.” Invoking the MPD’s racial doublestandard, Sherard avowed that Black youth were being beaten “in such a manner that the children’s
parents would have been subjected to jailing had they committed the act…If these matters cannot
be negotiated across the table, they will be negotiated in the streets in the form of demonstrations.”
CAPBC members called for a sit-in at Breier’s office.62
After the police chief rebuffed their request to meet, the committee turned its attention to
Mayor Maier. For a month, the mayor had delayed meeting with the CAPBC. On October 20, 1964,

Emphasis added by the author. Both Chief Breier and CAPBC Chairman Rev. B.S. Gregg had scheduling conflicts
that postponed their initial meeting. “Breier Meet 'Next Week,’” The Milwaukee Star, September 26, 1964, 3.
59 “Breier Too Busy, Seek Meeting with Mayor,” The Milwaukee Star, October 10, 1964, 1; Milwaukee Police Department,
Annual Report, 1963.
60 The MPD appointed its first two detectives to the newly created Bureau of Internal Affairs in October 1964. The
bureau was to investigate complaints of alleged police misconduct, derelictions of duty, and candidate investigations.
“Breier Too Busy, Seek Meeting With Mayor.”
61 “Police Brutality Probe by Outsiders Rejected,” The Milwaukee Journal, September 10, 1964, Part 1, 22; “A Look at the
Police,” The Milwaukee Journal, September 14, 1964, Part 1, 14.
62 “Seek Meeting with Mayor,” The Milwaukee Star, October 10, 1964, 2.
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ten committee members appeared at City Hall to impress upon him the urgency of the MPD’s
declining legitimacy among African Americans on the near north side and to deliver the group’s
seven-point platform.63 Maier’s staff kept the committee waiting, then said he was sick with the flu
and could not meet. When the CAPBC finally convened with the mayor on November 10 th, they
presented themselves as tax-paying citizens who were concerned about the “growing disrespect for
local policemen.” The CAPBC explained that the near north side’s “rising tension” sprang from “the
double-standard constantly used to measure citizens in that community.”64 Significantly, however,
the committee focused on the disrespect that poor and migrant Black youth sometimes conveyed to
white patrolmen. This had the effect of placing the onus for change on Black young people and
economically vulnerable residents, not on the law enforcers wielding power at street level.
Seemingly, against the wishes of its militant members, the CAPBC under-emphasized the
dehumanizing nature of police violence that had brought the group to City Hall in the first place.
Instead, the committee focused on the need for an improved human rights training program and the
hiring of more Black patrolmen to police in Black neighborhoods. The CAPBC, in this sense, met
Maier on his ideological terms. This was not entirely surprising, given the committee’s largely
middle-class composition and the influential voice that Black professional leaders, like Rev. B.S.
Gregg, marshaled within the group. In this sense, the committee reflected the transition towards
Black militancy, not the end result of that shift. The meeting with Maier provided a lesson for police
accountability advocates: Telling elected officials that Black citizens did not need “different
treatment,” but “equal treatment” from the MPD would not to be enough to prevent police violence
and reduce racial tensions.65

Present were Reverend B.S. Gregg, Assembly-elect Lloyd Barbee, Marilyn Morheuser, Calvin Sherard, Dr. William
Finlayson, Earl Calvin, Reverend Lovell Johnson, Professor Rudolph Morris, Reverend Lucius Walker, and Marvin
Hannah. “Mayor Maier Meeting Postponed,” The Milwaukee Star, October 24, 1964, 2.
64 “Maier ‘Passes Buck’ in Committee Meeting,” The Milwaukee Star, November 14, 1964, 1.
65 “Negro Police Called Need in Inner City,” The Milwaukee Journal, November 11, 1964, Part 3, 1.
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The CAPBC’s discussion with Mayor Maier proved ineffective from a reform standpoint, as
it allowed City Hall to affirm rhetorical control over the direction of what a growing number of
Black residents perceived as a crisis of police legitimacy. Maier sanitized the committee’s urgent
message about the MPD’s racialized brutality, neglect, and enforcement double-standards, as well as
the role that police played in escalating social tensions. Controlling the narrative helped City Hall to
reinforce a policing status quo that emphasized law and order at the expense of garnering procedural
justice and officer discipline for aggrieved Black citizens. The Maier administration, like Chief Breier
and, subsequently, the MFPC, refused to acknowledge that police violence really existed on the near
north side. They both acted on and reinforced the MPD’s exceptionalism narrative.
In a statement issued following the mayor’s meeting with the CAPBC, Maier shared his
respect for the committee’s “universal respect for the principles of law and order.” These were “men
of good will,” able to “tackle and solve mutual problems” through the “peaceful petition for redress
of wrongs.” He added that negotiation through government channels was essentially the “timetested method of democracy.” As such, Maier decried those taking “to corner soapboxes.” The
mayor castigated civil rights activists, who he saw as agitators seeking “violence and disorder.” Maier
rebuked seemingly combustive modes of Black political dissent, which were building momentum
nationally. In the process, he minimized the hard, often dangerous work that many grassroots
activists employed to change discriminatory laws. The goal remained pacifying potential disruptions.
I am convinced that they have the most to gain from law and order. The school
integration decision from 1954 is law and order. The civil rights bill, [that] just passed
Congress, is law and order. Where would the civil rights movement be without these
acts, without this law and order? Well, the answer is that they would be set back
some considerable distance. Law and order are the northsiders’ best friend, make no
mistake about it, because the opposite of law and order is mob rule, and that’s the
way of the Ku Klux Klan, the night riders, the bombers, and the lynch mob.66

“Mayor Maier’s Statement Following a Meeting, November 10, 1964, with the Citizen’s Anti-Police Brutality
Committee.”
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This was a misinterpretation of recent history—all the more stunning in that Maier issued his
remarks in the same year as Freedom Summer and the founding of the Mississippi Freedom
Democratic Party. The violent, in some cases deadly struggle to register Black voters in the Deep
South demonstrated that “law and order” was the mob, it was the Klan, it was white supremacy.
Prevailing white conceptions of law-and-order were the inverse of the Black freedom struggle and
the system that civil rights insurgents, from Selma to Milwaukee, fought to upend.
Maier’s response affirmed what often happens when Black police accountability advocates
downplayed the harsh realities of racialized police violence in meetings with the white-controlled
political establishment. Whether the CAPBC did so out of what some members viewed as a need for
political expediency was not clear. Ostensibly, Calvin Sherard believed that a more confrontational
approach with white police bureaucrats had a better chance of garnering substantive reforms.
Regardless, the mayor’s rejoinder showed that a tempered message only fueled the MPD’s longstanding exceptionalism myth, which continued to predominate. The widespread belief in the police
department’s infallibility helped undermine the capacity of police accountability advocates to move
the mayor, MFPC, and chief of police to action in service of Black law enforcement demands. Until
Milwaukee experienced a sizable outbreak of civil violence as a consequence of police-Black
community tensions, white police bureaucrats gladly held onto the notion that the MPD was still
among the nation’s most effective police departments. The disturbing reality of police brutality
known to the CAPBC and other Black near north side residents belied this notion. At this point,
however, police accountability advocates still believed that white city officials might act on their
behalf if they reasonably stated their concerns. All the same, there was no guarantee that a Black
uprising would even impress upon City Hall the need for change either. White elected officials, like
Maier, already blamed the behavior of Black individuals and Black-led organizations working to end
discrimination through activism for their own civil rights shortcomings. Indeed, in his response to
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the CAPBC, the mayor labored to make a distinction between the “decent, law abiding citizens” on
the near north side, who “do not approve of violence and disorder,” and those willing to resort to
“riots” or “the destruction of property” when expressing their “anguish.”67
While Maier reportedly found his meeting with the CAPBC “constructive,” it did little to
move the committee’s platform forward or to convince the mayor and Common Council that
political action was necessary. Maier deferred responsibility to the MFPC and Chief Breier, claiming
no authority to issue orders that met the CAPBC’s seven demands. As the Milwaukee Star reported,
he “gave excuses why he couldn’t (or wouldn’t) act, and started talking politics.”68 The meeting
further revealed the legal-institutional barriers to police accountability that obstructed local political
action. For instance, during their discussion, Mayor Maier referenced the 1911 state law that
empowered the police chief to set rules for the MPD. That same Wisconsin statute endowed the
MFPC with a civilian oversight function. The meeting with the mayor, therefore, was useful in that it
helped to clarify for police accountability advocates the institutional arrangements that constituted
Milwaukee’s police bureaucracy and the legal foundations of police power.
Delayed action from city officials meant young Black folk on the near north side continued
to experience unchecked police violence. Two teenagers, aged sixteen and fifteen, alleged that white
officers beat them in separate incidents in November 1964.69 Once again, the MPD’s District Five
station was the scene of police intimidation and brutal mistreatment. The CAPBC called an

“Mayor Maier’s Statement Following a Meeting, November 10, 1964, with the Citizen’s Anti-Police Brutality
Committee.”
68 “Maier ‘Passes Buck’ in Committee Meeting,” The Milwaukee Star, November 14, 1964, 1.
69 In the first case, a group of young Black men were stopped by four-to-five police detectives while walking down a
street on a Saturday night at around 8:00pm. One of the youths said a detective threw his parole card on the ground. For
protesting this action, the youth was tossed into a squad car and transported to District Five station. He was taken to the
hospital, but refused treatment. The teen was released after his mother contacted their parole officer. The other incident
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multiple patrolmen yanked him out and started beating him. The entire group of six was taken into custody. The
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emergency meeting at St. Matthew Church, inviting parents of the victims to recount their children’s
experiences for the record. MCCR program director William Parish joined the meeting, which
resulted in the organization of a picket outside of District Five on December 21, 1964. 70 CAPBC
demonstrators called for an investigation into District Five and for the MCCR or some other
municipal agency to investigate the MPD’s treatment of Black citizens. Addressing this issue did not
mean “creating a double standard,” but “alleviating the double standard that we are presently
confronted with.”71 The MNAACP, in a rare turn, allied with the more militant CAPBC. The
venerable civil rights organization announced it would boycott all businesses encompassed by
District Five if the committee’s requests went unheeded by the MPD.72 “We will extend it to the
downtown area, including all utilities and public services,” recently-elected president John Broadnax
remarked. Under new leadership, the MNAACP made more explicit connections between racialized
police violence in Milwaukee and other forms of discrimination.73 Calvin Sherard, Action Committee
chairman for the CAPBC, clarified that the committee was “not attacking the individual officers,”
but protesting “a policy” that allowed them to “exercise their personal view and strong racial feelings
under the disguise of law and order.”74 This distinction mattered; the committee understood that
without challenging police practices as outlined in the MPD rulebook, more unabated violence
would transpire against African Americans. It was police policy and the whims of the police chief
that protected the department’s “bad actors,” granting them ample discretionary room to enforce
the law as they saw fit.

The group also discussed a sit-in at Breier’s office and proposed a mass demonstration at the Milwaukee Safety
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NAACP,” The Milwaukee Journal, December 21, 1964, Part 2, 4.
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No investigations or official actions resulted from the demonstration. However, the rally did
put Chief Breier on high alert; he saw his department as under attack. “Baiting police officers has
become a problem in Milwaukee as in other cities,” Breier told a sympathetic crowd in rural Wausau,
Wisconsin.75 Rights activists and everyday Black citizens in northern cities—mostly poor and
working-class—were ramping up their criticisms of law enforcement in the wake of 1964’s urban
rebellions. Many had grown disaffected with urban liberalism, as well as middle-class African
American leaders.76 They began to demand control over institutions that traditionally engendered
racially discriminatory outcomes, like police departments engaged in disproportionately high rates of
surveillance, stops, and arrests in Black neighborhoods. For Breier, citizens who challenged police
authority were “inviting the breakdown of the forces that can protect them from disorder.” Groups
like the CAPBC, the chief surmised, were “confusing brutality with the lawful use of force.” 77
Although Calvin Sherard insisted that Breier had “no understanding of the problem” or its impact
on near north side residents, the chief’s own words suggested that he knew exactly what was
occurring: Black citizens were boldly challenging white supremacy. He advised that his officers
“need not and should not knuckle down, need not and should not take any abuse.” 78
With Chief Breier unwilling to listen and the mayor deflecting any responsibility, the CAPBC
moved to convince the MFPC to assert its assumed influence over Milwaukee’s policing apparatus.
The committee was giving civic negotiation a final chance. Rev. Gregg sent a letter to the
commission asking to “discuss ways of eliminating police brutality and affecting a better relationship
between the police department and near north side residents.”79 The two parties eventually
convened in a public meeting on January 21, 1965. The CAPBC asked that all Milwaukee citizens
“Baiting of Police Called Problem, The Milwaukee Journal, December 10, 1964, Part 1, 21.
Eric C. Schneider, Christopher Agee, and Themis Chronopoulos, “Dirty Work: Police and Community Relations and
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interested in eliminating police brutality and forging better relations be present.80 Supporters of both
the police department and committee attended—the latter, mostly Black, the former,
overwhelmingly white.81 The convening was scheduled to occur at the MFPC’s Safety Building
offices, but was moved to Judge Christ Seraphim’s courtroom after nearly two hundred people
attended.82 This courtroom was an inhospitable place for Black activists and arrestees seeking justice
within the criminal-legal process. As civil rights attorney Terrance Pitts observed, the Milwaukee
County Circuit Court judge, “backed the police without question.” Judge Seraphim once advised an
officer to “go back to school” and “learn how to use his Billy club” in reference to handling Blackled civil disobedience.83 The CAPBC now sat in hostile territory, eager to challenge the brutal results
of Seraphim’s advice in conversation with a part-time municipal agency seemingly empowered to
answer its pressing demands.
Rev. B.S. Gregg, the CAPBC’s Chairman, served as spokesman for the ten-person
delegation. The committee drew from a broad cross-section of moderate-to-progressive liberal
voices in Milwaukee’s civil and human rights community.84 After introducing the committee
members on hand, Gregg opened with remarks that emphasized the consequences of unbridled
police violence in other U.S. cities. He emphasized not only how police brutality and mistreatment
threatened public order and community safety, but how it also encouraged opportunities for reform
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as initiated by the police:
The problem which Milwaukee faces is not peculiar to this city. It is a problem which
all America faces. It is a problem which is one of the poisonous outgrowths of racial
prejudice, and one which must be faced before it causes racial tensions to erupt. It is
the problem of police brutality in the ghetto areas of large cities.85
The CAPBC made the point that Milwaukee’s police bureaucracy should be learning from what took
place in Harlem, North Philadelphia, Rochester, and other riot-torn cities in 1964. These
municipalities were now initiating “extensive training programs in human rights, human relations,
and the techniques and purposes of civil rights groups.” In contrast, the MPD, at present, offered
just five hours of human rights training to new recruits. Gregg referred to the high cost of civil
violence and the threat it posed to Black lives. African Americans were “not safe to peaceably move
about” their own neighborhoods. He recounted instances where Black youth were “beaten by
policemen while being transported” to holding cells and “sadistically punished prior to being
charged with a crime.” The discretionary authority of overzealous white police officers not only
promoted mistrust and fear, but inflicted serious physical harm. “Make no mistake about it,” Gregg
charged, “we have some law officers in this city who consistently insult, harass, and brutalize
Milwaukee Negroes…who act on the assumption that every Negro is a second-class citizen, a
person to be treated with contempt, a person without rights before the law.” The CAPBC criticized
Breier’s MPD for shunning preventative strategies, while prioritizing tactics of racial suppression.
Rev. Gregg even cited the use of “police dogs” in crisis trainings at District Five station, in addition
to other “techniques of quelling riots.”86 In Milwaukee, he said, “tensions are rising to the point of
explosion.” Rev. Gregg concluded the CAPBC’s opening statement by calling for “responsible,
speedy execution” of its platform by police bureaucrats. He reiterated the committee’s core
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demands, which “sprang from our day-to-day awareness of a problem of great magnitude.”87
As the meeting progressed, it became clear that the MFPC was not willing to take the
CAPBC at its word. Despite the testimony of a respected community organization, the commission
required proof that police brutality on the near north side was real. The CAPBC had not brought
affidavits, no formal complaints to file with the MFPC. Regardless, CAPBC member F. Marvin
Hannah said he would personally testify to being brutalized by Milwaukee police in 1963. In
response, MFPC member Judge Francis X. Swietlik bristled, “We want no ex parte testimony.”
Charges of brutality needed to be sworn under oath and “taken through due process of law,” he
said.88 Other comments from Judge Swietlik suggested that rumors about law enforcement and
improving the police department’s image were more important than securing justice for victimized
residents. “The word has gone out that our policemen are a bunch of brutes…if they are we will
clean it up, Swietlik concluded towards the end of the meeting.”89
The MFPC said it would review the CAPBC’s proposals. Two weeks later, it rejected the
CAPBC’s demands as an undue request for special treatment. The commission did, however, agree
that unaddressed police misconduct could lead to civil violence. Still, it made no specific efforts to
mitigate alleged police abuses against African Americans. “All citizens must be treated equally,” one
MFPC member stated. “None are to receive special privileges and none are to be mistreated.” The
commission basically relied on a reverse discrimination argument to deny Black complainants
redress for their claims of police misconduct. This reflected the wider tendency of Milwaukee
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officials to downplay and delegitimize Black grievances as human rights abuses. The MFPC
presumed that the impartiality of the law as written, its inherent “colorblindness,” ensured fair
treatment. The laws that police enforced, they said, were “designed and enacted to preserve the
rights of all citizens…The rights of all citizens are human rights.” MPD training was “designed to
afford equal protection to the public.” Changing how police enforced the law for one group created
a “double-standard,” violating the MPD’s ability to police “on an equal basis to all persons
throughout the city.”90
The MFPC’s critique of the CAPBC’s requests not only applied to allegations of undue
police violence, but to issues that they themselves had direct control over, such as the MPD’s racial
composition. As the board stated, “The rules provide that no recognition may be given to any
entrance or promotional applicant because of race, creed, or color.”91 Commissioners maintained
that “merit and merit alone” would determine success on “all entrance and promotional
examinations.” Staffing District Five was not under the MFPC’s purview. “Personnel are assigned by
the Chief to districts and duties on the basis of need—where they can best serve the public.” Acts of
aggression, name-calling, and neglect did not qualify as urgent needs. Likewise, the commission held
that psychological screenings were non-essential to police hiring and denied “officers on the
department…demonstrate in their performance that they are intolerant in their opinions.” On the
threat of “riots,” the MFPC said past civil rights demonstrations had not resulted in disturbances
and that police adequately controlled such dissent. There was little reason, they presumed, that civil
unrest would occur in Milwaukee.92
The MFPC also noted that according to the 1911 Wisconsin statute governing municipal

“The Board of Fire and Police Commissioners of the City of Milwaukee statement,” March 18, 1965, Box 21, Folder
9, Citizens’ Anti-Police Brutality Committee, 1964-1965, Lloyd A. Barbee Papers, 1933-1982, Milwaukee Mss 16,
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Archives.
91 “The Board of Fire and Police Commissioners of the City of Milwaukee statement.”
92 “The Board of Fire and Police Commissioners of the City of Milwaukee statement.”
90

213

police departments in the state, it had no power to control how Milwaukee’s police chief “regulated”
or “prescribed rules” for their department. It was Chief Breier’s responsibility, the commission
explained, to preserve “the public peace” and “see that all laws and ordinances of the city are
enforced.” The MFPC’s authority lay in its capacity to select employees for hire and arbitrate select
internal or public grievances, not to decide or rule on the treatment of officers by the department.
When “a valid complaint is submitted by a freeholder,” that individual may “order a hearing.” The
commission then “acts in a quasi-judicial capacity.” The MFPC elucidated for the CAPBC and other
police accountability advocates that it was “an administrative tribunal,” not a civilian oversight body.
It could not “act as an investigator, prosecutor or defender.” The “freeholder” clause prevented
non-property owners from filing grievances against police officers. Disqualified complainants had
no other choice but to register their grievances with the MPD itself.93
Notwithstanding the growing number of civilian complaints against the police, the MFPC
insisted that “proper training” made the MPD “very successful in PREVENTING RIOTS.”94 It was
Chief Breier’s responsibility to “prevent unlawful disturbances,” and not to “quell” them after the
fact. The department’s training procedures for crowd control were more than adequate,
commissioners insisted. The MFPC refuted that District Five officers were being trained on how to
use police dogs, or that the police department emphasized the “quelling” of riots over their
prevention. The MPD was “doing its job in teaching all of its members to avoid any discrimination
in dealing with the public.”95 While the commission admitted that “racial prejudice” may exist on the
force, they refused to believe that such bias could spark civil violence and further denied that the city
stood at the precipice of unrest. New police recruits, the MFPC argued, did not need to be screened
for bigoted views—hiring standards already weeded out racially biased applicants.
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As requested, the CAPBC documented first-hand accounts of police abuse and failed them
with the MFPC. Rev. Gregg delivered three affidavits in March 1965 that supported fifteen-year-old
James Spivey’s account of police violence. This particular complaint demonstrated the immense
bureaucratic hurdles that police accountability advocates had to transcend in order to garner justice.
The Black north side youth alleged white officers beat him at District Five station.96 Spivey’s injuries
were so severe that the police checked him into Milwaukee County’s emergency hospital. There,
doctors treated him for a serious head wound, telling the officers he should stay overnight for
treatment. The police refused, bringing him to a youth detention facility instead.97 Spivey alleged that
patrolmen called him racist names on the drive to the detention center. Breier offered no comment
on the complaint.98 The MFPC tabled the CAPBC’s claim to allow the commissioners time to review
Spivey’s allegations. Their eventual response underscored the crux of the police accountability issue:
plausible deniability and the abdication of institutional responsibility. Judge Swietlik questioned
whether the CAPBC was in compliance with the freeholder’s clause in bringing their complaint.99
Because the committee did not name a specific officer or note the complainant’s property owner
status, the MFPC moved to submit the complaint before the City Attorney, who also represented
the MPD. The commission evidently expressed no empathy for James Spivey. The CAPBC’s F.
Marvin Hanna attended the MFPC’s March 4 th meeting. When the commission entered its usual
“red tape routine,”100 he stood up to voice an objection. On the identification of the officers
involved, Hanna argued that the MPD refused to provide the names of the arresting patrolmen. The
MFPC allowed the CAPBC more time to retrieve the officer names and then amend their complaint.
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In the meantime, the commission sent the existing complaint over to the City Attorney’s office. Not
surprisingly, the City Attorney communicated at the next MFPC meeting that the CAPBC’s
grievance did “not comply with provisions of law and is therefore not a valid complaint.”101 Hanna
appeared at the City Attorney’s office to explain the circumstances. However, he did not bring an
amended complaint; he could not do so. The police department had refused to provide him with the
officers’ names because “juveniles were involved.”102 Still, he was able to retrieve their badge
numbers. However, these were deemed insufficient. The Spivey complaint was formally dismissed at
the next MFPC meeting for “not constituting a complaint within the law.”103 To say that
Milwaukee’s existing police oversight system benefitted accused officers was an understatement.
That the Spivey family even came forward to register James’ complaint was a rare
occurrence. Few police brutality victims brought complaints against the MPD out of fear of
retaliation. Publicly reporting acts of police violence was dangerous. Doing so could lead to police
harassment, intimidation, arrest and incarceration, or worse, violence. It brought stress and added to
the existing traumas of navigating Milwaukee’s uneven racial landscape. At a Milwaukee Commission
on Community Relations meeting, F. Marvin Hanna publicly stated that “his committee knew of
several instances where complainants’ families were threatened with removal from welfare aid if the
complaints were not dropped.”104 Many Black families did not trust white city officials to engage in
fair investigations. The CAPBC understood this, attempting to position itself as a liaison between
aggrieved Black residents and a powerful criminal justice system. However, this approach failed to
improve accountability for Black residents, in no small part because of the Catch 22 described
above. Public fears of registering complaints against the MPD meant that few police grievances

Milwaukee Fire and Police Commission, Minutes, April 1, 1965.
Milwaukee Commission on Community Relations, “Executive Committee Meeting,” April 29, 1965.
103 Milwaukee Fire and Police Commission, Minutes, April 15, 1965.
104 Milwaukee Fire and Police Commission, Minutes, April 15, 1965.
101
102

216

made their way into the public record. Without a formal record of racialized police violence, police
bureaucrats saw little need for action. City officials, namely Chief Breier, the MFPC, and Mayor
Maier, mistrusted the intentions of police accountability advocates. They refused to grant them the
benefit of the doubt when they raised issues of police brutality because they posed a challenge to the
city’s white racial order.
After the MFPC refused to honor the CAPBC’s affidavits in the Spivey case, the committee
largely disappeared from public view. In May 1965, the CAPBC dropped “police brutality” from its
name, rebranding as the “Committee for Better Police-Community Relations.”105 The name change
marked a symbolic victory for Milwaukee police bureaucrats, who hoped to minimize the issue of
police brutality. That phrase, B.S. Gregg admitted, seemed to hinder the committee’s ability to
improve “police-community relations.”106 By mid-1965, the CAPBC had dissolved. Individual
members continued to struggle for police accountability. Most notably, recently elected Wisconsin
State Assemblyman Lloyd Barbee made ending racialized police violence and limiting the power of
Milwaukee’s police chief central to his political agenda at the State Capitol in Madison over the
course of the next decade. Most CAPBC members turned their attention to the intensifying civil
rights issue of school integration, including Barbee and Marilyn Morheuser, co-chairs of Milwaukee
United School Integration Committee (MUSIC). Calvin Sherard, the CAPBC’s most outspoken,
radical voice, left Milwaukee for New York City.
Ultimately, the committee’s platform initiated a long-term process of unsettling Milwaukee’s
policing status quo. The CAPBC was among the first organizations to challenge the city’s powerful
narrative of policing exceptionalism. They were also the first to record the racially differential, often
brutal treatment of Black citizens by the MPD. Rather than identify police violence as a significant
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problem worth fixing, white police bureaucrats essentially cloaked themselves in the comfort of the
MPD’s vaunted reputation for crime control efficiency and professionalism. They deflected
responsibility after listening to clear-cut, often disturbing accounts of police brutality. Milwaukee’s
police bureaucracy aimed to reinforce existing law enforcement structures, which clearly benefited a
white majority. Chief Breier rejected the very premise of the CAPBC’s demands, denying the
existence of police misconduct. Mayor Maier, meanwhile, praised the group’s willingness to work
through formal channels, but claimed he had no power to enact law enforcement changes. He
cautioned the CAPBC that rule-changes were, according to state law, the exclusive purview of the
police chief. The all-white MFPC revealed its own skepticism of police brutality complaints, despite
its position as a quasi-judicial civilian oversight body.

Gaining Civil Rights Insurgency
The CAPBC was not alone in seeking to alleviate racial tensions on Milwaukee’s north side
in the 1960s. A more moderate, Black-led coalition called the Human Relations Coordinating
Council (HRCC) tried to pressure Chief Breier and the MPD into incorporating a community
relations program in 1966. The council’s advocacy, like the CAPBC’s, revealed the limits of formal
negotiation with the city’s white-controlled police bureaucracy. The council was a product of
Milwaukee’s liberal establishment. It formed under the auspices of the Milwaukee Commission on
Community Relations in August 1964 following the Harlem uprising. Eight separate organizations
comprised the council, which identified “a need for increased consultation and exchange of views”
among citizens concerned about human rights in the city.107 However, the HRCC reflected the same
“Analysis of Program on Milwaukee Commission on Community Relations,” June 11, 1964, Box 45, Folder 22,
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anemic civil-rights agenda as Mayor Maier. It called for the improvement of “inter group relations,”
“equal opportunity,” and “unity of purpose” across civic agencies without specific enforcement
objectives.108 The HRCC operated at the behest of City Hall liberals, who only sought to tame
individual “prejudices,” not address the institutional and economic racism that undermined Black
homebuyers, workers, and students. The HRCC had little interest in documenting police brutality. It
looked to hold the city’s police bureaucracy accountable in the interest of preventing civil unrest,
advocating a modified return to the MPD’s liberal law-and-order approach. HRCC members
expressed dismay when the CAPBC criticized the MPD. The group warned against “radicals”
fomenting an uprising in Milwaukee. The council opposed the creation of a civilian review board
and was hesitant to accuse the MPD of engaging in the excessive use of force against African
Americans. Instead, they argued for an improved police image through “community relations”
enhancements. The group did not demand justice for the growing number of Black citizens alleging
police misconduct.
A key difference between the CAPBC and HRCC was that the latter shunned direct action in
favor of political arbitration. Council members did not consider themselves “activists,” and opposed
civil disobedience as a method for achieving racial equality. The HRCC was strictly reformist, its
approach non-confrontational. The group called for meetings with police bureaucrats to discuss
community relations improvements. Continued eruptions of civil violence in U.S. Cities and the
possibility of unrest in Milwaukee informed the HRCC’s advocacy. As Rev. Louis Beauchamp, the
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council’s chairman, wrote to Chief Breier in January 1966, “Our national experience makes it clear
that inadequate communication produces distrust of law enforcement, especially on the part of those
segments of the community which feel themselves aggrieved by alleged inequities in the
administration of the law.”109 The policing status quo, according to Beauchamp, was unfeasible and
unrest imminent if the MPD failed to institute community relations reforms immediately. The
HRCC embraced emerging federal “police-community relations” guidelines, including the
integration of police departments and establishment of distinct internal units ordered to address
“problems of community tension.” The council lobbied for a voluntary police-community relations
committee comprised of police, clergy, business, civic, education, and minority group
representatives, and pushed for two pilot committees at the district level to mediate complaints.
Members stressed close cooperation with police administrators in an effort to “achieve community
understanding.” Their primary objective was for responsible community organizations to share
public safety information, largely in service of racial pacification. Like the CAPBC, the HRCC called
for an expanded human relations training program. They also followed the federal government’s
lead in supporting continuing educational opportunities for police personnel. The council suggested
the MPD apply for Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) funding.
Nevertheless, the HRCC faced resistance from Chief Breier, particularly after its members
called for the establishment of an internal police-community relations unit. Ostensibly because of its
more moderate, hands-off approach, the chief was initially willing to meet with HRCC
representatives. Five delegates met with Breier and the MFPC to discuss police-community relations
issues in April 1966. The meeting, held in Judge Christ Seraphim’s courtroom, saw white police
bureaucrats fixate on the HRCC’s claim that “many citizens who come into frequent contact with
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the police” viewed law enforcement in “the same manner as minority groups are viewed…faceless,
inhuman, and as scapegoats for many of the community’s problems.”110 Not surprisingly, Breier and
the MFPC responded defensively to the implication that police could be viewed as little more than
“faceless” agents. They questioned the council’s intentions and cast allegations of police isolation
from the Black community as generalizing and inaccurate. Although the HRCC expressed empathy
for the police, directly acknowledging the challenges officers faced, Breier and the MFPC insisted
that the police department could not be held liable for the near north side’s ills. In June 1966, the
chief rejected the HRCC’s proposal for a police-community relations program and refused to attend
any future meetings with the council.111 State law afforded him that right.

The Organization of Organizations
The Organization of Organizations took up Calvin Sherard’s mantle of Black working-class
advocacy for police accountability in the mid-1960s, as intensifying police-Black citizen tensions and
consistent civic inaction pushed Milwaukee towards civil violence. The group pressed police
bureaucrats to establish a “citizens review board” to adjudicate brutality complaints. A review board
would not only “give citizens the assurance that their complaints would be fairly heard,” but also
“protect police officers if they properly enforce the law.”112 The umbrella organization’s chairman,
John Franks, wrote Chief Breier directly. He stated that “officers of the law failed to fulfill their
obligations to the community through acts of negligence.”113 The creation of independent police
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oversight boards in cities like New York and Philadelphia influenced the Triple O’s proposal. “In
our position,” Franks said, noting the effects of Milwaukee’s worsening racial apartheid, “we are
often able to discover such cases whereas you may not be aware of them.” Franks criticized the
MFPC’s failure to conduct even a single hearing on a police brutality complaint since it became
empowered to do so in 1885. According to the Triple O, fire and police commissioners had not
heard or acted on any citizen grievances since 1952.
Chief Breier responded as he did when the CAPBC first called out his department for police
brutality in 1964. Milwaukee officers patrolling on the city’s near north side did “the same kind of
job as anywhere else.” The chief was right; police regimes across the country aggressively defended
their city’s racial boundaries and upheld white supremacy in comparatively poorer Black
neighborhoods and mixed-race environs. It was a position supported by conservative elected
officials, who made no effort to conceal their racist views when it came to matters of civil rights and
policing. For instance, after learning about a specific case of police negligence outlined by the Triple
O, a Democratic state senator from Milwaukee wrote to Chief Breier:
I want you to know that I trust you and your department and that your men will not
abuse their police powers. I also know that restraints must be used to the degree of
resistance, and though an error may occur from time to time, it is beastly and junglelike to demand resignations. I am against the establishment of a Citizen Review
Board, because if you have to make allowances to such a group, certainly you will
have to make the same allowances to all nationalities and ethnic groups of which we
have an abundance. Too bad you can’t sue for harassment of the police
department.114
That June, Mayor Maier responded to the Triple O’s call to establish a citizen review board.
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He insisted that the MFPC already served that function.115 In a WITI-TV interview, Maier said the
commission was open to all citizens in need of a case review. But the MFPC first required proper
documentation. Some Black residents said that the MFPC’s location, in the “intimidating
atmosphere” of the Milwaukee Safety Building, dissuaded residents from coming forward with
police brutality complaints.116 A Milwaukee Star reporter challenged the mayor’s contention and
contacted the MFPC. Secretary George Ruger told them, only “freeholders” could file police
complaints as required by Wisconsin law. That rule, according to Ruger, was meant to “show you’re
a substantial citizen and not a fly by night who just came into town and is trying to cause trouble.”117
The statute undermined the mayor’s argument that the complaint review process was democratic. As
the Star editorialized, “This provision of the law clearly denies the right of complaint to the ghetto
dwellers who need it most while giving it to the landholders who least likely to use it.”118 The
MFPC’s responsibility was “not to serve as a review board…but to recruit, hire and promote the
nearly 3,300 positions in the Milwaukee fire and police departments.” Should a hearing occur,
accused officers faced the threat of punishment in the form of paid suspensions. If the MFPC
administered a suspension of fifteen days or more, an officer was entitled to an appeal and trial in
the Safety Building. The MPD conducted investigations into alleged police misconduct and, under
Chief Breier, refused to disclose the results of “internal matters.” The Star reiterated that police
heightened tensions through their actions: “An ignorant policeman with a gun on his side, a night
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stick in his hand, and lacking restraint and discipline, is as dangerous a source of potential trouble in
an area of racial conflict as cane imagined.”119

Civil Rights Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies
Civil rights mobilizations, victories, and setbacks permeate the existing literature on Black
Milwaukee. Histories document the African American community’s social, economic and political
development, as well as the long civil rights movement that both professional Black citizens and the
working poor engaged in from the 1940s through the 1970s. Confrontations between the MPD and
residents of color are interwoven throughout narratives of Black proletarianization, migration,
education reform, and open housing activism.120 Indeed, the fraught relationship between Black
residents and law enforcement is an important thread connecting this burgeoning scholarship. 121
A flurry of Black-led civil rights campaigns between 1963 and 1968 captured news headlines
in Milwaukee, as well as the attention of a restive white public. Organizations like the Milwaukee
Congress on Racial Equality (MCORE), MUSIC, and the YC reflected the 1960s turn away from
accommodation and towards a more confrontational approach to securing racial justice. Late in
summer 1963, MCORE organized sit-ins against a Milwaukee County Social Development
Commissioner who made racist comments about Black migrants. MUSIC organized student
boycotts in May 1964 and again in October 1965 in response to biased practices in the public school
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system. That committee—led by the CAPBC’s Barbee and Morheuser—established “Freedom
Schools” for protesting Black youth. Educators at the schools taught Black history, culture, and
activism to Milwaukee youth for the first time. During the school boycotts, police officers visited
Black ministers who made their churches available to African American students. The police told
them not to cooperate with MUSIC, alleging its protests were organized by “communists” and
“rabble rousers.” Such police intimidation proved successful, as some church leaders withdrew from
the movement.122 MUSIC members also vied with police as they participated in human “chain-ins”
to protest educational injustices and the “stunning practice” of “intact busing.” 123
In 1965, Milwaukee’s NAACP Youth Council demonstrated against Big Boy restaurant's
racist hiring practices. And, in February and August of 1966, they rallied outside the Fraternal Order
of the Eagles Club in protest of its exclusionary membership policy. The YC called out elected
officials—nearly all of who were Eagles members—and marched in front of Milwaukee County
Judge Robert Cannon’s Wauwatosa residence. In June 1967, the Youth Council turned its attention
to housing discrimination. They marched again in Wauwatosa, this time against housing segregation.
The 200 straight nights of protest that the YC and advisor Father James Groppi led from August
1967 to April 1968—described by local historians as the “March on Milwaukee”—induced violent
white reactions and a mix of police behavior that ranged from the dutiful allowance of
demonstrators to engage in lawful protests to the infliction of police brutality once marchers
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crossed the 16th St. viaduct into the chaotic atmosphere of Milwaukee’s all-white south side.124
As Milwaukee’s civil rights insurgency intensified, the MPD kept a watchful eye on Black
freedom fighters and allies. The police occasionally used their discretion to strong-arm civil rights
activists, who they characterized as a threat to public order and traditional white middle-class
sensibilities. Civil rights demonstrations in Milwaukee, and across the country, targeted the
willingness of police to use force against Black men and women engaged in non-violent civil
disobedience. They also called out the militarized police violence used against Black dissenters
engaged in urban uprisings. On March 13, 1965, Milwaukee civil rights organizations staged a
massive solidarity march in support of Black and white activists marching in Selma, Alabama. State
police brutalized members of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), the
Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) and other coalitions while attempting to cross
the Edmund Pettis Bridge from Selma to Montgomery the previous week. Nearly 2,500 people
marched from MCORE’s headquarters to the Milwaukee County Courthouse. National episodes of
police violence and eruptions of civil disorder also provided cause for local mobilizations.
The “Milwaukee March toward Freedom and Independence,” for instance, commemorated
the second anniversary of the 1963 March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom.125 Held to
dramatize local grievances around “the absence of equality of opportunity in housing, jobs, and
schools,” the event doubled as a vehicle to communicate solidarity with Black men and women in
Watts who recently experienced civil violence and conflict with Los Angeles police. Flyers created
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for the demonstration asked, “Do Northside Milwaukee police have the same contempt” as LAPD
Chief William Parker, whose racism “sifted down though his department?” A cartoon of a white
officer choking and striking a man on the head with a Billy club adorned the leaflet, which directly
connected housing segregation to police violence: “How much is Milwaukee segregation costing
YOU and ME?”126 Police brutality was an integral part of urban America’s worsening racial
apartheid. The interracial assemblage, estimated between 400 and 800 people, marched from N. 12th
St. and Lloyd St. to MacArthur square. Protesters sang freedom songs and chanted civil rights
slogans along the route. The St. Matthews C.M.E. Church drill team led the procession; comedian
Dick Gregory and Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party delegate Fannie Lou Hamer addressed the
crowd. “For you to be free, my Caucasian friends, I must be free,” the Mississippi native Hamer
declared. In his speech, Gregory brought up the unrest in Los Angeles, “If a child cried, you
wouldn’t ask him why—you changed his wet diaper.” Police brutality need not entail physical force,
he continued. A verbal insult was enough. “Police brutality is the way [an officer] talks to me and the
way he handles me.” At the same time, Gregory observed that police were underpaid and had
difficult jobs. That they took their resentment out on others was unacceptable. “If the cop ever
wakes up and realizes he’s in the same boat, he’ll march with me,” Gregory proclaimed in a gesture
of solidarity. “The brick is not the answer…It’s not a problem of Black against white, it’s a problem
of right against wrong.”127
During the 1965 rally, a Milwaukee Star reporter asked the CAPBC’s Calvin Sherard for his
opinion on the Watts uprising. It was not long before he left the city. Sherard stressed paying more
attention to the fire than to the manmade tinderbox that fueled the blaze. “This is like being more
critical of an explosion and the noise produced by the explosion than of the fuse lighter, the
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instigator of the explosion.” Riot prevention, for Sherard, meant addressing “unjust systems” of
political racism and economy: “There must be a complete eradication of the ingredients that are
compounded to bring about such rioting…police brutality, job discrimination, and the double
standard that is exercised in many of the courtrooms around the country.” The chronic abuse of
“people’s minds and bodies” over time had translated into heightened disrespect for “manmade
laws.” Rioting was to be expected, “the law of nature is greater.” As he continued, “The mind and
body can only take so much…the only provocation the system has in carrying out these injustices
are class and color of skin.” Lawlessness was not the sole preserve of repressed Black citizens, but
also “penetrated our law enforcement agencies,” subjecting African Americans to police violence. It
was the police who “served as a nucleus to disorder.”128
White counter-protestors, representing a group called the Los Angeles Memorial Committee
(LAMC), met civil rights demonstrators on the steps of Milwaukee County Courthouse the day of
the Milwaukee March toward Freedom and Independence. Picketers, like insurance salesman
Bernard White, were eager “to protest the riots and anarchy that seemed to have gripped the
nation.” The LAMC’s signs implied that civil rights protests were unpatriotic. Like the police, they
blamed communism. “Is This Another Communist Controlled Demonstration?” one read.129 This
white citizens group aligned with others mobilizing in counter-protests of Black charges of police
brutality and discrimination. The Committee on Police Support (COPS), for instance, offered the
most forthright defense of Chief Breier and Milwaukee police. COPS vigorously denied that police
brutality existed, calling Black allegations of police abuse on the near north side “fraudulent” and
“sloganeering.”130 Foreshadowing the white calls of “reverse racism” to come in the aftermath of
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Affirmative Action, the committee insisted that it was Black citizens, not the police, who were the
true agents of harassment. “Decent citizens everywhere,” i.e. white, were to “honor” the police
“who protect us,” the group claimed. There were other organizations present in the city taking
public stands against the civil rights movement. Former Milwaukee Mayor Frank Zeidler reported a
large number of John Birch Society members in the city. Society co-founder, William J. Grede, of
Milwaukee’s Allen-Bradley Company, contributed heavily to the organization. Three Wisconsin
legislators were Birchers and three of the society’s executive board members lived in Milwaukee
County.131 Another prominent right wing group was called Truth About Civil Turmoil. AntiCommunist downtown business organizations screened the film “Anarchy, USA.”
In May 1967, retiring District Five Captain George Sprague said he did not believe any
“riots” would occur in Milwaukee. He decried the “willingness” of “minority groups” to “follow the
so-called leaders…into any tension situation” in a speech delivered before a COPS-sponsored event
at the Wisconsin Athletic Club.132 Captain Sprague—a known John Birch Society member—blamed
the press for inflaming racial tensions and not supporting the city’s police force. From Sprague’s
perspective, news outlets like The Milwaukee Journal were the real “harassers.” Sprague rejected the
possibility of “police harassment” against African Americans. Other speakers at the dinner, like
former FBI agent and then Salt Lake City Police Chief W. Cleon Skousen, traded anti-communist
conspiracy theories. “Communists,” Skousen suggested, “have made more progress in our country
in the last 20 months than they had in the last 20 years.” It was “Communists” who “fomented and
exploited unrest,” he claimed; they would make 1967 a year “America will never forget.”133 Skousen
and Sprague’s comments reflected widespread feelings among white police administrators that social
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fragmentation, moral decay, and misguided liberal policies and court decisions were “crippling police
officers in their work and destroying police morale.” The men cited recent Supreme Court decisions
and called liberal police review boards conspiratorial inventions designed to undermine police and
reduce their effectiveness. Riots in Watts, Los Angeles were communist-inspired and plotted,
victimizing “the good people” with “tragedy, despair, and violence.” Meanwhile, in Sprague’s view,
America’s prison populations were [regrettably] diminishing “almost as fast as the crime rate was
going up.”134 Because of Chief Breier and the MPD’s reactionary law-and-order approach, there was
not “any large degree of tensions” in Milwaukee.
Other conservative organizations backed the police in this racially charged climate,
denouncing the legitimacy of Black civil rights activism along the way. The Milwaukee Citizens’
Crime Committee (MCCC) organized “to promote safety from crime on city streets” and support
“the present conduct of police” and the “firm manner in which it handles arrests of criminals and
hoodlums.”135 Their formation was a direct counterpoint to the Citizens Anti-Police Brutality
Committee. The MCCC explicitly denied that the “mistreatment of Negroes by police” existed,
calling the CAPBC’s allegations “false and shameful.” The MCCC, a sub-committee of the racially
conservative Citizens’ Association of Wisconsin, Inc., opposed a state open housing law and efforts
to integrate Wisconsin public schools.136 The conservative body held its first meeting in January
1965, where six “directors” outlined a seven-point platform. The group endorsed the police
department’s “conduct and performance;” it affirmed its support of the rank-and-file “as friends
and neighbors,” encouraging “good citizens” to “be friendly, courteous and cooperative” to MPD
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personnel; it denied the existence of police brutality, citing “individual misconduct” to be
investigated by the Chief of Police, and not “any civilian review board;” it “censured” and
“condemned” the CAPBC’s likening of the MPD to a “Gestapo” police force at a District Five
protest; it demanded greater police protection in “high crime,” (i.e. Black) neighborhoods, including
“firmer control of demonstrators who many times block pedestrian and vehicles’ traffic and cause
loud disturbances;” it favored laws that compelled persons 16-years-of-age or older to “be tried in
criminal court for violent crimes;” and it said it would hold “citizens’ meetings to combat crime.”137
Although the MCCC maintained that its actions were “not pinpointed towards negroes” or
“motivated by any racial considerations,” the committee’s chairman stated that it met because of a
news report that three Black youths had beaten a white youth on a city bus traveling down 3rd St.138
Clearly the all-white MCCC saw Milwaukee’s crime problem through a racial lens and believed that
white residents were the victims. In its view, local political leaders were also guilty of “condoning
and fostering lawlessness.” At a March 1965 meeting called “to protest violence on Milwaukee’s
streets,” one MCCC member asked a sympathetic alderman, “How can we get Police Chief Breier to
use police dogs.” The group demanded more officers, more street lighting, and an end to the news
media’s “belittling” of the MPD. Black youth crime was the main point of discussion at the meeting,
which drew roughly 300 attendees. Some of the committee’s members were more vocal in their
retributive law-and-order rhetoric than others. State Senator Norman Sussman, an elected official,
called for revising of the children’s code so that 16 and 17-year-old minors would be criminally
prosecuted. The Milwaukee Democrat called for “no more hanky-panky, no more kissing ‘em, no
more loving ‘em; they must go into criminal court.”139
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Conclusion
Five days before the CAPBC met with the MFPC in January 1965, William Coates and
Michael Thomas learned their police brutality case would be heard in the U.S. District Court of the
Eastern District of Wisconsin. The federal bench had reversed a decision made by the City Attorney
to dismiss all charges on jurisdictional grounds. The Coates and Thomas families officially alleged
that officers Young and Hessel had violated the teens’ “right not to be deprived of their lives,
liberties, and property, without due process of law.”140 Despite their vivid descriptions of police
heavy-handedness, a liberal judge, former Wisconsin Governor John Reynolds, dismissed Coates
and Thomas’ complaint “on the merits” in April 1968. He cited a lack of direct evidence that police
brutality occurred. In the end, it was the word of two Black youths against two white police officers.
The latter’s standing as agents of the state afforded them the benefit of the doubt in court. 141
Collectively, Milwaukee’s white police bureaucracy, elected officials, and citizen-led
organizations denied the legitimacy of Black grievances against the MPD’s racially disparate
treatment. Pointing to the city’s comparatively low crime rate and the department’s vaunted national
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status, they saw little reason to second-guess what was, in their view, an exceptional law enforcement
agency. Hardening residential segregation exacerbated white perspectives around race, crime, and
public safety, as fewer-and-fewer white residents bore witness to the differential policing that the
CAPBC and other accountability advocates highlighted. While some white observers acknowledged
that overzealous policing occurred on Milwaukee’s near north side, most characterized it as a
necessary response to presumed criminality. The mainstream press supported this vantage point,
often emphasizing the racial dimensions of urban crime and, in turn, reinforcing racist perceptions
of Black life and culture.
While long-standing civil rights organizations, like the MUL and MNAACP, saw improving
police-Black community relations as essential to building a more equitable society, the CAPBC was
the first grassroots organization concerned about policing in Black Milwaukee to explicitly build on
the “institutional and organizational frameworks” of 1960s civil rights insurgents. The committee
challenged police bureaucrats to reimagine how Black near north side residents experienced the law,
advocating a bolder reform agenda that took on the city’s dual law enforcement system.142 While the
CAPBC’s charges of police brutality and warnings of civil unrest, fatefully, did not convince
Milwaukee’s all-white police bureaucracy to act in a substantive fashion, they nonetheless pushed the
struggle for police accountability forward. Significantly, the CPABC’s activism showed that racially
disparate policing was not simply the byproduct of bureaucratic intransigence, but it also reflected
City Hall’s lack of institutional and legal control over the MPD, its rules and governing practices.
Indeed, the CAPBC launched what would become a decades-long, multi-organizational
process of exposing and documenting police abuse against African Americans in service of garnering
accountability. Although its negotiations failed to produce meaningful change, the committee
proved influential in the city’s Black freedom movement. For example, before civil violence erupted
142
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in Milwaukee on July 30, 1967, the Triple O worked with the Catholic Archdiocese’s Council on
Urban Life and the Milwaukee Community Relations-Social Development Commission to
coordinate public hearings meant to record alleged cases of racialized police brutality. The Triple O
was an umbrella coalition of civil and human right organizations working to end poverty and build
economic power in Black Milwaukee.143 The documentation process added to the growing narrative
that policing looked different across the city’s color line. These hearings also dredged up pain and
discomfort for Black citizens who had arrived in search of economic opportunity and freedom from
Jim Crow. Targeted order maintenance policing helped belie much of the promise of northward
migration and revealed that Black people’s subordinate status as citizens was a national problem.
The CAPBC also encouraged Milwaukee police bureaucrats to take a public stance on Black
allegations of police abuse. It forced city leaders to, at the very least, consider what a rising number
of north side residents viewed as an unfair law enforcement system. White civic leaders—whether
they chose to admit it or not—stood at a crossroads over how they would enforce police power
across an increasingly multiracial, yet segregated and unequal metropolitan landscape. Would they
continue to support (or accept) police practices that generated disparate rates of Black surveillance,
brutality, and arrests? Or, would they reconstitute police authority in humane ways that accounted
for Milwaukee’s rapidly changing social and economic demographics and the civil rights revolution?
The CAPBC’s interactions with Chief Breier, Mayor Maier, and the MFPC provide insight into how
white city officials understood matters of race, policing, and violence. Their limited interactions with
the CAPBC made plain that institutional tactics of denial, deflection, blame, and criminalization
would endure until civil violence forced new modes of action.
Although short-lived, the CAPBC’s drive to garner a more responsive and just policing
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system for Black residents deserves more attention in Milwaukee’s civil rights historiography. While
the committee perhaps placed too much faith in negotiation, it nonetheless played an influential role
in moving the struggle for accountability forward. The CAPBC articulated a multi-pronged strategy
for police reform that shaped future efforts to transform Milwaukee’s uneven criminal justice
terrain. As the committee’s seven-point program enumerated, police bias was a constituent element
in the wider nexus of racial injustice that Black professional leaders, poor and working-class activists,
and everyday citizens confronted in the “late migration era.” Yet the struggle for police
accountability still holds a tertiary or quaternary place in the literature as compared to struggles for
employment and marketplace access, education desegregation, or open housing. The truth is, law
enforcement was ever-present and contoured all of these campaigns. White city officials tasked the
MPD with defending public order, safeguarding life and property against what most white
constituents saw as the lawless actions of civil rights agitators. As such, white police brass and rankand-file officers positioned Black citizens demonstrating against racial injustice as radicals willing to
flout the law for their own disruptive, self-serving ends.
African Americans fed up with Milwaukee’s dual law enforcement system worked to expose
the MPD’s racist narrative of policing exceptionalism. In doing so, they exhibited a range of
overlapping ideological and class positions, as well as competing strategies to effect change within
the public safety arena. The CAPBC, in particular, featured both racial liberals convinced that civic
negotiation was the best means of generating reform and more assertive working-class activists
willing to apply direct pressure in the streets. How police accountability advocates responded to an
abusive police power correlated with the militancy of their respective political vantage points and the
level of attention they received from the city’s antagonistic, all-white police bureaucracy. For
instance, the NAACP Youth Council and their advisor, Father James Groppi, experienced regular
police harassment, brutality, and arrests as a consequence of direct action protests and a
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comparatively militant racial and class politics. The YC’s radicalism shaped its clear denunciations of
the MPD as an occupying force that was more concerned with countering civil rights demonstrators
than protecting all citizens equally. Conversely, more reformist, middle-class coalitions, such as the
HRCC, deferred to Milwaukee’s white power structure. They eschewed civil disobedience as a
tactical approach to advancing equality and exhibited a greater unwillingness to lose white patronage,
despite their growing preoccupation with differential policing.
As Milwaukee’s civil rights movement intensified in the mid-1960s, so too did police
surveillance, harassment, brutality, and arrests. Much of it was directed against Black civil rights
activists. Preserving law and order remained imperative for the city’s white power structure during
this combustive period. Chief Breier’s increasingly reactionary brand of law-and-order served as an
effective instrument in countering civil rights insurgents. And, as the counter-organizing of white
racial conservatives demonstrated, reactionary law-and-order also served as a potent tool for rallying
the city’s white ethnic majority. Concurrently, Black civil rights activists and residents increasingly
viewed the MPD as the most visible symbol of white control. This perspective was grounded in a
deeper history of racial and class conflict, often mediated by law enforcement. Black migrants and
more established African Americans alike experienced intensifying police mistreatment and neglect
over the course of the 1960s, in part as a consequence of cyclical patterns of migration, segregation,
criminalization, and the MPD’s strategic over-saturation of Black spaces.
In the end, Black and allied police accountability advocates failed to impress upon
Milwaukee’s police bureaucracy the urgency of their demands for change in the mid-1960s. After
years of City Hall ignoring Black complaints of police brutality and calls for more diverse police
representation, input, and oversight, the city experienced its own version of civil unrest in late
Summer 1967. Violent racial confrontations among white counter-protestors and an interracial
cohort of open housing demonstrators followed that consequential event. Discussed in greater detail
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in the next chapter, the eruption of civil violence in Milwaukee at a politically charged moment of
civil rights insurgency had the net effect of reauthorizing Chief Breier’s power and legitimizing the
MPD’s reactionary law-and-order turn. The narrative of policing exceptionalism was maintained
locally, as Breier and Mayor Maier consolidated white support in the aftermath of unrest. They
utilized the political capital they gained in suppressing Black dissent to steer the direction of police
accountability activism away from transformative policy outcomes, which might have generated
“community control” for Black residents, as some activists began demanding in the late 1960s. At
the same time, white police bureaucrats gave the impression of progressive police reform when they
applied for and received federal law enforcement assistance grants intended to improve police-Black
community relations and minority hiring. Ironically, Breier resisted these efforts to better coordinate
and centralize police power. He believed they, too, threatened his institutional control. By the close
of the decade, Milwaukee’s corrosive racial politics persisted, rendering the enactment of even
reformist law enforcement outcomes a thorny proposition.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Reactionary Law-and-Order in Milwaukee
Milwaukee’s narrative of policing exceptionalism was rooted in an assumption—that the
police department’s (MPD) independence from City Hall facilitated a high degree of
professionalism, reform innovation, and crime control efficiency. Whether that assumption bore
out, however, was contingent on the personality, leadership style, and strategic agenda of the person
in charge. Historically, the Milwaukee Fire and Police Commission had (MFPC) appointed either
disciplinarian, headstrong police chiefs, like John Janssen, or more ostensibly forward-thinking,
liberal administrators eager to maintain public order through artful projections of police power as a
force for democracy, such as Joseph Kluchesky. All five police chiefs hired from 1888 to 1964
existed somewhere along that spectrum, which leaned just left of center to far-right ideologically. All
of them were police officials who understood their role of preserving Milwaukee’s traditional
capitalist, white cultural order. As a body, the MPD reflected the character of its head from the topdown; they alone diagramed, managed, and executed the city’s law enforcement hierarchy and
mission. They did so free of political interference, as provided for by state law. Striking workers,
wayward youth, and poor people, especially of color, remained vulnerable to violent police abuses of
power and aggressive order maintenance practices. These occurred despite the MPD’s exemplary
reputation. Still, most residents seemed to favor the end result of the police chief’s sovereign vision,
which for decades produced one of the lowest reported crime rates in the U.S. and a reform
orientation that was the envy of outside police agencies.
Intensive postwar Black population growth and the white racism it unleashed across all
segments of society shifted the above dynamic.1 It pierced a widening hole in an already precarious

Milwaukee’s Black population grew from 62,458 in 1960 to 105,088 in 1970. Campbell Gibson and Kay Jung,
“Historical Census Statistics on Population Totals by Race, 1790 to 1990, and by Hispanic Origin, 1970 to 1990, for
Large Cities and Other Urban Places in the United States,” U.S. Census Bureau, Population Division, Working Paper no.
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exceptionalism narrative that, for better or worse, relied heavily on the police chief’s inviolable
administrative discretion. Mounting Black community demands for fair police treatment, equitable
representation, and meaningful accountability complicated prevailing assumptions about a valueneutral police power, as well as the utility of the MPD’s widely admired reform approach. African
Americans—young and old, bourgeois and poor—not only revealed dual standards of justice that
tracked lines of race and class, but, after the 1958 police murder of Black migrant Daniel Bell, began
challenging police oppression through ever more confrontational modes of civil rights activism.
Black accountability advocates, in their diminished efforts to negotiate an end to police brutality on
Milwaukee’s segregated north side, learned that the MFPC did far more than stabilize police
recruitment and arbitrate personnel disputes. It acted as a regulatory firewall that shielded the police
chief from criticism and an honest hearing of citizen complaints against the MPD, while maintaining
a virtually all-white police force. In the mid-1960s, the commission defended Harold Breier—an
autocrat and avowed racist firmly situated on the John Janssen side of the local police chief
spectrum. Following Breier’s lead, white police bureaucrats denied the potential for the civil violence
then spreading across urban America, with a strong belief in the exceptionalism narrative Breier
inherited. Yet, the new chief showed no desire to uphold a historically liberal law-and-order record
that, while nominally democratic, served to obscure racism’s growing centrality to police power and
public perceptions of the MPD’s validity.
This chapter argues that Black Milwaukee’s deepening crisis of police legitimacy in the late
1960s was tied to how Chief Breier approached police administration. Breier served from 1964 to
1984, the longest tenure for an MPD chief since John Janssen (1888-1921). His imperious
leadership, shored up by the state-sanctioned authority outlined in the Progressive Era statute
(1911), was the clearest reason why police accountability remained so elusive for African Americans
76 (February 2005), Table 50.
239

and other minoritized groups unduly victimized by police violence. During a period of momentous
national progress on civil rights, the MPD endured as an antagonistic, oppressive force for citizens
of color relegated to the margins. The frustrations of Black Milwaukee residents, even after
Congress’ passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, reflected the limited scope of federal civil rights
gains and liberal anti-poverty programming, which never went so far as to guarantee the economic
justice needed to instill full equality. As historians have demonstrated, the liberal Johnson
administration’s anti-poverty agenda was rooted in the same racist ideas about Black life and culture
that undergirded the MPD’s liberal law-and-order agenda and “cultural adjustment” programs in the
1940s and Cold War 1950s. Despite briefly empowering community action agencies with resources
and decision-making power—a highly contested process politically—eruptions of civil violence in
the 1960s elevated public fears.2 The uprisings shifted the federal state’s urban agenda towards
punitive policies of racial suppression, and away from alleviating the structural causes of Black
dissent and issues like police brutality. Liberal and conservative political voices alike, local and
national, conflated peaceful mobilizations for justice, urban rebellions, and everyday street crime as
disorderly behavior, particularly Milwaukee’s latest police chief. This perspective held implications
for Milwaukee in Summer 1967 when Black leaders’ prophetic vision of civil violence came true.
North side unrest, aggressively put down by the MPD, led to the city’s white power structure
reckoning with “police-community relations” enhancements as a means of ensuring order. The
question was, to what extent, given the state-sanctioned authority of the police chief? Moreover,
how much progress could Milwaukee’s Black-led struggle for police accountability make given the
limitations of state law?
Sensing his profession and Milwaukee’s white cultural order was under attack from radical

That America’s “urban crisis” erupted into civil violence in U.S. cities is a long-term consequence of decades of human
conflict over issues of race, economics, and politics. Thomas J. Sugrue, The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in
Postwar Detroit (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 5.
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civil rights “agitators” and racial liberals in the 1960s, Breier eschewed government-backed efforts
that seemed poised to disrupt Milwaukee’s law enforcement status quo. Rather than embrace federal
liberal law-and-order reforms aimed at enhancing procedural justice within the criminal-legal system,
Breier doubled down on reactionary law-and-order policing. In turn, he ignored guidelines proposed
by the Johnson administration that encouraged municipal police departments to establish
“community relations units,” install police review boards, and expand racial diversity in their ranks.
The chief declined to support federal grant applications that often served preventative policing
goals. He argued that the MPD already had a community relations plan that worked well for citizens,
African Americans included. When civil rights groups and federal agencies pressed Breier to resolve
his department’s discriminatory practices, he leveraged the state-sanctioned authority afforded him
by the 1911 statute. The chief successfully scorned outside political interference well into the 1970s.
Breier was supported in doing so by Milwaukee’s political establishment, which recognized his
immense sway over a mostly white constituency that generally subscribed to the era’s backlash
politics. He exceptionalized Black-led civil rights organizations like the Milwaukee NAACP Youth
Council (YC), Organization of Organizations (Triple O), and the city’s Black Panther Party chapter
(MBPP). Breier framed them as “communists” in need of aggressive policing, vigilant monitoring,
and, from time-to-time, a heavy hand. His legal impunity was a necessary pre-condition for curbing
left-wing political upheaval. The 1911 statute continued to reinforce the MPD’s legitimacy with “law
abiding” Milwaukeeans during Breier’s tenure, while guaranteeing that elected officials hesitated to
defy their city’s popular police chief.
Since Milwaukee maintained a comparatively low crime rate, its national reputation for a
high level of public safety remained intact. Still, federal officials and other external observers took
notice of the overt racism that came to typify a police force once heralded for its strong
relationships to policed communities. The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders
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(NACCD), which argued that white racism and a lack of resources, jobs, and equitable schooling in
segregated Black communities fueled America’s urban rebellions, sent a research field team to
investigate conditions in the city.3 For the first time, a federally-commissioned agency sought out,
listened to, and trusted local Black perspectives on what racial liberals saw as a dual policing system
organized around privileging and protecting white interests. Chief Breier’s reactionary law-and-order
ethos was notable in the aftermath of the city’s 1967 “civil disturbance.” The relatively small uprising
followed more than a decade of police-aggravated tensions between city officials and Black young
people, racialized “close surveillance” policies, and mounting brutality on Milwaukee’s north side.
Although Mayor Henry Maier and Breier emerged from the conflict as victors for their assertive
response, some local officials began to take Black demands for police accountability more seriously.
Recent appointees to the MFPC, including its first African American member, and liberal voices on
the Common Council and in the Milwaukee Commission on Community Relations favored
advancing select procedural reforms. These included making it easier for non-property owners to file
civilian complaints against the MPD, hiring a new “community relations specialist” to rebuild trust,
and emphasizing minority police recruitment. Still, the Mayor continued to go slow on civil rights.
His post-civil disturbance plan offered hollow pronouncements with little teeth. White constituents
made-up an overwhelming majority of Maier’s political base, informing this political calculus. When
asked to explain why he did not oppose Breier’s reactionary response to civil unrest, such as
outfitting a new Tactical Squad to repress civil rights activists, the mayor pointed to the 1911 statute
that upheld the police chief ’s authority.
Once valorized by the U.S Justice Department for its liberal “reform era” innovations,

These researchers reported what they learned from Milwaukee activists, organizational leaders, police personnel, elected
officials, and others into summaries and policy recommendations that helped flesh out the Johnson administration’s
most comprehensive report to date on the nation’s urban crisis. For a historical account of the National Advisory
Commission on Civil Disorders, see: Steven M. Gillon, Separate and Unequal: The Kerner Commission and the Unraveling of
American Liberalism (New York: Basic Books, 2018).
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NAACD field team interviews showed that the MPD was perceived by Black-led organizations,
community leaders, and civil rights groups as a highly regressive police department. This was, in
part, reflected in the work of police accountability activists. Organizations like the Ad-Hoc
Committee on Police Administration (AHCPA) and Catholic Archdiocese’s Council on Urban Life
(CUL), for example, elevated issues of police reform in the local civil rights movement. They spotlit
critiques of Milwaukee’s discriminatory police function, detailed biased law enforcement practices,
and explained why the MPD remained so isolated from the city’s heavily policed communities of
color. The AHCPA and CUL hoped to bring Milwaukee’s police bureaucracy more firmly into the
ambit of the federal government’s police reform program. Washington D.C. was investing millions
of dollars into a massive project of police modernization, coordination, and civil rights compliance.
The War on Crime, ironically, laid the foundations for a punitive carceral state that, over time,
wreaked havoc on African Americans in Milwaukee. The priority for the Johnson administration and
U.S. Justice Department in the late 1960s was taming dissent, restoring order, and controlling crime.
Conversely, police accountability advocates on the ground in Milwaukee wanted to secure procedural
justice for Black and Latinx residents vulnerable to police mistreatment. Neither federal agencies or
local accountability activists paid enough attention to police discretion and the capacity of officers
to inflict unchecked violence.

1967 Civil Disturbance
On Saturday, July 29, 1967, National Urban League Director Whitney M. Young, Jr. warned
readers in a syndicated column that “the reason for riots is not mysterious. It is obvious to anyone
with eyes to see with and ears to hear with. But too many civic leaders act blind and deaf when it
comes to the Negro’s just grievances. They say ‘it can’t happen here’ and when it does, they blame it
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on outside agitators.”4 Less than twenty-four hours after Young’s piece ran in The Milwaukee Star, the
nation’s “long hot summer” came home to Milwaukee. A multi-day outbreak of civil violence,
mostly involving white police and Black young people, touched off on the city’s north side on the
morning of July 30, 1967. The embers of Detroit’s uprising had only begun to cool when the
sparking incident, a late-night skirmish between two young Black women outside a Milwaukee
CORE-sponsored dance, turned into a larger disturbance involving police and several hundred
spectators. Frustrated Black youth eventually converged with officers. Some bombarded batonwielding police with debris.5 Police ordered folks to disperse. While walking home, some people
broke glass storefront windows. The collective anger of Black young people reflected years of
building tension and resentment towards the MPD. Patrolmen and special unit reinforcements
arrived, adorned in riot gear and armed with shotguns. They were prepared to quell the escalating
disorder by force. The MPD’s militaristic bearing, and later that of the Wisconsin National Guard,
intensified a small uprising that fanned out across Black Milwaukee’s core business district.6 Police
funneled a raucous crowd down N. 3rd St., seeking to contain and control the mass of people before
they reached downtown. Physical articulations of Black dissent and forceful police reaction lasted
well into the morning, then repeated the following evening as rumors of police brutality swirled.
More violence transpired—shooting, looting, and burning—sporadically throughout the week. The
violence included the police killing of an 18-year-old college student, Clifford McKissick. The MPD
argued McKissick was suspected of firebombing a paint store.7 According to Father James Groppi,
however, the innocent McKissick was “killed unnecessarily and irresponsibly,” just outside of his

Whitney M. Young, Jr., “To Be Equal,” The Milwaukee Star, July 29, 1967, 4.
Karl H. Flaming, Who 'Riots' and Why? Black and White Perspectives in Milwaukee (Milwaukee: Milwaukee Urban League,
1968), 8-10.
6 Mayor Henry Maier had quietly prepared for “rioting” since the previous year.
7 McKissick was shot and killed by police at approximately 10:00pm on August 2, 1967. “Flash Point,” The Milwaukee
Journal Sentinel, July 30, 2007, accessed July 15, 2015, http://www.jsonline.com/news/milwaukee/32420114.html; “Bitter
Crowd, 500 Strong[,] Attends McKissick Funeral,” The Milwaukee Star, August 12, 1967.
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own home.
In the end, Milwaukee’s civil disturbance did not meet the federal government’s criteria for a
“riot,” according to investigators, “at least in the sense that Detroit and Newark were riots.”8
Nevertheless, it generated four deaths, over one hundred injuries, 1,450 arrests, two destroyed
buildings, and more than $570,000 in unrecoverable losses.9 Localized property damage included a
few overturned cars, one a police vehicle.10 Law enforcement intensified the clash, according to
many African Americans, by reacting “out of misinformation or panic…much more strongly than
the situation warranted.”11 The show of police force was strong, as 750 MPD officers, 250 state
troopers, and 950 Wisconsin National Guardsman had closed off an 840-square-block area of the
primarily Black north side by Monday morning.12 Most “riot” participants were reportedly young
Black men. A majority of the damage was window and plate glass breakage, with some minor fires.
Looting was minimal.13 Only one “sniper” was confirmed and apprehended, despite police-reported
gunfire. Most bullets emanated from police weapons. Racist media depictions of wanton shooting,
looting, and burning at the hands of “roving gangs of Negros” gave the impression of a more
serious conflict.14 Frenzied news stories fueled pathologizing narratives that blamed Black youth

Bernard Dobranski, 1, “Milwaukee, Wisconsin, Materials Resulting from Field Team Trip Sept. 27, 1967-Oct. 3, 1967,”
Folder, 001346-025-0001, Civil Rights during the Johnson Administration, 1963-1969, Part V, Lyndon Baines Johnson
Presidential Library, Austin, Texas. Milwaukee’s uprising was relatively tame. In Detroit, for example, 43 people died,
police arrested 17,000, and tens of thousands of buildings were destroyed. Glenda Elizabeth Gilmore and Thomas J.
Sugrue, These United States: A Nation in the Making, 1890 to the Present (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 2015), 438.
9 Historians Thomas Sugrue and Kevin Mumford make important connections between the civil violence that erupted in
Newark and Detroit, respectively, and how racial inequality was exacerbated by the larger economic and political shifts
taking place in metropolitan America after World War II. Kevin Mumford, Newark: A History of Race, Rights, and Riots in
America (New York: NYU Press, 2007); Sugrue, The Origins of the Urban Crisis. The most thorough historical account of
Milwaukee’s 1967 uprising is featured in Patrick Jones’ history of the city’s civil rights movement. Patrick D. Jones, The
Selma of the North: Civil Rights Insurgency in Milwaukee (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009).
10 Ashley M. Howard, “Milwaukee Revisited,” The Black Scholar, August 17, 2016, Accessed June 20, 2020,
https://www.theblackscholar.org/milwaukee-revisited-ashley-m-howard/.
11 National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, “Report on Disturbances in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, July 30August 6, 1967,” 85, Folder, 001346-024-0871, Civil Rights during the Johnson Administration, 1963-1969, Part V,
Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library, Austin, Texas.
12 Howard, “Milwaukee Revisited.”
13 An early morning rainstorm that occurred on July 31 st helped ease the night’s unrest.
14 The NACCD deemed the looting and fire damage minimal and found most of the property destruction to be
“window and plate glass damage.” Twelve police officers were injured, one killed. Most arrests were curfew violations
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criminality ahead of poor living conditions and differential policing. Such portrayals minimized the
severity of longstanding Black grievances with police and the political potency of Black youth
resistance to police mistreatment. Milwaukee’s uprising, on the whole, was “a metaphor for the lack
of connection” that poor and working-class Black citizens felt towards failed urban policies, more
specially liberalism’s failure to address either systemic inequality or day-to-day racial indignities.15
Whether characterized as a “riot,” “uprising,” or “rebellion,” Milwaukee’s “civil disturbance,”
as city officials named it, reflected America’s ongoing policing crisis in the 1960s.16 It conveyed
accumulating Black frustrations with white racism and questions about the legitimacy of police
power. And it showed how far the country still had to go in terms of realizing its commitment to
democracy. Although police directly enflamed racial tensions, Chief Breier described the event as “a
case of plain lawlessness.”17 Sapping the comparatively small uprising of any political legitimacy
ensured that it would not “rise to the level of formal politics.”18 Breier shielded the police
department and his forceful response from outside criticism. Alternatively, bodies like the Milwaukee
Commission on Community Relations (MCCR), the Milwaukee Urban League (MUL), and the

within police cordoned near north side. Father Groppi and nine Milwaukee NAACP Youth Council members were
arrested on July 31, 1967. The city’s estimate of unrecoverable losses included property not covered by insurance and
extra police, fire and National Guard expenses. Frank Aukofer, “A Night of Riot—and Afterward—in Milwaukee,” The
Milwaukee Journal, August 11, 1967, Part 2, 1, 11; Jones, The Selma of the North, 148; National Advisory Commission on
Civil Disorders, “Report on Disturbances in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, July 30-August 6, 1967,” 17, 80, 105.
15 Matthew J. Countryman, Up South: Civil Rights and Black Power in Philadelphia (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 2006), 155.
16 On the use of language by historians to describe the civil violence of the 1960s, see: Amanda I. Seligman, “But Burn—
No”: The Rest of the Crowd in Three Civil Disorders in 1960s Chicago,” Journal of Urban History 37 (2) (2011): 230-255.
According to a follow-up study on Milwaukee’s 1967 civil disturbance, “Civil disorder” and “racial conflict” were
popular terms employed by both Black and white residents, while “revolt” and “insurrection” were not. J. A. Slesinger,
“Community Opinions Concerning the Summer 1967 Civil Disturbances in Milwaukee,” University of WisconsinMilwaukee, April 1, 1968, 5. Sugrue has argued the term “uprising” is most appropriate for portraying the civil violence
of the 1960s. It encapsulates a “spontaneous upsurge of protest or violent expression of discontent, something with
political content, but short of a full-fledged revolutionary act.” Thomas J. Sugrue, Sweet Land of Liberty: The Forgotten
Struggle for Civil Rights in the North (New York: Random House, 2008), 334.
17 National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, “Report on disturbances in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, July 30-August
6,” 44. “Lawlessness” was a term commonly employed by police administrators to inflate communism and crime in
response to the urban uprisings of the 1960s. Stuart Schrader, Badges without Borders: How Global Counterinsurgency
Transformed American Policing (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2019), 114.
18 Schrader, Badges without Borders, 239. National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, “Report on disturbances in
Milwaukee, Wisconsin, July 30-August 6, 1967,” 44; Schrader, Badges without Borders, 114.
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University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee’s School of Social Welfare revealed stark divisions in how white
and Black residents understood the causes of civil unrest. Professor Joseph A. Slesinger analyzed
decisions made by public officials to re-impose order.19 His report further exposed the depths of
racial inequity in the city. For most white observers, the “riots” amplified the need for “law and
order.” Respondents cited a “breakdown of social control,” rebellious youth, inadequate parental
supervision, “Communist” and “Black Nationalist” political agitation, and the rhetoric of civil rights
leaders as precipitating factors.20 White respondents also “supported measures designed to control
deviant behavior and violence.”21 Conversely, most Black participants in the study saw “poor
housing, job discrimination, unemployment, unequal educational opportunities, and police brutality”
as primary determinants. The outbreak of civil violence was a consequence of protracted racial
discrimination in housing, employment, education, and public accommodations. Moreover, they
viewed the MPD as “responsible for turning what would have been a minor blowing-off of steam
into a full scale riot.”
This perspective was largely corroborated by researchers working for the National Advisory
Commission on Civil Disorders, which visited Milwaukee in September 1967.22 A field team
investigation of the city’s civil disturbance revealed deep polarization between the MPD and Black
residents. Their report on Milwaukee detailed Chief Breier’s reactionary, almost counter-insurgent
approach to police administration and the department’s racialized discretionary tactics on the
ground. Such findings belied the liberal law-and-order ethos that typified Milwaukee’s narrative of

Twenty University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee social scientists contributed to this report. Among the UW-Milwaukee
social scientists was George Kelling, future co-author of the 1982 Atlantic Monthly article outlining “Broken Windows
Theory.” See: Introduction; Slesinger, “Community Opinions Concerning the Summer 1967 Civil Disturbances in
Milwaukee”; National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, “Report on disturbances in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, July
30-August 6, 1967,” 1.
20 Slesinger, “Study of Community Opinions Concerning the Summer 1967 Civil Disturbance in Milwaukee,” 37. Jones,
The Selma of the North, 161.
21 Slesinger, “Study of Community Opinions Concerning the Summer 1967 Civil Disturbance in Milwaukee,” 37.
22 NACCD field team interviews and research were conducted from September 27 to October 3, 1967. “Milwaukee,
Wisconsin, Materials Resulting from Field Team Trip Sept. 27, 1967-Oct. 3, 1967.”
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policing exceptionalism in the 1940s and 1950s, which outwardly emphasized “community
relations,” but still encouraged racial control and close surveillance tactics. The thirteen-person team
surveyed conditions on the ground, seeking to explain the causes of civil unrest. Their findings
reflected the NACCD’s conclusion that America was “moving toward two societies, one black, one
white—separate and unequal.”23 On the MPD, investigators said police were “virtually anonymous in
fact and in law. It is the general impression of the white community that the department performs
its function competently and efficiently. However, the Negro community views it as brutal, corrupt
and segregated.”24 The field team proposed elected officials take on a larger role in Milwaukee’s
police bureaucracy, to “exert an influence on the chief to improve the department” and raise
accountability. Until then, the MPD would “remain a bone of contention”25—no small task given
Breier’s state-sanctioned authority and the political influence he wielded as defender of the city’s
white cultural order.
As NACCD investigators underscored, Mayor Maier had spent close to fifteen months
preparing to manage a riot and no time trying to prevent one.26 Many Black citizens expected future
outbreaks of violence to occur, lest the city begin “redressing the legitimate grievances of the Negro
community” that provoked police-Black citizen tensions. The mayor’s response to civil violence
affirmed white political support and, consequently, popular approval for the MPD’s reactionary lawand-order approach. The mayor’s swift declaration of a “state of emergency,” issuance of a nine-day
curfew around the “Inner Core” disturbance area, and request for 1,200 National Guard troops

The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, The Kerner Report (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
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reinforced white support and easily tempered Milwaukee’s small uprising.27 The response earned him
the enmity of some Black civil rights activists, who alleged racial double-standards in enforcement.
Maier refused to take the same actions when 13,000 white counter-protestors confronted only a few
hundred Black and allied open housing marchers in August, 1967.28 To many white residents, Maier’s
decisiveness proved he was willing to defend their interests against those of seemingly unruly Black
malcontents, whose protests they linked to a rising crime rate. The mayor reinforced conflations of
street crime and non-violent protest when he argued the civil disturbance was “deliberately planned
in advance” by “militants” to make him “look bad” for going slow on civil rights.29 While he
successfully fought for a change in Wisconsin’s formula for aid to cities, Maier also deflected
criticism of his own inaction and failure to curb white discrimination and advance integration.30
Fears of crime were real, for both white and Black residents. Each demanded more police
protection, as the city saw a 90.7 percent increase in “serious crime” from 1963 to 1967. 31 However,

The curfew, ratified by the Milwaukee Common Council on July 31, 1967, included the closing of all liquor stores,
taverns, and service stations. Sales of alcoholic beverages, gasoline, weapons and ammunition were immediately
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31 Chief Breier blamed rising robberies, burglaries, larcenies, and auto thefts on juvenile criminality, a lack of parental
control, the need to assign beat patrolmen to monitor civil rights demonstrations, and the “teaching and preaching of
disrespect by certain elements of the community.” David N. Mitchell, “Flood of New Crime Shows No Sign of
Cresting,” The Milwaukee Journal, June 30, 1968, Part 1, 1, 12.
27

249

this data was misleading for technical and political reasons.32 Maier backed Breier’s conservative
approach to crime control, lest he face the “strong backlash of public opinion” from white south
side residents and political figures.”33 He was “astute” in that he never undertook political actions
“likely to be unpopular with the majority of his constituency,” Assemblyman Lloyd Barbee noted.34
Black voters barely factored into the mayor’s political coalition. His fiercest critics described him as
“disinterested in constructive action toward alleviating the problems of the Negro community.”35
Most blue collar and professional white residents saw the MPD chief as a bulwark against Black
activism and crime. Therefore, the mayor approached him with cautious deference.36 Breier boasted
decades later that Maier could make suggestions about policing, but never give him orders.37
Mayor Maier’s high approval rating among white residents, including labor and business
interests, combined with Chief Breier’s state-sanctioned authority and the MPD’s social isolation
from poor and working-class Black residents, ensured that Milwaukee’s police bureaucracy would
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the Northtown Planning and Development Commission characterized the mayor as “extremely thin skinned” and
“maladjusted.” National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, “Report on Disturbances in Milwaukee, Wisconsin,
July 30-August 6, 1967,” 3; “Interview with Ray Alexander, Associate Director, Northtown Planning and Development
Commission,” 2, “Milwaukee, Wisconsin, Materials Resulting from Field Team Trip Sept. 27, 1967-Oct. 3, 1967.”
36 Ronald H. Snyder, “Chief for Life: Harold Breier and His Era” (Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee,
2002), 69; Aukofer, City with a Chance, 20.
37 Snyder, “Chief for Life,” 70.
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continue to sidestep the “community relations” issues that liberals in the federal government saw as
foundational to the urban unrest of the 1960s. Perceptions of effective crisis management shaped
local prescriptions. To a growing number of African Americans, City Hall had abdicated its
responsibility to Black voters. Elected officials ignored how white racism structured north side living
conditions and aggressive policing in the area. Political cover enabled Breier to double-down on
hostile law-and-order tactics, engendering fear and distrust of the MPD among Black residents and
intensifying Milwaukee’s crisis of police legitimacy. Mayor Maier took a hardline stance on “rioting,”
but moderated his approach according to his audience. As the mayor said in a press conference, he
would “not stand by and permit violence…it was his responsibility to do everything in his power to
save life and property in Milwaukee.”38 Civil unrest not only posed a threat to the public good, but
also to Maier’s downtown economic development and neighborhood improvement projects. These
schemes relied on federal subsidies, so the mayor was eager to maintain a good working relationship
with the Johnson administration and federal bureaucrats. Still, white city officials perceived the Black
“Inner Core” as, if not innately disordered, then prone to disorderly behavior based on the same
racist “culture of poverty” arguments that undergirded urban liberalism and prolonged the urban
crisis. “The only hope we have is an orderly society,” Maier argued. “It is my responsibility,” he
continued, “to look after orderliness in our society and in Milwaukee and to look after the interests
of our citizens.” While the mayor generally subscribed to the “harm principle” embraced by liberal
city governments dealing with intersecting issues of inequality and public safety in the postwar
period, it was clear whose “orderliness” he saw as in need of supervision: the poor and workingclass African Americans provoked into police-citizen confrontations.39
“Mayor Maier press conference concerning local religious leaders and civil disturbances, August 30 1967 (partial),”
March on Milwaukee Civil Rights History Project, accessed November 15, 2018,
https://collections.lib.uwm.edu/digital/collection/march/id/1771/rec/7.
39 The harm principle held that “the state was justified in policing only activities that physically or materially harmed
others. It signaled a turn away from the overpolicing of status offenses. However, because white “cosmopolitan liberals,”
in cities like San Francisco, had a tendency of “rooting Black violence in Black culture,” the harm principle was applied
38
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Civil rights activists offered an alternative perspective on the 1967 uprising. They sought to
leverage civil violence into political action that addressed the structural inequality at its heart. A
coalition of leaders from Black-led organizations and churches outlined reform proposals. The
“Common View,” an umbrella coalition of civil rights organizations and Black leaders, requested a
meeting with Mayor Maier to press its demands. The group cited the “indifference projected by the
white power structure” and City Hall’s failure to establish programs that substantively addressed
local conditions.40 The Common View’s proposals touched on housing inequality, unemployment,
educational disparities, biased judicial procedures, and limited recreational facilities. On policing, the
coalition made eight demands for procedural reforms that expanded Black police representation,
community input, and oversight. Specifically, they called for the hiring of a Black District Five
Captain, a Black “community relations specialist,” the installation of a “joint citizen-police grievance
system,” a Black MFPC member, the suspension, without pay, of any officer involved in a
questionable shooting, a Police Aide program that catered to Black students, the appointment of a
Black judge, and a public defender system for people accused of violating the law.41 After some
delay, the mayor eventually met with the group. But he rebuffed their calls for civilian oversight,
insisting that the MFPC already had “the power to hire, fire, and promote policemen” and “hear
charges of misconduct.” Milwaukee, unlike other cities, had “a civilian review board with power for
more than fifty years,” he stated. The mayor rejected the notion of MFPC bias, insisting the
commission was a “fair and impartial” body. Instead, he faulted civil rights leaders for their “studied
effort…to avoid bringing a case” before the board.42 Regarding the Common View’s demand for a

unevenly in poor spaces of color. Christopher Lowen Agee, The Streets of San Francisco: Policing and the Creation of a
Cosmopolitan Liberal Politics, 1950-1972 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014), 14, 157.
40 National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, “Report on Disturbances in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, July 30August 6, 1967,” 17, 69.
41 “Riots Called Reaction to Whites' Indifference,” The Milwaukee Journal, August 2, 1967, Part 1, 10.
42 All they had to do was ask the MFPC “on its own motion to take the case,” Maier said. Recall that the Citizens AntiPolice Brutality Committee had brought alleged cases of police abuse but were denied legal authority to make their
claims. National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, “Report on Disturbances in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, July 30252

Black fire and police commissioner, Maier said he would “not make an appointment simply to
appoint a Black man. He must be qualified and carry a lot of weight.” In a statement demonstrating
the MFPC’s fealty to the mayor, Maier said any future commissioners “must be willing to push my
objectives and be able to execute the many detailed steps required to make my program come
true…he must be a supporter of mine.”
Maier refused to work with the Common View. Instead, he devised a thirty-nine-point plan
with another group of African American leaders. The Interdenominational Ministerial Alliance
(IMA), according to the mayor, was the true voice of Black Milwaukee, as the Common View
allegedly did not represent the people’s interests. The “moderate-to-conservative” faith leaders in the
IMA had “long-standing ties to the mayor.”43 Meeting with Maier on August 5, 1967, they worked
out a response to civil violence. Dubbed Milwaukee’s “Little Marshall Plan,” the scheme emphasized
racial inclusion within the existing white order. It called for no direct economic aid or revised power
arrangements that benefitted poor and working-class Black citizens. The centerpiece was a “crusade
for resources,” which reflected the mayor’s argument about resolving urban ills through
metropolitan and state cooperation.44 The plan’s criminal justice measures reflected proposals
outlined by the federal Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice (PCLEAJ),
and even some of the Common View’s proposals, namely the recruitment of more Black police and
improved “community relations.” But it was short on specifics of how to get there. Racial
pacification was City Hall’s focus. Yet, Maier and the IMA conveyed no assurances of even
implementing racial diversity on the MPD and the improvement of the police image.45 One element

August 6, 1967,” EX-8.
43 Jones, The Selma of the North, 166.
44 Property taxes, according to Maier, were “never intended to carry the problems of today—poverty, blight, and special
educational needs.” Therefore, county, state, and federal governments, well-funded by suburban property and corporate
taxes, were obligated to provide struggling cities with the revenues necessary for funding social and economic programs.
National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, “Report on Disturbances in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, July 30-August
6, 1967,” EX-3.
45 The Little Marshall Plan called on an outside agency, the Milwaukee Conference on Religion and Race (MCRR), to
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of the plan that the mayor and Common Council had the authority to enact was commissioning yet
another study on the “Inner Core” and devising ways to alleviate poverty, unemployment, and
crime—labor that the Milwaukee Commission on Community Relations (MCCR) already performed
in the late 1950s and whose findings Maier rejected upon taking office in 1960.46
Civil rights activists decried the IMA-supported plan. The thirty-nine points could have
marked an inflection point in terms of how white city officials approached race, crime, and policing.
Yet, the enactment of more gradualist reforms that only appeased a small sub-set of Black middle
class residents trumped the public safety concerns of the city’s Black majority. Milwaukee CORE
leader Cecil Brown, Jr. called the plan “asinine,” arguing the mayor would only “use it for his
purposes.”47 Maier had forged a program headlined by toothless measures that brought no
immediate relief. Improved police-community relations through Black police hiring was the
administration’s response to the crisis of police legitimacy.48 According to the mayor, it had to be, as
he claimed no power to make internal changes on the MPD and showed little interest in doing so. A

establish a “bi-racial council” that would meet with the MFPC “to examine police hiring and promotion practices and
examine citizens’ complaints.” The MCRR was supposed to “establish curricula to train youths 14 years and older for
eventual positions in the Police Department,” with the assistance of the Superintendent of Schools and vocational
school director.
46 Other proposals required the mayor to “seek,” not guarantee, state and federal aid for new manufacturing jobs and
programs that would specifically cater to Black workers. These and other housing, mortgage insurance, zoning, and
urban renewal proposals had little chance of passing Wisconsin’s Republican-controlled legislature. The plan included
federal policies on “rat control” and “air and water pollution” abatement, laudable goals in theory, but again, reforms
that City Hall had no power to authorize. Finally, the program called on the Common Council to introduce a countywide open housing measure, ignoring Alderwoman Phillips’ three unsuccessful attempts to pass a municipal fair housing
ordinance. Each time, Phillips was denied in the Common Council on a vote of 18-1. While Maier’s plan carried the
pretense of change and interracial cooperation, it represented more of the same for struggling poor and working-class
Black residents.
47 Brown also alleged the mayor held a grudge against the city’s three heavily Black voting wards because he did not carry
them in the 1964 election. “Interview with Cecil Brown, Jr., Director of Milwaukee CORE,” 4, “Milwaukee, Wisconsin,
Materials Resulting from Field Team Trip Sept. 27, 1967-Oct. 3, 1967.”
48 The mayor recognized the dearth of Black police personnel. But he blamed Black residents, citing their lack of interest
in becoming police officers. “You cannot expect a Negro to reach the highest levels of command if there are only a
handful willing to work in the department. Missing from the mayor’s analysis was any appreciation for the profound
mistrust Black Milwaukeeans felt towards the police department. African Americans were “suspicious, afraid, and bitter
toward the police department,” with complaints ranging “from a lack of tact and common sense on the part of the
police to extreme harassment and brutality. Maier’s “community relations” proposals were at odds with the harsh reality
of police power and discretion, which it wielded unevenly predominantly Black areas. National Advisory Commission on
Civil Disorders, “Report on Disturbances in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, July 30-August 6, 1967,” 15-16, EX-8.
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reconfigured MCCR focused on “building bridges of understanding,” creating “open lines of
communication,” and “preserving diversity without endangering the social order.” As such, the
commission failed to target racialized power imbalances enforced by the MPD.49 The city’s focus on
equal opportunity hiring and “education and conciliation” further ensconced Breier’s reactionary
law-and-order approach.
Maier’s Little Marshall Plan reflected his mastery of what historian Michael Katz once
termed “mimetic reform.”50 The mayor responded to Black civil rights demands in ways that
imitated the rhetorical thrust of racial liberalism. However, his responses signified an incomplete
realization of Black civil rights demands in that they created the mirage of new programs that, even
if actualized, maintained inequitable structures of power and patterns of resource allocation. For
example, at the height of the direct action campaigns led by Lloyd Barbee and Milwaukee United
School Integration Committee against the discriminatory practice of “intact busing,” Maier
proposed a “War on Prejudice.” That plan, a reference to the Johnson administration’s “War on
Poverty,” called for metropolitan cooperation, acculturation, and a voluntary public relations
campaign that would “make discrimination unpopular, so unpopular…that those who practice it will
find themselves in an ostracized minority.”51 The War on Prejudice was little more than a revised
appeal for attitude adjustment—a liberal “hearts and minds” approach. It not only targeted white
residents, but also African Americans, implying that discrimination flowed in two directions and was
a problem of equal racial contribution. Nor did Maier press the Milwaukee Common Council or
state legislature to enact policies that addressed white discrimination in any systematic fashion.
Consequently, Black civil rights leaders saw the mayor’s policies as a continuation of the
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accomodationism of the 1950s, embracing a political gimmick that relied on hollow promises and
the veneer of action on racial injustice in the form of study committees, reports, and interracial
convocations.52

Contours of Reactionary Law-and-Order
Milwaukee’s 1967 civil disturbance reflected over a decade of accumulating, under-addressed
police-Black community tensions. Public frustrations were compounded by City Hall’s
unresponsiveness to growing Black demands for economic justice and an end to discriminatory
employment, education, and housing policies. Civil violence was a likely outcome, as Milwaukee’s
white-controlled police bureaucracy remained comfortable refusing Black claims of police abuse.
The unwillingness of the MFPC to accept Black complaints, and the limited authority of other
institutions, like the Milwaukee Commission on Community Relations, to guarantee accountability
for overpoliced and underprotected African Americans reinforced the racial double-standards at the
heart of the city’s narrative of policing exceptionalism. Chief Breier, empowered by state law, freely
administered reactionary law-and-order against Black political “agitators” and their “communist”
sympathizers. He did so with no fear of impunity and little desire to improve “community relations.”
His order maintenance approach emphasized controlling the activities of Black civil rights activists
and youth, who comprised more than half of the city’s African American population. The
exceptionalism narrative and racist ideas about Black living conditions reinforced one another.
When the 1967 civil disturbance erupted, it most white Milwaukeeans did not question the MPD’s
legitimacy to restore order or the utility of police authority. Instead, most white power brokers
chided Black freedom fighters and allies. Liberals in city government placated Black discontent.
They promised to update the MFPC’s recruitment and oversight practices, to satisfy Black police
52
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accountability demands, meet federal civil rights requirements, and hopefully prevent further unrest.
Liberal appeasement in service of procedural justice and limiting opportunities for political dissent
was part of the equation when it came to legitimizing police power at the community level.
Divergent conceptions of safety and disorder fueled public debates. Some Milwaukeeans felt
less safe because they held racist views about crime, which they unevenly attributed to poor and
migrant African Americans. Others, particularly Black residents, felt increasingly vulnerable to
discretionary police violence, as much as they did crime. In truth, people living on Milwaukee’s
segregated north side were disproportionately vulnerable to both crime and over-zealous policing.
Still, resolving interrelated concerns around interpersonal and state violence resulted in government
reform solutions that expanded police power and investments in law enforcement as the primary
agent for maintaining social order. White commentators and policymakers never probed the MPD’s
history of terrorizing poor and working Black and Brown folk. Consequently, federal and local
solutions stressed increasing racial diversity, developing interagency cooperation, improving
“community relations,” and upgrading police hardware and “soft power” capacities. Shoring up the
MPD as a response to civil violence supplanted efforts to alleviate poverty on the north side through
federal interventions. The War on Poverty had begun to empower Black-led community agencies in
the mid-1960s. The lack of local political pressure to shift how the police functioned, civil unrest,
and subsequent episodes of racial violence surrounding the Milwaukee NAACP Youth Council’s
grassroots campaign for a fair housing ordinance saw Chief Breier double-down on his department’s
aggressive, response-oriented crime control and order maintenance tactics. Civil violence, amplified
by an intensifying national conversation around race and public safety, reinforced the assumed need
within Milwaukee’s white power structure for a stronger police presence on the north side and
vigilant monitoring of Black civil rights activists, who showed no signs of letting up on challenging
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white supremacy through direct action, “not violent” protests.53
The MFPC appointed Breier chief during a critical juncture in U.S. criminal justice history.
Police regulations were shifting in the 1960s. The “procedural revolution” transformed state criminal
procedures and re-authorized the application of police discretion in ways meant to limit abuses of
power. The Supreme Court moved from a flat preoccupation with guilt or innocence to ensuring
that the procedural, or due process rights of criminal defendants were better recognized throughout
the justice system. The liberal Warren court decided cases that dealt with processes of arrest,
investigation, and adjudication. Their decisions favored criminal suspects, who were historically
rendered vulnerable to police misconduct, such as when officers violently questioned suspects using
the “third degree.” Police administrators, on the whole, saw the Supreme Court’s decisions in the
Mapp (1961), Gideon (1963), Escobedo (1964) and Miranda (1966) cases as attacks on their authority,
the discretion of officers, and police expertise. With reported street crime rising, many police chiefs
believed the federal government was being too protective of “criminals” and ignoring the safety of
“law-abiding” citizens. The court had undermined “reform era” crime control strategies that relied
on procedural efficiency in the criminal justice system. As a result, it became harder for police to
arrest and convict individuals.54 This process was central to Milwaukee’s narrative of policing
exceptionalism. Both the civil rights revolution occurring in the streets and in the criminal-legal
system informed Chief Breier’s reactionary law-and-order approach.
It is impossible to separate the MPD’s reactionary turn from Harold Breier’s upbringing and
professional evolution. The chief was “old-school”—the product of a pre-World War II era when
white civic elites and defenders of the traditional racial order entrusted law enforcement to preserve
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the peace free from the corrosive influence of politics. Breier once professed that his job was to
protect “the good people” of Milwaukee from the “bad.”55 This dichotomy tracked lines of race and
class and built on decades of discriminatory structures. As a Black newspaper columnist noted just
after the chief’s death in 1998, “Breier never saw blacks as ‘good people.’” 56 His stubborn, hardnosed leadership style was comparable to overtly racist law-and-order proponents, like Frank Rizzo
in Philadelphia or Bull Connor in Birmingham.57 But it also reflected the more covert, racialized
order maintenance instincts of reform era heavyweights, such as O. W. Wilson in Chicago or
William Parker in Los Angeles.58 Like the latter, Breier looked to maintain order and control crime
through response-oriented automobile patrols and sound detective work following the commission
of crimes. He did not believe the police should serve a dedicated social relations function. Reform
era chiefs who emphasized “crime suppression, technological innovation, and administrative
efficiency,” like Breier in Milwaukee, “tended to shunt aside community relations work.”59 Liberal
reformers, on the other hand, believed that centralization and improving community relations were
not mutually exclusive developments. Enhanced technology, crime detection, and policing efficiency
could coexist with greater community involvement and police responsiveness to communityidentified problems.
Chief Breier’s rigid approach to police administration was forged during his early life on
Milwaukee’s south side. There, he developed a conservative understanding of morality and society.
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Like countless other blue-collar white ethnics, Breier typified the mostly Polish-American south
side’s parochial views on race. He grew up in a strict Lutheran household in the 1910s and 1920s—
one of three children born to German immigrant parents.60 The Great Depression encouraged the
young Breier to forego college and help support his family. From 1929 to 1939, he worked industrial
jobs to earn money.61 Breier entered law enforcement as a Sheriff’s Deputy in 1939. In 1940, he
accepted a position as patrolman with the MPD. In three year’s time, he made Acting Detective and
soon ascended the bureau’s ranks.62 Throughout his life, Breier lived in the same neighborhood,
eventually buying a home with his wife Eleanore in 1941.63 A provincial upbringing and conservative
values shaped Breier’s leadership style. While he considered himself a “hard-headed professional,”
NACCD investigators described him as an “anti-intellectual”—a man “opposed to education,” who
discouraged officers from attending college to gain new skills.64 The MFPC named Inspector of
Detectives Breier Milwaukee’s twelfth police chief on February 15, 1964.65 He earned the position
based on his reputation as a “strong disciplinarian,” an “active and aggressive officer.” 66
Commissioners believed him capable of “rectifying conditions” on a police force dealing with a rare
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63 Breier met his wife, Eleanor Klancnik while working at the paint factory. Her parents owned a south side tavern, the
Sunnyside Tap. Snyder, “Chief for Life,” 22.
64 This is an area where Breier clearly diverged from most reform era police chiefs, who valued education as a marker of
professionalization. See: Samuel E. Walker, A Critical History of Police Reform: The Emergence of Professionalism (Lanham:
Lexington Books, 1977); National Commission on Civil Disorders, “Report on Disturbances in Milwaukee, Wisconsin,
July 30-August 6, 1967,” 14.
65 George Ruger to Milwaukee Common Council, February 17, 1964, Box 81, Folder 22, “Fire and Police Commission,
1960-1965,” Records of Mayor Henry W. Maier Administration. Nineteen sixty-four was also the same year that
Republican presidential nominee Barry Goldwater ignited a conservative movement for law-and-order in response to
civil rights demonstrations and Black uprisings in northern cities. Breier perceived issues of crime and safety through a
similarly racialized lens, frequently conflating non-violent civil disobedience and protest with illicit behavior and rioting.
66 He actively visited crime scenes as Inspector of Detectives. Breier also engaged in “gun battles” with suspects, both as
an Inspector of Detectives and as Chief of Police, earning him department citations and burnishing his crime-fighting
lore. Snyder, “Chief for Life,” 25-26.
60

260

corruption scandal.67 Most MFPC members saw Breier as unflappable in demeanor—well-suited for
maintaining internal and external order as Milwaukee pursued its economic growth and
redevelopment agenda in a socially combustible postwar context.68
Four factors shaped Breier’s lifelong skepticism of external forces: police suspicion of
civilians, his “contempt for non-professionals,” a desire to protect his statutory authority, and his
confusion over why citizens desired change when, in his view, Milwaukee was already one of the
safest cities in the U.S.69 Breier was known as “a cop in the traditional sense of the word.”70 From an
external vantage point, the chief vigorously maintained the MPD’s institutional independence,
refusing to allow predecessors’ achievements in police professionalization “go to hell” as a result of
political interference.71 Internally, he demanded loyalty from all subordinates and rewarded faithful
officers with administrative cover when they faced outside scrutiny, especially those alleged to have
engaged in racialized misconduct. Strategically, he subscribed to the three “r’s” that defined reform
era policing: “random patrol, rapid response, and reactive investigation.”72 The chief prioritized
enforcing the criminal code, arresting law violators, and closing-out cases, all while running an
airtight department in which power flowed from the top-down.
Having spent decades in the Detective Bureau, Breier favored a reactive “detective
In 1962, 35 Vice Bureau and Traffic Bureau officers were forced to retire or resign following a state investigation into
charges of bribery, ticket fixing, and tax evasion. After two weeks in office, Breier stopped an internal investigation into
the police scandal, refused to disclose any disciplinary actions, and failed to cooperate with Wisconsin’s Assistant
Attorney General on a state investigation into police corruption. Snyder, “Chief for Life,” 29. “Rectifying conditions”
quote from Milwaukee Fire and Police Commissioner Peter Pavlovich. “Milwaukee’s Inspector Breier Is Appointed
Chief of Police,” The Milwaukee Journal, February 16, 1964, Part 1, 1, 12.
68 Ironically, the press initially saw Breier as a great communicator, who often left his door open and gave candid
interviews when called upon after murders, robberies, and other serious crimes occurred. Snyder, “Chief for Life,” 26.
69 “Outsiders” in this context included other units within Milwaukee’s police bureaucracy, such as the mayor’s office, the
Common Council, and the MFPC. Snyder, “Chief for Life,” 66-67
70 “Interview with Ray Alexander, Associate Director, Northtown Planning and Development Commission,” 2,
“Milwaukee, Wisconsin, Materials Resulting from Field Team Trip Sept. 27, 1967-Oct. 3, 1967.”
71 Charles J. Sykes, “Opposition United on Police Bill,” The Milwaukee Journal, May 13, 1980, Part 1, 1, 3.
72 “Community policing” advocates in the 1980s identified the “three R’s” as an outmoded approach. They argued that
random patrol, rapid response, and reactionary investigation ineffectively prevented and reduced crime, undermined
relationships with policed communities, and wasted law enforcement resources. Fritz Umbach, The Last Neighborhood
Cops: The Rise and Fall of Community Policing in New York Public Housing (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2011),
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culture.”73 This penchant for reacting to crime rather than preventing it served to weaken the MPD’s
beat patrol services. As one criminologist argues, Breier focused little on developing relationships
with Black business-owners, churches, and community organizations in service of order
maintenance.74 He worked to guarantee Milwaukee’s exceptional status as a “crime free” city by
arresting and processing a high volume of criminal offenders.75 That meant engaging in aggressive
order maintenance policing in predominantly Black “high crime” areas. The chief assigned white
police recruits from the south side to “the toughest police beats” in the city to “prove themselves
from the beginning.” Breier’s district commanders charged line officers with neglect of duty if they
returned to district stations without meeting daily arrest quotas. Consequently, the “police routinely
questioned people in advance of accusing them for crimes.”76 Some officers relished working north
side beats, not to protect people, but, as one African American leader put it, to “take advantage of
the situation” for “their own betterment and promotion.”77 Like his predecessors, the chief directed
most department resources towards Black Milwaukee neighborhoods and employed racialized crime
data to justify the MPD’s crime control strategy and reinforce ideas about racial difference .
Thanks to the 1911 statute, Breier wielded his power over rank-and-file officers with little
concern for institutional blowback. He imposed strict standards and expected rank-and-file officers
to obey all of his rules and commands. The chief forbade all police personnel from speaking publicly
on law enforcement matters without his approval. Violators faced immediate reprisal—threatened,
disciplined, or fired depending on the offense. Early in his administration, he punished rulesviolators with two-week suspensions. This policy remained in effect until the Milwaukee Police
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Patrolmen’s Protective Association (MPPPA) “legislated the maximum non-appellate suspension
period to five days.”78 Chief Breier punished rule violators by occasionally forcing them to work on
scheduled off days without pay “until he was satisfied.” One researcher likened this practice to
“involuntary servitude.”79 Breier was cold, but shrewd, only suspending officers when he was certain
they would not appeal to the MFPC. His regimented internal policies inadvertently facilitated the rise
of police union power in Milwaukee, as the MPPPA largely defined itself against their boss’ strict
disciplinary practices, his antagonism towards educational development, and his reluctance to engage
in community relations improvements.80
Chief Breier differentiated himself from his liberal law-and-order forerunners in terms of
how he envisioned “police-community relations.”81 He shunned bringing officers into dialogue with
Black and Latinx community groups, refused to actively push for integration, and scorned the
concept of community relations units, bureaus, or programs within the MPD. When civil rights
organizations challenged Breier’s decision-making when it came to engaging with minoritized
communities, he not only distanced himself on policy, but rhetorically undercut his critics’ moral
position by labeling them as criminal subversives. The chief pursued ad hominem attacks against
perceived opponents, while denying non-police stakeholders a role in shaping the direction of
policing in Milwaukee. Knowing that substantive reforms would only be enacted through statutory
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revision, the chief felt free to insist that both racialized police violence and any need to work with
community groups in resolving crime was a myth.82 Furthermore, the MPPPA outflanked him from
the left on the community relations issue. Union president Robert Kliesmet said the MPPPA was
willing to collaborate with community organizations to improve public safety. While the union’s core
objective was defending the interests of rank-and-file officers, they also saw a public safety value in
revising the police department’s image.
Breier’s sense of impunity was reinforced by his “great popularity among whites in the
greater Milwaukee area.”83 A high level of support from white blue-collar and middle-class
professionals “probably neutralized any influence” elected officials had over Breier’s MPD. 84 This
esteem only grew in the wake of the 1967 civil disturbance and subsequent Black-led demonstrations
for open housing—campaigns that notably penetrated the chief’s native south side. Breier further
proved his racial bona fides when he rebuffed Black police brutality complainants, rejected calls for
citizen review of the MPD, and conflated civil rights demonstrators with violent criminals. He
defended police officers who roughed up fair housing marchers after protests at Kosciuszko Park
descended into chaos. White residents expressed their “general gratitude” for the “absence of
serious riots,” despite some having committed acts of racial violence.85 The urban uprisings of the
1960s focused white attention “on the role of the police as protector of property and master of
order.”86 This strengthened Breier’s resolve. Civil rights “militants,” in his view, refused to follow the
Changing the policing statutes required pronounced social demographic changes within the political landscape, so as
to convince enough state representatives of the merits of revising the law. The political will required to alter Wisconsin’s
1911 policing statute took time to develop over the course of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. Chief Breier rejected charges
that the MPD was ever brutal in its handling of Black citizens, or that police themselves instigated unrest through
disrespect or mistreatment of Black youth. Yet both critics and supporters of the MPD found that the department was
“not accessible to the people it served.” Most attributed this to his “narrow definition of police work.” Breier was “the
official expert” who needed “no outside views.” Police Isolation and Community Needs, 85.
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law or work through established grievance channels. Then they initiated violence when his men
attempted to lawfully re-impose order in the community. In stubbornly resisting Black dissent,
Breier embodied a white folk hero persona—a powerful avatar for those eager to conserve white
hegemonic power in a proud white ethnic city.
Breier’s comprehension of “race relations” shaped a strategic approach that centered Black
surveillance, subversion, and suppression. He addressed “civil rights insurgents” through a domestic
“counterinsurgency” agenda that aimed to stamp out political dissent and any perceived “socialist,”
“communist,” or “revolutionary” infiltrations of society.87 Breier’s logic was not new. It stemmed
from decades of discriminatory policies and practices that hardened racialized dichotomies of
“good” (white) and “bad” (Black) space and citizens.88 Such racially-coded moral distinctions were
founded in white racial and class biases that were not unique to Milwaukee. Blue-collar white
Philadelphians, for example, “used class distinctions as rhetorical qualifiers to explain who they were
not willing to share urban space with.”89 Police liability was less of an issue for Breier than law
enforcement being attacked by racial liberalism run amok. He thought the nation was, more broadly,
losing its moral footing and traditional values. Liberals were too eager to coddle “criminals.” This, in
turn, fueled revanchist white demands for law-and-order, a sentiment that spread in the mid-1960s,
particularly in the suburban and exurban communities that comprised an important base of support
for Richard Nixon in 1968. To many white voters, liberalism had failed in its “ability to ensure
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personal security,” creating political space for a conservative backlash.90
Chief Breier’s subordinates reflected his parochial views on race, which emanated from the
top. District Five Police Captain George Sprague embodied the most prominent example. Sprague
was a known John Birch Society member who, according to Assemblyman Lloyd Barbee, was
“openly contemptuous of Negros.”91 Chief Breier put him in charge of the police district with the
largest African American population: District Five. In 1967, approximately 90,000 Black residents
lived on the near north side, which District Five largely encompassed. Captain Sprague rejected a
federal grand jury complaint of alleged violations at his precinct. He denied complaints were even
filed, blaming “rabble rousers” for District Five’s external scrutiny.92 The avowed racist “dismissed”
police brutality charges against police officers “out of hand.” His attitude was “an excellent
reflection of the attitudes and beliefs of the Police Chief, Harold Breier,” according to Lloyd Barbee,
“a racist and a bully.”93
Chief Breier understood issues of police accountability through a similarly racialized lens.
His reactionary law-and-order regime undermined police misconduct complaints. Breier denied
accountability for Black claims of police brutality with special vigor. NACCD researchers described
“inadequate” “channels of communication for grievances.”94 Citizen complaints were “an exercise in
futility,” according to Black residents. When the public filed a complaint of “police brutalization,”
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Breier oversaw in-house investigations. Several complainants observed that “nothing was done,” as
if the chief’s officers could “never tell a lie and therefore [could] do no wrong.”95 Not “a single
conviction or reprimand” for “alleged [police] mistreatment” occurred from 1964 to 1967—Breier’s
first three years in office.96 External investigations simply did not happen. The Milwaukee
Commission on Civil Rights lacked the “powers to do anything” in response to police
discrimination.97 The MFPC “served the function of a Review Board for the adjudication of
complaints,” but, according to people interviewed by the NACCD, never brought one to trial. While
residents occasionally filed civil litigation against the MPD or individual officers, none were
“pursued to judgment.”98 Interviewees described “a do-nothing attitude” when it came to City Hall’s
capacity to curb police misconduct.99 Mayor Henry Maier euphemized police violence, proudly
describing the MPD as “pretty tough.”100 While Breier apparently disciplined officers “from time to
time,” he did nothing to stem the flow of police violence being administered on Milwaukee’s north
side.
The deadly police shooting of 44-year-old Lee Wilson on December 30, 1967 illustrated that
eruptions of civil violence that summer had done nothing to raise police accountability standards.
Wilson was killed following the enforcement of a petty crime: jaywalking. Yet another ruling by the
Milwaukee County District Attorney of “justifiable homicide” frustrated Black citizens.101
Conflicting accounts from police and witnesses at the scene renewed tensions and deepened
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mistrust.102 Civil rights groups rallied around the Wilson killing, lending urgency to growing demands
for civilian police oversight, improved police-Black community relations, and the hiring of more
Black MPD officers.
While Black leaders were livid, they were largely powerless to obtain justice. Some saw police
integration as the only viable solution—a means of mitigating against the racist discretion of white
patrolmen. Integrating historically white police regimes, like the MPD, was one of several enduring
liberal responses to police brutality and elevated racial tensions. Many African Americans perceived
Black officers as “reformers” in their own right, arguing their race made them intrinsically sensitive
to the community’s needs and, therefore, less likely to harass and abuse.103
The NAACP Youth Council circulated a petition calling for an inquest into Wilson’s
“murder.” YC members described Wilson as “industrious and dedicated to his [four] children.”
Commando Milton Latson warned that his group would “retaliate” if police ever tried to use lethal
force against open housing demonstrators as they had against Wilson and Clifford McKissick. 104As
he continued, “We are no longer nonviolent toward the police department.” County Supervisor
Isaac Coggs connected the MPD’s aggressive policing on the near north side to the issue of
residential segregation, urging the YC to march on the statehouse in Madison and demand a state
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fair housing law.105 Outraged African Americans and allies rallied for justice. “It is time for the
community to act against the police killing of Negroes for no reason at all,” Coggs exclaimed. “If the
police want war they will get it,” he added. Coggs called out the District Attorney for “covering up”
police misconduct.106 Roughly 300 demonstrators marched down Center St.—the scene of the
killing—to Wisconsin Ave, then up N. 8th St. to the Milwaukee Safety Building. The Wisconsin Civil
Liberties Union requested a federal probe into Wilson’s death ten days later. Breier imposed no
discipline on the officer who shot Wilson. “As far as I’m concerned, the air is clear,” Chief Breier,
said, defending their actions.107
African American police spoke candidly to the NACCD about Chief Breier’s explicit
toleration of racialized police violence. A former Black officer, Charles Densford, worked under
Breier’s command while serving as Inspector of Detectives in the early 1960s. The fifteen-year
veteran confirmed that his boss condoned police brutality in front of personnel. Densford told
NACCD researchers that detectives began their day shifts questioning individuals arrested during
the previous night. “On many occasions,” it was “quite obvious” they had experienced violence at
the hands of police.108 When Densford reported police brutality incidents to Inspector Breier, he was
told to “mind his own business.” Another Black detective made notations of in-house beatings on
interview cards. Breier reprimanded that officer for documenting what he witnessed. As Inspector,
he made light of officers using lethal force. During a roll call, as the bureau discussed a police
brutality incident that occurred on Milwaukee’s north side, Densford said Breier commented, “Well,
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I guess we’ll have to shoot a few of the bastards.”109 He also characterized Breier as “a bully and a
dictator who does not permit his officers to think at all.” MPD personnel had to obey the chief’s
orders “without deviation.” Many feared him, according to the officer.
White officers perceived to have transgressed the MPD’s “us-against-them” mentality when
it came to policing Black Milwaukee faced retaliation from department administrators. In one
instance, a white officer assigned to patrol a beat in a majority Black district built a rapport with
Northcott Neighborhood House Director Rev. Lucius Walker. The Organization of Organizations
founder asked the officer, who hailed from Milwaukee’s south side, to teach Northcott youth about
police regulations and how the beat patrol function worked. After speaking about his experiences
working in law enforcement with Black Head Start school children, kids affectionately embraced the
white officer. Chief Breier received word, as newspapers reported on the hug. Soon thereafter,
Special Assignment Squad (SAS) officers questioned the white patrolman about his relationship to
Northcott Neighborhood House, which they knew to be an organizational base for planning civil
rights demonstrations. An hours-long interrogation ensued, whereby the SAS beat the white
patrolman to the point of needing hospitalization. He was subsequently forced to resign due to “socalled civil rights activity,” according to attorneys Jim and Gilda Shellow.110 Chief Breier apparently
wrote the patrolman a recommendation letter for a job in Florida on the understanding that he
would not publicize his beating at the hands of police co-workers.
Perpetrating and covering-up racist police violence was as much a function of the MPD’s
command structure as it was the discretionary choices of police personnel. Breier revised the
department’s administrative hierarchy in ways that facilitated and protected rank-and-file officers
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known to employ violent methods. As Milwaukee Sentinel reporter Gene Cunningham told NACCD
researchers, “a certain portion of the police force employed brutal methods.”111 The MPD’s twelvemember SAS reported directly to the chief of police. It was drawn from across the department and
“responsible only to Breier for whatever purposes he wished.” He was, Cunningham suggested,
“fully aware that such methods were used.” The NACCD field team concluded that Breier ran “a
tough department” that was “impervious to all charges against its offices of brutality.” The
“widespread complaint” of police mistreatment produced “no justification and no redress.”112 Class
position made little difference. As youth program director Mel Hall told NACCD researchers, police
committed “brutality against all Negroes in Milwaukee…middle-class or not, as long as he is black,
police treat him the same.”113 Breier was strict about enforcing the law, even minor offenses, like
parking violations and jaywalking. Because he was so rigid, officers “appeared tougher than they
were before.”
Chief Breier’s disdain for civil rights activists and conflations of political dissent with
lawlessness shaped the MPD’s operational adjustments in the late 1960s. The most notable was his
formation of the Tactical Enforcement Unit (TEU) on August 7, 1967. Breier established the unit
before the embers of the 1967 civil disturbance had cooled. He assigned the all-white “Tactical
Squad” to monitor violent crimes, public demonstrations, crowd control situations, and illicit
behavior on Milwaukee’s Black near north side, Latinx near south side, and “the hippie section” of
the mostly white east side.114 The unit featured seven sergeants and forty-five officers, who cruised
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“troubled areas in unmarked cars,” searching for events that might “spark a riot or lesser civil
disturbance.”115 They applied what one police administrator called “selective enforcement,” whereby
police saturated a particular area with “all of the available manpower.”116 The goal was to “suppress
trouble before it gets out of hand” with just one or two cars.117 This was the essence of Breier’s
reactionary law-and-order ethos. The chief handpicked personnel with the highest arrest totals and a
penchant for intimidation for the Tactical Squad. He formed the unit around the same time that the
Los Angeles Police Department established its famed Special Weapons and Tactics unit.118 The TEU
administered a similar “get tough” version of “riot control” in Milwaukee’s “high crime” areas. 119 It
brandished intimidating weaponry. According to researcher Kenneth Feit, the TEU “patrolled
ghetto neighborhoods with shotguns openly displayed and functioned in a military fashion by
making summary arrests.”120 The TEU was notorious for harassing and arresting Black youth and
radical-left activists on minor, often contrived offenses. The NAACP Youth Council and other Civil
Rights-Black Power organizations referred to the unit as the “Goon Squad.” Its aggressive react first,
ask questions later ethos hardened negative Black perceptions of the MPD “as an occupational army
in a subcultural colony.”121
The TEU symbolized Breier’s reactionary law-and-order approach for accountability
advocates. Like the Special Assignment Squad, the unit reported and was directly accountable to the
chief alone. Other cogs in the police bureaucracy had no control over its actions. When Social
Development Commission (SDC) members Jeanetta Robinson and Alderwoman Vel Phillips
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questioned the Fire and Police Commission about the Tactical Squad’s repressive tactics, its
seemingly exclusive assignment to Black sections, and its lack of African American or Latinx
officers, commissioners said they were “unfamiliar with the inner operations of the police
department.”122 The MFPC, again, deflected responsibility to Breier, who said the SDC had “no
authority to investigate the procedure of the police department.” Armed with his state-sanctioned
authority and the support of most white residents and elected officials, Breier refused to placate his
critics. Instead, the chief attacked the SDC for “condoning crime rather than trying to prevent it.”123
The TEU was, according to the chief, made up of “crime fighters” who operated “strictly according
to the law.” Legal or not, the Tactical Squad’s daily operations personified the MPD’s most
discriminatory practices. It exacerbated media narratives of crime, violence, and disorder on
Milwaukee’s north side. “Instead of the tactical squad preventing a riot from occurring, they are
contributing to the possibility of a riot,”124 Jeanetta Robinson argued. The Tactical Squad’s
oppressive function amplified white fears and racist ideas about Black criminality, indirectly
contributing to harmful cycles of poverty and despair. According to the Milwaukee Star, there was an
upsurge in crime and murder on the north side as a direct result of the TEU’s harsh tactics.125 Breier
had little use for such complaints, exclaiming that “if a citizen does not violate the law, he will never
come in contact with this tactical squad.” Yet, plenty of “law-abiding” Black residents still
encountered the unit’s aggression.126
A biased criminal-legal system shielded the police chief’s reactionary law-and-order regime.
African Americans experienced “unequal justice” in Milwaukee County courts—disproportionate
punishments, stricter sentencing, and “exorbitant bail for minor offenses.” According to
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123 “SDC Got No Answers from Breier,” The Milwaukee Star, March 16, 1968, 1, 17.
124 “SDC Got No Answers from Breier,” The Milwaukee Star, March 16, 1968, 17.
125 “Creative Conditions,” The Milwaukee Star, March 16, 1968, 4.
126 “Creative Conditions,” The Milwaukee Star, March 16, 1968, 4.
122

273

Assemblyman Lloyd Barbee, it was well known in the community that Black families could “not
obtain justice in the courts.”127 Judicial discrimination was “an explosive issue.” Civil rights
advocates regarded Judge Christ Seraphim as the worst offender. He had “a non-judicial
temperament,” Barbee reported to NACCD researchers. Seraphim was “extremely severe with
people…arrested in demonstrations or any other sort of activity with which he [did] not personally
approve.”128 The long-time judge attempted to coerce arrested activists into pledging that they would
never again demonstrate for civil rights in public—a constitutional right—before imposing severe
sentences.129 He applied a “double-standard of justice,” levying higher fines, stricter and longer
punishments to Black defendants. Moreover, state prosecutors purportedly charged white and Black
arrestees differently, despite similar offenses. White residents received lower charges that carried
lighter penalties, while Black defendants faced more serious charges with harsher sentences.130
The court assigned public defenders only to citizens charged with felonies, attorney Alan
Eisenburg said. It rarely advised people charged with misdemeanors of their legal rights. Milwaukee’s
Legal Aid Society advised indigent defendants to take guilty pleas.131 The system “very definitely”
discriminated against poor citizens of color. There had not been “one single conviction of police
brutality in Milwaukee.”132 As of 1967, Milwaukee officials had never held a public inquest hearing
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following any police killing or in-custody death. Had the city called for one after officers shot and
killed Clifford McKissick during the “civil disturbance,” U.S. Attorney Thomas Brennan believed it
would have alleviated racial tensions and Black mistrust of the police.133 When law enforcement
“brutalized” Black Milwaukeeans “without any provocation,” City Hall failed to grant relief. Without
of “a fair and impartial judicial system,” Barbee asserted, efforts to garner police accountability
proved futile. As Eisenburg detailed, Milwaukee police enjoyed the benefits a biased court system
that enabled them to escape prosecution. The attorney once defended a Black police brutality victim
who had seventeen witnesses testify to an officer’s misconduct. The accused patrolman simply told
the court that the defendant was lying and they lost the case. “There has to be some kind of check
on the police,” beyond the press, a strong “civilian review board,” Eisenburg noted. 134
State law established an independent Fire and Police Commission. But the MFPC did not
operate in isolation from local politics. A south side political club, the Milwaukee Metropolitan Civic
Alliance (MMCA), influenced the city’s police bureaucracy in postwar decades. The MMCA
supported pro-growth candidates committed to maintaining the traditional order. This included
Henry Maier in his campaigns for mayor and Wisconsin’s state assembly. As mayor, Maier appointed
at least three MMCA members to the MFPC. That commission’s Chief Examiner/Executive
Secretary, George Ruger, was also a club member. The alliance traded on its connections with City
Hall to get Inspector of Detectives Harold Breier appointed police chief in 1964, ahead of internal
candidates who were more closely aligned with the police department’s liberal law-and-order era.
Breier was an affiliate of the south side civic alliance. The MFPC, comprised of a retired business
executive, local union officials, and an attorney representing the interests of south side
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manufacturers, saw value in Breier becoming chief. This also helps explain why the commission was
so defensive when the Citizens Anti-Police Brutality Committee demanded accountability in 1964.
The MFPC was, to an extent, beholden to the MMCA and “careful to work within the boundaries”
of “archaic law,” according to researcher Carl Hamm.135 While the MMCA supported Democrats
nationally, it flexed a powerful conservative voice in Milwaukee politics. As such, the MFPC
“exemplified the [civic alliance’s] desire to preserve the status quo and the ‘right’ if not the ‘far right’
in politics at the local level.”136 The mayor’s club allegiances also neutralized City Hall’s efforts to
expand police accountability, as he ignored the Martin-Weber Committee’s 1968 call to establish a
new public safety review board that was more accountable to citizens.
When the MFPC appointed Harold Breier as police chief in 1964, Milwaukee civil rights
organizations had only just begun challenging anti-Black racism through direct action street
demonstrations. The city’s burgeoning civil rights insurgency magnified issues of racialized police
violence and lax accountability. Efforts to address policing intersected with and gave shape to related
campaigns to end employment, education, and housing discrimination. Civil rights mobilizations
reciprocally intensified white racial animosities, especially among blue-collar workers, merchants, and
professionals on the south side and other all-white sections of the city. Chief Breier showed little
regard for the physical mistreatment of activists. He once commented about those who resisted the
police, “If they get up again, we’ll knock ‘em down again.”137 In Breier’s view, Black protestors
undermined police-community relations, and not the other way around. Civil rights activists not only
inspired civic disorder, but were responsible for Milwaukee’s rising crime rate. It was because the
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MPD had to “control last summer’s riot and subsequent demonstrations,” distracting them from
standard assignments, that reported crime increased thirty-three percent Breier said in 1968. Civil
rights marches, in Breier’s view, harmed the MPD’s “patrol potential,” as they diverted personnel and
resources away from crime-fighting. To “promote harmonious police-community relations,” he
argued that civil rights groups should teach their followers “the rights and duties of citizens.” Breier
blamed urban ills on the “self-appointed pseudo community leaders” who “taught and preached
disrespect for law and order.”138
The MPD intimidated and surveilled African Americans at Breier’s direction. The chief
expanded the “close surveillance” tactics of his predecessors. Patrolmen interrogated dozens of
Black residents on a routine basis “to know who was on the street in case a crime was committed.” 139
For Breier, overt racial profiling was the most effective means of preventative patrol. Former Police
Captain Carl Hamm, who oversaw the Youth Aid Bureau before being removed by Breier, said it was
informal policy to stop and question any Black residents “discovered after dark outside the area
which most Negroes lived.”140 African Americans, journalist Frank Aukofer wrote, felt “watched” in
their own communities. Suburban white residents, on the other hand, felt protected by the police. 141
Patrolmen were instructed to arrest any Black people who “talked back to a police officer” and
detain on a traffic infraction “any Negro stopped or seen with a white woman in his car.” 142 Chief
Breier instructed subordinates to track the movements and telephone calls of civil rights leaders,
including Lloyd Barbee and Father Groppi. In August 1966, he put the NAACP Youth Council and

He suggested that Father Groppi and the YC ordered Black youth to skip school in favor of demonstrating and
rioting. “Breier Says Police Force Has Served Public Well,” The Milwaukee Journal, June 13, 1968, Accent, 1.
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its “Freedom House” headquarters under surveillance. The YC reported seeing SAS officers
photographing its members.143 Breier argued that police monitoring of Freedom House was in the
group’s interest, speciously arguing they needed “protection” from outside threats. The YC knew the
MPD was conducting surveillance as “a pretext to bully and intimidate.” Under the watchful eye of
plainclothes officers, the department photographed, hassled, and arrested YC members over trivial
non-violent offenses, such as littering, “interfering,” or playing dice. The group said white officers
verbally incited them to riot.144 Police claimed they could “shoot off a few” without any
consequence. In response to the MPD’s scrutiny, the YC conducted its own “surveillance” of
Breier’s home residence.145
Breier’s racial politics informed administrative, or structural decisions he made as police
chief. He refused to establish an internal community relations unit tasked with developing
partnerships with Black and Latinx residents, or neighborhood associations concerned about
interpersonal crime and police violence. Partnering with communities of color to ensure stability
undermined police authority and posed a threat to public order in his view. Breier was hesitant to
champion minority recruitment and refrained from nominating Black patrolmen, detectives, and
ranking officers (two) for promotion. The chief rejected grassroots demands for enhanced civilian
input on devising enforcement strategies, whether offered by civil rights activists or political liberals
and moderates. While Breier insisted that MPD personnel acted without bias, his administrative
choices suggest otherwise. The chief de-emphasized human relations training in the police academy.
New recruits received sixty-two hours of training total, yet only four explored “human relations”

This direction followed the firebombing of the Milwaukee NAACP’s offices, as well as an anonymous bomb threat
called into City Hall. “Anonymous Call Sparked Evacuation, Bomb Hunt,” The Milwaukee Sentinel, August 10, 1966, Page
10, Part 1; “Curious Onlookers Visit Bomb Site,” The Milwaukee Sentinel, August 10, 1966; Jones, The Selma of the North,
150.
144 Police also allegedly told YC members that they hoped they would have to serve in the Vietnam War—a global
conflict that saw a disproportionate share of poor and working-class Black citizens killed.
145 They held two “protective vigils” on September 30 and October 1, 1966. Shortly thereafter, the YC announced the
formation of its “Commando” unit, which Breier viewed as a direct provocation. Jones, The Selma of the North, 150-152.
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issues. Those that did failed to address minoritized perspectives, racial discrimination, or the
troubled relationship between Black and Latinx communities and law enforcement. The only
training film that remotely dealt with “prejudice” emphasized Polish-American experiences. Here,
the MPD diverged from previous liberal law-and-order administrations. During the 1950s and even
early 1960s, former Inspector Raymond Dahl said the MPD built strong working relationships
between the MPD and Black community leaders, in service of crime prevention.146 Dahl saw “race
relations” as a “problem” just starting to be “scratched” by the MPD when Breier was named chief.
After 1964, this programming was almost entirely ignored.

The War on Crime and Milwaukee
In the wake of the 1960s urban uprisings, the Johnson administration invested heavily in
policing. Concurrently, it hoped to reign in racist law enforcement practices that threatened to
destabilize Black communities and further undermine the police image. Racialized police violence
and misconduct threatened the administration’s efforts to empower inner city neighborhoods
through “Great Society” employment training and economic development programs. Federal
officials planned to compel America’s thousands of individual police agencies to be more democratic
and value-neutral in their discretionary enforcement practices, ensuring that police better complied
with civil rights laws and were held accountable to all citizens. The federal state built on a liberal law-

Dahl retired from the MPD in 1965. The 31-year MPD veteran was proud of his work. He strongly backed the
MPD’s beat patrol program, which he saw as “the answer to juvenile delinquency and to traffic enforcement…the
answer to crime prevention.” Still, like Breier, Dahl bypassed police discretion as a factor in generating “the recent wave
of civil disobedience,” asserting that “law and order” was “a community problem, not a police problem.” Schools and
parents had to do more to teach “respect for the law.” “How One City Keeps Its Streets Safe,” U.S. News & World
Report, September 28, 1964, 70. Dahl retired from the MPD to become an instructor at the University of Louisville’s
Southern Police Institute. There, he organized a seminar on “race relations and riot control” that was partially funded by
a $500,000 Ford Foundation grant. Dahl had competed with Breier, among others, for the chief of police position.
“Police Here Understand Race Relations: Dahl,” The Milwaukee Journal, October 6, 1965, Part 3, 1; Milwaukee Police
Department, Annual Report, 1965, 23.
146

279

and-order agenda proposed by the Truman administration after World War II.147 Yet the
administration’s overarching goal was to strengthen law enforcement, so as to better manage periods
of civil unrest and political dissent.148 Police militarization, via grant-funded technology and weapons
upgrades, helped advance this process. While most police leaders rejected law enforcement
liberalism in the 1940s, “revisions and renovations” to policing amid the social crises of the 1960s
drew in “practitioners and expert counselors” shaped by global experiences with anti-communist,
counter-insurgency missions.149 To assure public safety, the President’s Commission on Law
Enforcement and Administration of Justice proposed establishing criminal justice planning agencies,
standardizing the collection of crime data, and investing millions in police professionalization
through a dedicated federal agency—the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA).150

The Truman administration aimed to shore up the “first civil right” of citizens: freedom from violence.” See: Naomi
Murakawa, The First Civil Right: How Liberals Built Prison America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014).
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The commission argued for aligning police with government institutions focused on social and
economic development, including the Community Action Programs established as part of the War
on Poverty.151 Police participation, in theory, helped control crime, tempered youth delinquency, and
mitigated prospective civil disorders.152
The Johnson administration framed the War on Poverty and War on Crime as twin
enterprises—equality and order as two sides of the same coin. However, making connections
between law enforcement and federal anti-poverty programs did more to aggravate inequality than
aid distressed urban communities. As historian Elizabeth Hinton has argued, the liberal
administration “operated from the assumption that black community pathology caused poverty and
crime.” It “supported a punitive transformation of urban social programs” founded “on the
principle that saturating a targeted area with surveillance equipment and police officers performing
both social welfare and crime control functions would effectively restore order.”153 Even as they
contributed to social welfare programs, the government held municipal police responsible for

accessed January 20, 2020, http://time.com/3746059/war-on-crime-history.
151 The Challenge of Crime served as the basis for the 1968 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, which, among
other provisions, established the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration within the U.S. Department of Justice.
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Government Printing Office, 1967).
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“identifying criminals and removing them from the streets.”154 The economic costs of civil violence
and the “paramilitary response” that a small percentage of Black residents engaged in convinced
federal officials that the War on Poverty’s “housing, education, and training programs” were
indefensible spending priorities.155 As the administration began closing War on Poverty programs in
Black communities, scaling back funding for “autonomous grassroots organizations,” local police
departments filled the void. The bulk of federal domestic aid to cities was soon being directed
towards punitive criminal justice solutions as opposed to rehabilitative, non-violent public health
solutions.156 The transition of the federal War on Poverty to the War on Crime in the late 1960s and
into the 1970s was supported by the same racist, criminogenic ideas about Black life and culture that
characterized the Great Migration era.157 Not only did federal officials ignore the institutional racism
that conditioned the postwar urban crisis, but they cataloged Black civil disobedience alongside
lawless white resistance. This helped reinforce a thorny middle ground that allowed both racial
liberals and conservatives to argue for enhanced policing and punishment in response to civil unrest
rooted in racism and inequality.158 In this way, the Johnson administration helped lay the
foundations for the nation’s late-century “carceral state.”159
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In Milwaukee, the War on Crime converged with the police bureaucracy’s mixed efforts to,
on the one hand, impose law and order amid rising reported crime and, on the other, gradually
democratize police hiring, build mutual trust in predominantly Black and Brown neighborhoods, and
improve accountability structures in the face of sustained police violence. Chief Breier’s reactionary
law-and-order ethos contrasted with the Johnson administration’s liberal “community relations”
recommendations. Milwaukee police chiefs had embraced liberal law-and-order reforms in the
1940s. Yet, Breier eschewed any that called for closer working relations between police and
communities of color vulnerable to police violence, poverty, and crime. This contrasted the outward
pronouncements of police chiefs addressing similar public safety concerns in racially segregated U.S.
cities. Breier joined police leaders who “decried federal encroachment” while they “craved federal
dollars.”160 He was willing to apply for police equipment and computer upgrades that improved the
MPD’s technological and weapon’s capacities. But Breier was skeptical of interventions from
Washington, D.C., or Madison for that matter, that he believed might weaken his authority. He saw
the creation of “community relations units,” independent civilian oversight boards, and racial
diversity in police hiring and promotions as a threat to his ability to control MPD regulations,
procedures, and outcomes. Therefore, he refused to apply for federal criminal justice planning grants
that went towards police-community relations improvements and opening lines of communication

against reform” in the criminal justice arena, “enabling all manner of repressive policing and wanton violence to go
unchallenged.” As Stuart Schrader has argued, federalism “was the same force that “sanctioned passivity amid lynchings
and other racist outrages.” Schrader, Badges without Borders, 118-119. Grafting the War on Crime onto city governments,
like any national project of its size and scope, was a knotty process. Local dynamics threatened to undermine the intent
and application of federal criminal justice directives. Significantly, conservative political forces at the national level relied
on the ideology of federalism to ensure state control over War on Crime implementation and expenditures. This blocked
some municipal criminal justice planning agencies form receiving direct federal aid, in addition to CAPs eligible for War
on Crime funding. The Johnson Crime Commission argued that Black-run social institutions that had received federal
anti-poverty funding had failed urban youth. As a result, Black young people expressed their discontent in a disorderly
fashion. The commission subscribed to Labor Department undersecretary Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s thesis that, despite
racial discrimination and inequality, a lack of “strong and loving parental guidance” had produced a generation of Black
youth prone to criminality. Such racist assumptions influenced the PCLEAJ’s “battle plan.” Hinton, From the War on
Poverty to the War on Crime, 101.
160 Schrader, Badges without Borders, 114.
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with residents living in “high crime” areas. Milwaukee’s police chief worked to rhetorically and
administratively limit opportunities for outside meddling into the department’s affairs. This
presented a problem, as the Department of Justice mandated state and local police agencies
receiving any federal aid comply with the 1964 Civil Rights Act’s anti-discrimination provisions.
Breier’s resistance to federal directives, in turn, hardened Black and Latinx perceptions of police
illegitimacy and unaccountability.
Breier insisted in the press and before police accountability advocates that the MPD already
had an effective “community relations” program. The department printed and distributed “crime
prevention brochures” on auto theft, muggings, women’s self-defense, and burglaries. Police
lectured to school children, handed out pamphlets, recognized citizen contributions to crime
control, and set up event booths for police recruitment. To the chief, these activities generated the
“personal contact” among police and community groups that reformers demanded. The MPD
developed “citizen cooperation” in support of the city’s “crime fighting program.” In other words,
“community relations” for Breier relied on one-way communications of police policy to citizens
interested in the police function. There was no preventative imperative to involve the community in
the day-to-day work of controlling crime; police responded after it occurred. Citizens were
responsible for answering police questions when asked, then moving out of the way. Residents did
not help shape crime control or order maintenance strategies, set rules, or impose discipline. The
MPD’s “excellent” community relations program was, according to Chief Breier about “a common
understanding of teamwork, fair play, and wholesome living.”161 That was “community relations of

All patrolmen and detectives were “trained to be courteous and to use good judgment and common sense in their
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Safety Building. Officers volunteered time lecturing on crime prevention, “the dangers of drug abuse,” “women’s selfdefense,” and “citizen-police cooperation.” They did so at parent-teacher gatherings, business events, and church and
fraternal association meetings. Feit, “The Milwaukee Police Department, March-April, 1970,” 9; “Breier Says Whole
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the highest form.”162
Milwaukee’s policing history shows that the relationship between federal law enforcement
experts and local police officials was not always one of collaboration, as scholars have suggested.
Chief Breier rejected the main problem areas outlined by the National Advisory Commission on
Civil Disorders in its 1968 report.163 He did not see psychological or cultural sensitivity screenings as
necessary in determining who patrolled in predominantly Black spaces. Police review boards,
likewise, were anathema to police administrators in Milwaukee and a threat to the chief’s legal
authority. Breier saw no use for detailed policy guidelines that provided officers with discretionary
guidance on determining whether criminal offenders should be arrested according to contextual
factors. Lawlessness was lawlessness and the chief wanted his officers to arrest all violators. Breier
did not support Black police recruitment for the sake of diversity. The “best” applicants should be
hired, regardless of race, based on exam scores and job fitness. The chief paid little mind to federal,
state, and local coordination around police planning, preferring to set his own strategic direction for
his department. He eschewed federal aid for community-based crime control agencies staffed by
social workers, city employees, and police. Breier also rejected social welfare agencies that
functioned outside the purview of the criminal justice system, like Youth Service Bureaus. While he
opposed bringing communities into closer contact with the MPD, that did not mean Breier refrained
from monitoring populations he viewed as criminal and potentially rebellious. While the federal
government expressed concern about a vulnerable police image and law enforcement’s perceived

According to Breier, the MPD logged 3,200 hours of community relations work in the first four months of 1968. The
previous year, he added a mandatory 12-hour training course on “the importance of proper decision making by line and
staff supervisors,” a video for supervisors titled “Police-Minority,” and concert performances by the MPD band at
schools. Breier also noted that the MPD’s Youth Aid Bureau coordinated discussions between young people and
professional athletes. Children in police custody received special attention from the MPD, he maintained. Commanding
officers evaluated cases and brought in parents for conferences intended to “reach an understanding of the law.” “Breier
Says Police Force Has Served Public Well,” The Milwaukee Journal, June 13, 1968, “Accent,” 1.
163 The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, The Kerner Report (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2016).
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legitimacy in a charged political atmosphere, Breier saw the MPD’s image as strengthened by 1967’s
civil unrest.
Advancing police reforms, to the extent that they had any control over the implementation
process, fell to Mayor Maier, the Common Council, and the MFPC. For City Hall, enacting even
minimal police reforms without alienating white voters who supported the status quo upheld by
Breier and his allies was a delicate process. While all three institutions historically backed the
independent authority of Milwaukee’s police chief, they, unlike him, saw opportunities to make
piecemeal adjustments that appeased both accountability advocates and besieged Black residents
mistrustful of the police and eager to more responsibly curtail rising crime. Still, they struggled
mightily to institute federal community relations guidelines with Breier in charge of the MPD. As
studies on Los Angeles and Chicago illustrate, Milwaukee was well behind in creating a revised
“community relations philosophy” as it grappled with its crisis of police legitimacy.164 The city also
diverged from San Francisco, St. Louis, Atlanta, and Baltimore, where neighborhood centers
received citizen complaints, involved “the community in analyzing and correcting its own
problems,” and emphasized “self-determination, communication of grievances, department
feedback, civilian crime prevention and revised training programs for recruits.”165 In this way,
citizens were brought into the process of expanding—and further legitimating—police power.
Against this backdrop, Milwaukee’s police bureaucracy applied for criminal justice funding to
shore up its policing system. The recruitment, training, and assignment of Black officers signified the
most palatable reform in the wake of the 1967 civil disturbance. The Johnson Crime Commission
had listed Black police hiring among its policy recommendations, finding that “for police in a Negro
community to be predominantly white can serve as a dangerous irritant.”166 The NACCD echoed
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calls for police diversification, among other structural recommendations in its 1968 report. The
LEAA awarded state criminal justice agencies federal dollars to meet specific policing objectives.
Following passage of the 1968 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, Governor Warren
Knowles established the Wisconsin Council on Criminal Justice (WCCJ).167 The council conducted
state criminal justice planning and administered Safe Streets Act funds in Wisconsin. Recruiting
Black patrolmen became part of a larger plan to alleviate police-Black citizen tensions on
Milwaukee’s north side. For racial liberals, the approach corresponded with the equal opportunity
and “maximum feasible participation” provisions guiding the Johnson administration’s Great Society
platform.168 Yet expanding Black participation in the system without challenging law enforcement’s
basic charge of defending white capitalist interests, or preserving the subordinate status of poor and
working-class people of color, meant racialized police violence would persist.169 The federal
government only superficially addressed the street-level discretion, oversight, and disciplining of
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administration’s anti-poverty agenda. They called for the “maximum feasible participation” of poor people living in
designated poverty areas. This included Milwaukee’s north side. The Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO)
distributed grants to local community action agencies responsible for planning and dispersing federal funds to grassroots
antipoverty agencies. CAPs were intended to empower poor people to lift themselves up out of poverty on their own
initiative. However, they left vulnerable Black residents liable for the War on Poverty’s success or failure. Federal
officials failed to name white racism or hold to account the federal, state, county, and municipal agencies responsible for
historical patterns of injustice. The Johnson administration maintained a liberal rationale for conducting CAPs,
emphasizing poor Black behavior as the primary driver of metropolitan inequality. The federal government located the
onus for change on poor people themselves, asking them to fix entrenched economic conditions of the white majority’s
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officers that enabled discriminatory enforcement, abuses of power, and lax accountability.
Chief Breier avoided race-conscious recruitment drives engaged in by other big city police
departments. Civil Rights Attorney Terrance Pitts noted that he removed Black patrolmen from the
civil disturbance area.170 A number quit the department because they had to be “Uncle Toms” to
make it professionally. In 1968, the chief addressed Black police recruitment and its place in the
police bureaucracy’s public relations efforts. Although he said it was the MFPC’s job to oversee
employment, Breier said he “made it a matter of policy to urge all our law enforcement people to ask
qualified persons to make application for the position.” While he insisted this “solicitation” was “to
all people regardless of color or creed,” the chief could not say how many Black men served on the
department. Estimates for June 1967 pointed to thirty-five to forty of 2,000 sworn officers, with
Captain Dewey Russ being the highest ranking Black employee.171 Attrition rates were high. The
MPD was only two percent Black, “with little chance of improvement in the foreseeable future.”172
Breier’s racist attitudes “permeated the entire department,” a NACCD field team representative
wrote. The chief denied that Black officers possessed cultural fluency, or that their experiences and
familiarity with the Black community diverged from the white rank-and-file. All personnel
comprised “a vital part of our community relations program,” Breier insisted. Black recruitment
“would help any police department’s community relations program,” he reasoned. Yet, Breier made
no direct effort to recruit African Americans and undermined the MFPC’s efforts. Black personnel
had to genuflect to white superiors in order to advance in rank. Breier, some said, undermined

“Interview with Terrance Pitts,” 3, “Milwaukee, Wisconsin, Materials Resulting from Field Team Trip Sept. 27, 1967Oct. 3, 1967.”
171 “Breier Says Police Force Has Record of Service to Public,” The Milwaukee Journal, June 13, 1968, “Accent,” 2. Of
1,800 sworn personnel on the MPD, the NACCD field team reported “only 70” were Black. Assemblyman Barbee
counted no more than forty. These counts varied because the police department and MFPC did not track race in
employment. “Adequacy to City’s Response to Grievances,” 1, “Milwaukee, Wisconsin, Materials Resulting from Field
Team Trip Sept. 27, 1967-Oct. 3, 1967.”
172 “Potential after Riot,” 1, “Milwaukee, Wisconsin, Materials Resulting from Field Team Trip Sept. 27, 1967-Oct. 3,
1967.”
170

288

promotional opportunities.173 Promotion had little to do with “professional abilities.” Officers
advanced because they agreed with Breier and were deemed “controllable.”174
The city appeared to take demands for improved police accountability structures, minority
recruitment, and the need for culturally responsive policing seriously as the War on Crime ramped
up. However, it inevitably sabotaged its own narrow reform proposals as a result of the police chief’s
immense power. A prime initiative was hiring a “Community Relations Specialist” (CRS) to handle
citizen police complaints, lecture on “human relations” at the police academy, speak to community
groups about the police function, and recruit Black and Latinx officers.175 The first CRS was
appointed in November 1967, in the wake of civil unrest. The position was initially approved by
Mayor Maier and the Common Council in 1966.176 Richard Artisan, a Black police officer with FBI
experience, got the job but resigned within six months. He stated in a public letter that “community
relations programs require the involvement, cooperation, and assignment of uniformed personnel
who are committed to its success.” The MFPC, Artisan alleged, delayed the implementation of new
procedures, held hearings behind closed doors, and deprived its own specialist of a “functional role
in processing complaints.”177 He said he could not adequately represent the interests of the
community.
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Likewise, Rev. Kenneth Bowen, a Black pastor and respected community leader, referred to
the job as “a sinecure to appease the black community.” The new CRS “resented the intimidation”
that police bureaucrats exerted. The position lacked authority to follow up on public grievances. The
department blocked the CRS from contacting accusers, even to inform them of a complaint status.
When CRS Bowen criticized Chief Breier for his personal obstruction, the MFPC admonished him
behind closed doors, urging Bowen not to speak to reporters. The local press objected to this
exclusion, citing a freedom of information violation. Rev. Bowen began referring cases to the
Wisconsin Civil Liberties Union over the MFPC. Protecting the police image and cooling
opportunities for dissent seemed to be the commission’s sole priorities, not instilling justice for
aggrieved citizens.
Chief Breier deliberately undermined the CRS’ utility. He offered little to no institutional
support to Richard Artisan or Rev. Kenneth Bowen. Breier refused to assist on dispute resolutions
between police and community members that the CRS mediated. Without the chief’s backing, and
thus rank-and-file support, the CRS failed to repair damaged community relations, instill trust, and
encourage Black young people to join the MPD. Breier declined to appoint the few existing Black
officers on the force to help the CRS and MFPC recruitment efforts. In addition, he squandered
federal money earmarked for Black and Latinx Police Aide recruitment by directing the bulk of the
grant towards lecturing lower-to-intermediate elementary school children; he avoided high school
students who might presently seek a police career. As CRS Bowen observed with frustration, the
Breier downplayed the extent to which Black people “identified [the police] with the arm of
repression.”178 When the Common Council Judiciary Committee held a hearing in 1970 about
strengthening the CRS and including a stronger oversight function, Breier testified that he opposed
civilian review of police complaints and argued it would hinder police morale. The motion was
178
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shelved; more than half of the Common Council was beholden to Breier. As Louis Miller, the
MFPC’s first Black commissioner stated after his 1973 resignation, “None of the actions we’ve taken
have done anything to slow down citizen complaints…the same things are being done by the police
department.”179
Consequently, the police bureaucracy’s community relations strategy foundered. It was
difficult to enact substantive reforms when the police chief possessed so much authority.
“Community relations” improvements had to correspond with Breier’s willingness to participate.
This led to wasteful spending. For instance, federal grant money was used to purchase and outfit a
“community relations mobile unit” in 1969.180 Police patrolmen drove the vehicle—a customized
bus—into communities of color. There, they lectured to the public on the benefits of policing
careers and people’s responsibilities in helping law enforcement control crime and maintain order. In
1971, an evaluation team determined that the community relations mobile unit “did not meet goals
of minority recruitment or specialized training.”181 This failure, along with a growing number of
violent police-citizen encounters, encouraged Black community leaders to take a far more active role
in police testing, hiring, and training.
Administrative intransigence was not the only reason Milwaukee’s police-community
relations program failed to meet its objectives; the MFPC had a credibility problem. Many Black and
Latinx folk saw the commission as withdrawn and beholden to the mayor and police chief. As a
1975 Milwaukee Journal series documented, all but one Fire and Police Commissioner had politically
donated to Mayor Maier’s political campaigns as of 1974.182 Residents pondered the commission’s
capacity for hearing alleged grievances and fairly assessing police misconduct violations. The MFPC
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had not dismissed a single police officer based on a citizen complaint since it gained the authority to
do so in 1911, despite several known cases of police brutality and abuses of power. The MPD’s
Bureau of Internal Affairs (BIA), handpicked by Chief Breier, investigated the few police complaints
that the commission heard.183 The bureau denied the CRS access to police records and reports when
conducting investigations into police brutality. The BIA also conducted investigations on public
complaints brought by citizens to police district stations. The BIA was said to be chronically
“understaffed,” its employees “overworked and untrained for the subtleties of following through
with complaints.” Breier only appointed aging officers to the bureau who professed loyalty to the
chief and the MPD’s existing structures. No officers with college degrees served in the BIA. Their
job, according to one researcher, was to “erase problems,” nothing more. Chief Breier, Newspaper
publisher Irwin Maier stated, oversaw all charges of police brutality to ensure that the truth remained
concealed.184
One reason the MFPC struggled to remove abusive officers was the “freeholder’s clause” in
the 1911 statute, which stated that only property owners could file grievances with the commission.
The Common Council voted to change the City Charter in 1968 to expand the pool of potential
complainants to “qualified electors.”185 The Wisconsin State Assembly also approved its own
procedural reform measure. Nonetheless, the MFPC continued to deny youth, passersby, and people
unable to vote due to a criminal conviction from filing complaints. The Ad Hoc Committee on
Police Administration (AHCPA) fought to change the verbiage from “electors” to any “person”
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with a complaint, as it made a series of accountability recommendations in November 1968. 186
The MFPC was historically secretive. When the WCCJ awarded the commission $35,000 in
Safe Streets Act funds to write a comprehensive plan for criminal justice improvements, a draft was
submitted and adopted in a closed Common Council session. The MFPC held hearings on police
misconduct behind closed doors as well. The City Attorney objected to this practice on the grounds
that citizens deserved a fair hearing. The commission was not legally obligated to do so, however.
Back-and-forth delayed implementation of a revised complaint procedure.187 “Mired in the status
quo,” the MFPC put more energy towards defending an outmoded, ineffective oversight model than
towards proposing reforms that allowed the people to determine “how the department was run.” 188

Struggling for Police Accountability
In rejecting “police-community relations” reforms that saw a more proactive role for law
enforcement in improving the social and economic conditions facing his city’s Black and Brown
populations, Chief Breier and the MPD indirectly strengthened the arguments of critics who
supported liberal law-and-order. His reactionary approach to police tactics and administration
rendered preventative policing strategies a more attractive solution, even if these too called for a
high rate of taxpayer investment and rested on precarious public perceptions of police legitimacy.
This was the goal for most African Americans in Milwaukee. Black citizens wanted to be included in
the police bureaucracy, believed in law enforcement’s capacity for change, and hoped to have a
meaningful role in the police decision-making and oversight process. Moreover, few accountability
advocates hoped to “abolish” the MPD. Rather, they aimed to reconstitute the department around
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liberal principles of access, fairness, and inclusion. And yet, Chief Breier and Milwaukee’s whitecontrolled political establishment treated even reformist police accountability advocates as radical
leftists seeking to overthrow the established order.
In the summer of 1968, after two hundred straight nights of marching for an open housing
ordinance, Milwaukee’s NAACP Youth Council turned its attention towards the issue of racialized
police violence. The group implored Breier to meet and discuss “police-community relations”
improvements. That the chief negotiate with “the poverty stricken, the ghetto minority and the
youth generation…venting their wrath upon the only identifiable image of their government, the
police officer,” in his view, was “hogwash.”189 Yet, this was the crux of the problem—police were
often the only state agents that many segregated Black residents encountered on a daily basis. The
YC took special issue with the department’s TEU, which they perceived as a repressive unit
authorized by the chief to stamp out civil rights activists and aggressively impose racial control on
Milwaukee’s north side.190 The council gathered more than two thousand signatures for a petition
that demanded one particularly violent TEU officer be removed from the unit, as well as from
policing Black neighborhoods. That July, the MPD arrested two YC members at a tavern. Following
this incident, the council urgently called for a meeting with the MFPC, which was evidently working
with the Milwaukee Commission on Community Relations to find solutions to the inner city’s
policing crisis. For the YC, it was important that Black police officers, “who have an understanding
of the people and their problems,” take the lead in any new community relations program. 191 The
group attended an MFPC meeting on July 26, 1968. There, they demanded the removal of Tactical
Squad officer Armando Brazzoni. Father James Groppi and YC members accused him of using
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“threats and coercion” and “inciting violence by his attitude and action.”192 Residents shared firsthand accounts of Brazzoni’s aggression, as well as the brutality of TEU officers in general. Breier,
meanwhile, said he investigated the complaints and, not surprisingly, found no wrongdoing. The
MFPC continued to act as a firewall for the chief. Commission chair Francis Swietlik informed the
YC they had no power to tell the chief where to assign his personnel. If a qualified citizen registered
a “lawful” complaint against an officer, they would conduct a trial. Alderwoman Vel Phillips
attempted to compel action in the Common Council, such as transferring police officers “considered
to be hostile or contemptuous toward black people.” However, her all-white colleagues voted down
the proposal.193
Assemblyman Barbee, at the time Wisconsin’s only Black legislator, documented the MPD’s
surveillance and often brutal practices as evidence in legislative bills that addressed Milwaukee’s
unchecked police authority. This included police “tapping telephone lines,” following civil rights
leaders,” “parking around their homes,” “excessive scrutiny of private lives,” “keeping police
dossiers on civil rights activists,” “photographing demonstrators and those present at public
hearings.”194 Barbee outlined the need for Black “community patrols” on the north side, where
residents “overwhelmed by invading white armies in blue” would feel safe navigating their own
neighborhoods. In one of the earliest articulations of Black “community control” of the police in
Milwaukee, Barbee argued that patrolmen could train Black youth and attorneys on how to educate
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residents on their civil rights, register grievances, and deal with abusive police and a biased criminallegal system that was “either unwilling or unable to believe that policemen lie.” Those who “daily
experienced the ongoing denial of justice” were best prepared “to operate programs to alleviate the
misadministration of justice.” As Barbee’s work with the Citizens Anti-Police Brutality Committee in
1964 and 1965 revealed, city officials ignored police brutality complaints, “regardless of the person
or group to whom they were presented.” The inability to right police wrongs “through conventional
channels” amplified Black community mistrust and established a dire need for reform. Barbee joined
in calling for Black police recruitment and training. However, added that these programs should also
educate white residents, so they would not over react to seeing African American police. Black youth
must also be included in the MPD’s Police Aide program, Barbee noted.
Milwaukee newspapers confronted Chief Breier’s hands-off approach to police-community
relations before civil violence struck in 1967. The Milwaukee Journal called for a reform program that
embraced preventative approaches to controlling crime. It editorialized that white patrolmen
symbolized a wider system of racial injustice to many Black citizens, who needed to feel understood
in order to properly value the police function. To “help prevent trouble before it starts,” the door
must be open to “persons the police regard as trouble makers.”195 Police, moreover, should value
citizen contributions to order maintenance. The MPD could not rely on “crowd control and riot
regulation” alone. Still, the Journal and others making the case for police reform did not make
connections between structural racism, police “boundary work,” and the persistence of poverty and
crime on Milwaukee’s segregated north side. Updated human relations training programs and district
level “police-citizen liaison committees” would not address policing’s core function of repressing
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vulnerable workers and the poor whose discontent was seen by elites as a threat to the traditional
social and economic order.
A study committee formed by the Wisconsin legislature following the release of the NACCD
report chided the Milwaukee police chief’s “Pollyanna” attitude towards “police-community
relations.”196 Legislators concluded that there was “as much desire for law and order” on the near
north side as there was in surrounding communities. Police had to work harder to earn the respect
of “the ghetto community” in order to resolve tensions. Breier’s refusal to cooperate with the
Governor’s Commission on Law Enforcement to procure federal aid and his unwillingness to attend
the 1968 International Police Chiefs Association meeting rankled investigators, who also chastised
Milwaukee’s Common Council for not concerning itself with police rules and practices. Aldermen
historically passed resolutions on routine decisions, like changing fiscal allowances for police
uniforms and transferring funds through city coffers. Increasing racial tensions between the police
and Black citizens, as well as a rise in reported street crime in the late 1960s, encouraged the
Common Council to debate police-community relations and the city’s civilian police complaint
structures. Aldermen discussed Milwaukee’s lawful controls over the chief of police and the need for
a rigorous police department study. Between 1965 and 1972, the Common Council introduced at
least six ordinances related to police-community relations and the pacification of racial tensions.
Most followed the “storm of riots” around the country from 1967 to 1968. 197
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While government studies did nothing to alter the legal parameters of police power in
Milwaukee, Mayor Maier nevertheless insisted on commissioning a new one to determine how the
city might reduce police-community tensions and improve the police function. Many in Milwaukee’s
Black community saw this as a face-saving measure. In 1968, Maier appointed the Martin-Weber
Committee (MWC) to improve the organizational function of city government.198 The body
recommended several notable public safety improvements. Its members agreed with the growing
consensus among police accountability advocates that the MFPC should have the power to remove
fire and police chiefs “at its pleasure,” while also setting “indefinite terms” of employment. 199 The
MWC lamented the commission’s “limited authority” on rule-making and personnel matters.
Furthermore, it saw Breier’s concentrated power as “a serious organizational flaw.” The chief was
“neither elected nor accountable to an elected official or body, directly or indirectly.”200 The public
was blocked from offering input on how their communities were policed and lacked any institutional
mechanism to address perceived misconduct.
The Martin-Weber Committee implicitly denounced the existing statutory framework of
police power that privileged Milwaukee’s police chief. Bringing the community into the decisionmaking process, the MWC argued, would provide the MPD with “a broader base than would
otherwise exist for the acceptance and support of enforcement policies.” Among its proposals, the
committee called for a more comprehensive police function that went beyond “apprehending law
breakers.” Its proposals for enhanced “visibility” and oversight mirrored the Johnson Crime
Commission’s 1967 recommendation for more “effective legislative, executive, and judicial review
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and control” of the police.201 The MWC wrote that “civilian control” of the MPD be “substantially
increased.” To do so, it called for the MFPC to function as a true “policy board.” “Personnel
matters”—the “selection, appointment, promotion, demotion and discharge of fire and police
officers”—required bureaucratic oversight, well outside of the MPD’s purview. This revised “Public
Safety Board” “would exercise policy-making authority over many aspects of the Department” and
be liable for “budgeting, community relations, physical facilities, organization, compensation, rules
of conduct, research and evaluation of performance.”202 Breier opposed the concept as “destructive
of police morale.”203 Around this time, the Common Council and Wisconsin Assembly both
introduced bills that limited Milwaukee Police Chiefs to terms of five to six years, subject to renewal.
Neither measure passed.
Racial liberals remained at the vanguard of Milwaukee’s police accountability movement in
the late 1960s. A grassroots coalition, the Ad Hoc Committee on Police Administration (AHCPA),
formed after the release of NACCD report in February 1968. The committee of veteran civil rights
activists sought to change law enforcement policies in ways that increased Black representation,
input, and oversight in Milwaukee’s police bureaucracy. They identified approaches to reforming
local police administration: passing ordinances, revising statutes, applying community pressure, and
enacting “test cases.” The AHCPA was rooted in Milwaukee’s legal and Catholic civil rights
community. The Milwaukee Archdiocese’s social justice arm, the Council on Urban Life (CUL),
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galvanized the AHCPA. A legal and ethical responsibility drove the group’s police-community
relations proposals. Attorney Jack Eisendrath chaired the committee, which advocated six main
objectives: First, revising the 1911 statute so that all persons in first-class cities could file lawful
grievances against the police, not only electors or property-holders. Second, establishing judicial
review of MFPC decisions. Third, creating an independent staff with subpoena powers to review all
police complaints. Fourth, expanding the MFPC from five to seven members, each serving threeyear terms. Fifth, passing a statute that would limit police and fire chiefs to five-year
appointments.204 Finally, recruiting and promoting more Black police officers.205
The reformist AHCPA believed in procedural justice and the fair imposition of public order
by law enforcement. The phrase “police brutality” was notably absent from the committee’s
demands. The group did not single out white racial violence committed against Black demonstrators,
nor did it highlight the MPD’s surveillance of civil rights activists. Alternatively, the AHCPA saw it
as “essential to the maintenance of law and order in any community that citizens live with respect
for the police.” In turn, “an effective police force must have respect for and understanding of the
people in a community in which the police seek to enforce the law.”206 The AHCPA noted the
MPD’s exceptional status, observing that people “pointed with pride to a police force which had
gained a preeminent position in the Nation.” However, the department’s community relations
program had become “sorely strained,” aggravating tensions “between citizens and police in the
Central City.” “Riots and destruction” were not the answer, but neither was the “sheer force and
violence” employed by police against groups of color “yearning…for social acceptance.”207 The
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AHCPA delivered its recommendations to Mayor Maier’s Committee on City Government
Reorganization on February 29, 1968.208 For the first time, Milwaukee police accountability
advocates looked to set term limits on the police chief, as well as a mandatory performance review.
The support of Black elected officials helped further the AHCPA’s agenda. Alderwoman Vel
Phillips worked with the committee to draft ordinances and introduced them in the Common
Council. She argued that Chief Breier was “accountable to no one but himself,” that he possessed
“vast powers” in need of being reined in.209 On July 12, 1968, Phillips proposed a measure that
empowered any person eligible to vote in the state, a “qualified elector,” to register a police
complaint with the MFPC. This measure would supplant the “freeholder” requirement written into
state law. It passed the Common Council and informed the legislature’s subsequent decision to
remove the property requirement from the 1911 statute. Unfortunately for Philips, her colleagues
shelved the remainder of the AHCPA’s recommendations. One required the MFPC to investigate all
police complaints and establish an independent staff within the commission to assist with processing
citizen grievances. The Community Relations Specialist would also gain access to police misconduct
files.210 Another proposal would have established “a proper police-community relations program
inside the MPD,” as lobbied for by the AHCPA. Finally, Phillips had proposed that the police chief
assign more Black officers to north side districts.
The Council on Urban Life, beyond its leadership capacity in the AHCPA, worked to
address the “deep hostility” and “abrasive relationships” between Black citizens and the police.211
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The “social planning and urban affairs” non-profit played an active role in supporting Black-led
struggles for school integration, open housing, and welfare rights. Father Patrick Flood, its
Executive Director, was a staunch human rights advocate inspired by the civil rights movement and
the Catholic Church’s Vatican II reforms.212 He sat beside Father Groppi in September 1967 when
the YC advisor testified to the MPD’s brutal treatment of Black citizens before the NACCD in
Washington, D.C. The two priests joined YC Commandos and community representatives from
Watts, New York, and Omaha.213 When it came to policing, the CUL’s Social Action Committee
acknowledged that grassroots activists lacked coordination on police reform. “Fragmentation” and a
lack of “organization and unity” frequently undermined change. The CUL spoke out in support of
Milwaukee’s new Black Panther Party chapter, which was experiencing police intimidation and
retaliation from the MPD and FBI. The police “are not repressive because they are sadistic
monsters,” Flood remarked. Rather, “they are because they sense that repression is what society
expects from them in regard to blacks, browns, the poor and the politically unpopular.” The CUL
admonished the MPD and MFPC’s “unparalleled secrecy.” It was no wonder that the public had a
“complete lack of faith” in the criminal justice system. The council criticized Breier’s lifetime tenure
and his refusal to cooperate with investigative and regulatory bodies, such as the Johnson Crime
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and hopelessness” that spilled out into rioting and police-community violence. Groppi continued, “When we teach him
nonviolence, then I think we ought to talk about nonviolence in the black community. If he is not going to be
nonviolent, I don't think the black man should be told to be non-violent.” “Commission Meeting, September 21, 1967,”
1518-1615, Folder, 001346-003-0538, Civil Rights During the Johnson Administration, 1963-1969, Part V, Lyndon
Baines Johnson Presidential Library, Austin, Texas.
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Commission, the NACCD, and the WCCJ, which administered Safe Streets Act funding.214
Carrying on the Citizens Anti-Police Brutality Committee’s legacy of documenting the
MPD’s racialized violence, the CUL gathered testimony from Black residents who experienced
police mistreatment. It used this evidence to support federal police brutality complaints and court
filings. For instance, the council documented the case of Mattie Shaw, a Black mother living on
Milwaukee’s north side. Shaw saw two white police officers enter her house without a warrant.
Inside, they threatened her sons with physical violence. Another individual, Avelardo Valdez, said an
MPD officer brutalized him while walking on the all-white South Side. He filed a complaint with the
police department, but never heard back. Police questioned Mattie Gulley Westbrook’s son for
several hours over a purse snatching he did not commit. Agnes Copeland’s son Michael was
“detained, roughed up, handcuffed, and questioned by police for no reason.” James Coleman
claimed he was “severely beaten by police.” He filed a police brutality claim with the MFPC, but it
was rejected because he did not own property.215 Charges against Coleman were dismissed by a
Milwaukee County court. Soon after, the Wisconsin ALU then filed a federal lawsuit on Coleman’s
behalf. Mary Robinson’s daughter was “roughed up” by law enforcement. Police kicked in her front
door and chased her kids around their own house. Sherry Walden was “beaten and sworn at,” then
arrested and thrown into a police wagon outside the Milwaukee Arena. Walden was charged with
disorderly conduct after inadvertently striking an officer. Barbara Mabra was several months
pregnant when police barged into her home without a warrant. They knocked her over while trying
to arrest her husband on gambling charges. James Simmons was bitten by an officer at the
Milwaukee Safety Building and had his jaw broken.216 These troubling accounts of police brutality

“The Police Problem in Milwaukee,” 1-2, Box 2, Folder 13, Council on Urban and Rural Life Records, Subject Files,
1966-1984, Police Community Relations, 1967-1971.
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illustrate the profound disrespect, dehumanization, and violence that the MPD meted out against
Black and Latinx residents, as well as the consequences of lax accountability. Police had license to
use violence, knowing full well the department had their back.
The grassroots struggle for police accountability became more cross racial in the late 1960s.
Latinx migrants and some Afro-Latinx people and their descendants also faced police brutality and
challenged it accordingly, often working in partnership with Black-led Civil Rights-Black Power
organizations. Mexican-American activist and labor organizer Ernesto Chacon helped establish
Milwaukee’s Latin American Union for Civil Rights (LAUCR) in 1968. The organization, composed
mostly of Mexican-American and Puerto Rican residents, fought to increase social services for
Latinx Milwaukeeans. The group confronted a familiar set of conditions—labor exploitation,
housing discrimination, and education bias. The LAUCR collaborated with the NAACP Youth
Council and was supported by Assemblyman Barbee and Alderwoman Phillips.217 La Guardia, a
bilingual community newspaper published by Avelardo “Lalo” Valdez, railed against Chief Breier
and the MPD’s oppressive authority on the city’s near south side. While conservative Latinx
residents largely supported law enforcement, a number of Brown youth, young adults, tavern
patrons, and members of rights-based organizations “working to correct racism and deprivation”
related experiences of police harassment and brutality.218 The MPD engaged in a “police riot” against
Latinx demonstrators in March 1971. Militant Latinx organizations on the left, including the
LAUCR, Young Lords, and Spot Centro Nuestro, decried reformist approaches that framed policing
as “workable in general.” They refused to accept liberal arguments about the “maladjustment” of
Latinx newcomers over the “racism and bad administration” at the heart of the policing system.

Black and Brown activists joined forces on a seven-month protest of Allen-Bradley Corporation for the firm’s
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Many argued the MPD reflected the white ruling class’s desire to suppress “working people, welfare
people, youth minorities,” and other “stepped on” groups. Those who fought for “civil rights,
human rights, justice, and freedom for Spanish Speaking people and poor people” were “enemies of
the existing social order.”219
Few studies critiqued the police power like Kenneth Feit’s two-part investigation, published
in 1971. The 29-year-old seminarian researched the MPD for nine months under the auspices of the
CUL. His research anticipated the criticisms leveled against Chief Breier and the police bureaucracy
by the Wisconsin State Committee of the U.S. Civil Rights Commission in 1972. Feit provided “a
systematic analysis” of the department, advocating for structural changes to police operations. 220 His
study evaluated police recruitment and training, assignments and promotions, citizen complaints and
police-community relations, police administration, and the coercive actions of the TEU. It expanded
on the NACCD’s 1968 findings, revealing an operationally flawed, racist structure that functionally
undermined reform. Feit identified two fundamental issues. First, civilians had virtually no role in
the day-to-day affairs of the MPD. Second, police personnel were prevented from showing
“professionalism and self-determination” in the workplace.221 Breier’s reactionary leadership, Feit
ascertained, was the reason for the department’s internal and external deficiencies, especially on
matters of oversight, community relations, and minority recruitment. The MFPC, he determined,
was not an adequate civilian review board. It deferred power to the police chief and failed to
adjudicate charges of police violence. The CRS lacked authority to set and implement community

“Some People Call Him Pig, because That’s What He Is!!!,” 1.
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relations policies. Instead, they experienced intimidation from both the police chief and MFPC.222 In
regards to the MPD’s lackluster record of Black recruitment, Feit identified four barriers: the
department’s negative public image, the relative scarcity of African Americans in command
positions, the frequent disqualification of Black and Latinx recruits for “economic” and “culturallydetermined” reasons, and the pervasive racism on the force.223 As the seminarian concluded, “all of
this pointed to a structural problem within the Police Department itself…a conspiracy of
silence…too much secrecy and too much power in the hands of one man.” Chief Breier’s
consolidated power isolated the MPD from the communities it overpoliced and underprotected.
This not only affected residents, but encouraged low morale on the department.224 Reforms that
failed to directly address the chief ’s power would provide only “an illusion of change.”225

Conclusion
Through his reactionary application of law-and-order, ironclad grip on police power, and
racist dog whistles, Chief Breier undermined police accountability and the Black-led struggle to
transform Milwaukee’s police bureaucracy into a more equitable, culturally responsive law
enforcement system. His symbolic authority derived from his white south side roots and parochial
attitudes on race, gender, and sexuality.226 That influence was reinforced by a criminal-legal system
and police bureaucracy that reflected white south side political, business, and labor interests.
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However, Breier’s legal authority stemmed from the 1911 statute that granted Milwaukee public
safety chiefs life tenure and near-absolute policymaking and regulatory power. Revising that statute,
which the police chief defended at every turn, emerged as the principal goal of accountability
activists in the 1970s. Breier’s commands over police operations, opposition to external review and
federal interventions, and racist perceptions shaped the strategic direction and reputation of his
department in lasting ways. He maintained an insulated, militarized, and reactive police force. The
MPD manufactured consent to police counterinsurgency through Breier’s acts of rhetorical
criminalization, violent police boundary work, and the effecting of arrests.227 No public figure was
more consequential in fomenting mistrust of the police and denying the reality of Black claims of
racialized police violence than Harold Breier.
Breier’s tenure did not mark a complete disjuncture with the past, as some scholars have
suggested.228 While it is true that the “chief for life” clung to “the unfettered authority that his
lifetime tenure and total control over police policy and procedures gave him,” previous MPD chiefs
enjoyed the same privileges.229 Where Breier differed was in his rejection of law enforcement
liberalism—both in terms of his rhetorical leadership and administrative practices. Breier
exacerbated an existing set of racialized criminal-legal and law enforcement arrangements. Chiefs
Joseph Kluchesky and John Polcyn, for instance, masked racist understandings of Black life and
culture in a more liberal, assimilationist veneer that reinforced the MPD’s progressive national
standing. Breier, on the other hand, lifted any pretense that the MPD must adhere to liberal
administrative principles, police training, or departmental rule-making. Unlike his predecessors,
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Breier refused to embrace the guidance or policy proposals of outside experts, or to participate in
public safety discourses and commissioned government studies that challenged his views. Anything
threatening to limit his sole authority was out of bounds. In turn, Breier no longer concealed the
MPD’s reliably poor treatment of poor and working-class Black and Latinx residents behind a veil
of social progress. Instead, he quashed public dissent from white supremacy through openly
coercive policing tactics marked by routine harassment, surveillance, and intimidation. Breier
preserved Milwaukee’s reputation for efficient crime control through a no-nonsense, counterinsurgent projection of police power. His leadership style was closer to Chief John Janssen’s:
secretive and unyielding. Only for Breier, the MPD’s perceived enemies were no longer European
immigrant workers, but rather low-income Black “militants” and civil rights activists.
The timing of Breier’s reactionary law-and-order turn matters; he resisted liberal police
reform proposals at a critical juncture of federal statecraft in the late 1960s. To better maintain order
in America’s riot-torn cities, federal officials tried to reign in discretionary police power and ensure
civil rights compliance across the nation’s intricate criminal justice system through commissioned
studies, the introduction of new policing guidelines, and highly coordinated and massive taxpayer
investments in the policing and penal initiatives that comprised the War on Crime. Breier’s
reactionary law-and-order tactics contradicted liberal efforts to globally project police power in
America as racially inclusive, democratic, and lawful.230 He refused to move on civil rights demands
for diverse police representation, input, and oversight; bypassed federal and state investigations into
the causes of its 1967 “civil disturbance”; and dismissed criminological findings that recommended
more preventative public safety measures. The data that social scientists gathered in the late 1960s
shaped national policing debates and policies, including the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
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Streets Act of 1968. Alternatively, Breier fought to preserve the MPD’s state-sanctioned
independence. This encouraged his staunch defense of “law-abiding,” i.e. white Milwaukee residents
and informed his forceful calls to maintain the city’s “good order.” At the same time, Breier
welcomed government investments in police militarization and “riot control.” Emboldened by
conservative public support, Chief Breier readily embraced federal law enforcement assistance when
it aligned with his reactionary program to counter civil rights insurgency and aggressively control
crime, particularly on Milwaukee’s north side.
Racial demographic shifts, gaining civil rights insurgency, and federal interventions revealed
the limits of urban liberalism as a vehicle for change in Milwaukee. It exposed the myth about the
city’s narrative of policing exceptionalism that many Black residents knew already. Given the extent
to which coercive order maintenance policing strategies like over-saturation, “close surveillance,” and
stop-and-frisk already disrupted Black lives on Milwaukee’s north side, Black community leaders saw
continuities in the MPD’s tactics under Breier. Liberal or reactionary law-and-order tended to
produce similar results. The sustained direction of police resources and attention towards Black and,
to a growing extent, Latinx spaces engendered a steady stream of stops, arrests, and violent policecitizen encounters. The MPD helped advance the criminalization of Black and Brown people in the
eyes of a fearful white public, while further provoking an “us versus them” policing mentality. The
department’s occupational presence and aggressive order maintenance function exacerbated
deteriorating economic conditions in tandem with employment, housing, and education
discrimination. While the police were not the only agents of the state responsible for diminishing
Black life chances, civic access, and structures of opportunity, they clearly stood as the most “visible
and easily accessible symbol of a society that many Negroes feel is unjust.”231

This quote comes from a Milwaukee Journal editorial. It continues: “The police function can sometimes mean the
difference between community harmony and community hate, between area calm or upheaval. Intimidation, badgering,
the contemptuous remark, the hasty arrest for the slightest infraction—such tactics tend to aggravate the situation.”
231

309

Whether the MPD was viewed as exceptional for its efficient crime control and reformorientation or it counter-insurgent aggression and resistance to police-community relations
programs, Black Milwaukeeans experienced a more coercive and severe brand of law enforcement
during Chief Breier’s tenure. His reactionary approach underscored the urgency for Black civil rights
activists to address police power. Discriminatory treatment remained a through line for Black and,
increasingly, Latinx citizens relegated to a segregated and unequal urban terrain that demanded raceconscious, non-punitive safety measures. Intensifying police violence raised the sense of urgency
among Black and allied police accountability advocates, who mostly sought reformist objectives, like
increasing Black police representation, input, and oversight. Police accountability advocates saw
raising access and opportunity as the most effective means of curbing ongoing challenges around
police violence and unresponsiveness to Black public safety concerns. From racial liberals in the Ad
Hoc Committee on Police Administration to Milwaukee’s more radical Black Panther Party chapter,
accountability advocates expressed a range of ideological vantage points. All fought to remake
policing so that it would better serve those living on the social and economic margins. Garnering a
greater measure of control over who applied police discretion, enforced the law, and regulated police
actions across heavily-policed spaces of color made sense as movement objectives.
Chief Breier’s reactionary approach re-contoured Milwaukee’s narrative of policing
exceptionalism around his rejection of police reform. The narrative’s 180-degree shift developed in
tandem with Black Milwaukee’s gaining civil rights insurgency, just as its liberal law-and-order hay
day relied on the suppression of poor Black migrants. Chief Breier’s aggressive handling of the 1967
civil disturbance and subsequent civil rights demonstrations affirmed his legitimacy among a
majority of white residents and civic elites. He stubbornly denied that Black residents faced a unique
policing crisis and saw police misconduct allegations and complaints of abuse as a subversive threat
“The Police and the Negro,” The Milwaukee Journal, May 16, 1967, Part 1, 16.
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to police legitimacy. Breier presented a dramatic foil for Black and allied accountability advocates.
But his presence was also a double-edged sword. His authoritarian rule of the MPD, repressive
street-level tactics, and broad political influence complicated the public safety landscape. Breier’s
rejection of liberal law-and-order obscured the fundamental problem that policing itself functioned
as a tool of racial and class suppression. No reform had ever transformed this dynamic. His overall
resistance to federal policing recommendations, such as establishing an internal community relations
bureau or strengthening police-community partnerships, narrowed the focus of accountability
groups. Breier’s stewardship of the MPD delayed the ability of police accountability activists to
overhaul Milwaukee’s policing structures in ways that more meaningfully served Black community
health and safety concerns. Scrutinizing where Breier’s authority emanated from, curtailing his
power, and thus rendering the MPD more amenable to liberal procedural reforms occupied much of
the movement’s energy in the 1970s. This focus eventually resulted in tangible statutory reforms,
including the empowerment of the MFPC and City Hall to set police rules and implement oversight.
But it also meant continued government investment in policing as a solution to urban ills rooted in
race-based economic inequities.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Envisioning Community Control of the Police
With Police Chief Harold Breier, police bureaucrats, and elected officials shielding police
misconduct, the Milwaukee Police Department (MPD) continued to surveil, neglect, and brutalize
Black citizens with impunity during what historians have termed the “long 1970s” (1969-1984).1 In
response, civil rights and Black Power organizations persisted in challenging unchecked police
violence and indifference, while waging new battles over internal discrimination and minority
recruitment. However, in this post-Civil Rights Act period, Milwaukee’s policing system remained
broadly immune to change. State law still empowered Chief Breier to run the MPD free of political
interference and oversight. An abiding faith in the necessity of law enforcement as a means of
managing inequality, containing social discord, and regulating street crime endured. Support from
Milwaukee’s white majority reinforced the police department’s sense of legitimacy and
imperviousness to change. Breier was a near immovable object to both liberal reformers and Civil
Rights-Black Power groups demanding a radical overhaul to the public safety apparatus. He even
refused to coordinate with federal agencies trying to advance a national War on Crime that was
injecting millions of dollars into local law enforcement.
Still, the long 1970s saw a diverse range of citizens and government actors alike chip away at
Chief Breier’s authority, while also visualizing new modes of neighborhood safety that derived from
the self-determined needs of “overpoliced and underprotected” people themselves.2 “Community
control” of the police emerged as a rallying cry for Black Power activists and allies engaged in
Milwaukee’s struggle for police accountability. This chapter focuses on the emergence of community

Bruce J. Schulman, The Seventies: The Great Shift in American Culture, Society, and Politics (New York: Simon and Schuster,
2001), 4.
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Illinois Press, 2006), 118.
1

312

control in the late 1960s and 1970s, locating its place in the longer movement and tracing its
relationship to more moderate reform efforts. At the same time that Black Power groups articulated
their vision for community control, racial liberals sought to harness federal civil rights law to force
the MPD into compliance on its hiring and oversight practices.
Community control activists and liberal reformers alike strove to overcome Chief Breier’s
reactionary stewardship of the MPD. However, they approached that task with different goals in
mind. The former articulated a vision for community control out of life-or-death urgency,
particularly given the disproportionate rate with which Breier’s regime was ending Black lives.
Recurrent police violence on Milwaukee’s north side from 1968 to 1975 reinforced longstanding
frustrations with the city’s whitewashed police bureaucracy. Survival was the first concern, as law
enforcement was legally empowered to kill. Locating police authority in the hands of the
marginalized, mauled, and murdered was the only recourse. Community control advocates
understood the MPD’s “us against them” mentality emanated from the top-down. Breier showed no
desire to change course; therefore, poor and working-class Black folk had little choice but to
envision an entirely different system that located power at the grassroots. Community control was a
counter-argument to reactionary law-and-order. But it also marked a departure from liberal law-andorder in its affirmation of Black humanity, dignity, and self-empowerment. The concept rejected
Black exceptionalization by the police. In an era of worsening deindustrialization, budget austerity,
and retributive statecraft, community control reflected Black peoples’ will to solve urban problems
on their own terms. It brought together Black Power activists, civil liberties advocates, and Black
political representatives. Their collective struggle mattered, in part because it helped move the state
legislature to act on redirecting police power in Milwaukee away from the police chief and towards
democratically elected or appointed bodies.
Liberal reformers, on the other hand, prioritized the democratization of the MPD in the
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interest of preserving public order. As Black Milwaukeeans outlined their vision for community
control of the police, federal officials continued to wage a War on Crime that was designed to
expand police power on liberal terms. The federal state was investing huge sums of money in local
policing and criminal justice initiatives. At the same time, the U.S. Justice Department and other
federal agencies wanted to ensure that local police departments were more representative of
historically overpoliced communities of color, more value-neutral in their discretionary practices,
and more preventative in their crime control function. As the U.S. Civil Rights Commission detailed
in a 1972 study, and as Black and Latinx residents knew all too well, the MPD had a long way to go
in terms of meeting the expectations of federal bureaucrats. Washington D.C.’s interests—as well as
most racial liberals in Milwaukee—centered on preventing unrest and diminishing crime. The federal
government prioritized upholding the social and economic order and limiting opportunities for
dissent, especially from radical Black political organizations like the Black Panther Party. Expanding
minority recruitment was seen as a means of improving “police-community relations” and
preserving order. Diverse representation in law enforcement was a top priority, as well as an
overlapping demand with community control activists. Officers who lived in the neighborhoods they
patrolled and looked like the citizens they policed were, both parties held, more likely to keep the
peace free of violent conflict. Police and citizens would, ideally, build trust, minimize tensions, and
effectively prevent crime together.
Acting at the behest of Black citizens and Black police officers, federal agencies and the
courts played an important role in moving the MPD towards a more democratic system in the 1970s.
Federal officials in the U.S. Justice Department rendered the MFPC’s recruitment process, if still
imperfect, more racial and gender inclusive by mandating affirmative action. But they also
emphasized civil rights compliance to help shore up the machinery of policing, strengthening public
perceptions of law enforcement’s legitimacy. In the process of investigating Milwaukee’s police
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department and ruling on the civil rights complaints of MPD personnel, they further exposed the
city’s historically racist law enforcement system. Here, federal agencies held up the liberal law-andorder era (1930s-1950s) as exceptional, without considering the extent to which police discriminated
against and criminalized Black residents in this period. In any case, federal bureaucrats looked to
create pathways of access and opportunity in the current moment. One way the courts did so was by
filing binding orders, called “consent decrees,” that mandated affirmative action hiring and set goals,
checkpoints, and conditions for police bureaucrats to meet. Local officials either fell in line with
federal civil rights provisions or lost valuable block grant funding. City Hall needed federal aid to
equalize property tax shortfalls, so it supported compliance. Unfortunately for reformers, they still
had to contend with a strong-willed chief who was, at least as he saw it, entitled to disregard federal
interventions. Breier fought hard to preserve his autonomy, whether that meant challenging various
recruitment directives or resisting a U.S. Attorney’s investigation into the MPD’s history of racialized
violence.
Both community control advocates and liberal reformers shared the goal of hiring more Black
officers as part of transforming local policing. For community control advocates, Black police
patrolling in Black districts signaled a greater likelihood for respect and, thus, survival. Decades of
repressive enforcement tactics administered at the direction of white police officials encouraged
Black activists to demand more law enforcers who looked like them. They desired responsive
peacekeeping from individuals who understood their culture and history in relation to white
supremacy. In truth, Black police recruitment totals fell below their anticipated number. Reformers
encountered a lack of support from City Hall, feeble MFPC recruitment campaigns, and internal
police racism so vehement that it either precluded Black applications or forced African American
officers from the job, sometimes before they could finish probationary periods. A lack of
accountability inside the MPD reflected lax accountability structures outside.
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As community control advocates and racial liberals reimagined police power in Milwaukee,
two forces also gained political influence in the city’s public safety discourse during this period. First,
a growing neighborhood movement coalesced. Led by liberal homeowners in racially transitioning
neighborhoods, it featured a diverse set of middle-class voices. Community associations prioritized
crime and safety issues at a moment when residents were losing faith in municipal institutions.
Neighborhood groups believed police bureaucrats, especially Chief Breier, could do more to help
communities proactively control crime and reign in police violence. They supported “communityoriented” policing, an emerging approach to crime control that threatened to up-end “reform era”
policing.
Second, the Milwaukee Professional Policemen’s Protective Association (MPPPA) loomed as
a dominant voice of opposition to calls for procedural reform and the disciplining of officers
accused of misconduct. The association first organized in 1909 to defend MPD personnel who
faced civil litigation. In the early 1970s, it used the arbitration process to establish itself as a
powerful foil to Chief Breier and police accountability advocates. While ranking association
members backed the chief ’s wider agenda and valued his support when police came under attack
from critics, the MPPPA dissented from Breier’s strict rules and opposition to making “community
relations” improvements. To union leaders, the status quo left rank-and-file officers vulnerable to
violent crime, especially on the north side. Both the MPPPA and Milwaukee’s neighborhood
movement found inspiration in rights-based campaigns meant to build political power for interest
groups. Whether defined by race, profession, or residential status, Milwaukeeans of all stripes
organized self-help units dedicated to advancing their interests amid waning faith in technocratic
governance.

The War on Crime in Milwaukee
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Historical context is key when tracing Milwaukee’s Black-led struggle for community control.
Most importantly, the long 1970s saw an unprecedented federal expansion of police power. First
initiated by the liberal Johnson administration in the wake of the 1960s urban rebellions, the national
War on Crime grew under President Richard Nixon and his successors.3 The Republican candidate
won election in 1968 calling for a return to “law and order” in response to public anxieties around
urban crime, civil violence, the counterculture, identity-based activism, campus revolts, and protests
against the war in Southeast Asia.4 Rising fears about crime, disorder, and protest had been a subtext
of the final Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. Nixon vowed to prevent further
unrest in America’s cities and, like his Democratic predecessor, saw law enforcement as critical to
restoring order within low-income African American communities. Nixon unified working- and
middle-class white suburban voters under a shared message organized around racialized fears of
continued political upheaval. As historian Christopher Agee writes, “conservatives would unleash the
police to enforce traditional standards of citizenship in the streets and would exclude untraditional
perspectives from government debate.”5
In this context, liberals worked to convince the “law-and-order administration” that
affirmative action policies would serve as “a bulwark against urban disorder.”6 The executive branch
upheld the provisions of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and supported efforts to diversify police
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3

317

agencies. However, that did not mean Nixon supported liberal law-and-order reform goals. In fact,
the administration’s “get tough” approach largely reflected Chief Breier’s hardline views on race and
policing. Both Nixon and Breier opposed Supreme Court decisions that protected the rights of
criminal suspects and decriminalized status offenses, diminishing police discretionary authority.7
Nixon was clear about what he saw as the root cause of crime, arguing it was “insufficient curbs on
the appetites or impulses that naturally impel individuals towards criminal activities.”8 As such,
“surveillance, sentencing, and incarceration strategies” grew more punitive under his direction.9 The
Nixon administration increased criminal convictions and imposed harsher sentencing guidelines,
particularly on drug crimes, while strengthening U.S. courts and prisons.10 In the process, “the
nation’s incarcerated population transformed from majority white to majority black and Latino.” 11
Nixon’s team worked to roll back domestic social welfare and anti-poverty spending. Alternatively,
the Johnson administration had emphasized growing police power, while continuing to support
rehabilitative criminal justice outcomes and funding cities in ways that addressed economic inequality
and poverty.
The Nixon administration’s War on Crime, like Johnson’s, focused on containing poor and
potentially “rebellious” urban communities of color. Both administration’s targeted “segregated

Supreme Court rulings, like Miranda v. Arizona (1966), recognized the civil liberties of criminal suspects. Conservatives
viewed these decisions as too permissive. The decriminalization of local status offenses, like vagrancy, also nurtured “the
conditions for more unrest,” requiring a “reassertion—and expansion—of police power and discretionary authority” in
poor and working-class urban spaces. Max Felker-Kantor, Policing Los Angeles: Race, Resistance, and the Rise of the LAPD
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2018), 43.
8 Quote in James Forman, Jr. Locking Up Our Own: Crime and Punishment in Black America (New York: Farrar, Straus and
Giroux, 2017), 76.
9 For instance, the Nixon administration built hundreds of new prisons and jails at state and federal level, introduced
mandatory minimum sentencing in the District of Columbia Court Reorganization Act of 1970, “sanctioned the practice
of holding suspects in jail without formal charges” and established new offender categories to ensure longer terms of
incarceration. Hinton, From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime, 138.
10 In 1971, President Nixon declared a “War on Drugs” that targeted “hard” illicit drug use, abuse, and trafficking,
especially in poor communities of color. Forman, Jr., Locking Up Our Own, 20-21.
11 The problem of crime for Nixon was the problem of “street” crime, or urban Black crime. “In a direct and systematic
way,” Elizabeth Hinton argues, “Nixon recognized that the politics of crime control could effectively conceal the racist
intent behind his administration’s domestic programs.” Hinton, From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime, 142.
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urban areas as a means to dispel civil disorder and manage the effects of the country’s urban
crisis.”12 However, Nixon’s “New Federalism” platform tackled America’s urban crisis with a
different set of objectives in mind. It granted states control over the use of federal anti-crime
funding to meet state, county, and municipal criminal justice needs. Federal money was distributed
through a familiar block grant system.13 But it put mostly conservative state administrators, as
opposed to grassroots organizations and liberal city governments, in charge of directing the fight. 14
The U.S. Justice Department invested tens of millions of dollars in state and local War on Crime
initiatives through the newly created Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA). 15 While
most federal grant money went to white suburban and rural municipalities, which reported less
crime, a large share of federal dollars still went to shoring up the power of police in cities.16 The
president supported projects that expanded law enforcement’s “punitive authority in Black urban
neighborhoods” through “discretionary” crime control funding.17 This discretionary executive
funding was essentially unregulated. Federal investments in municipal crime control, through state

Hinton, From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime, 136.
“Federal policymakers used block grants to empower state planning agencies to develop their own path for the War
on Crime by finding local projects and programs of their choice. But the Safe Streets Act forced states, if they had not
done so already, to develop long-term strategies for their respective law enforcement programs, providing federal
funding for such efforts at 90 percent of their cost.” Eligibility for LEAA grants required local and law enforcement
officials to devise criminal justice improvement plans that dealt with “training, detecting, and apprehending criminals,
and improving prosecution and the courts.” Grants were rarely turned down; some were poorly conceived. Hinton, From
the War on Poverty to the War on Crime, 143.
14 With the election of Carl Stokes in Cleveland in 1968, Black candidates started to win elections in cities with growing
Black populations and liberal politics.
15 The 1968 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act established the LEAA. “Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968 42 U.S.C. §3789d,” United States Department of Justice, accessed April 2, 2020,
https://www.justice.gov/crt/omnibus-crime-control-and-safe-streets-act-1968-42-usc-3789d.
16 Peter Constantine Pihos, “Policing, Race, and Power in Chicago” (Ph.D. diss., University of Pennsylvania, 2015), 213214.
17 This discretionary spending maintained an “enduring” and “highly repressive” federal function in segregated urban
neighborhoods. The Nixon administration relied on “the discretionary portion of the crime control budget to fund law
enforcement initiatives of its own choosing.” Congressionally authorized discretionary funds allowed the administration
to continue the block grant process while also paying directly for local crime control programs they deemed necessary in
cities. Hinton, From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime, 137. Prior to 1968, the federal government used discretionary
spending programs under a tax structure dating to the 1930s. Federal revenues grew by nearly five times from 1932 to
1970. State and municipal resources—comprised largely of property and sales tax revenues—fell dramatically in that
span. The federal government contributed limited criminal justice resources and oversight to states and municipalities,
which exclusively underwrote police departments themselves. Pihos, “Policing, Race, and Power in Chicago,” 215.
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block grants and discretionary spending, accelerated the decline of social welfare and anti-poverty
programs.18 The administration cut the funding authority of community-based organizations headed
by poor Black and Latinx citizens through the federal government’s newly decentralized revenue
sharing program. This diminished “the relationship between the federal government, municipalities,
and poor Americans.”19
The War on Crime’s expansion coincided with growing national unease around stagnant
markets and rising inflation. A recession from 1973 to 1975, for instance, devastated industrial cities
like Milwaukee. Deteriorating economic conditions in cities hit poor and working-class African
Americans the hardest. Black workers experienced meager industrial employment and wage gains in
the long 1970s. Rising Black male un- and under-employment paralleled the steady out-migration of
heavy manufacturers, exacerbating deindustrialization and white suburban growth.20 Creeping
industrial decline leveled Milwaukee’s Black working-class in the late 1970s and into the 1980s.21 The
regional labor market, historian Marc Levine argues, developed a “spatial mismatch” in the last third
of the 20th century. In this period, suburban and exurban municipalities experienced net employment

Under Nixon, the LEAA also facilitated corruption in its criminal justice spending. Millions of federal dollars went to
“public organizations, private companies, and individual researchers who could develop technology, hardware, and
theories that would help the federal government prevent future crime.” Hinton, From the War on Poverty to the War on
Crime, 136. Corporate backers, friends of the administration, and influential private companies invested in the nation’s
punitive carceral turn at the state, county, and municipal levels, often receiving preferential treatment. State Senator Jerris
Leonard, a Republican representing the Milwaukee suburbs, chaired the LEAA from 1971 to 1973. “Jerris G. Leonard,
Jr. Papers, 1956-1968, 1998-2000,” Finding Aid, Milwaukee Mss 115, Wisconsin Historical Society, Division of Library,
Archives, and Museum Collections, accessed March 5, 2020, http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi/f/findaid/findaid-idx
location=wimiugma;c=wiarchives;cc=wiarchives;q1=Jerris%20Leonard;rgn=main;view=text;didno=uw-whs-mil00115.
19 Hinton, From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime, 137.
20 Industries with “less specialized product lines and stiffer price competition” moved facilities “to lower-wage
communities” in suburban and rural Wisconsin, non-union states in the Sunbelt South, and overseas. John Gurda, The
Making of Milwaukee, 3rd ed. (Milwaukee: Milwaukee County Historical Society Press, 1999), 414.
21 Although manufacturing remained “a critical source of jobs” through the early 1980s, nearly all heavy manufacturers
closed their city plants for good or relocated by the 1990s. Between 1972 and 1992, forty-six percent of industrial
manufacturers disappeared from Milwaukee’s local economy, including iconic corporations like International Harvester,
A. O. Smith, and Allis-Chalmers. Trotter, Black Milwaukee, 299. Milwaukee’s industrial economy declined sharply in the
early 1980s. A strong dollar, high interest rates, and increasing price competition from foreign manufacturers made it
more expensive to produce goods. Fifty-six thousand industrial workers in the four-county metropolitan area lost their
jobs between 1979 and 1983 after reaching a high of 220,200 workers in 1979. Gurda, The Making of Milwaukee, 418.
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gains.22 As industrial job losses in the city intensified, Milwaukee’s population of working-age Black
men grew by 30,000.23 They had few options to turn to for work. Concomitantly, the city’s Black
poverty rate rose from 28.4 percent in 1980 to 41.9 percent in 1990.24
Thousands of Black workers, relegated to poor central city neighborhoods, were unable to
compete in a segmented labor market that largely bypassed Milwaukee’s north side. Enduring
metropolitan segregation added to a racialized politics of public safety that continued to target Black
people struggling to stay afloat financially. Many were forced to engaged in informal economic and
illicit activities.25 Reported crime data in this period continued to reinforce criminalizing perceptions
of Black life and culture. As America’s punitive turn worsened in the Nixon era and beyond, the
stain of a criminal record made it exceedingly difficult for African American workers to secure
adequate employment. The above factors combined to produce a racially disproportionate, high rate
of Black joblessness. In 1970, Black male unemployment in Milwaukee reached fifteen percent—
nearly twice the rate of white city dwellers and quadruple that of white suburbanites.26 Well over
half of all Black workers in Milwaukee held industrial positions at the start of the decade, compared
to 42 percent of white workers. Automation played a role in limiting Black industrial employment, as
new machinery and technologies allowed corporations to expand production levels while keeping
pace with fewer personnel. Consequently, the metropolitan area’s total industrial output value
increased from $2.98 billion in 1967 to $8.5 billion in 1980, despite net job losses in Milwaukee. 27

Marc V. Levine, “The Crisis of Black Male Joblessness in Milwaukee: Trends, Explanations, and Policy Options”
(University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, Center for Economic Development, 2007).
23 This figure reflects Black working-age male population growth between 1970 and 2000. Levine, “The Crisis of Black
Male Joblessness in Milwaukee,” 33-34.
24 Gurda, The Making of Milwaukee, 421.
25 Housing segregation confined more than ninety percent of Black male workers to the city proper. Gurda, The Making
of Milwaukee, 421.
26 This joblessness rate tracks Black men in the prime of their working lives, between 25 and 54 years of age. Levine,
“The Crisis of Black Male Joblessness in Milwaukee,” 9, 33-34. By 1986, Black male joblessness in the city reached 26
percent—nearly three times the metropolitan average. By 1987, the city lost 28,386 jobs while the suburbs gained more
than 30,000. Gurda, The Making of Milwaukee, 421.
27 The city was able to escape the worst aspects of the 1973-1975 recession.
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Meanwhile, class was becoming more salient within Milwaukee’s Black community, much as
it was elsewhere in urban America. In the 1970s, Black citizens entered both the public and private
sector in large numbers. Some individuals turned to policing careers, since law enforcement offered a
living wage, job security, and a decent pension. As historian Peter Pihos has noted, “an upwardly
redistributive but formally race-neutral political project led to new opportunities for black
advancement combined with a collapse of the bottom end of the labor market.” The end result of
that liberal project was a sizable increase in “black class stratification from what existed under Jim
Crow.”28 In turn, class dynamics played a more central role in delineating intra-racial conversations
around public safety and U.S. criminal justice policies. A growing literature has documented the role
that powerful, middle-class and affluent Black community leaders in cities like New York, Atlanta,
and Washington, D.C. have played in supporting the growth of America’s late-century carceral
state.29 Although a rising chorus of Black professionals and newly elected politicians called for an
“all of the above” approach that blended rehabilitative and retributive measures in controlling crime,
“each incremental step” in the War on Crime’s advance “resulted in dishing out more punishment.”
This was, in large part, a result of “racialized state failure.”30 The nation’s divided federal state had
favored an inequitable tax structure that made it virtually impossible for liberals to pursue
redistributive social policies. The disparate mass incarceration of Black criminal offenders was not
“wholly foreseeable” at the time, even if African American experiences with the U.S. justice system
rendered it predictable.
Against a depressed economic backdrop, crime became more of a “material reality” for
Black Milwaukeeans, as it disproportionately harmed poor and working-class families of color. Still,

Peter C. Pihos, “The Inclining Significance of Crime,” The Journal of Urban History (2019), 3-4.
See: Michael Javen Fortner, Black Silent Majority: The Rockefeller Drug Laws and the Politics of Punishment (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 2015); Forman, Jr., Locking Up Our Own.
30 Lisa L. Miller, The Myth of Mob Rule: Violent Crime and Democratic Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016),
100.
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despite the gaining prominence of “law and order” as a slogan, public anxieties around crime and
safety appeared to factor less in the city during the early 1970s than issues of “taxation and
housing.”31 The Milwaukee Urban Observatory (MUO) attributed this to Milwaukee’s powerful
“local and national reputation as a safe city.”32 However, not all residents felt safe.33 Reports of
elevated street crime, particularly in Black inner city neighborhoods, raised alarm among community
leaders. Black residents both bore the brunt of urban crime and experienced an undue share of the
police response. Chief Breier’s reactionary law-and-order approach did little to address the root
causes of crime and too often failed to resolve cases involving Black crime victims. Public framings
of Milwaukee’s north side as crime-riddled fed a fear-driven public safety narrative. White state
officials used this account to justify harsher criminal justice policies that failed to treat poverty and
inequality with economic aid and enhanced welfare assistance. The white public’s obsession with
“the specter of black crime” fueled America’s carceral turn in the late 20th century.34 Racialized crime
discourses carried political weight, as many Black voters supported increased spending on the MPD
and favored more street patrols to control the spread of crime.35 At the same time, they advocated
for culturally responsive policing that adequately observed the civil rights of policed citizens.
As suggested above, Milwaukee’s narrative of policing exceptionalism still held currency in

Henry J. Schmandt and Harold M. Rose, “Citizen Attitudes in Milwaukee…A Further Look,” Milwaukee Urban
Observatory (Summer 1972), 33.
32 The Milwaukee Urban Observatory at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee published a report, “Citizen Attitudes
in Milwaukee,” in September 1971 based on surveys conducted with 443 households during July and August 1970. The
Wisconsin legislature funded a second study conducted by the Milwaukee Urban Observatory and UW-Milwaukee that
expanded the project’s scope to include data of race, age, income, homeownership status, and neighborhood of
residence. It reflected deeper racial polarization. Henry J. Schmandt and Harold M. Rose, “Citizen Attitudes in
Milwaukee, Wisconsin, Summer, 1970” (September, 1971), 1-3, 56.
33 The MUO found that about 80 percent of residents favored public agencies “stopping” drug selling and using over
“education,” providing “better medical treatment,” or “dealing with underlying causes.” “Citizen Attitudes in
Milwaukee,” 64.
34 As historian Simon Balto argues, that “specter” did so well before the postwar era. Simon Balto, Occupied Territory:
Policing Black Chicago from Red Summer to Black Power (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2019), 128.
“Youths and youth gangs,” “Blacks,” “Hippies,” “radicals,” and “agitators” were perceived as “the biggest problem” in
Milwaukee, all far above “the Mafia.” “Citizen Attitudes in Milwaukee,” 65.
35 “Citizen Attitudes in Milwaukee…A Further Look,” 43-44; “Citizen Attitudes in Milwaukee,” 56.
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the 1970s. It influenced public understandings of crime and safety. According to a 1972 MUO
survey, residents were satisfied with the MPD’s overall performance.36 A 1972 U.S. Civil Rights
Commission study also showed that “a substantial percentage” considered the department to be
“the best police force in the country.”37 Again, however, this satisfaction was not uniform. Variables
like income, education, occupation, age, and race mattered when determining who favored the MPD.
People “of lower economic status,” many living in communities “where the crime rate was highest,”
were “more likely” to be “disenchanted” with the police and “to have unfavorable contacts.”
Residents in this group were frequently renters who felt “less safe” walking through their
neighborhoods at night. Women constituted a higher percentage than men of those “dissatisfied”
with the MPD. Likewise, people with “little formal education,” who worked in “semi-skilled,
unskilled, and service worker” positions showed higher rates of disenchantment than
“businessmen.” Milwaukee youth were more inclined to believe that law enforcement did “not treat
people in their neighborhood well.” “Elders” expressed concern about “crime and the safety of the
streets,” but were generally satisfied with their police protection.
A “sizable proportion” of African Americans “in all socio-economic categories” believed
the MPD enforced the law unfairly. Respondents said Black people were “not treated in the same
manner as whites” and that “the system of justice discriminates against them.”38 Of those who
expressed the greatest dissatisfaction with the police, roughly five times as many were Black than
white.39 Forty-one percent of Black citizens felt “unsafe,” while 63 percent of white respondents felt
“safe.” Forty-three percent of surveyed Black people responded that the MPD as not good at

Eighty-five percent of Milwaukeeans surveyed by the Urban Observatory in 1972 expressed satisfaction with law
enforcement, thirty-four percent of whom were “highly satisfied.” “Citizen Attitudes in Milwaukee…A Further Look,”
34.
37 Wisconsin State Committee of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Police Isolation and Community Needs (Washington,
DC: Government Printing Office, 1972), 2.
38 “Citizen Attitudes in Milwaukee…A Further Look,” 44.
39 Only 8 percent of Black respondents were “highly satisfied” with law enforcement. “Citizen Attitudes in
Milwaukee…A Further Look,” 39.
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“protecting residents.” A majority said police “took a while” to respond to service calls, while two
thirds of white residents said police arrived “right away.” Black dissatisfaction with the MPD also
“cut across all income groups.” This contrasted the “highly favorable rating” of all white residents.
Furthermore, Black discontent with police translated into a wider dissatisfaction with the criminal
justice system as a whole. Forty-one percent of Black respondents saw the courts as “unfair,” versus
sixty-two percent of whites.
Ultimately, War on Crime funding did little to alter police conduct. Instead, the LEAA
strengthened state and local police patronage systems.40 Before Congress passed the 1968 Safe
Streets Act, local police departments relied almost exclusively on property and sales tax revenues to
operate. Suburbanization diminished Milwaukee’s annual budget. Public property holdings declining
from forty to thirteen percent of individual and corporate holdings from 1950 to 1980. 41 After the
conservative Democrat Henry Maier was elected mayor in 1960, he increasingly turned to the federal
government to help pay for social and economic programs and emergency services, like the police.
As Milwaukee struggled to balance annual budgets in the long 1970s, agencies like the LEAA
offered necessary relief. Between 1968 and 1975, agencies in the city received almost $3.8 million in
federal criminal justice funding.42 Police bureaucrats, namely the MFPC and City Hall, applied for
nearly $600,000 to recruit and train police personnel. LEAA grants focused on “minority
recruitment” and ways of improving “community relations.” The MPD spent just over $618,000
federal dollars on “computerization,” which went towards upgrading the police department’s data
collection and surveillance capacities.43 Computer-based technologies helped the MPD forecast
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crime patterns, while also bolstering statistical data collection in “high-crime” neighborhoods. It also
facilitated militarized police crackdowns on radical Black activists and low-income criminal offenders
of color. Almost no federal investments went to upgrading police weaponry in this period, although
the city received $28,500 for “riot control” in 1968. Milwaukee police received ample funding at a
time when federal and state governments severely curtailed investments in housing, health, and jobstraining resources.
The Wisconsin Criminal Justice Council (WCCJ) administered LEAA funds in the state. The
20-member body was one of the first state planning agencies in the country set-up to apply for and
receive Safe Street Act funds.44 Under a Republican governor, Warren Knowles, the WCCJ initially
prioritized police training and juvenile delinquency. Members recognized criminal justice funding
alone would not “eradicate the causes of crime.” Partnering with agencies and “professionals in
other fields,” they surmised, would help address public safety issues in a “rapidly changing society.” 45
In 1970, the council resolved to dramatically expand criminal justice spending in the state. Federal
LEAA disbursements increased from $3,795,000 in 1970 to $7,309,000 in 1971.46 The WCCJ had
more money to pursue a dual racial pacification and crime-fighting agenda.47 Most funds went to
Milwaukee, where police reported about one third of all crime in Wisconsin.48 When Democratic
Governor Patrick Lucey took office in 1971, he appointed new WCCJ members. Liberals reoriented
the council’s focus on police-community relations and fighting the War on Drugs in Wisconsin.
“Governor Makes Corrections and Courts Priorities in Charge to New Council,” “Wisconsin Council on Criminal
Justice Bulletin,” 1, Box 104, Folder 16, “Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, 1969-1971,” Records of Mayor
Henry W. Maier Administration.
45 Thomas Lubenow, “Milwaukee Has Third of State Crime,” The Milwaukee Journal, December 9, 1970, Part 2, 1-2.
46 WCCJ estimated it would spend $12,735,000 in Safe Streets Act funding in 1972, $17,000,000 in 1973, $22,887,000 in
1974, and $26, 934,000 in 1975. Thomas Lubenow, “Milwaukee Has Third of State Crime,” The Milwaukee Journal,
December 9, 1970, Part 2, 1-2.
47 The WCCJ proposed distributing more than $235,000,000 in federal, state, and local funding from 1970 to 1975. Task
forces were also appointed to address the criminal courts and corrections. Thomas G. Lubenow, “Lucey Ready to
Resume State’s War on Crime,” The Milwaukee Journal, June 20, 1971, Part 2, 14.
48 The council recognized that crime was not limited to Black neighborhoods. In fact, it noted in 1970 that that there was
a “dramatic upturn” in “non-ghetto” crime among white middle-class youth. Thomas Lubenow, “Milwaukee Has Third
of State Crime,” The Milwaukee Journal, December 9, 1970, Part 2, 1-2.
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Governor Lucey expanded the WCCJ from twelve to eighteen members, adding six people from
Milwaukee. Chief Breier was notably absent from this delegation; he largely refused to participate in
state War on Crime programming. Former Urban League Director Walter Kelly, however, served as
the council’s executive director. The re-constituted WCCJ crafted policies, reviewed LEAA grant
applications, and authorized funding requests.

The Demand for Community Control
Community control in the long 1970s was, according to one historian, a “radical agenda of
reorienting the relationship between residents and the police.”49 Ideally, it located decision-making
power in the hands of people historically persecuted by state violence and white racial terror, and
called for “rigorous external oversight” of a revised law enforcement system. Black Power activists
focused on community survival framed its agenda. The Oakland Black Panther Party for Self
Defense (BPP) perhaps articulated the best known vision for community control of the police in
June 1969.50 Monitoring and reimagining law enforcement was part of the organization’s larger
program to, as Robin D.G. Kelley writes, “provide for the social needs of Black communities where
the state failed.”51 The BPP called for separate public safety departments in Black, Brown, and white
communities. These agencies were to be headed by a full-time police commission, not individual
chiefs. “Neighborhood Police Control Councils” comprised of community members would
democratically select police commissioners. These councils would have the power to discipline
officers and direct commissioners to change policies by a popular vote as needed. They could also
fire appointed police commissioners deemed unresponsive to the community’s needs at any time.
Max Felker-Kantor, “The Coalition Against Police Abuse: CAPA’s Resistance Struggle in 1970s Los Angeles,” The
Journal of Civil and Human Rights 2 (1) (Summer 2016), 79.
50 “Petition Statement for Community Control of the Police,” The Black Panther, June 14, 1969, 16.
51 Robin D.G. Kelley, “What Abolition Looks Like, From the Panthers to the People,” Abolition for the People,
October 26, 2020, accessed October 27, 2020, https://level.medium.com/what-abolition-looks-like-from-the-panthersto-the-people-6c2e537eac71.
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The people would hold the authority to recall neighborhood council representatives. Finally, all
police had to live in communities they safeguarded.
Black Power activists and allies in Milwaukee articulated a similarly far-reaching vision for
overhauling Milwaukee’s policing infrastructure. These more radical police accountability groups not
only advocated for Black representation, input, and oversight within the city’s police bureaucracy, but
for community control of an entirely new law enforcement system. In the aftermath of the 1967
civil disturbance and the civil violence meted out by police and white south side fascists against
Milwaukee’s NAACP Youth Council during the group’s fair housing marches, ideas about communal
self-determination animated Milwaukee’s civil rights insurgency. The concept extended to Latinx,
Indigenous American, and Women’s organizations, sparking a host of identity-based groups. Selfdetermination infused the city’s political left with a more revolutionary politics that rejected
liberalism and conservatism’s white heteropatriarchal and imperialistic policy prescriptions. Existing
within Milwaukee’s white power structure, which forcibly contained its own internal colonies in the
city’s ghettoized near north and south side communities, was no longer feasible. Public cynicism
deepened as elected officials brushed aside or placated Black and Brown complaints of police
violence. The MPD, Father James Groppi warned, was “the most imminent problem in the Black
community…nothing more than an occupation army.”52 The department’s “oppressive nature” was
meant to “keep the Black man in line.” Mounting distrust of police bureaucrats and their capacity to
change facilitated ideas about community control at the base of Milwaukee’s civil rights insurgency.
Communal self-determination emanated from Milwaukee’s blossoming Black Power
organizations. The movement surfaced locally in October 1966, a few months after Student NonViolent Coordinating Committee Chairman Stokely Carmichael famously declared in Greenwood,
Mississippi: “We been saying freedom for six years and we ain’t got nothin’. What we got to start
52
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saying now is Black Power!”53 However, Black nationalist organizing in the city extends back to the
1920s, when Milwaukee featured an active United Negro Improvement Association chapter. 54 As the
revolutionary Black Panther Party for Self-Defense was forming in Oakland, California, the
interracial NAACP Youth Council established its militant “Commando” unit to help protect civil
rights demonstrators from white vigilante and police violence. Police had joined white counterprotesters in attacking YC activists and allies at open housing marches, especially when they crossed
over to the city’s south side. Roughly 16,000 angry residents, for instance, greeted some eight
hundred civil rights marchers on the second night of the YC’s lengthy open housing campaign. 55
Police brutality followed the arrests of demonstrators, who comprised a multi-racial contingent. The
Commandos formed after white supremacists bombed the YC’s “Freedom House” headquarters on
the north side. The young Black men wore black berets, black boots, and a customized
“Commando” sweatshirt.56 Rather than claiming to be disciples of “non-violence,” they upheld a
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principle of “not-violence.” The “security unit” was not afraid to use force, but only when necessary.
“If the police or the white crowds came after us or the marchers, we weren’t afraid to mix it up,”
former Commando Prentice McKinney said. “We fought back.” As such, many white observers
viewed them as “a violent, militant organization.”57
Milwaukee’s short-lived Black Panther Party chapter (MBPP) shared a vision for community
control that extended beyond law enforcement. The group, which reached between seventy-five and
one hundred members, organized in the winter of 1968.58 Its members ideologically opposed city
officials and Black moderates, whose liberal politics catered more to Black bourgeois interests than
the Black poor and proletariat.59 The MBPP saw liberalism as complicit in processes of Black
ghettoization and economic exploitation. In response, they advocated for, as co-founder Kenny
Williamson put it, “community control of community institutions” and “cooperative economic
endeavors.”60 Via the provisioning of social services, Milwaukee’s Panthers established a
“community-oriented organization.”61 On the issue of police brutality, the MBPP’s goal was never to
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use violence or cause a civil disturbance. “The gun,” member Walter Chesser stated, was used
“merely as a defensive tool.” The chapter’s community service initiatives included a free breakfast
program for school children, free healthcare clinic, and prison visitation program that supported the
families of incarcerated north side residents. The MBPP collaborated with radical-left white and
Latinx organizations.62 As historian Yohuru Williams argues, their willingness to build a multiracial
coalition “moved [the MBPP] closer, in theory at least, to the model already established by Father
Groppi and the Commandos.”63 However, the Black Panthers’ willingness to “intervene” and
“rectify” problems through armed self-defense distinguished it from the YC’s “not-violent”
approach.64
Milwaukee’s Panthers articulated a vision for community control of the police that drew on
the legacy of Black working-class resistance to the MPD’s racialized violence.65 It was part of its
“larger efforts to improve police-African American relations.”66 The group’s community control
plan emphasized decentralization of the city’s police bureaucracy. Chief Breier had far too much
power in the current system. Like the Oakland Party, the MBPP conceived of a police hierarchy that
located managerial authority with independent police districts demarcated by race. Fifteen-member
neighborhood councils, elected by community residents, would vote on a district commissioner,
who would be subject to recalls by citizens as needed. “The people should control everything,”
Dakin Gentry added.67 Lieutenant of Information Nate Bellamy said the MBPP’s goal was to
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“alleviate from the black community all these fascist, racist storm troopers and, in turn, replace them
with respectable new police officers.”68 He recognized there were “some people on the police
force…dedicated to the people’s needs,” but these officers were “caught up into the system” and
trapped by “fear of losing their jobs.” The Black community, party members held, were prepared to
police themselves on their own terms and had to have oversight of the process. Furthermore,
community control would “lessen the case-load of overburdened courts,” which saw Black
defendants appearing on charges that were “petty or trumped-up” as a result of police discretion.69
The MBPP barely got their self-defense program off the ground before the chapter’s initial
iteration was dissolved, largely as a result of conflicts with police and subsequent legal cases.
Because of the Black Panthers’ national reputation for armed confrontations with law enforcement,
the MPD made eradicating the local chapter its top priority.70 Chief Breier moved to eradicate the
group from the city entirely. In his view, the Panthers posed a dangerous, highly subversive threat.
Therefore, the MPD amplified an already combustible atmosphere on Milwaukee’s predominantly
Black north side. The chief ’s approach aligned with other law-and-order regimes, who targeted Black
Panther branches throughout the country.71 On occasion, clashes between law enforcement and the
Panthers resulted in bloodshed. The MPD’s Tactical Squad targeted, harassed, and arrested the
Milwaukee branch. Outfitted with “overly aggressive,” “outcast officers,” the TEU specifically
targeted the MBPP. The paramilitary unit rolled three-to-four people deep in squad cars on the
north side, its officers visibly armed with shotguns and rifles.72 Meanwhile, the MPD’s Red Squad
conducted surveillance and maintained a file on the group.73
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While the MBPP tried to avoid confrontations with the MPD, they did not shy away from
them either. Milwaukee police arrested three MBPP members who allegedly tried to murder a white
police officer with a shotgun blast after he pulled over their vehicle in September 1969. The three
Panthers denied the charge, insisting that police had framed them and planted a shotgun. According
to Nate Bellamy, the MPD tried to “stop the party from educating the people” and “jail as many
panthers as possible.” The “Milwaukee Three,” as they became known, were “beaten badly” by
police.74 A trial for attempted murder took placed in November 1969. An all-white jury sentenced
two defendants to thirty years in prison; the third was sentenced to ten.75 “Police persecution was,”
historian Andrew Witt argues, “the primary reason why the first wave of the Milwaukee Panthers
disbanded” that winter.76 However, “internal dissension” also played a major role. Rank-and-file
MBPP members felt betrayed when Branch Captain Dakin Gentry wrote to the BPP’s Central
Committee asking for the dissolution of the chapter based on a “lack of success in the community.”
They observed that Gentry and Bellamy received plumb jobs in Milwaukee’s “Concentrated
Employment Office.” City Hall was known to offer bureaucratic service positions to Black militants
as a means of cooling down political radicalism or stifling dissent. Regardless, Oakland dissolved the
MBPP before it had a chance to press for its community control agenda.77
Other organizations filled the void left by Milwaukee’s Black Panthers on demanding
community control. The Wisconsin Committee to Combat Fascism petitioned City Hall in 1970 to
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redistribute power from “the one-man dictatorship of Chief Breier” to the neighborhood level.78
They proposed a decentralized structure similar to the MBPP model. Milwaukee’s American Civil
Liberties Union chapter, meanwhile, also supported community control of the police. Organizer
Joan McManus drafted a position paper that detailed the ACLU proposal. Her intent was “changing
the concept and role” of law enforcement “so that status and success” in policing meant “being
responsive to the needs of the people in the community.”79 A drastic shift was needed, since “every
other approach to improving police/community relations had failed.” Liberal reforms did not
address the racial and economic implications of police power, focused on whether “improving
image,” “recruiting minorities,” or establishing “citizen advisory review boards.” 80 Like the MBPP
and anti-fascism committee plans, McManus underscored decentralization. She envisioned a
reformed MPD reconstituted under a multi-district framework. The ACLU framed the MPD as “an
occupying army” that did not “know nor care about the people or the culture of the community
they work in.”81 A set of dual enforcement standards existed, set by a powerful police chief and “the
dominant white middle-class culture.” Pushed to the margins were Black and Brown men and
women who resided in heavily policed, under-serviced, and segregated neighborhoods.82
McManus was clear in her writing that “the police problem in Milwaukee” was not “a matter
of a few bad cops…to be remedied by higher standards and psychological screening.” Rather, it was
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“the police system itself—quasi-military, secret, based on maintaining the status quo”—that allowed
for police repression.83 Eventually, she asserted, policing “corrupts all but the most exceptional
men.” By not speaking out against police violence, the community “gives it our tacit approval.”
Because society expects Black, Brown, poor, and “politically unpopular” citizens to be repressed, the
MPD inflicts violence. They get away with abuses of power because liberal opposition is
“fragmented” and local politicians are “extremely conservative, parochial, and secretive.” She cited
an “absence of organization and unity,” which makes it easier for police misconduct to go ignored.

1972 U.S. Civil Rights Commission Study
At the same time that radical Black Power organizations and the Milwaukee ACLU laid out
their visions for community control of the police, more moderate liberal interests concerned about
issues of public safety worked towards making the MPD more accessible, fair, and communityoriented. They did so to better control crime, which felt to many people like a growing problem in
the long 1970s, but also to reduce opportunities for civil disorder and racialized police violence.
While community control advocates also wanted to better address crime in Black and Brown
neighborhoods, their prevailing concern was the routine police brutality being administered by
Breier’s MPD. Liberal organizations and accountability advocates prioritized order maintenance
improvements and mending relationships between a recalcitrant police force and disparate
community groups. At different times, both of these ideological/political forces turned to the
federal government, either for LEAA funding to help pay for programs related to crime and safety,
or to intervene when the MPD failed to meet its compulsory civil rights requirements.
Federal investigations aided Milwaukee liberals in documenting the need for police reform.

Joan McManus, “The Police Problem in Milwaukee,” 1, Box 1, Folder 15, “Greater Milwaukee Conference on
Religion and Urban Affairs, Police Accountability, 1984-1985, 1991,” Joan McManus Papers, 1970-2003.
83

335

Following the political upheavals of the 1960s, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights (USCCR)
interrogated police discrimination within individual agencies in an effort to highlight structural
biases, enforce civil rights compliance, and encourage procedural reforms that would better serve
diverse urban populations.84 In 1972, the commission investigated the MPD. The USCCR appointed
a Wisconsin Study Committee (WSC), which found a police department and top administrator that
was “accountable to no one.”85 The WSC’s report on the MPD revealed for a national audience the
extent to which Chief Breier’s impervious authority undermined the police department’s ability to
police fairly, address internal and external discrimination, and hold officers accountable for
misconduct. It also documented the apparent turn towards reactionary law-and-order that Breier had
facilitated since becoming chief in 1964. Once perceived by federal agencies as an exemplary police
force, the MPD now stood out more for its regressive tactics, strict regulations, and institutional
isolation than for its admired professionalism, reform-orientation, and efficient crime control. The
state-sanctioned independence that, for decades, was seen as a boon to the department’s outwardly
progressive development, now prevented City Hall from making even basic alterations to
Milwaukee’s policing system, or the MPD’s strategic approach, public outlook, and internal culture.
The WSC’s report, released on December 6, 1972, dealt a symbolic blow to Chief Breier’s
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reactionary law-and-order methods, but did not force any structural adjustments. The committee
questioned the MPD’s insularity and the usefulness of its freedom from external oversight. The
WSC noted that little had changed since the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders
(NACCD) identified “police brutality” as “the most pervasive” issue identified by Black citizens in
the fall of 1967.86 Milwaukee’s police bureaucracy showed “no sensitivity” to “the magnitude of this
problem.” The WSC acknowledged that the MPD, once considered “a model” and “pioneer in
progressive police measures,” had lost its “innovator” reputation under Breier.87 Instead, it found an
administrator “whose central focus…has been to stress traditional police duties.”88 The chief
“downgraded” areas that other police departments now stressed, such as “college education,
specialized teams for juveniles, and minority and community relations units.” He denied public
requests for information and refused to comply with inquiries from outside government agencies,
including the U.S. Department of Justice.89 In terms of waging Milwaukee’s War on Crime, Breier
refused to apply for federal grants earmarked for “human relations training, community relations
work or programs designed to treat special situations” related to race.90 These tasks were left to the
Mayor’s office and MFPC. The police chief ’s “independence on civilian control” allowed him to
“avoid public scrutiny” for all departmental operations.
The WSC identified pervasive discrimination within and without the MPD. They proposed
solutions that would rid the MPD of racism and create a more balanced system. The liberal
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committee concluded that the MPD’s organization and policies had severely “isolated” it from the
communities of color most in need of responsive policing and protection from interpersonal crime
and police misconduct. The WSC called on Milwaukee’s mayor to “devote his considerable influence
to the task of making the MPD accountable to the electorate,” to marshal support from the
Common Council and state officials, and to use his executive authority to re-organize the police
department. The WSC posed a series of questions to Mayor Maier about the MPD, as well as the
MFPC’s capacity to raise police accountability standards. His answers largely deflected responsibility.
The mayor pointed to the police chief ’s statutory powers, arguing that his office only had the
authority to direct the MPD during times of emergency, like the 1967 civil disturbance. Maier
applauded the MFPC’s minority recruitment efforts, despite the fact that it fell well short of its goal.
Regarding civilian oversight, the mayor cited the 1911 statute and the Wisconsin State Supreme
Court’s decision to affirm the Milwaukee police chief ’s autonomy. Consequently, the WSC
recommended that all Safe Streets Act funding for the city be withheld until the MPD drastically
improved its “human relations” training practices, cooperated with outside agencies and funding
sources, established a dedicated “community relations unit,” and recruited additional “minority”
officers.91
The WSC report also documented the experiences of Black police officers in Milwaukee. It
exposed a problematic system of Black police recruitment, assignment, and promotions. The
committee recognized that “uniformed personnel jobs in local police and fire departments were the
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most difficult for minorities to obtain.”92 Recruits entered the department as patrolmen, some
through the Police Aide program. After five years, eligible patrolmen could apply for sergeant. After
a period of time as sergeant, they could apply for lieutenant and, eventually, captain. Since 1885, the
MFPC had overseen all hiring and promotions in Milwaukee’s police and fire departments. The
Commission designed, scheduled and administered entrance and promotional examinations and
determined eligibility lists based on composite grades. As of 1973, the grade for new recruits
featured three examination components: forty percent written, thirty percent physical agility, and
thirty percent oral interview. Successful recruits exhibited “good moral character,” had zero felony
convictions or “habitual petty law violations,” and were U.S. citizens with at least one year of
residency in Wisconsin. They had to demonstrate English proficiency and pass reading
comprehension, oral, and written exams. Patrolmen between the ages of 21 and 33 years also had to
meet a 5’ 8” height requirement.
Until 1968, the MFPC kept no record of how many Black officers worked for the MPD. This
changed with the arrival of Marquette Law School Dean Charles Mentkowski, who aimed to update
the commission’s statistical records and meet federal diversity requirements. Still, despite dozens of
applications, very few Black candidates succeeded in getting hired on the MPD. The Assistant to the
Executive Secretary of the MFPC selected written exam questions, which were supplied by the
Public Personnel Association. The MFPC conducted oral interviews and physical agility tests. Failure
to obtain a passing score on either resulted in disqualification. Eligible candidates were also expected
to pass medical screenings. Breier offered no reliable data on the number of Black police officers
employed. Depending on who the WSC asked, estimates ranged from thirty-three to seventy-one.
According to interviewees, Breier ordered Black officers not to respond when anyone asked about
his department’s racial composition.
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The WSC’s investigation reflected Milwaukee’s economic segmentation and racial segregation.
Chief Breier exacerbated existing racial and class schisms, as City Hall and the MFPC looked to
diversify the MPD. One way City Hall tried to do so was by hiring a Community Relations Specialist
(CRS) to help improve the department’s image by mediating disputes between heavily-policed poor
and working-class communities of color and law enforcement. At Breier’s urging, rank-and-file
officers voted against its creation. The chief saw the position as unnecessary, since every patrolman,
in his view, was already a community relations expert. The WSC noted that Breier stressed traditional
practices, like monitoring jaywalking. He rejected partnering with Black-led organizations and
community institutions to better control crime. The chief ’s aversion to taking Black police
recruitment and retention deepened the gulf between the department and the MFPC’s Community
Relations Specialist.
The WSC’s recommendations charted a reformist path that was meant to better connect police
bureaucrats to federal War on Crime programming, mitigate opportunities for civil disorder, and
ensure that the MPD was in compliance with civil rights laws. If the city followed these steps, justice
would be more equitably served. Moreover, civil service employment opportunities would become
more widely available to populations suffering from disproportionate unemployment, poverty, and
crime. To ensure the creation of a more diverse police force that advanced access and opportunity,
the committee proposed eliminating the MPD’s one-year state residency requirement. That rule
effectively barred recent Black and Brown arrivals from employment and precluded national
recruitment efforts. It advocated for a reduction in the department’s 5’ 8” height requirement, which
Latinx representatives argued disqualified them from entry onto the force. Regarding the testing of
police recruits, the committee recommended that the MFPC devise an entrance exam that was free
of cultural bias and more specific to the functions of the job. Although it should not serve as an
“intelligence test,” they argued that examinations should include psychological testing for new
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recruits. Finally, existing Black officers should be enlisted to recruit patrolmen and police aides, with
the MPD recording its racial data and tracking progress of advancement.
Ultimately, the WSC shed a brighter light on the MPD’s discriminatory practices, particularly
the department’s internal racism and undermining of minority recruitment, retention, and
advancement.93 The committee’s recommendations mostly focused on improving police-community
relations, outlining specific areas to enhance civilian input and oversight. Public testimony revealed
that people of color saw the MPD “as a quasi-military occupational force unresponsive to
community concerns and needs.”94 Therefore, the WSC recommended establishing “community
advisory boards” to aid district-level commanders in developing “mutual understanding of
department policy and community needs.” Such advisory boards were to include women, students,
senior citizens, “business people,” and other community representatives. The Committee also
recognized that Chief Breier’s lifetime tenure was a great hindrance to accountability. It
recommended Mayor Maier and the Common Council restructure the city’s public safety institutions
so that the police and fire chiefs served limited terms and were held responsible by elected officials.
Finally, any public complaints received by the MPD should go before the MFPC. Grievance hearings
were to be well-publicized, so citizens could be made aware of their options when they experienced
police mistreatment.
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The Police Killing of Jacqueline Ford
Supporters of community control grew increasingly vocal in the wake of several high-profile
police killings of Black Milwaukee citizens in the mid-1970s. On November 14, 1972, the famed
Black feminist and Marxist philosopher, Dr. Angela Davis, said one of their names before a packed
house of about 1,000 spectators at the Black-owned Creative Center on N. Teutonia Ave.95 Less than
six months removed from being acquitted of aggravated kidnapping and first-degree murder charges
in California, Davis decried Ms. Jacqueline “Jackie” Ford being “viciously shot down by a Milwaukee
cop.96 A white Detective, Snead Carroll, was the culprit. He fatally shot the 19-year-old less than a
week after Mother’s Day, on May 17, 1972. Carroll killed Ford outside of the inner-rear doorway of
a second-story flat on N. 13th St. He was one of three detectives to enter the building’s rear entrance
that day. The detectives ascended Ford’s staircase in search of a man who was wanted in connection
with an armed robbery and shootout. The officers found 23-year-old Duane Greer, Ford’s
boyfriend, in the apartment.97
Soon after Carroll shot Ford, the MPD’s public relations team went about defending the
veteran detective’s honor. Police on the scene reported Ford’s death as accidental. They said he had
rushed up the back staircase to subdue the young woman, who, at first, officers said was brandishing
a butcher’s knife. They retracted that claim. Carroll said he “tripped” while moving quickly up the
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staircase, unintentionally firing his service weapon in the direction of Ford’s lower right chest.
District Attorney E. Michael McCann called the shooting “accidental, though tragic.” Although he
requested an inquest hearing at the behest of the Ford family, McCann told reporters that Carroll
was “one of the most capable and professional men in the Milwaukee Police Department.”98 Few
police accountability advocates expected justice from the DA. As McCann told Joan McManus in
1970, he would “probably never file criminal charges” against a police officer in “a citizen complaint
case.” They would not be able to overcome the credibility afforded to police in court.99
Black residents, incensed over Ford’s death, mobilized a campaign for justice. Twenty-five
community members filled a small room for the June inquest hearing, including friends and family
of the deceased. When the county medical examiner announced his decision to exonerate Detective
Carroll, loved ones cried out against what they knew to be a grave injustice. Attorney Terrance Pitts
called the medical examination a “whitewash.” “If a cop can’t be held responsible for falling and
killing someone,” he asked, “What are our lives worth—nothing.”100 Duane Greer, on the other
hand, was charged with attempted murder, armed robbery, and “causing injury by conduct regardless
of life.” At the hearing, MPD detectives reiterated their story, insisting that one accidental shot was
fired. However, witnesses and neighbors presented a murkier picture. Greer and Ford’s sister
testified to hearing multiple shots fired. A Madison crime lab expert studying the case argued that
the bullet that hit Ford exited her body and entered the apartment door from the opposite side of
where police described. Nevertheless, the medical examiner confirmed the police version of events.
Carroll’s actions were ruled “excusable homicide.” After the inquest hearing, Sarah Ford addressed
the press. She called out the whitewashed criminal-legal system’s contradictory character and self-
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serving narratives, commenting, “Each one is coming up with a different story…. They’re going to
stick together on their lies…They makes the law, and they breaks the law, to their own advantage.”101
Black-led neighborhood organizations assembled in the days after the Ford killing,
demanding community control of the police as part of a larger quest for Black political and
economic self-determination.102 In Milwaukee, a short-lived umbrella coalition of Black Power
organizations formed as the Council of Black People (CBP). The CBP’s focus was to eliminate
police violence on the north side. For its members, that began with garnering Black police
representation, gaining Black input on police policy, and guaranteeing Black civilian oversight of
police actions. MBPP co-founder Walter Chesser said it was “the first time in Milwaukee [that] Black
people came together to seriously deal with the question of community control of the police.” 103
The CBP’s goal was ultimately to engender more responsible police protection—not to abolish law
enforcement, but “to develop a police department responsive to the community it serves.”104 That
included decentralization of the MPD, or at least uncoupling the department from the
“impregnable” grasp of Chief Breier. The critical issue for Chesser and others was the lethal,
physical police force regularly inflicted on African Americans. The CBP “was not responding to the
loss of one black life,” he affirmed, but “to the deaths of all Black persons at the hands of
Milwaukee’s Police Department.”
The CBP organized a demonstration at the Milwaukee Safety Building in the wake of the
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Ford killing, where they presented three demands: first, for the MPD to fire Detective Carroll.
Second, for Breier to replace all white patrolmen serving in Black Milwaukee neighborhoods with
Black officers. Third, for the police chief, mayor, and MFPC chairman to formally apologize to the
Ford family for carelessly ending Jacqueline’s life. The CBP worked with Black clergy to shine a
brighter light on issues of police violence, circulating a petition for legal changes that permitted
community control of the police.105 On May 23, 1972, upwards of 300 people marched on
Milwaukee’s Safety Building after Ford’s funeral service. 106 Four of the marchers representing the
CBP—Walter G. Beach II and Webster Harris of the recently formed New Image Concept,
Commando Project I leader Jesse Wade, and Robert Bond of Interested Veterans of the Central
City—demanded a meeting with Chief Breier. “We are not satisfied,” Beach told the press after the
meeting.107 “The three points that we presented to the chief were presented as strongly as [they]
could be presented. And we let the chief know that we were not satisfied with anything other than a
positive position on the part of the police administration,” he added. While Beach insisted the CBP
would “continue to pursue the issue,” he looked to set the public’s mind at ease about any threat of
civil unrest surrounding the outcome of the inquest hearing. “We are not here to destroy or tear
down. We merely want to make input. And we feel that we ought to have that opportunity to talk to
the chief to seek the beginning of negotiations on behalf of the citizenry of the City of Milwaukee,
specifically of the Black community, and with the Police Department. This is what I call working
together,” Beach concluded.
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None of the CBP demands were met. Chief Breier told the council he would take “a long,
hard look” at removing white officers from Black neighborhoods by the next year. However, he
called the request “impractical,” citing a limited availability of Black patrolman candidates.108 Not
surprisingly, the chief refused to fire Carroll, who he believed acted appropriately and was
exonerated by the DA. In a letter to his fellow MFPC members, Louis Miller, the only Black
commissioner, pleaded for at least a suspension pending a full investigation. 109 But Miller’s colleagues
rejected his request. Assistant City Attorney Thomas Hayes advised the MFPC that police officers
could not be suspended unless a “formal complaint” was filed by an “elector.” The only room for
action was on recruiting more Black police. That representation was so low, five years after the
MFPC had begun taking minority recruitment seriously, was a problem for a commission that had
done little beyond placing a handful of public advertisements, outfitting a “community relations
mobile unit,” and employing a “community relations specialist” to lecture to Black and Latinx people
on the benefits of police work. The MPD’s harsh tactics in minoritized spaces, meanwhile,
undermined their recruitment efforts long-term. Countless Black and Brown youth mistrusted
police and showed no interest in joining their oppressor. But even those who expressed interest
faced institutional barriers. In 1972, only two Black young people qualified for the Police Aide
program, despite an eligibility list of sixty-two candidates. The MFPC’s executive secretary, Arlene
Kennedy, cited “economic conditions” and “high unemployment” as factors. Yet Black officers and
community members knew that written exam questions favored white test-takers in their cultural
framing. This compounded existing distrust of Milwaukee’s police bureaucracy.110
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Because of the CBP and Walter Beach’s commitment, Black police recruitment remained the
only viable reform solution. The statute protecting Chief Breier’s authority, combined with his
political influence, neutralized any hope for elected officials expanding community input or civilian
review structures. Whether Black officers patrolling on the north side would actually lead to a
reduction in racialized police violence was an untested question. As one retired Black officer
claimed, he and his peers intervened in potentially violent situations involving white police and Black
citizens. “If you see an officer getting heavy handed with someone else,” the officer said, “you step
in between and you take the blow. And then when they hit you, you can hit back.”111 In 1971, only
fifty-one Black officers served out of 2,200 sworn personnel—just two percent of the MPD’s
total.112 At Breier’s direction, supervising officers refrained from assigning Black officers to the same
squad. They were not allowed to congregate together on the job. The goal for Walter G. Beach II
and his collaborators was to create power in numbers, eventually moving Black officers up the chain
of command within the existing system. He started a community-based hiring drive, working
alongside the Milwaukee Urban League, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, Adult Basic Education
Department of the Spanish Center, and MFPC to host skills training workshops.113
Beach’s efforts were successful. Ford’s death motivated, for instance, future League of
Martin president Lenard Wells to join the MPD.114 His long career began as two forces converged in
the long 1970s: Black Power organizations seeking to implement community control of the police
Milwaukee Mss EZ, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Archives.
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and the federal government enforcing civil rights compliance within police agencies. Beach’s
recruitment push, in January 1973, secured a record sixty-two minority applicants—mostly Black,
but also some of Latinx and Native American ancestry. 115 In May, he founded a police training
school that would operate through his non-profit organization, the New Image Concept (NIC),
which sought grant funding through the LEAA. The “image” of the MPD was the main inhibitor to
“good potential policemen,” Beach surmised.116 Black politicians supported the one-time Milwaukee
NAACP president’s recruitment efforts. Without recruiting more Black patrolmen, Lloyd Barbee
wrote Beach, “the dogs who are to protect us will become madder, or wolves who will prey upon the
Black and Latin community all the more.”117 Mayor Maier appointed the second Black Fire and
Police Commissioner, William Gore, in May 1973. It marked a liberal transition for the MFPC, as the
board moved further away from the secretive, conservative, all-white civic alliance’s powerful
influence. Police brutality, Gore said, was “something that should be looked at honestly and
corrected.”118 He expressed hope that Milwaukee would curb Black suspicions of police. However,
additional police killings foiled this goal.

Black Lawmakers and Police Reform
Racialized police killings, like the Ford case, shaped Black political agendas during the long
1970s. Milwaukee’s few Black legislators responded to constituent demands for accountability.
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However, they found lax support from white colleagues. Assemblyman Lloyd Barbee, who had
joined Alderwoman Vel Phillips in calling for more Black police officers in the early 1960s, was the
most active.119 His participation in the Citizens Anti-Police Brutality Committee (1964-1965), when
Chief Breier refused to work with local organizations in alleviating police-community tensions,
showed him that fixing Black Milwaukee’s policing crisis would require legislative solutions. In 1968,
Barbee introduced a bill that granted anyone the right to file a complaint against the police with the
MFPC, regardless of taxpayer or property owner status. It passed. The next year, he proposed
additional measures that failed.120 “We no longer have time for debate when incidents of violence by
police are directed against and restrict the legitimate movement of people,” Barbee argued.121 His
first bill mandated psychological screenings for police recruits, so as to remove potentially dangerous
or racist patrolmen.122 Another made it illegal for police to abuse any person stopped, arrested, or
detained by law enforcement. In “incident after incident,” the assemblyman observed, Milwaukee
police were “catching a person unaware and physically assaulting him for no reason other than
exercising his power.”123 A third measure would have established a civil rights division within the
Wisconsin Department of Justice. That agency, among other responsibilities, was to handle all police
brutality and misconduct allegations registered in the state.124 Finally, Barbee drafted a bill that would
install a civilian head of the MPD—a commissioner appointed by and who served at the mayor’s
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discretion.125 All of these bills reflected mounting Black frustrations with the city’s all-white police
bureaucracy. Unfortunately, few made it out of committee. 126
Assemblyman Barbee again addressed police brutality in 1971. He specifically responded to
the violence inflicted by the MPD’s Tactical Squad. His latest measure declared that “no law
enforcement officer shall abuse any person detained or in the custody of a law enforcement
agency.”127 The proposed bill helped aggrieved people file lawsuits with the U.S. Justice Department,
along with calling for mandatory investigations. Any officers who engaged in violent acts or
misconduct were to be disciplined. Barbee put forward more bills, including one that challenged the
1911 statute granting Milwaukee public safety chief ’s lifetime tenure, policymaking authority, and
regulatory independence. “If we want to begin to get rid of militarism from the police department,
then we have got to start with the department’s leadership,” he stated.128 During a June 1973
legislative hearing on setting four-year term limits for public safety chiefs, Barbee and an assembly
colleague, Harout Sanasarian (D-Milwaukee), criticized Chief Breier’s “arrogance,” “inaccessibility”
to citizens, and “roadblocking” of elected officials who tried to make the MPD “more open and
responsive to the people.”129 In Barbee’s view, the department had become exceptional for being the
only police department in the country to run “contrary to democratic arrangements,” with a “police
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chief appointed for life.”
Other Black legislators introduced policing measures as more got elected to office in the
long 1970s. State Senator Monroe Swan, former chair of the Organization of Organizations,
introduced three bills in March 1973. They responded to the MPD’s brutal searches and
interrogations following the shooting deaths of two officers. The first measure required on duty
police in “first class cities” to wear police badge identification numbers sewn on their uniforms.130
The second called for a five-member “police and fire safety review board” to be established in each
of Milwaukee’s seven police districts. The boards would be able to evaluate and act on civilian police
complaints.131 One member from each board would also serve on the MFPC, raising the
commission’s membership from five to twelve members. Swan’s third bill, co-sponsored with five
other senators and three representatives, called for the creation of a “safety commissioner’s” office
in Milwaukee. The Safety Commissioner would be responsible for appointing police and fire chiefs
and holding them accountable. They would report to the MFPC, which would be expanded from
five to nine members, with the Common Council appointing two members and the fire and police
unions appointing two as well. The measure also called for public safety chiefs to serve four-year
terms. Swan introduced another measure in April prohibiting police officers in first-class cities from
living outside of the precincts or districts in which they served.132
Lloyd Barbee was also the first Black community leader in Milwaukee to float the idea of
police abolition. He told the city’s International Society for General Semantics chapter in 1968 that
all police forces should be abolished. “They are taught violence and actively practice it,” Barbee
stated, referencing the police riot that had just taken place outside of the Democratic National
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Convention in Chicago.133 He framed the police as defenders of class privilege, “put in a position of
killing human beings for taking or damaging property.”134 “This kind of action triggers counteraction” from overpoliced citizens, who perceive law enforcement as “an occupying army.” Barbee
held that it was only possible for the police to “maintain law and order” if they respected human
dignity rather than “violate it with acts of brutality, harassment, and sadism.” 135 To make his point,
Barbee alluded to an era of benevolent policing, pre-militarized and with sound community
relations. We can no longer “rely on hardware and weapons for law and order,” Barbee commented.
“Police now play the role of provocateurs, doing much more harm than good,” and “white bigots
support this kind of force.”136
Barbee unsuccessfully tested his abolition concept in the legislature in October 1969. He
introduced what is essentially a proposal for community control of law enforcement. The bill called
for the abolition of all police departments in Wisconsin cities and villages with populations over
5,500 residents. The departments were to be replaced with volunteer forces led by civilian
administrators appointed by community boards, who were also tasked with supervising the agency’s
“day-to-day activities.”137 The bill did more than simply dismantle organized police departments. It
called for their civilian-led replacements to be staffed by unarmed officers. In not carrying deadly
“instruments of force,” historically used to “escalate essentially peaceful situations into violent
confrontations,” law enforcement would keep the peace, refrain from brutality, and “further reduce
the authoritarian appearance of policemen.”138 Barbee argued this engendered “community respect
and acceptance” from residents who mistrusted the intentions of police. Lastly, the bill also called
for “a draft procedure” when volunteers were needed. Draftees would be guaranteed the right of re“Barbee Feels Police Shouldn’t Exist at All,” The Milwaukee Journal, September 14, 1968, Part 2, 6.
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employment, assuming they held a job, after two-year terms. All officers would undergo
psychological screenings. Community boards would be empowered to set procedures according to
local conditions. For Barbee, police “abolition” meant dismantling and rebuilding law enforcement
from the ground up under a program of community control that anchored policing in service, not
racist public order enforcement.

Re-organized Milwaukee Black Panther Party and the United Black Community Council
Following the Council of Black People’s apparent dissolution in 1972, Milwaukee’s Black
Panther Party (MBPP) reorganized.139 It was formally re-chartered in 1973 and featured about fifty
members, mostly Black women. Again, the MBPP took up the banner of community control of the
police. In May 1974, the group called for the formation of a citizen elected “City-wide Police
Commission” (CPC). While all Black residents experienced some form of overpolicing and
underprotection in Milwaukee, the Panthers faced a near-constant threat of police harassment,
surveillance, and violence. The Party’s national reputation for armed militancy and Black Nationalist
posturing encouraged a focused police response locally. While the CPC had little chance of
realization in a white-controlled city dominated by competing liberal and conservative political
interests, it outlined a unique vision for community control that served as a baseline for more radical
police accountability advocates going forward. Ronald Starks called the plan “the first viable
restructuring of the present police department system designed to institutionalize actual control by
the community.”140
The Black Panthers’ idea for the CPC revived the public safety board concept outlined in
1968 by the Martin-Weber Committee (MWC). The MWC had proposed replacing the Fire and
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Police Commission with a seven-member body responsible for setting all police policies.141 However,
the MBPP wanted to add eight additional members. CPC candidates would run on public campaigns
funded by City Hall. They had to be civilians, at least eighteen years of age, and should not
concurrently hold public office. The CPC would then choose local administrators to oversee seven
police district boards. These citizen-led boards would hold the authority to hire and fire police
personnel, promote officers, process complaints, and operate the internal affairs bureau. CPC
records would be open and accessible to the public, and people could petition for special meetings
as needed. Central to this self-determined vision was, again, requiring the police to live in the
districts they served. This would ensure fair representation, raise standards of accountability, and
improve community relations, while at the same time lowering Black arrest rates. The MBPP set a
goal of collecting 30,000 signatures for a state legislative referendum to “change laws governing
police affairs” in 1976. To build support, they proposed educational classes to familiarize people
with the MPD’s “history, structure, and operation.”142
Black Power organizations flourished in Milwaukee during the mid-1970s. The revived
MBPP and others participated in a United Black Community Conference in August 1974. 143 It was
designed to bring Black Milwaukeeans of sundry political, religious, and philosophical perspectives
together. The conference’s more than a dozen workshops aimed to create a unified Black position
on local issues like police brutality, education, housing, healthcare, and the needs of veterans. Penny
and Michael McGee, both Black Panthers and community activists, led the conference’s steering
committee. They focused on developing Black political unity, community control of institutions, an
“economic base” for community survival programs, and registering Black voters.144 The event led to
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the formation of the United Black Community Council (UBCC), which competed with Black-led
liberal coalitions in debates around police violence and public safety. The group came to include
former members of the MBPP, after Huey Newton shut down all branches outside of California in
1977, members of the Republic of New Africa, and the Nation of Islam.145

January 1973 Police Slayings and Response
The issue of police-Black citizen violence was aggravated amid a violent start to 1973. On a
cold January night, two white patrolmen, Charles Smith and Gerald Hempe, were shot and killed on
N. Palmer St. by a 26-year-old Black male suspect.146 It was not immediately clear why the officers
pulled Ben Sanders and a vehicle of three passengers over, nor why the traffic stop took a tragic
turn. According to witnesses, police were arresting a passenger, 21-year-old Gregory Daniels, when
Sanders exited the vehicle and began firing.147 Community members suspected the MPD’s history of
“social harassment” played a role.148 In response to the first slaying of a police officer since 1967, the
MPD engaged in an aggressive “manhunt,” or, what one Black Vietnam War veteran called, “a
search and destroy mission.”149 Three tavern owners complained to the Milwaukee NAACP that
officers stormed into their establishments, lined patrons up at gunpoint, searched them for guns, and
made arrests.150 Black homeowners decried a lack of search warrants. Alderman Ben Johnson said
the killings were “symptomatic of the problems that are confronted daily” by Black citizens. 151 More
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than a dozen suspects were eventually apprehended, with more stopped, searched, and questioned.
The invasive “hunt” triggered latent traumas. Officers “forcibly entered” several family residences
and businesses in the vicinity of the crime in search of witnesses and suspects. One elderly man said
he did not know who he was more scared of, “the cops or the muggers…” The police “treat us just
like we was all criminals.”152 Some “terrorized” suspects were so badly beaten they required
hospitalization.153 At a district station, police denied attorney visitations to interrogated suspects.154
Jesse Wade, of the Commandos I project, expressed remorse about the officers’ deaths.155 However,
he also surmised that the young patrolmen would still be alive “if cops hadn’t been messing with
folks.” Most Black people in the city, he said, “don’t go looking for cops…they go the other way.” 156
The MPD’s actions evoked the 1956 and 1957 police searches for Black rape suspects
following the alleged sexual assaults of white women. Only this time, the Black community had
more political capital. Black elected officials connected the tragedy of the police murders to
discriminatory law enforcement tactics and a lack of protection for Black residents living on
Milwaukee’s north side. Alderman Orville Pitts observed that an “illegal curfew” existed after 9:00
p.m. in the Black community. Residents found in violation were “stopped and frisked while they
walked or drove their cars.”157 The MPD criminalized African Americans, while ignoring “the
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156 “Police Attitudes toward Inner City Decried,” The Milwaukee Journal, February 2, 1973, Part 2, 7.
157 “Maier Pleads for Peace, Pitts Seeks Protest,” The Milwaukee Journal, February 8, 1973, Part 1, 9.
152
153

356

muggers, burglars, and other people who commit crimes” in their neighborhoods. Johnson called for
“psychological screenings” of police officers so as to remove those “who had overt racism and
hostility.”158 This was not about “going soft” on crime, he said, but instilling “mutual trust and
respect.” Having learned from past police-citizen conflicts, Black political leaders agreed that
reaching out to the MPD to improve police-community relations was “futile,” “worthless,”
“superfluous.”159 The same went for the “useless” MFPC, as County Supervisor Terrence Pitts
described the commission. According to the supervisor, “the only way to stop harassment and police
brutality” was “to win cases in a civil court system.”160 His brother (Orville Pitts) called for an FBI
probe, noting that justice “can only be achieved through the federal process.” Pitts’ investigation
request characterized the MPD as “engaged in a conspiracy to deny civil rights to citizens.”161
Speaking in front of about one hundred frustrated Black constituents at the Northtown Planning
and Development Center, the Black alderman called on thousands of residents to inundate City Hall
with their grievances against the MPD and peacefully “paralyze” municipal government. 162
Black politicians were not alone in voicing their concerns about racist policing. A white
alderman, Martin Schreiber, said public complaints made against the police for acts of violence
should be City Hall’s “top priority.” By February 10, 1973, at least four civilian complaints of police
brutality had been turned over to the U.S. Department of Justice’s Civil Rights Division.163 Still,
rather than listen to and act on Black grievances against the police, Mayor Maier focused on other
issues, like uniting residents living in Milwaukee’s “Model Cities” district to fight against federal
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budget cuts.164 Rather than tell police to stop harassing Black people, Alderman Pitts said, Maier told
“members of the (black) community not to walk the streets at night, to refrain from provoking the
police.”165 He warned against local demagogues manipulating “false charges, innuendos, and
tensions” around policing. The Milwaukee ACLU, alternatively, framed the north side as a
“tinderbox” ready to explode following the next instance of police intimidation or brutality. The
organization demanded better police leadership. Black residents suggested the community engage in
“economic boycotts” to pressure Chief Breier into disciplining violent officers.166 Although the
Milwaukee County District Attorney conducted a brief “John Doe” probe into civilian claims of
“police brutality, abuse, and harassment,” the investigation turned up no police reprimands or
convictions.167 Meanwhile, white citizens defended Chief Breier, who according to The Milwaukee
Journal, was “seen by large numbers of Milwaukeeans as the city’s foremost protector against the
forces of crime and disorder.”168
In response to the 1973 police killings and the MPD’s aggressive response, representatives
from over sixty Black professional and service organizations chose twelve community leaders to
form a Show of Solidarity Committee (SSC). The liberal coalition administered a familiar set of
demands. Upwards of three hundred people attended the SSC’s first meeting at Calvary Baptist
Church that February. The open assembly included all Black city, county, and state elected officials.
The committee challenged the MPD searches in the wake of the police killings. Without blaming the
entire department, it castigated “a bigoted minority of officers bent on destroying the goodwill that
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does exist” in the Black community.169 The SSC demanded improved police-Black community
relations—“an immediate end to all acts of hostility, brutality, and misuse of police authority”—in
addition to Chief Breier’s resignation and a change to the state law granting police chiefs lifetime
tenure and rule-making authority.170 The committee planned a protest march from Garfield Park to
City Hall for the following week to pressure Mayor Maier and the Common Council to finally act on
making police-community relations improvements. Reverend Roy Nabors, Pastor at Calvary Baptist
Church, warned the mayor that if he ignored the coalition’s demands, up to 3,000 residents would
march. The SSC met with Maier and, perhaps not unsurprisingly, changed their proposed
demonstration to a rally.171 In cancelling the march, Nabors cited a reduced volume of civilian
complaints, mounting clergy support for Black concerns, and more open communication from the
mayor’s office.172
The rally at Calvary Baptist Church generated five demands. They included a restructured
police department, with term limits on the chief of police, a citizen review board, an expanded
MFPC to include Black and Latinx members, the appointment of Black commanders and
assignment of more Black officers in majority African American districts, and the enforcement of a
recently passed ordinance requiring police officers to wear patches showing their badge numbers. 173
Louis Miller, who had resigned from the MFPC in January, told attendees that the MFPC was an
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anti-Black institution. He left his post, in part, because bringing “significant change” to the
previously all-white body felt like such a monumental struggle. Miller urged residents to “push for a
stronger voice.”174 At the rally, the SSC established a police brutality fund to be administered by the
Milwaukee NAACP. It called on citizens to file federal lawsuits in response to police brutality cases.
Alderman Pitts said police violence resulted from the power wielded by manufacturers, industrialists,
and bankers. The MPD served at their behest. Therefore, political pressure should be applied to
local capitalists.
More incidents of racialized police violence transpired that summer, often under murky
circumstances. In late June, police shot and killed a disabled 24-year-old Black man after he
commandeered a police service weapon in Police District Five’s parking garage and wounded four
officers.175 Warren Pettis was arrested on charges of public drunkenness and disorderly conduct. He
reportedly shouted to officers that he was not going to die like Chicago Black Panther Party leader
Fred Hampton, who was notably murdered by federal police in December 1969. Pettis was a war
veteran, who three months earlier had commented on the employment problems of returning Black
servicemen.176 He said he had been brutalized by police. Counselors at Project WHERE, a veteran’s
support organization, suspected he was provoked into a shooting match by police. The organization
described him in glowing terms as someone who “wanted to become a more productive citizen
within the Black community.”177 In August 1973, two officers shot and killed 22-year-old Andrew
Friend—a young Black man who, according to MPD reporting, was acting erratically and
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endangering the lives of children while in an alcohol or drug-induced state.178 Friend’s family called
the shooting “mass murder” and challenged the police version of events.179 The case perplexed and
saddened many residents, amplifying Black mistrust of the police. As the public intellectual James
Cameron editorialized, “the police, evidently, knowing nothing about imagination, or even the basics
of human psychology, reverted, apparently, to their natural behavioral pattern in dealing with black
people.”180 Milwaukee County Medical Examiners ruled the shooting “justifiable” after a tense
inquest hearing. Andrew Friend’s family charged the MPD with manipulating witness testimony and
the county with ignoring requested subpoenas.181

Civil Rights Compliance and Revenue Sharing
The public outcry among African American residents that greeted the police killing of
Jacqueline Ford in May 1972, the release of the USCCR’s report on the MPD that December, and
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the police violence that followed the murder of two white patrolmen in January 1973 converged
with local, state, and federal efforts to bring Milwaukee’s police hiring practices into compliance with
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Guaranteeing diverse hiring, free from racial bias, remained
the most palatable reform proposal supported by both liberal police accountability advocates and
poor and working-class Black people concerned about public safety. Both sides worked to alleviate
police-community tensions without diminishing law enforcement’s capacity for effective crime
control and order maintenance in a city grappling with compounding issues, like white flight, federal
disinvestment, deindustrialization, and increasing street crime. 182 For City Hall officials, the stakes
were not simply about mitigating opportunities for civil violence among Black residents frustrated
by inequality or, for some, protecting vulnerable populations of color from police misconduct—they
were also about the possibility of losing federal grant dollars under the Nixon administration’s
revenue sharing program.
On October 20, 1972, a Wisconsin Council on Criminal Justice (WCCJ) civil rights
compliance officer asked Chief Breier to account for the MPD’s racial demographics and submit
data on all white, Black, Mexican, and Native American personnel hired onto the department since
January 1, 1971. The compliance officer, Rina Rosenberg, wanted the names, racial backgrounds, and
assignments of all rank-and-file officers and an explanation for how their recruitment occurred,
including any gender restrictions and an outline of all screening processes.183 Breier responded,
petulantly, and declined to provide any demographic information. He argued the MPD had only
applied for “radio equipment” upgrades from the WCCJ and was thus exempt from state monitoring
because his grant request did not have “employment” or “training” as a “primary objective.”
Rosenberg informed Breier that federal law mandated compliance from all agencies receiving any
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LEAA funding.184 She gave him a deadline of November 27, 1972, less than a month before the
Wisconsin State Committee published its report on the MPD’s institutional isolation and
discriminatory internal and external practices. Still, the police chief abstained. The WCCJ proposed
holding a hearing on the MPD’s unwillingness to comply with federal civil rights law and, in March
1973, recommended that the U.S. Justice Department deny Milwaukee $400,000 in Safe Streets Act
funds. Mayor Maier assured the council that Breier had complied with its request and the WCCJ
canceled the hearing.185 But the chief, nonetheless, bypassed the council and sent the MPD’s
demographic data straight to the LEAA in Washington, D.C.186 He reported that fifty-eight Black
men, one Black woman, six Native Americans, and ten Latino men served on a staff of 1,900 sworn
personnel—roughly four percent of his department.187
The LEAA forwarded the MPD’s demographic information to the DOJ’s Civil Rights
Division, which met with the Maier administration, the MFPC, and Chief Breier on August 30,
1973.188 After the meeting, the DOJ announced an investigation into Milwaukee’s police recruitment
practices.189 If the city’s police bureaucracy was found to be in violation of U.S. civil rights law, then
it would not only lose criminal justice funding, but all revenue sharing monies for 1974—a total of
$16,374,629.190 While the DOJ did not name specific anti-discrimination claims it was investigating
They also made clear to Breier that the MPD was not being charged with discrimination (at this time), just with a
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or who called for the probe, it said federal officials were looking into the “systematic exclusion” of
“minorities” from the “testing procedures and physical requirements for policemen.”191 As policeBlack community tensions increased in the mid-1970s, Black MPD officers brought complaints of
internal racism to federal authorities. They supported the USCCR’s 1972 probe. Some even met
anonymously with local reporters before the Wisconsin State Committee released its findings. Black
officers were hesitant to talk with the press on the record, fearing retaliation from supervisors and
Breier. They expressed hope that the investigation would compel the DOJ to file litigation alleging
discrimination in police hiring and promotions, as it recently had in Chicago and Buffalo. 192 A
memorandum circulating throughout the MPD suggested “some men coming into the department”
would not have met previous hiring standards. New recruits, accordingly were “to be watched closely
for rule infractions” during their one-year probationary period, during which time they could not
appeal disciplinary measures.193 Although Breier insisted on his support for inter-governmental
cooperation, he stated that any MPD personnel who spoke with DOJ investigators would be subject
to internal rules barring discussions of “official business” with “outsiders.” 194 He demanded federal
subpoenas for police testimony. Of the twenty-nine officers contacted to testify, only three
responded.195 When an investigator incredulously asked the chief who he was “responsible to,” what
“supervisor,” he said he was only “responsible for the efficiency and good conduct of the
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department.”196
The threat of losing millions of dollars in federal funding “roused” Milwaukee’s police
bureaucracy into finally taking action on revising its recruitment and testing practices. It is important
to recognize the federal government’s role in pushing local reform. However, this was a liberal
intervention that did nothing to alter existing police structures and had no immediate impact on
long-standing Black complaints of police violence. DOJ investigators wrote to the MFPC in August
1973. It demanded that the commission rewrite its civil service hiring documents, so as to ensure
minority recruitment and testing procedures free of cultural bias. The goal, they said, was “hiring
40% of black patrolmen,” as previously set by the commission.197 The MFPC had only begun
tracking the racial composition of Milwaukee’s police and fire departments in 1973. 198 Following the
release of the USCCR’s December 1972 report, it instituted dual eligibility lists that tracked white
and non-white candidates. The commission resolved to hire two minority officers for every three
white applicants.199 Only one Black candidate qualified in 1971.200
At the same time that the DOJ conducted its investigation, Black police officers filed Equal
Employment Opportunity complaints. These ushered in federal court monitoring of Milwaukee’s
public safety hiring and assignment procedures. U.S. District Court Judge John Reynolds filed a
consent decree in 1974 mandating the hire of three “minority” officers for every five open positions
on the MPD. On June 28, Reynolds filed a temporary restraining order that prevented the MFPC
and Milwaukee Fire Department from hiring twenty-two white applicants.201 The order prevented
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the commission from hiring patrolmen examined in Summer 1974, and “temporarily restrained” the
MFPC from “engaging in any unlawful discriminatory employment practice or any practice which
serves to continue past discriminatory employment practices against women.” It also barred the
commission from “using unfair and non-job related physical ability tests for positions of police
patrolman until a final determination on the merits of this case.” Reynolds set a hearing for October
2, 1974.202
Reynolds certified the MFPC’s affirmative action program in the case Ward and U.S. v.
Milwaukee (1974). It centered Black women’s experiences with the MPD and instigated lasting hiring
changes based on both race and gender. In the case, Christine Ward, a 28-year-old Black applicant,
filed a class action lawsuit against the city and MFPC. She filed on behalf of thirty-seven women
who had passed the written examination for patrolman, but then failed the “physical ability” test.
Lloyd Barbee represented Ward. He denounced the MFPC’s physical ability test as “inaccurate” and
“discriminatory…not a true test of a person’s strength.”203 Ward’s suit alleged that when
“patrolmen” were hired, they did not need to continue taking the physical examination in order to
stay employed. This made the process arbitrary and unfair. As Barbee observed after Judge Reynolds
entered a final court order in 1979, this legal battle was only the beginning of a broader process of
integrating the MPD and, in turn, making it more accessible and accountable to the communities it
served. “We won the legal constitutional battle for employment opportunities,” he said. “It will be a
hollow victory unless more Blacks, minorities, and women apply, qualify, multiply, and stay in this
field. Only by working more in these types of jobs can change from within be accomplished.” 204
In the end, the DOJ filed two lawsuits alleging racial and gender discrimination in
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Milwaukee’s public safety hiring practices. One was filed against the city and MFPC on October 17,
1974. Federal attorneys alleged that a “pattern or practice of discrimination based on race and sex
with respect to employment” existed in the police and fire departments. Federal prosecutors argued
the city was operating in violation of title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, the provisions of the State and Local Fiscal
Assistance Act of 1972, the provisions of the Safe Streets Act, and rights guaranteed under the 14th
Amendment.205 Title VII exempted state and local governments from being required to protect
employees from discrimination. The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 expanded the
provision to cover public and private employers, educational institutions, and labor organizations
with fifteen employees or more.206 The State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act, signed into law in
October 1972, allocated $30.2 billion to U.S. states over a five-year period. A provision of the law
prohibited “discrimination by race, religion, national origin or sex” in the distribution of federal
funds. Chicago’s Afro-American Patrolmen’s League (AAPL) was the first police organization to file
an anti-discrimination complaint with the U.S. Treasury Department.207 The group alleged
institutional discrimination against Black, Mexican-American, and Puerto Rican officers in Chicago.
The MPD had even greater racial disparities than Chicago. Black officers comprised fifteen percent
of Milwaukee’s total population, but only three percent of sworn police personnel. Black officers
comprised sixteen percent of Chicago’s force and thirty-three percent of the city’s population.208
MFPC Executive Secretary Kennedy and Chief Breier filed written depositions with the U.S.
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Attorney’s office in December 1974. On February 11, 1975, Judge Reynolds ordered the MPD to fill
fourteen of twenty-four patrolman vacancies “from among those who are currently being
considered for an eligibility list” and “who were previously examined in June or July 1974 on the
basis of the defendants’ policy of hiring two qualified minority applicants for every three majority
applicants.”209 Reynolds ruled the MFPC had followed “unconstitutional procedures” in its written
and physical agility testing. In response to the federal government’s earlier pattern-and-practice
investigation, he issued a summons through the DOJ’s Civil Rights Division. It ordered the MFPC
to immediately stop engaging in practices that had “the purpose or effect of unlawfully
discriminating against any future employee or any applicant or potential applicant for employment as
a fire-fighter with the Milwaukee Fire Department because of such individual’s race, sex, or national
origin, etc.” The city responded with an appeal. James Brennan, Milwaukee’s City Attorney, countersued, charging the federal government with discrimination by engaging in a selective enforcement of
civil rights law. Brennan claimed the U.S. had exempted suburban fire and police departments from
setting minority hiring quotas. This response disappointed Black leaders. MNAACP President
Thomas Malone summed up the community’s frustration with City Hall’s equivocation on
affirmative action hiring: “Milwaukee has to get its own house in order. Here is where the
professional job market can have the greatest impact on minorities. Here is where there are many
minorities who want jobs as firemen and policemen. Milwaukee has a greater opportunity to hire
minorities than the suburbs do, and a greater responsibility.”210
While ideological divisions were present among liberal reformers and more radical activists
demanding community control, these federal interventions suggested that there was broad
agreement around the need to democratize the MPD once and for all. The former looked to alter
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Milwaukee’s policing system so that it better reflected the communities it served, generally to
preserve public order, create access, and limit violence. The latter envisioned a transformed police
bureaucracy that directly empowered overpoliced and underprotected citizens of color with input,
oversight, and representational authority. The combination of police violence, growing anxieties
over street crime, and mounting desires among everyday people to organize and become more
involved in preserving neighborhood safety signaled that the status quo was in trouble. Chief
Breier’s isolated and reactionary law-and-order approach was increasingly less popular with citizens,
as Milwaukee diversified in the late 20th century. The city’s Black-led struggle for police
accountability, with the support of federal agencies, was gradually turning towards revising the 1911
statute that historically empowered Milwaukee’s police chief—a power that was “unique in the
United States, with nothing like it short of military occupation.”211

Citywide Coalition for Community Control of the Police
Around the time that Milwaukee’s second Black Panther Party chapter outlined its vision for
community control of the police and the weakening of Chief Breier’s power, liberal reformers also
worked to attenuate the MPD’s authority under a related, if less self-determined model. The
Milwaukee ACLU, having drifted from its most radical 1970 writings on community control,
organized with Black legislators and civil rights activists in July 1974 under the banner of the
Citywide Coalition for Community Control of the Police (CCCCP). The multi-organizational unit
formed as police brutality claims rose following the 1973 police slayings. The coalition called for the
police chief to be held liable to the mayor and Common Council and for the elimination of their
lifetime tenure.212 The CCCCP saw political negotiation as the best recourse in effecting change,
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given Breier’s statutory authority. They came to see proposals for community control that
empowered minoritized groups with input on police policy directly as unfeasible. Nevertheless, the
coalition aimed, according to Lloyd Barbee, to “work together on legislation” that rendered the
MPD more “open and accountable to the public” and to “push passage of the recommendation
proposed by the Martin-Weber Committee.”213 The CCCCP specifically addressed “the secret and
autonomous practices” of the MPD and Chief Breier’s “public-be-damned belief that he is
accountable to no one.”214
In September 1974, the CCCCP and nearly one hundred residents pressured the Milwaukee
Common Council’s public safety committee to draft an ordinance creating an independent public
safety review board that functioned outside of Breier’s purview.215 Spokeswoman Karen Golsil
attacked his lifetime appointment and “sole control over department operations.” ACLU attorney
Curry First argued that police misconduct and inadequate protection were unsustainable and
dangerous; law enforcement discouraged citizen complaints and offered no public relief. The
CCCCP-backed proposal was drafted by Alderman Ben Johnson, one of two Black city
councilmen.216 The measure authorized a mayor-appointed public safety board to set policies related
to police budgeting, community relations, compensation, facilities, and more. The six-member body,
serving six-year terms, would appoint new police chiefs on a limited term basis. For the CCCCP, the
proposal was a compromise, as the coalition wanted safety board members to serve three year terms
The 1968 Martin-Weber Committee proposed the creation of a seven-member public safety board. The review board
would be able to set police department policy related to budget, community relations, facilities, organization,
compensation, research, rules of conduct, and evaluation of performance. It would also be empowered to appoint future
police chiefs, who would serve a specified term limit, retain civil service status, and have administrative responsibility
over the MPD. Public safety board members would be appointed by the mayor, serve six-year terms, and enjoy the
support of a full-time staff person. “Combat Police Abuse,” The Milwaukee Star Times, November 30, 1974, 4; “State Rep.
Lloyd Barbee–Comment–Combat Police Abuse,” The Milwaukee Courier, November 30, 1974.
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and be represented by two union members, two “minority group” members, two members of the
general public, and one youth (aged 18-24). The CCCCP asked for safety board candidates to be
nominated by citizen petitions with 5,000 signatures and for the board to select its own chairman,
not the mayor. They also made clear that those most affected by police violence—racial minorities,
youth, and the poor—must receive sufficient representation.
As the CCCCP observed, city officials undermined community-led efforts to make the MPD
more accountable by telling grassroots activists that police rule-making authority and oversight were
subject to state law. Then, when those same groups traveled to Madison to support the revision of
state law, city officials claimed policing issues were matters of “local concern” and “none of the
legislature’s business.”217 The Milwaukee Common Council never passed the review board ordinance.
Breier remained “immensely powerful and popular,” capable of ending an alderman’s career by
leaning on a network of white civic organizations, business communities, and citizen’s councils. 218
They lacked the political will to put their voices on record. However, some Common Council
members did argue for revising the 1911 statute that determined police rule-making authority and
outlined the police chief ’s terms of service. They came to see this as a more effective way to
generate accountability, from a legal standpoint, without ceding police power to everyday citizens. A
multi-racial coalition of state representatives, led by Milwaukee Democrat Dennis Conta, worked in
Madison to reform law enforcement in “cities of the first class,” i.e. Milwaukee. For state lawmakers,
the challenge was striking a “delicate balance” between limiting the potential for partisan
manipulation of the MPD—the quality that had built the exceptionalism myth—and preventing an
“uncontrollable, authoritarian police department.”219 However, only a handful of Black lawmakers
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supported civilian, as opposed to political, review of the police.

A Deadly Winter in the Policing of Black Milwaukee
Two more lethal police brutality incidents occurred in December 1974. Both were ruled
justifiable by the District Attorney, aggravating a tempestuous few years of police-Black citizen
conflict and renewing further calls for community control. In the first incident, police shot and
killed Black Panther Johnnie Starks in his own apartment. Mary Pendleton, a 42-year-old Black
woman accompanying the 54-year-old Starks, died from smoke inhalation after Tactical Squad
officers hurled tear gas into the flat. The chemicals ignited a building fire that injured six additional
people. Two Black plainclothes detectives actually arrived at the scene first, in search of a homicide
suspect. A shootout ensued. Later, a white TEU officer, Gerald Albertson, fired the fatal shotgun
blast that killed Starks. Albertson had a history of violence. The MFPC failed to discipline the
officer after a Black woman alleged that he beat her 15-year-old son with a wrench “for no justifiable
reason.”220 The MPD claimed that officers raided Starks’ building in search of a murder suspect. Yet,
none was found. As Community Review Board member Jeanetta Robinson later stated during a
UBCC “peoples trial,” Starks was armed with a revolver because he was involved in citizens’ crime
watch. He had attempted to keep “dope smokers and others doing illegal things out of the
building.”221 He likely suspected that the plainclothes officers were malicious intruders.
Black residents were outraged at the killings, and showed it in the streets. The UBCC
demonstrated outside of the Milwaukee Safety Building. Protestors demanded an independent
investigation of Starks and Pendleton’s deaths.222 Police and sheriff ’s deputies retaliated by arresting

The mother, Ms. Donna Schrank, testified at a Community Review Board “peoples trial.” “Police Brutality,” The
Milwaukee Star Times, January 23, 1975, 3.
221 Deborah Crosby, “Community Review Board Vows Verdict,” The Milwaukee Star Times, January 9, 1975, 1.
222 “Group Will ‘Try’ Police,” The Milwaukee Courier, January 18, 1975, 2.
220

372

ten members of UBCC’s Committee to Fight Police Repression. Having been spurned in the past,
Black activists refused to wait for city officials to conduct an inquest hearing. Two days after the
UBCC arrests, the council formed a “Community Review Board” (CRB) to investigate the killings. 223
In true Milwaukee fashion, they met at the Paradise Lanes bowling alley. The CRB’s main objective
was “to organize the community politically” and render the MPD “more responsive and sensitive to
the needs of the community.”224 Knowing that white police bureaucrats would not review and act on
these police brutality cases in a thorough and timely fashion, Black community control activists took
it upon themselves to review cases and issue verdicts. They proposed “people’s trials,” after which
they would submit their findings to the District Attorney, Mayor Maier, Chief Breier, the MFPC, the
state legislature, and the DOJ.225 The process served both a substantive and symbolic, almost
therapeutic function for a community traumatized by unchecked police violence. Whether
Milwaukee’s police bureaucracy acted or not, the CRB would perform its due diligence on behalf of
poor and working-class Black people vulnerable to police violence. As UBCC chair Hubert Canfield
wrote, it was difficult to get Black community members to come forward with their stories of police
brutality out of fear of retaliation.226
Only two days after the Community Review Board formed, a white patrolman shot and
killed a Black 16-year-old. Jerry Brookshire was unarmed. Officer Ray Marlow said he fired his gun
“accidentally”—a grim reminder of Snead Carroll’s shooting of Jacqueline Ford. Marlow asserted
that he was chasing Brookshire, a suspected “car thief ” and “purse snatcher,” after the teenager ran
from a reportedly stolen vehicle. His account stated that Brookshire resisted arrest as Marlow was
engaging in a pat down.227 The patrolman’s gun evidently fired as he fell while frisking Brookshire,
The UBCC initially looked to form a police review board as early as August 22, 1974. “Black Panel on the Job,” The
Milwaukee Courier, November 16, 1974, 13.
224 “Inner City Hearing Critical of Police,” The Milwaukee Journal, January 20, 1975, Part 2, 4.
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who laid spread eagle on the ground.228 However, an eyewitness contradicted the officer’s report.
Risking police intimidation and potential violence, a woman bravely came forward and told
authorities that the young man was gunned down while climbing a fence.229 The police killing
enraged an already emotional and increasingly divided Black community. Residents were still trying
to make sense of the Starks and Pendleton killings less than two weeks prior. Lillie Mae Brookshire,
Jerry’s mother, filed a civil rights lawsuit. In 1979, she received a $12,000 “wrongful death”
settlement for the loss of her son.230
Black politicians registered their alarm in the wake of the latest police killings. Alderman
Orville Pitts wired Chief Breier a message, on Christmas day, of “shock and dismay.” Milwaukee’s
second-ever elected Black alderman called for Officer Marlow to be “discharged or suspended for
unprofessional conduct.” The “rash of ‘accidental deaths,’” he noted, severely weakened trust in the
police— “law abiding citizens” believed the MPD “unfairly administered” justice.231 “Justifiable
outrage, fear, and anger swept through the Black community in the form of meetings, excited rallies,
minor conflicts…and ‘grand-stand plays’” following the deaths of Starks, Pendleton, and
Brookshire.232 Upwards of five hundred people crammed into St. Mark A.M.E. Church on
December 27, 1974. Mayor Maier arrived halfway through the emotionally charged event, greeted by
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a din of “jeers.”233 He used his time to defend the city’s record on “Inner Core” issues, blaming
“social conditions” and the Nixon administration’s budget cuts to programs that addressed
“unemployment,” “bad housing,” and “family problems.” Black elected officials called for a “united
Black front” against the city’s “racist police system” and proposed ending the lifetime appointment
of Milwaukee police chiefs.234 County Supervisor Terrance Pitts implored City Hall to “stop giving
the police money to kill black people” and to appoint Black Police Captains in MPD Districts Five
and Seven. Some community members called for an “armed black defense group.” Meanwhile, the
Brookshire family demanded an independent doctor’s examination, Black solidarity, and justice for a
senseless police “murder.” Hundreds more attended community meetings later that week, including
one specifically for women.235
“Conflict and dissent” within the community shrouded the formation of a twenty-one
member grassroots study group charged with investigating the Brookshire killing and answering the
recent rash of police repression.236 A group of up-and-coming Black activists, including 25-year-old
Black Panther Michael McGee denounced the city’s Black political class for intentionally “freezing
out” and drawing support from the UBCC’s Community Review Board. In response, the CRB said it
would take it upon itself “to expose the brutality and injustice Black people are being subjected to
by the police department.”237 In their view, Black citizens could ill afford another official
determination of excusable homicide, nor could they give in to a white-controlled political process
that consistently abdicated justice for Black victims of police violence. Black elected officials had,
journalist Deborah Crosby wrote in a Star Times editorial, the “resources and knowledge,” useful
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information and expertise, to help citizens win this “righteous struggle.” But there was “a distinct
point where their hands were tied by careers, reputations, and friends” they were not willing to risk.
The “nature of politics in this country leaves no room for endless sanction of would-be Black
messiahs.”238 Supervisor Pitts countered that the UBCC were “Johnny-come-latelies” who came “to
disrupt” and “engineer leadership through disunity.”239
The group that McGee and the UBCC dissented from—the “Committee of 21” (C21)—was
represented by a mix of Black politicians, civil rights veterans, Latinx community leaders, and liberal
organizational stalwarts.240 Some members, like Rev. R.L. Lathan, had struggled against police
brutality in Milwaukee ever since the police murdered Daniel Bell in 1958. Citizens Anti-Police
Brutality Committee leaders Rev. B.S. Greggs and Assemblyman Barbee also participated. The C21
demanded that Officer Marlowe be suspended without pay as a “pending an honest and full
investigation of this latest homicide.”241 It turned to federal tools for protecting the civil rights of
individuals through litigation, while also pressuring Mayor Maier to compel Chief Breier “to enforce
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the laws equally or resign.”242 The committee observed the need to change state law, which
undergirded the MPD’s institutional independence and freedom from oversight. At a meeting,
Barbee noted his introduction of several bills in the legislature between 1969 and 1974, which
addressed police chief term limits. Replacing Breier was not enough, he said, “we have to alter the
system.”243 The C21 petitioned the U.S. Attorney General to investigate the MPD “for conspiracy to
commit genocide against Blacks in violation of law and humanity.” They also stated that Milwaukee’s
inquest system and the District Attorney's office should be scrutinized as well. Police killings of
Black men and women are consistently ruled “accidental and justifiable homicide.” The group called
for “a complete investigation of the recent homicide[s] by the police during December 1974. The
harm which flows from these killings of Blacks by so called law enforcers murders justice, the
essence of good government…investigate, prosecute and convict the killers in blue of Blacks and
minorities.”244
Concurrently, the UBCC’s Community Review Board invited Black politicians and business
leaders to its first hearing on January 5, 1975. Chairman Kenneth Williamson, representing a diverse
cohort of students, youth, community organizers, veterans, attorneys, and elected officials, chalked
up their “conspicuous absence” to “bad timing” and “conflicting schedules.” Williamson stressed
“the need for unity”— “divisions [in the black community] are in fact only metaphysical.”245 The
UBCC’s urgency was plain: “Each and every day that we waste seems to be fatal…it is of paramount
that we begin to get on our job.” Part of the review board’s charge was creating a task force to “pre-

“Breier Ouster Asked at Rally,” The Milwaukee Sentinel, December 30, 1974. Box 57, Folder 1, “Police Brutality, 19611974, undated,” Lloyd A. Barbee Papers.
243 “Suspension Asked,” The Milwaukee Sentinel, December 30, 1974. Box 57, Folder 1, “Police Brutality, 1961-1974,
undated,” Lloyd A. Barbee Papers.
244 Committee of 21 to U.S. Attorney General, December 31 1974, Box 140, Folder 3, “Police Department, OctoberDecember, 1974,” Records of Mayor Henry W. Maier Administration.
245 United Black Community Council letter to Black community leaders and organizations, December 25, 1974, Box 62,
Folder 13, “Miscellaneous Organizations, United Black Community Council, 1974,” Vel Phillips Papers, 1946-2009 (bulk
1957-2009), MSS 231, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Archives.
242

377

investigate” police-involved shootings of black residents, “past, present, and future.”246 That they
were “pre”-investigating police killings indicated the UBCC’s distrust of Milwaukee police
bureaucrats. Too many times, Black deaths at the hands of the police went unpunished, police
policies unaddressed. “The Committee sees that the police murders last month are not ‘accidents’
but part of a systematic pattern of police repression against Black people and all working people.”
The group connected Milwaukee’s struggle to a national Black movement against police violence.
“We have seen brothers and sisters murdered and harassed not just in Milwaukee but all across the
country.”247 The Board vowed to report its findings directly to “the community” with an “analysis of
why [the death] happened.” In these “People’s Trials,” they looked “to offer possible changes” to
police practices “to end such conduct.” These changes would then be submitted to “the proper
authorities.”248
A “People’s Trial” was held the following week by the Committee to Fight Police Repression
at Canaan Baptist Church.249 The UBCC called for the punishment of any officers involved in the
shootout that claimed Johnnie Starks and Mary Pendleton’s lives. The committee demanded
“organized resistance” in poor and working-class communities against police repression.250 A march
of around one hundred persons to the MPD’s District Five station followed.
More police shooting deaths of Black citizens followed in 1975. The police killed a 20-yearold Black male in August.251 Charles Dailey was mistaken as a burglary suspect. Police alleged that he
pointed a gun at officers. The District Attorney’s office, again, ruled the police actions “justifiable
homicide.” Michael McGee and the UBCC called for Black self-defense— “Do for yourself. Defend
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yourself…the only gun slingers left in town are the police.”252 A week earlier, Steven H. Gaston was
shot and killed by police.253 The twenty-one-year-old had tried to evade a roadblock in an allegedly
stolen car. New conversations around police-Black community relations took place in halls of
government, but no substantive actions that shifted police policies, administrative structures, or
oversight capacities resulted.254 Speaking before the United Black Community Conference, McGee
not only called out the DA, Chief Breier, and Mayor Maier, but also liberal Black elected officials
and the Committee of 21. He implored, “Does anyone know who else we can turn to, except
ourselves?”255
In June 1976, the UBCC reiterated the Milwaukee Black Panther Party’s demands for
community control of the police. That meant electable, district-level citizen review boards that were
empowered to oversee all police actions; civilian input and open communications on police policies;
and the hiring of more Black and Brown police officers.256 The UBCC counted almost twenty police
killings since 1972. It was times for “each district police station to be controlled by the people that
live within that particular district’s boundaries.” Government study committees, formal inquests,
investigations, political deliberations—none of it had led to revised law enforcement procedures or
more humane and accountable police behavior on Milwaukee’s north side. Mayor Maier had the
power under Milwaukee’s City Charter, to “take care that the laws of the state and the ordinances of
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the city are duly observed and enforced; and that all officers of the city discharge their respective
duties.” And yet, when Black police accountability advocates demanded redress for disparate and
deadly MPD practices, he claimed to have no control over the MPD.257 It was the same story in 1976
as it was in 1966, as it was when Black community leaders first tried to shift the terms of police
power in Milwaukee during the post-World War II era.

Community Control and the Neighborhood Movement in Milwaukee
Black demands for community control in the 1970s converged with the development of a
wider “neighborhood movement” that, as historian Joseph Rodriguez notes, “included residents of
all races and ethnicities actively seeking to address community problems via direct action.”258 This
multi-racial drive for localized power at the grassroots built on Black-led organizing models to
address social, economic, and political concerns that community leaders thought white city officials
had neglected, including administering responsive crime control and curbing police brutality.259
Protests of racist urban renewal policies and freeway construction projects, as well as efforts to
garner more direct public control over the disbursement of federal Community Action and Model
Cities funding in the 1960s, helped establish a baseline of activity for Milwaukee’s burgeoning
neighborhood movement. Calls for infrastructure and municipal service improvements, which
diverse community organizations amplified through demonstrations, compelled city officials to take
these local demands seriously and view neighborhood associations as interest groups whose voices
mattered in the enactment of civic policy.
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While these primarily middle-class, predominantly white community associations confronted a
host of issues—from curbing freeway expansion, to battling real estate “block-busters,” to fighting
for school desegregation—crime and safety became a top priority, particularly as middle and
working-class Black families began moving into previously all-white areas on the city’s northwest and
west sides following the passage of new fair housing laws in the late 1960s. Crime control was a
concern for neighborhood “self-help” organizations like the Cooperation West Side Association,
Mid-Town Neighborhood Association, and Sherman Park Community Association, who respectively
organized to stabilize and economically develop their individual communities. The crime issue was
magnified as both a material reality and a phenomenon historically racialized by white politicians,
media outlets, and residents. Milwaukee neighborhood associations joined a national drive that
reflected deepening public anxieties around street crime, police protection, and the local impact of
constrained municipal budgets.260 Neighborhood groups reimagined crime control on their own
terms, though they were eager to do so in consort with the police department, from whom they
desired greater cooperation, respect, and service. Select law enforcement agencies throughout the
country were just beginning to embrace principles of “community policing,” which was coalescing
as a strategy for re-integrating beat patrol officers in neighborhoods to proactively prevent crime,
resolve disputes, and facilitate trust between police and citizens.261
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not translate into an expanded police budget during the 1970s and 1980s. Rodriguez, Bootstrap New Urbanism, 79.
261 Nostalgia undergirded the community-oriented policing project of the late 20th century. Advocates characterized the
approach as a return to a bygone era of policing, when officers walked a beat and cultivated mutually beneficial relations
with shop-owners, community groups, parents, and youth. This was never the case for all citizens, particularly groups of
color. The strategy assumed that everyday people added value to the policing mission and, therefore, called for their
input and collaboration in identifying policing priorities and allocating resources. Community-oriented policing made
sense for residents, who were collectively experiencing the threat of crime. Through its deployment, citizens could
theoretically exert a measure of control over the police, mitigating the proliferation of crime and disorder, as well as
opportunities for police malfeasance. Community-oriented policing was meant to reorient rank-and-file officers away
from random patrols and centralized command posts, which, by the 1970s, criminal justice experts, social critics, and
everyday residents came to view as disengaging, ineffective, and volatile. Encouraging police to familiarize themselves
with people living in the districts they patrolled would hypothetically reduce police-community tensions, minimize the
use of excessive police force, and better control disorderly behavior. The problem with community-oriented policing,
among others, was that municipal police forces were not looking to surrender autonomy or their expert status as crime260
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The neighborhood movement sought to align itself with preventive policing strategies. Citizen
“block watch” systems emerged in the 1980s and 1990s, whereby residents organized community
patrols and hired private security firms to monitor the spread of crime in their neighborhoods.
These practices, according to one scholar, “shattered what had been a state monopoly on the official
surveillance of public spaces.”262 Neighborhood “watch” programs normalized civilian engagement
in proactive street patrol, sometimes functioning alongside police officers and police surveillance
practices. However, in Milwaukee, MPD assistance to block-level community watch efforts remained
contested given Chief Breier’s hesitancy to embrace community involvement in policing. He saw an
expanded community role as ineffective in resolving crime and thought it would diminish police
authority. Chief Breier and Mayor Maier also argued that beat patrols were too costly and
necessitated greater taxpayer support.263 Despite the fact that some community associations
deliberately embraced racial diversity, Milwaukee’s neighborhood movement was not free of bias.
Poor and working-class Black and Latinx citizens, particularly youth, received the bulk of
community and police attention based on historically perceived, thoroughly racialized white
conceptions of disorder and criminality.
The neighborhood movement prompted a range of responses in individual communities.
Some, like the Sherman Park Community Association (SPCA), explicitly opted to make integration a
priority in their racially changing northwest side district. At the same time, SPCA members urged
Black newcomers to comply with white middle class notions of proprietorship and communal

control agents. The approach also privileged the voices of homeowners, organizational elites, businesses, and other
moneyed interests at the expense of poor and working-class residents. “Broken Windows policing”—a communityoriented policing strategy that targets low level, non-violent offenses thought to produce more serious crimes—is part of
this paradigm. It has resulted in a disproportionate number of Black and Brown arrests. Broken Windows theory coauthor George Kelling was a Milwaukee native. See: Introduction; James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling, “Broken
Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety,” Atlantic Monthly (March 1982), 29–38.
262 See: Benjamin Holtzman, “Expanding the Thin Blue Line: Resident Patrols and Private Security in Late TwentiethCentury New York,” Modern American History (2020), 2, doi:10.1017/mah.2020.1.
263 Rodriguez, Bootstrap New Urbanism, 79.
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respectability. This stemmed from a shared belief held by its members that achieving a desirable
“quality of life” in their neighborhood meant stabilizing property values, which in turn would help
homeowners preserve local perceptions of community safety and security. The SPCA attracted
“responsible” homeowners and developers who bought into the idea of proactive crime reduction.
Poor and working-class Black migration to the northwest side neighborhood threatened to disrupt
this model, since race-based state and private sector housing policies historically linked Black
habitation to poverty, vice, and crime. Liberal community groups like the SPCA challenged racist
housing policies through mobilizations and legal actions inspired by civil rights activists, while also
working to remake understandings of Black racial inferiority that might derail their community’s
progress. Against a backdrop of social demographic change, collective struggle, and metropolitan
transformation in the 1970s, community-oriented policing in Milwaukee took shape.264

Milwaukee Professional Policemen’s Protective Association
The long 1970s was also an era of expanded police union power in Milwaukee. Opposition
to Breier’s strictures influenced the Milwaukee Police Patrolman’s Protective Association’s (MPPPA)
development. A level of institutional mistrust flowed from within the department as much as it did
without. Police unions accumulated power and used it to advance specific goals, such as garnering
wage increases, securing benefits, upgrading equipment, and meeting staffing needs.265 Today, they
On the SPCA, see: Juliet Saltman, A Fragile Movement: The Struggle for Neighborhood Stabilization (New York: Greenwood
Press, 1990).
265 Both neighborhood associations and police unions drew on the ideas of a criminologist turned community organizer
name Saul Alinsky. Some police unions found his argument that “change comes from power; and power comes from
organization,” appealing. “In order to act,” Alinsky argued, “people must get together.” Saul D. Alinsky, Rules for
Radicals: A Pragmatic Primer for Realistic Radicals (New York: Random House, 1971), 114. On police unions embracing
Alinsky’s ideas, see: Ron Delord, Michael R. Shannon, Michael R., and Jon Burpo, Police Union Power, Politics, and
Confrontation in the 21st Century: New Challenges, New Issues (Springfield: Charles C. Thomas, 2008), 23. On an example of a
Chicago community association drawing from the Alinsky model, see: Simon Ezra Balto, “‘The Law Has a Bad Opinion
of Me’: Policing and Politics in Twentieth Century Black-Chicago,” (Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin-Madison,
2015), 207. On Alinsky being more of a political liberal than a radical, see: Arnold Hirsch, Making the Second Ghetto: Race
and Housing in Chicago 1940-1960, 2nd ed. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2008), 209. The Triple O studied
radical community organizing in Chicago with Alinsky as it endeavored to organize poor and working-class Black
264
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tend to endorse political candidates who reflect their conservative values and support objectives that
protect their rights as officers. Police unionism has translated into modern police departments
becoming independent political units that mobilize for their own benefit, “regardless of what that
means for the public.”266 Law enforcement has immense power over the lives of citizens, including
the power to kill. Therefore, it is critical that enforceable measures of police accountability exist.
Contemporary police unions undermine accountability more than any other force in the criminal
justice system. As legal scholar Matthew Flynn warned as early as 1974, “The rise of the power of
police unions in the past decade is a development…which will also have to be dealt with if the
police are to be accountable to the public.”267
Chief Breier’s antagonistic relationship to the MPPPA influenced Milwaukee’s struggle for
police accountability. Mutual respect existed among police administrators and the police association.
However, it wavered under Breier’s draconian leadership. He set inordinately strict rules and
expected his officers to follow them accordingly. Breier imposed his authority over the professional
and personal lives of rank-and-file police, even dictating who they could or could not live with. He
dismissed the idea of salary increases for officers who earned advanced degrees or obtained college
credits, calling higher education “bad for department morale.” The chief refused to meet with
MPPPA officials to discuss possible treatment options for personnel dealing with alcoholism, drug
addiction, or emotional distress.268 For decades, the MPPPA operated as a fraternal and protective
association whose views aligned with police administrators and the movement for
professionalization. This emphasis started to shift in the 1960s and 1970s, as the police union
movement progressed. As labor historian Dennis Deslippe has written, “demands for racial justice
Milwaukeeans. Mark Edward Braun, “Social Change and the Empowerment of the Poor: Poverty Representation in
Milwaukee’s Community Action Programs,” (Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 1999), 159.
266 Simon Balto, “Occupied Territory: An Author’s Response,” Black Perspectives, African American Intellectual History
Society, April 10, 2020, accessed April 10, 2020, https://www.aaihs.org/occupied-territory-an-authors-response/.
267 Matthew J. Flynn, “Police Accountability in Wisconsin,” Wisconsin Law Review 1131 (1974), 1148.
268 Breier also blocked officers from seeking outside support. Snyder, “Chief for Life,” 39.
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and individual rights led to great scrutiny of [police] behavior.” More attention paid by society to the
rights of suspects and intensifying public criticism of police practices encouraged rank-and-file
officers to feel more and more isolated and unappreciated.269 Police unions organized to address
what they saw as unfair, racially biased affirmative action policies advanced by the civil rights
movement.
Since 1885, a local ordinance prevented police personnel in Milwaukee from engaging in offduty political activities, such as turning out the vote for political candidates or making contributions
to campaigns. MPPPA members could not collectively bargain and police rules forbade officers
from discussing police business with “outsiders,” including arbitrators. Breier made the rules and no
one could publicly discuss the MPD handbook without facing reprisal from the chief. In October
1970, the MPPPA asked the Common Council to revise Milwaukee’s 1885 ban on off-duty political
activity. Breier quashed the attempt using his vast political influence to pressure aldermen on the
council’s finance committee. Then, in January 1971, the MPPPA’s executive board asked city labor
negotiators and Mayor Maier for the right to bargain on rules, police grievance procedures, and
salaries. Breier responded by reprimanding eight of the nine officers on the board.270 Rank-and-file
officers responded by waging a “blue flu”; ninety-five percent of the city’s police officers called in
sick on January 23, 1971. As historian Ronald Snyder noted, it was “the first time in city history that
public employees had engaged in such activity.”271 Wisconsin Employment Relations Commissioners
travelled to Milwaukee from Madison to help city officials negotiate with uniformed officers and
ensure public safety. Breier was ostensibly detached from the negotiations, but also working out of
view to prevent his prized Detective Bureau from joining the action. During the four-day walkout,
Dennis A. Deslippe, “‘Do Whites Have Rights?’: White Detroit Policemen and ‘Reverse Discrimination’ Protests in
the 1970s.” The Journal of American History 91 (3) (December, 2004): 939.
270 MPPPA president Robert Kliesmet, the ninth officer, was on leave from the MPD and, thus, out of Breier’s reach for
punishment. Federal District Court Judge ordered the removal of Breier’s officials reprimands from the officers’ files in
1973. Snyder, “Chief for Life,” 41.
271 Snyder, “Chief for Life,” 41.
269
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the MFPC authorized the use of special police. Supervisors and Milwaukee County Deputy Sheriffs
kept the peace. A Milwaukee police wives organization and surrounding police unions supported the
MPPA’s actions, as did the Left-progressive Kaleidoscope newspaper, which drew a distinction between
the rank-and-file and Chief Breier’s “boys— (non-striking members) the vice squad, the detective
bureau, and the subversive squad.”272 While the union assumed all hell would break loose if they
struck, crime and traffic accidents maintained the same rates. The MPPA failed to win the
endorsement of the AFL-CIO, which argued that their salary demands were too high and their
social positions too conservative and alienating from the labor movement. Eventually, a court
injunction ended the strike.
Milwaukee diverged from other big cities confronting the urban crisis in that its police
bureaucracy never presented as fearful of additional rioting or intensifying Black demands for
civilian review. While some liberal mayors, as historian Alex Elkins has observed, “appointed police
commissioners with a mandate to maximize efficiency in the war on crime and to discipline officers
who were rude, offensive, or unduly brutal to members of the public—especially black residents,”
Chief Breier doubled-down on his reactionary law-and-order approach.273 Under Breier, the MPD
eschewed the elite, technocratic professionalism advocated for by the International Association of
Chiefs of Police. Alternatively, Milwaukee’s police chief enjoyed state-sanctioned lifetime tenure,
allowing him to resist War on Crime interventions that he saw as meddlesome and overreaching.
Furthermore, he did not view police brutality as real, let alone a practice unevenly meted out against
African Americans. Indeed, Breier saw the MPD as exceptional because of its institutional
independence, an efficient, value-neutral crime control machine that existed above the fray of urban

“Internal Breieritis,” Kaleidoscope, January 29 - February 4, 1971.
These police commissioners prioritized preventive patrol sought to cut costs by optimizing efficiency. This brand of
police management was top-down, but also technocratic. Alexander B. Elkins, “Battle of the Corner: Urban Policing and
Rioting in the United States, 1943-1971” (Ph.D. diss., Temple University, 2017), 462.
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politics. He essentially authorized police brutality through his permissive accountability structures,
enabling aggressive discretionary policing in Black spaces and against civil rights demonstrators.
Consequently, the city did not feature the same contentious relationships shared by rankand-file officers and “professionalism experts” leading other urban police forces. Chief Breier never
implemented “economy measures like one-man patrol cars” and “departmental trial boards” used
“to scapegoat officers before a bloodthirsty public.”274 In fact, the opposite was true in Milwaukee,
where MPPPA leaders called the chief out for not taking police-community relations seriously
enough. The police union argued that Breier’s inattention to community relations matters and his
willingness to allow Black mistrust of the police to deepen put the lives of MPPPA members at risk.
This is not to say that line officers in Milwaukee were not frustrated by the liberal Supreme Court’s
police rulings in the 1960s, which ostensibly prioritized the needs of criminals over law
enforcement, nor that they supported civilian review boards as means of tempering racial unrest.
Moreover, they did not have to worry about an “elite management class” replacing Breier’s
reactionary law-and-order approach, given the state-authorized structure of police power. The union
generally aligned with Breier. Still, the MPPPA was becoming frustrated with a top-down system that
privileged the Detective Bureau at the expense of patrol.275 In 1973, the police association won the
right to appeal departmental rules to an outside arbitrator.276
The MPPPA, alongside other police unions nationally, “combined the traditional progressive
goals of organized labor to win greater power, rights, and dignity for workers with a more

Elkins, “Battle of the Corner,” 463.
All police officers had to meet Breier’s rigid standards of conduct. However, the chief, a former detective who led the
Detective Bureau for two years, favored personnel who solved crimes, not those who responded or prevented to
disorder. For Breier, the MPD’s detective culture gave shape to the department’s reputation for crime control efficiency
and its reportedly high clearance rate. See: George Kelling, Policing in Milwaukee: A Strategic History (Milwaukee: Marquette
University Press, 2015).
276 The association did not strike again until December 1981; it waged a 36-six-hour walkout after Alderman Roy Nabors
remarked to the press that a Black man who shot and killed two police officers had likely feared for his life. Snyder,
“Chief for Life,” 4, 7.
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conservative, indeed even counter-revolutionary, agenda.”277 However, the MPD’s rank-and-file did
not need to “defeat” a “liberal and radical program to regulate front-line officers,” or proposals like
“civilian review,” “tougher departmental trial boards,” or “stricter gun-use guidelines” until the late
1970s and early 1980s. The structure of police power, and the authority that state legislation vested
in Milwaukee’s police chief, delayed urgency in this area for MPPPA members.278 In the interim,
police union leaders framed their grievances as civil rights demands. The MPPPA championed
collective bargaining—Wisconsin passed one of the nation’s first such laws for public employees in
1959—and more transparent grievance procedures within Milwaukee’s police bureaucracy.279 They
focused their activism on union recognition and developing a workable police-community relations
plan. According to MPPPA officials, efforts to improve police-community relations had “resulted in
frustration for many sensitive police officers who want to bridge the credibility gap with minority
groups.” They claimed that aggressive, racist officers perpetuated “the negative ‘pig’ stereotype”
ascribed by many residents of color and argued that “the cloud of poor police community relations
has contributed to a breakdown in police protection.” Some officers did crackdown on Black and
Brown folk, while others were “reluctant to intervene in racial situations for fear of a brutality
charge.” The point being that, somewhat ironically given their political position today, police union
members in Milwaukee believed they had “a vital interest in maintaining good community
relations.”280
Alternatively, Chief Breier saw little need or rationale for the community to play an active
role in everyday police work.281 Early in 1970, the chief reaffirmed this perspective before the

Elkins, “Battle of the Corner,” 463.
Elkins, “Battle of the Corner,” 463.
279 Wisconsin Labor History Society, “Primer,” accessed April 11, 2020,
https://www.wisconsinlaborhistory.org/resources/primer/.
280 Police Isolation and Community Needs, 73-74.
281 In Breier’s view, the citizen’s job was to respond to police questioning, help solve crimes as needed, while never
engaging in crime prevention strategies or directing police oversight. That was handled internally by the department. In
April 1966, Breier maintained “all policemen are trained to be courteous and to use good judgment and common sense
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Milwaukee Common Council’s judiciary committee.282 That January, the MPPPA announced it would
apply for $40,000 in Safe Streets Act funds to establish a “program involving police and community
in closer cooperation.” “Project Communication,” was “a program designed to improve the quality
of the relationship between citizens and the police.” Under the plan, two MPPPA members—
“professional police personnel”—would meet with community groups “to exchange ideas and
hopefully increase understanding of police and community perspectives.”283 Breier refused to
comment publicly, while expressing his displeasure internally. Behind the scenes, he forced
subordinates, many of who had respected him as a leader who always stood up for police officers’
interests in moments of public outcry against the profession.284 The Detective Bureau’s supervisors
and the John Birch Society joined Breier in opposing the measure. The latter mailed oppositional
literature out to local police officers.285 Consequently, the union withdrew its application for LEAA
funding in March.286
In August 1973, an arbitrator determined that MPPPA members could appeal MPD rules
beyond Chief Breier. It was “the first blow to Breier’s absolute control over the police
department.”287 Milwaukee’s police union, not elected officials fearful of Breier, initiated, what
MPPPA President Robert Kliesmet called, the “good erosion” of the chief ’s power.288
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Civil rights gains, continued attention to law enforcement, and the federal government’s
efforts to stabilize cities in the wake of 1960s civil unrest led to a more intensive cataloging of
racialized police violence. As Milwaukee citizens filed complaints against abusive police officers in
the federal court system and with the Milwaukee Fire and Police Commission (MFPC), police
mistreatment was better documented.289 From 1964 to 1974, residents filed no less than forty-five
claims of police brutality against the city.290 Still, judges determined all of these complaints were
“invalid.”291 In that same span, at least 128 citizens filed grievances with the MFPC. Yet the
commission dismissed seventy percent of these cases; no officers lost their jobs. Only eight police
personnel received suspensions, most for “a week or less.” As of 1975, the MFPC had yet to fire a
single police officer based on a police brutality complaint. Fears of police retaliation and frustration
with the commission’s slow review process dissuaded citizens from filing grievances.292 Meanwhile,
Milwaukee police killed at least six residents from 1972 to 1974 alone. Each death was ruled
justifiable, almost all victims were Black.
The question for most poor and working-class Black folk in Milwaukee was not whether the
exercise of political control over the MPD was necessary, but how to re-cast who exercised that
authority. Community control mandated civilian oversight of police strategies, “enforcement
decisions,” and conduct.293 Citizen review—anchored in policed communities and operated by

The MPD’s training manual defined police brutality as “conduct unbecoming of a member and detrimental to the
service.” Barbara Dembski and Monroe Walker, “A Look Beyond the Badge,” The Milwaukee Journal, February 23, 1975,
Part 1, 1.
290 Between 1968 and 1974, the MPD fired three officers for “misconduct connected to citizen abuse.” The dismissals
resulted from internal investigations “prompted by publicity” surrounding the cases. But this was rare. It is not clear if
the abused citizens were Black or representative of another minoritized group. Barbara Dembski and Monroe Walker,
“Some Find Police System Frustrating,” The Milwaukee Journal, February 23, 1975, Part 1, 20.
291 From 1970 to 1974, thirteen citizens alleged civil rights violations in federal court filings. Three were settled out of
court. “Some Find Police System Frustrating.”
292 Attorneys also expressed fear of police reprisal. White residents filed charges against the MPD too. However, Black
and Latinx citizens filed the most complaints. “Some Find Police System Frustrating.”
293 Under community control, the policing of minor crimes like “disorderly conduct, drunkenness, and vagrancy” would
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policed citizens—was fundamental to this concept. Without it, unchecked abuses of police power
would “only widen the gap” and “increase the warfare” between law enforcement and minoritized
citizens.294
Milwaukee’s Black-led struggle for police accountability turned to community control in the
long 1970s. While it never achieved the level of local authority that adherents imagined, particularly
from the standpoint of garnering rule-making input and civilian complaint oversight. Still, as this
chapter argues, Black and allied police accountability advocates moved a white-controlled police
bureaucracy towards a more democratic framework. During the long 1970s, reform activity buzzed
around issues of police violence, administrative control, and law enforcement strategy. For better or
worse, that action was united by the widespread conviction that policing was the most legitimate
means of preserving order in a socially and economically changing city.
Against the backdrop of intensifying police-Black civilian violence, rising public fears about
crime, a deepening budget crisis, and internal police dissension, a political consensus emerged
around revising the institutional independence that had long defined Milwaukee’s narrative of
policing exceptionalism. By 1975, Black and white allied state legislators worked to revise the
policing structure in “first class cities.” Despite his widespread popularity among white constituents,
Chief Breier’s leadership had grown costly, both from a police budget standpoint and the rising
number of payouts the city was making to settle police brutality claims. The federal government, via
the USCCR’s 1972 report, outlined why the MPD’s community isolation was detrimental to the
maintenance of law-and-order and effecting public safety. The shooting death of Jacqueline Ford by
a Milwaukee detective, the 1973 slayings of two MPD officers and the racialized police violence that
followed, and the police killings of Jerry Brookshire and other Black citizens illustrated the system’s

Black politicians embraced community control. Cleveland’s first Black mayor, Carl Stokes, cited the “nationwide
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dysfunction. The MFPC was unable to meet the needs of aggrieved citizens. Federal lawsuits and
legislative changes are the only way to secure accountability and transform Milwaukee’s police
oversight structures.
In Milwaukee, the long 1970s was an era of prolonged social tensions, political activism, and
intra-racial discord. It was an unsettled moment of Black movement building that largely centered
on curbing police violence and ending institutional discrimination on the MPD. It was a period
when poor and working-class people of color, Black and Latinx, expressed vocal disenchantment
with Chief Breier’s reactionary leadership. Spurned by urban liberalism and mistrustful of governing
institutions, Black and Brown freedom fighters turned inward, to their own communities, and
imagined what it would mean to build power from the grassroots.
However, local efforts to instill community control of the police and respond to ongoing
episodes of racialized police violence failed to restructure police power on acceptable terms. This
had as much to do with the persistence of liberal policy prescriptions that framed police reform
exclusively as a matter of weeding out individual bad actors and advancing institutional diversity, as
it did with conservative backlashes against Black political dissent, costly social welfare programs, and
rising street crime. Liberals and conservatives joined forces to expand the machinery of the carceral
state in the long 1970s. The bipartisan tough on crime consensus legitimized police power as a
solution to the 1960s urban crisis without fully appreciating the role law enforcement had always
played in aggravating urban inequality and reproducing biased criminal-legal outcomes that
disproportionately harmed African Americans. Reactionary and liberal law-and-order politics,
therefore, continued to shape Milwaukee’s racial politics, which still broadly favored a white
working, professional, and business class majority. As such, Black men and women consistently
found themselves on the wrong end of perpetually a racist, sexist, and classist policing system.
The Black-led movement for police accountability challenged the core assumptions that
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powered Milwaukee’s durable narrative of policing exceptionalism. For decades, City Hall prided
itself on the MPD’s assumed professionalism and crime control efficiency—a status that most
elected officials believed sprang from the department’s state-sanctioned independence from political
oversight and the freedom it was afforded to innovate. Concerns around the persistence of racialized
police violence under Chief Breier, as well as rising street crime on Milwaukee’s north side,
engendered grassroots and federal pressures for City Hall to confront its established approach to law
enforcement. While the civil violence of 1967 ushered in new prospects of reform, encouraging
police bureaucrats to make changes to police recruitment and community relations procedures,
resistance from the MPD undermined success.
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CHAPTER SIX
The Coalition for Justice for Ernest Lacy and the Limits of Reform
“This Lacy-type incident, so common in American life, is a condition we live with and
expect to happen to any one of us, every time we step out into the city streets!”1 So wrote Black
community historian, and America’s only known racial terror lynching survivor, James Cameron as a
1983 civil suit filed by the mother of a slain police brutality victim worked its way through the
federal courts. The deadly circumstances that eventually resulted in a $600,000 settlement, two
statutory reforms, and the firing of a white MPD officer began late on the night of July 9, 1981
when a brutal police encounter led to the death of yet another Black young person in Milwaukee.
Ernest Lacy had taken a break from helping his cousin paint an apartment when he walked to the
Open Pantry Food Mart at Wisconsin Ave. and N. 23 rd St. to retrieve a snack. On the way, three
members of the Milwaukee Police Department’s (MPD) all-white Tactical Enforcement Unit—each
with a history of using excessive force—stopped and questioned him about an alleged rape that
occurred near W. Michigan and N. 20th St.2 The female victim was white and the officers were
looking for a Black male suspect.3 Lacy fit the assailant’s description.4 Likely “petrified” when the

James Cameron, “An Open Letter to the Milwaukee Fire and Police Commission Regarding the Ernest Lacy
Complaint,” March 31, 1983, 12, Dr. James Cameron Pamphlet Collection, Milwaukee Public Library, accessed October
31, 2020, https://content.mpl.org/digital/collection/jcameron/id/529/rec/5.
2 “Officer Says Lacy Not Told He Was Arrested,” The Milwaukee Sentinel, April 15, 1983, Part 1, 5; “Officers, Lacy Family
Plead Cases,” The Milwaukee Journal, June 14, 1983, Part 2, 17. Officer Dekker reportedly “choked” a Black woman in
front of the Milwaukee Arena because, according to the victim, she “touched” him “in a friendly gesture” after asking
about a group of people being locked-up in a police paddy wagon. A second confrontation in 1978 saw Dekker beat two
men and two women in a tavern. In November 1980, Dekker, Eliopul, and Kalt, together, were accused of beating an
unarmed man unconscious. Their actions underscored a culture of violence that fostered mistrust and resentment among
Black citizens. “Dekker Tied to Four Other Brutality Cases,” The Milwaukee Courier, July 18, 1981, 1, 3.
3 The specific circumstances of the crime—a racialized sexual assault—conjured historical images of white rage and fed
racist narratives of Black male criminality and lustfulness after white women. See Chapter Two. Black female
complainants of sexual assault, meanwhile, said they experienced a double-standard when it came to police responses in
Milwaukee. About three months before Lacy was stopped by police, Black community members and Black police
officers faulted the MPD for not taking seriously “a string of attacks” against Black women on the city’s north side. Four
of eighteen victims were raped. Gregory D. Stanford, “Blacks Want More Done to Nab Rapist,” The Milwaukee Journal,
April 16, 1981, Part 1, 1.
4 Officers testified later at an inquest hearing that the alleged suspect was a 5’ 10” Black man with “long bushy
sideburns” and wearing a blue shirt. Gregory D. Stanford, “Witness Tells How Officers Arrested Lacy,” The Milwaukee
Journal, September 18, 1981, Part 1, 10.
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officers approached, he hesitated to comply with their aggressive commands.5 The 22-year-old
suffered from a psychological condition that manifested in acute “periods of emotional stress.” 6
What happened next underscores the tragic legitimacy of Ernest Lacy’s fears of Milwaukee
police. The three cops arrested him, failing to read him his rights in the process. According to the
police report, a resistant Lacy tried to run before being placed in the back of a squad car. One of the
officers grabbed his arm; a struggle ensued. Eventually all four men were on the ground, jostling
over competing goals of freedom and suppression. To subdue Lacy, Officer Thomas Eliopul
pressed his knee against the young man’s upper back and neck, between his shoulder blades, with
Lacy’s left cheek pressed to the sidewalk. Eliopul then raised Lacy’s arms, almost perpendicularly,
behind his torso for handcuffing—a move that an independent medical examiner said helped cut-off
the flow of oxygen to the lungs.7 The other two officers, James Dekker and George Kalt, held their
suspect’s legs down. Witnesses saw the officers wrestle Lacy to the floor, inducing a “violent,
convulsive seizure” before he was “absolutely still.”8 Medical opinions varied about what stopped
Lacy from breathing, though all agreed Eliopul’s force played the decisive role.9 Once he was

Lacy’s parents described their son as “petrified of the police,” as well as “gentle,” “docile,” and “not violent.” Joe
Manning and John Fauber, “Family Says Lacy Thought He Was Inferior to Others,” The Milwaukee Sentinel, July 11, 1981,
Part 1, 5.
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Was Frightened, Withdrawn,” The Milwaukee Journal, April 24, 1983.
7 Nathaniel Sheppard Jr., “Death of Black Man in Police Custody Leads to Bitter Protests,” The New York Times, August
16, 1981.
8 As the officers carried Lacy to the police van, one witness said his “eyes were open, his tongue was partially out, he was
not breathing and he was not moving.” The witness, an electrician named Fred Kolde, was on his way home from work.
Nathaniel Sheppard Jr., “Death of Black Man in Police Custody Leads to Bitter Protests,” The New York Times, August
16, 1981. Another witness said he saw Lacy thrown on the hood of a police squad car twice, then kneed in the groin by
police. Family members viewing Lacy’s body post-mortem said they saw blood on his genitals. Kevin Merida, “2nd
Autopsy Clouds Case,” The Milwaukee Journal, July 12, 1981, Part 1, 1, 4.
9 Alan Eisenberg, the Lacy family’s attorney, hired an independent “legal and forensic medicine specialist” to review the
deceased’s body. Ophthalmologist G. W. Lazachek determined that Lacy died of “compression strangulation.” The force
of Eliopul’s knee to Lacy’s neck cut off his air supply. Kevin Merida, “2nd Autopsy Clouds Case,” The Milwaukee Journal,
July 12, 1981, Part 1, 1; “Defense Doctor and Eye Specialist,” The Milwaukee Journal, July 13, 1981, Part 1, 10. Other
medical experts, including Milwaukee County Medical Examiner Chesley Erwin, disagreed with Lazachek. Remarkably,
Erwin suggested there was a strong possibility that Lacy was “frightened to death.” After two county autopsies, medical
examiners reasoned Lacy probably died from a lack of oxygen but officially left the cause of death “undetermined.”
Sheppard Jr., “Death of Black Man in Police Custody Leads to Bitter Protests”; Marilyn Kucer, “New Autopsy Fails to
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forcibly restrained, the Tactical Squad members called for a police van. It arrived minutes later and
they carried Lacy into the vehicle’s holding chamber and shut the door.10 The police then drove to
the sexual assault survivor’s home to identify Lacy. In this moment, they said they recognized he was
unconscious. Police attempted to revive him using an ammonia capsule.11 The unconscious Lacy was
rushed to Good Samaritan Medical Center and pronounced dead at 12:46 a.m. on July 10, 1981. 12
Earlier that night, around the same time that Lacy was stopped, patrolman David A. Clarke Jr.
arrested a man who later admitted to committing the sexual assault.13
News of Lacy’s death spread the next morning.14 It reached a number of Black community
groups who, over the course of “the long 1970s,” had committed to addressing the net effects of
structural racism and racialized police violence against Black Milwaukeeans. Some, like the United
Black Community Council (UBCC), prioritized issues of police brutality and neglect.15 Indeed, this
latest in-custody death invigorated police accountability activists who were already struggling for a
more just, responsive, and community controlled law enforcement system. Black residents living on

Reveal Cause of Lacy's Death,” The Milwaukee Sentinel, July 13, 1981, Part 1, 1, 13.
10 It was against police rules to place an unconscious person into police van. The two police van attendants testified to
the MFPC in 1983 that they believed Lacy was conscious when he entered the van, and that he was “passively resisting”
the officers. “2 Say They Believed Lacy Was Conscious,” The Milwaukee Journal, April 13, 1983, Part 1, 5. A block or two
away, they stopped and searched two more Black males, arresting one on a minor Sheriff’s warrant. The arrested man
saw Lacy’s body spread across the floor upon entering the back of the van. He warned an officer, but they ignored his
appeal. This witness, Tyrone Brown, said he told one of the police officers that Lacy looked “beat up pretty bad,” to
which the officer replied, “How do you know he wasn’t hit by a car?” Sheppard Jr., “Death of Black Man in Police
Custody Leads to Bitter Protests.”
11 The failure of Eliopul, Dekker, Kalt, and the two officers driving the van to provide medical attention would later
serve as a focal point for both accountability advocates and state legislators.
12 His body, according to an independent pathologist, showed abrasions and bruises. Woliver, From Outrage to Action, 6263; “No Blows,” The Milwaukee Courier, July 18, 1981, 8.
13 Clarke would go on to serve as Milwaukee County Sheriff from 2002 to 2017. “Officers Were Taught First Aid,
Instructor Testifies at Inquest,” The Milwaukee Journal, October 10, 1981, Part 2, 4. As community activist Howard Fuller
recounted: “…what happened was, allegedly, there was a rape, and the only description was, it was a young Black man.
Ernest Lacy just happened to be going to the store. And…what they did to him was, they [the police] threw him down
and they, you know, went into that choke hold, or put their knee on his neck. And, he, he ultimately died in police
custody, in the van. And…there were witnesses who saw this and came forward. And so, our whole thing was that these
police needed to pay for his death.” Howard Fuller (Distinguished Professor of Education, Marquette University), in
discussion with the author, March 2013.
14 Police told Lacy’s family he “just died.” Woliver, A Measure of Justice, 62.
15 Evidently, a Lacy family member called the UBCC’s Michael McGee the same night Ernest died. Woliver, A Measure of
Justice, 63.
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Milwaukee’s segregated north side had weathered an onslaught of police abuse in recent years. At
least ten Black men and women lost their lives in police-Black citizen encounters between 1967 and
1981.16 Non-lethal police brutality incidents continued unabated since the issue first gripped Black
community leaders in the postwar era. Between 1972 and July 1981, citizens filed over 267 police
misconduct complaints with the Milwaukee Fire and Police Commission (MFPC).17 At least fifty
cases sat pending in state and federal courts at the time of Lacy’s death.18 Black allegations of police
brutality often went unreported. Fears of police retaliation and a sense that the system did not work
in their favor prevented more from coming forward. Many citizens, according to journalist Gregory
Stanford, had “come to accept it as a fact of life and had little hope that officials would act on their
complaints.”19 In the wake of Lacy’s death, the threat of civil violence was real. Black rebellion was
in the air nationally. Miami’s Liberty City and Overtown neighborhoods had just experienced civil
unrest after an all-white jury exonerated four white police accused of beating a Black insurance agent
to death.20 “Our city of Milwaukee is in a crisis,” James Cameron warned. “Whether it will terminate
peaceably or in more bloody steps being taken remains to be seen.”21
This chapter places the police killing of Ernest Lacy in context. To do so, it pays attention to
historical contingency and agency.22 Any victories that the Coalition for Justice for Ernest Lacy
See: Appendix A.
The MFPC dismissed 154 of these complaints. Sheppard Jr., “Death of Black Man in Police Custody Leads to Bitter
Protests.”
18 The cases were pending in both federal and county circuit courts. Chief Breier said that the MPD had fewer
misconduct complaints against its officers than in other cities and commended his department’s training program.
Gregory D. Stanford, Barbara Dembski, and James Romenesko, “Lacy Death Puts Spotlight on Police Conduct,” The
Milwaukee Journal, July 26, 1981, Part 1, 1.
19 For many, the MPD inhabited “the role of an occupying army in which brutality is routine.” Gregory D. Stanford,
Barbara Dembski, and James Romenesko, “Old Questions Surface in Wake of Lacy Death,” The Milwaukee Journal, July
26, 1981, Part 1, 10; Gregory D. Stanford, Barbara Dembski, and James Romenesko, “Minorities See Police as Brutal,”
The Milwaukee Journal, July 30, 1981, Part 1, 1.
20 The man’s name was Arthur McDuffie. Miami’s Black uprising occurred in 1980. “The Day Miami was Rocked by
Riot After Cops Cleared in McDuffie Beating,” Miami Herald, May 15, 2016, accessed April 26, 2020,
https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miami-dade/article77769522.html.
21 At the same time, he noted that some Black residents had “the utmost confidence” in the MPD, despite “quite a few”
having “ceased to respect its insensitivity to respect of the human personality.” Cameron, “An Open Letter to the
Milwaukee Fire and Police Commission Regarding the Ernest Lacy Complaint,” 7.
22 Historian Andrew Baer’s book on Chicago’s police accountability movement shaped my thinking on “contingency”
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(CJEL) achieved in the early 1980s were tied to contextual factors that transcended the case itself.
More specifically, police bureaucrats operated under a brightening federal spotlight at the time of
Lacy’s 1981 death. Two preceding developments, both surfacing in 1978, raised federal scrutiny.
First, a former MPD officer divulged the truth about the 1958 police killing of Black migrant Daniel
Bell. The officer said the patrolman who shot Bell not only planted a knife on his lifeless body,
justifying self-defense claims, but that supervisors knew about the murder and helped cover it up.
The Bell case revelations sparked demands for justice, a federal lawsuit, and accelerated grassroots
activism around passing a statute that would reduce the police chief’s policymaking authority. The
shocking disclosure also encouraged a federal investigation of the MPD’s history of using deadly
force. Second, a group called Residents Integrating Law Enforcement (RILE) requested a federal
probe into racial and gender discrimination on the police force. A U.S. Attorney’s investigation led
to mandates on diversity hiring that, if unmet, could strip Milwaukee of valuable revenue sharing
funds. In 1981, the city’s Black police association, the League of Martin (LM), went even further.
The LM filed a Title VII lawsuit against Chief Breier, the MPD, MFPC, and City for violating Black
officers’ civil rights. The League’s complaint alleged racist hiring, promotion, and assignment
practices. These two developments added to a mix of existing forces that threatened to disrupt
Milwaukee’s policing status quo.
Next, this chapter details the steps that activists took to secure “a measure of justice” for
Ernest Lacy’s family from 1981 to 1983. Far from fomenting civil unrest, the CJEL channeled an
emotional public response into the largest peaceful campaign for racial justice the city had seen since

and “agency.” As Baer writes, “the interplay between agency and contingency in the [John] Burge scandal” mattered in
terms of what police accountability advocates were able to achieve over the course of decades. It was “the convergence
of perseverance and opportunity” that enabled social movement activists and advocates for institutional accountability to
eventually succeed in bringing the abusive commander to justice. Likewise, factors of contingency— “both concrete and
abstract developments”—informed how the Chicago Police Department’s torture scandal and the movements it inspired
played out over time. It framed “opportunities and constraints.” Andrew S. Baer, Beyond the Usual Beating: The John Burge
Torture Scandal and Social Movements for Police Accountability in Chicago (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2020), 1011.
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1968. In the months following the Lacy killing, thousands of residents demonstrated in support of
the Lacy family and for the prosecution of the officers responsible for cutting his life short.
Marches, rallies, sit-ins, boycotts, and lawsuits endured well into the mid-1980s. The CJEL’s
movement was powered by a diverse coalition of Black and allied community groups—many of who
were tired of seeing the MPD kill young Black men and women with impunity. Public anxieties and
distrust of the police undermined communal safeguarding at a moment of worsening economic and
political distress for African Americans. Considering Lacy’s innocence and the arresting officers’
checkered pasts, accountability groups sensed an opening to confront police bureaucrats on their
historical failure to deliver justice to Black police brutality victims. Building on the movement tactics
of preceding campaigns, the CJEL garnered results in areas where prior mobilizations had failed. For
instance, the MFPC eventually fired the officer directly responsible for Lacy’s death. The city also
paid a substantial sum to the victim’s family.
Official responses to Lacy’s death and mounting Black frustrations around policecommunity relations and police violence were also contingent on recent political, social, and
economic changes. Milwaukee’s Black population increased by almost 42,000 between 1970 and
1980.23 Meanwhile, its white population decreased by about 139,000. This demographic shift held
political ramifications for longtime Mayor Henry Maier and other elected officials trying to retain
power. While the city remained seventy-three percent white in 1980, African Americans were
emerging as a more influential voting bloc, along with Latinx residents. Constituents of color cared
deeply about issues of crime and policing. A 1980 Milwaukee Journal poll, for instance, showed that
69 percent of Black voters were dissatisfied with Chief Breier’s leadership.24 Yet, despite the salience

Campbell Gibson and Kay Jung, “Historical Census Statistics on Population Totals by Race, 1790 to 1990, and by
Hispanic Origin, 1970 to 1990, for Large Cities and Other Urban Places in the United States,” U.S. Census Bureau,
Population Division, Working Paper no. 76 (February 2005), Table 50.
24 Gregory D. Stanford, “Maier Seen as Having Kept City from Typical Urban Woes,” The Milwaukee Journal, February
14, 1980, Part 2, 6.
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of police-community relations as an issue, the mayor received ample Black support in his 1980
reelection bid. According to some reporters, the mayor “divorced himself from the Police
Department in the public’s mind.” Although Maier’s challenger, Assemblyman Dennis Conta,
authored a 1976 bill that put term limits on public safety chiefs and limited their rule-making
authority, most Black voters saw him as “soft” on policing overall. Maier’s willingness to establish a
committee to track developments in the Lacy case—a step never taken by a Milwaukee mayor in
response to a racialized police killing—reflected a desire to show Black constituents that he was
taking their concerns seriously.25 With the revelations of the 1958 murder cover-up, Maier also had
little choice politically but to provide full transparency.
The Lacy case was indirectly connected to glaring economic indicators. Throughout the
“long 1970s,” a “spatial fix” had occurred in Milwaukee’s economy that disproportionately affected
Black workers and their families.26 The city’s rapid industrial decline at the end of the 1970s and

Maier also needed greater minority support as he eyed an unprecedented seventh term in 1984.
Marc Levine, “The Crisis of Black Male Joblessness in Milwaukee: Trends, Explanations, and Policy Options,”
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, Center for Economic Development, Working Paper (March 2007), 9. On the
“spatial fix” metaphor, see David Harvey, The Limits of Capital (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982). On the
“long 1970s,” or the period between 1969 and 1984, see: Bruce J. Schulman, The Seventies: The Great Shift in American
Culture, Society, and Politics (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2001).
Midwestern manufacturing firms facing rising oil prices and diminishing profits sought fresh opportunities abroad to
outsource production lines and utilize cheaper labor in deregulated markets. New technologies and strategies facilitated a
shift towards “integrating and managing spatially dispersed global enterprises. Revised global trade rules and financial
practices, in addition to new protections for Western intellectual property, led to the abandonment of U.S. production
facilities for “more lucrative arrangements” overseas and in the nation’s Sunbelt South. Milwaukee industrial firms
struggled to pay off debts, so they laid off workers and started closing factories. The expectation of obtaining a union
job with good wages disappeared for most high school graduates. Jobs in the information and healthcare sectors paid
similar wages, but required specialized training and advanced degrees. Jane L. Collins and Victoria Mayer, Both Hands
Tied: Welfare Reform and the Race to the Bottom of the Low-Wage Labor Market (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
2010), 35-36. Project out and it was clear that national policymakers, firms, financial institutions, and state governments
were engaging in a larger process of social reorganization around “perceived market imperatives” that concentrated
corporate and proprietary control over goods and resources. These ranged from “intellectual property rights, to laws
governing the movement of goods and capital across borders and the basic rules undergirding employment.” Brishen
Rogers, “Work after Quarantine,” Boston Review, April 7, 2020, accessed April 8, 2020, https://bostonreview.net/classinequality/brishen-rogers-work-after-quarantine. Such initiatives undermined worker’s rights and labor contracts
negotiated over decades of political struggle. The “social wage,” which was informed by citizenship, community
standards, and economic conditions, gave way to “a naked competitive logic.” The antecedents of this market-oriented
structure existed in the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s. However, it was accelerated by U.S. elected officials in the 1970s, 1980s,
and 1990s. State actors failed to ensure that the global economy met the daily needs of poor and working-class people,
especially Black citizens.
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early 1980s and its transition from a high-wage manufacturing economy to a comparatively lowwage service economy in the late-20th century impacted Black workers and families differently than
white. Black workers had yet to attain high levels of labor seniority.27 Laid off white workers, most
of who lived in comparatively prosperous neighborhoods and suburbs, fared much better in terms
of finding new, good-paying jobs.28 In 1970, Milwaukee’s Black poverty rate was twenty-two percent
below the national average. By 2000, it was thirty-four percent higher than the national mark. Lowwage service jobs, which surpassed available manufacturing opportunities by 1981, were among the
only jobs available to under-educated Black workers.29 The “mark” of a criminal record, or the
lingering professional stain assigned by the state to the growing number of Black citizens swept up
in U.S. “wars” on crime and drugs, compounded harsh economic realities.30 When the CJEL
formed, Americans were experiencing the second “dip” of a global economic recession that
devastated Black and Latinx families. The recession began shortly before President Ronald Reagan
signed the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, which cut taxes for corporations and wealthy
Americans, slashed domestic spending for the poor, and drastically reduced federal low-income
housing subsidies.31 Against this backdrop, the CJEL put aside lingering ideological differences
within Milwaukee’s Black-led movement for accountability and focused on securing justice for the
Lacy family and re-constituting police power.

This was the case for Black men in particular. Decades of union and employer discrimination in the early-to-mid 20th
century undermined Black workers’ ascent within organized labor; they were only just beginning to garner high-level
union jobs. See: Joe William Trotter, Jr., Black Milwaukee: The Making of an Industrial Proletariat, 1915-1945, 2nd ed. (Urbana:
University of Illinois Press, 2006).
28 Their whiteness and affluence “insured that new businesses would spring up” in white urban enclaves and suburban
municipalities. Isabel Wilkerson, “How Milwaukee Has Thrived While Leaving Blacks Behind,” The New York Times,
March 19, 1991, A1.
29 Many retail and service sector jobs were part-time, making it harder for Black families to save money and meet basic
needs. Between 1973 and 1996, women’s work outside of the home rose by forty percent. Collins and Mayer, Both Hands
Tied, 37.
30 Devah Pager, Marked: Race, Crime, and Finding Work in an Era of Mass Incarceration (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
2007).
31 Between 1981 and 1989, the Reagan administration reduced Housing and Urban Development’s budget by nearly four
times, “from $74 billion to $19 billion in constant dollars.” “Ronald Reagan: A Better Friend of Blacks than Obama?”
The Milwaukee Courier, February 12, 2011.
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The Police Killing of Daniel Bell Revisited
Although justice at the time went for naught, the 1958 police killing of Daniel Bell sparked
Milwaukee’s Black-led movement for police accountability.32 The 22-year-old’s tragic shooting death
roused Black community activists and professional leaders, who were growing more and more
concerned about both the individual prejudices of white patrolling officers and the rampant neglect
shown by law enforcement towards Black crime victims on the city’s north side. And yet, the full
story of Bell’s demise remained unknown to the public for twenty years. Bell’s family always
suspected foul play.33 They worked assiduously to clear his name and tell the truth of his false
criminalization. However, no verifiable evidence or witness testimony existed that would hold up in
Milwaukee’s white-controlled criminal-legal system. This changed in 1978, after former patrolman
Louis Krause confessed to a reporter and District Attorney E. Michael McCann that Bell was not
shot in self-defense, but murdered in cold blood by Officer Thomas Grady.34 Seeking to ease a
“troubled conscience,” Krause set the record straight about a lethal police encounter that, as
historians argue, galvanized Black Milwaukee’s postwar freedom struggle. 35 Krause also spoke
candidly about the wider culture of racialized violence on the MPD. For example, he described how

See: Chapter Two.
Daniel Bell’s siblings suspected foul play from the moment police said their brother had flashed a knife with his right
hand. He was left handed. So too did the Black community members who mobilized a protest march in the weeks that
followed. As the Bell family grieved a fallen son, a “conscious and detailed” masking of the truth ensued. The
conventional media portrayed their loved one as “a knife-wielding aggressor” and little more. The Bell family “endured
the false stigma of persistent governmental perjury and racial insults to their brother’s memory.” Dock Bell, the family
patriarch, died in the arms of one of his sons before a final verdict was ever read in the family’s civil case. Kelly, “What
Price Justice,” 2.
34 “Partial Truth on an Ugly Incident,” The Milwaukee Journal, August 31, 1979, Part 1, 10. Grady had resigned from the
MPD in 1958 before having to face disciplinary charges for “conduct unbecoming of an officer.” Jerry Resler, “Coverup
in ’58 Homicide,” The Milwaukee Sentinel, September 1, 1979, 10. Krause was dismissed by the MPD in April 1958 for his
role in tavern fight that occurred with five other officers. He struggled with alcoholism after leaving the force,
descending into years of heavy drinking before sobering up three years before making his confession about Daniel Bell.
Jerry Resler, “Coverup in ’58 Homicide,” The Milwaukee Sentinel, September 1, 1979, 10.
35 In addition to tackling police violence, Milwaukee’s civil rights movement addressed racism in employment, public
accommodations, education, and housing. See: Patrick D. Jones, The Selma of the North: Civil Rights Insurgency in Milwaukee
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009).
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officers would place Black suspects “on the elevator in the old Safety Building” and give them “an
elevator ride going to the top floor, back down to the garage and literally beating the shit out of
them” the entire time.36 Black residents told similar stories to the National Advisory Commission on
Civil Disorders research team in 1967, as did Black police officers.37 DA McCann opened a John
Doe investigation into a police cover-up in late November 1978.38 Chief Breier, a detective in 1958,
called Krause’s story “bull roar” and defended the MPD’s historical practices.
In Krause’s revised telling of Bell’s 1958 murder, the young man was pulled over on account
of his race. Whether he had a broken tail light or not mattered less than Officer Grady’s eagerness
to, as Krause stated, “arrest some niggers.”39 Likely frightened of the consequences of being
apprehended again for not possessing a driver’s license, the Louisiana native fled. After catching up
with Bell, Grady fired from behind him at point blank range.40 Bell was unarmed, so Grady planted a
“throwaway knife” in his right hand to make it appear as if he had fired in self-defense.41 The two

Police abuse of Black arrestees in MPD elevators was a notorious tactic used by Milwaukee police to administer
private beatings. The testimony of a Black clergyman who spoke during a town hall on police-community relations in
October 1978 illustrates this fact, as well as the connections between racialized police violence and the maintenance of
white supremacy and housing segregation in the city. The Black pastor, Rev. George Johnson, said he called the police
on a white neighbor after the neighbor physically struck him and his daughter. Two white officers responded. Instead of
recording Johnson’s account of what happened, the officers first conferred with the abusive neighbor. After recording
his story, they walked over to Rev. Johnson and “advised” him to leave the neighborhood. According to Johnson, the
patrolmen insisted he had “no right living in that area.” When he asked the police for their names and badge numbers,
they refused. They then arrested Rev. Johnson on a disorderly conduct charge. Johnson filed a complaint with the
District Seven commander. Then, while riding in an elevator with the officers, they stopped the machine and
administered a severe beating. The police threatened the clergyman, saying, “you don’t know what you have done” and
what you are “getting yourself into.” In his testimony, Rev. Johnson likened the “people wearing blue suits” to the “men
who beat us in white sheets.” Kleinert and Kleinert, “Police Misconduct: Fear, Apathy, and Coverups,” The Milwaukee
Courier, August 15, 1981, 1, 12.
37 George L. Roberts to Sam Dennis, September 15, 1967, “Materials Resulting from Field Team Trip Sept. 27, 1967Oct. 3, 1967,” Folder, 001346-025-0001, Civil Rights during the Johnson Administration, 1963-1969, Part V, Lyndon
Baines Johnson Presidential Library, Austin, Texas; Lenard Wells (Lecturer, University of Memphis), in discussion with
the author, November 2016.
38 Helane Morrison, “After 20 Years, the Echoes of a Police Gunshot Return,” The Milwaukee Journal, December 10,
1979, Part 1, 16; Jeff Kannel, “Was There a Cover-up? Shooting Case Unresolved after 21 Years,” The Milwaukee Courier,
January 15, 1979, 1.
39 Sylvia Bell White and Jody LePage, Sister: An African American Life in Search of Justice (Madison: Wisconsin University
Press, 2013), 176. The officers reported that Bell fit the description of a Black male robbery suspect.
40 The muzzle of his gun literally touched Bell’s jacket. Grady pointed the weapon upward, so as to inflict a mortal head
wound.
41 The Milwaukee Journal defined “throwaways” as “knives or spare guns that could be planted on bodies after police
shootings to make it appear that officers shot in self-defense.” “Bell Case ‘Shocks’ Ex-Police Chief,” The Milwaukee
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patrolmen—who were not partners, but whose paths met on shift that night—reported an
improbable story in which Bell shouted while running away, “You sons of bitches will never catch
me, I’m a hold-up man.” Relying on false information, an all-white inquest jury handpicked by the
Milwaukee County Sheriff exonerated Krause and Grady. As Bell family attorney Walter Kelly wrote
during legal proceedings over twenty years later, Thomas Grady had “a known propensity for racial
prejudice against blacks.”42 The disgraced former officer admitted to framing Bell in August 1978.
He pled guilty to reckless homicide and perjury charges the following year, was convicted, and began
serving a seven-year prison term in January 1980.43
Louis Krause’s confession to a police cover-up in the aftermath of the Bell killing delivered
what appeared to be a fatal blow, at least conceptually, to the MPD’s narrative of policing
exceptionalism. His admission disrupted the notion that, when left to its own devices free of
oversight, the MPD was well-equipped to deliver efficient and honest crime control. Krause told
John Doe investigators that the “coverup and conspiracy” engaged in by police supervisors “reached
to the top of the department.”44 It began at the crime scene and was actively supported by two
commanding officers: Detective Inspector Rudolph Glaser and Detective Captain Leo Woelfel. 45 In

Sentinel, September 3, 1979, Part 1, 5; District Attorney E. Michael McCann to Milwaukee Journal Editorial Board,
September 5, 1979, Box 140, Folder 9, “Police Department, January-August 1979,” Records of Mayor Henry W. Maier
Administration, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, Milwaukee Series 44, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Archives. State law
permitted police to shoot at “fleeing felons.” White and LePage, Sister, 176.
42 Grady evidently remarked to Louis Krause after ending Bell’s life, “it’s just a goddamn nigger kid anyhow.” Walter F.
Kelly, “What Price Justice: The Daniel Bell Case,” Box 19, Folder 1, “Bell, Daniel 1982-83,” National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People, Milwaukee Branch, Records. Milwaukee Mss EP, University of WisconsinMilwaukee Archives. According to Krause, Grady spent his shift hunting for Black north side residents to detain; Grady
“needed some more arrests that night…he was going to check some vacant homes around 7th or 8th St. or Vine St. and
arrest some niggers.” Diane Schwerm, “Justice Done in 21-Year-Old Shooting Case, McCann Says,” The Milwaukee
Journal, August 30, 1979, Part 1, 16.
43 “Extensive Bell Coverup Denied,” The Milwaukee Journal, July 19, 1980, Part 1, 8.
44 A Detective Sergeant allegedly told Krause to “stick to your guns,” when he tried to explain to supervisors what
happened on the night of February 2, 1958. Curry First to Thomas Atkins, NAACP New York Headquarters, January
19, 1983, Box 19, Folder 1, “Bell, Daniel 1982-83,” National Association for the Advancement of Colored People,
Milwaukee Branch, Records. Milwaukee Mss EP. Then Police Chief Howard Johnson denied any knowledge of a coverup.
45 Both Glaser and Woelfel had died by the time Krause told his revised account. The first story about the police coverup of the Bell killing was buried on page sixteen of the Milwaukee Journal. A year later, it was headline news. Helane
Morrison, “After 20 Years, the Echoes of a Police Gunshot Return,” The Milwaukee Journal, December 10, 1978, Part 1,
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order to cast the innocent Bell more credibly as a knife-wielding criminal, Captain Woelfel ordered
Detective Russell Vorpagel to pick up a “known alcoholic” and buy her drinks before bringing her
to the morgue to identify Bell as a criminal.46 When Krause told his superiors the truth about what
happened to Bell, he said “they convinced him to match his story with what Grady had told him”—
that the officer shot in self-defense at a lunging Black man slashing a knife. Nobody in power would
question their fabrication. Krause’s testimony revealed that the MPD’s reputation for honest police
administration in the liberal law-and-order era was “a veil of lies.”47 The cover-up masked racist, lifethreatening, and illegal acts of police discretion. MPD supervisors were willing and able to protect
their own officers at the expense of the truth, systematically devalue Black life, and further justify the
department’s undue, extractive presence in Black urban spaces. These choices aligned with police
policies that determined how Black neighborhoods experienced law enforcement—harmful double
standards that helped preserve narratives of racial difference, promoted common white perceptions
of Black criminality, and supported racial segregation.
The Coalition for Justice for Ernest Lacy would not have gained the organizational following
or community support it did in 1981 had a grassroots campaign for justice not emerged in 1979
around the revisited Bell case. In addition to the Bell family filing a federal lawsuit against Thomas
Grady, former Police Chief Howard Johnson, and the City of Milwaukee for violating Bell and his
family’s civil rights, frustrated police accountability advocates made their voices heard on the
streets.48 For decades, Black and Latinx citizens had critiqued Milwaukee’s racist policing system and

16.
46 Detective Vorpagel refused to go along with the Captain’s plan and eventually quit the MPD over the Bell case. The
only individual who claimed to have “identified” Bell as their assailant was actually robbed while Bell sat in jail for
driving without a license. Captain Woelful and Inspector Glaser also had the officers falsify police reports to make the
murder appear more legitimate. White and LePage, Sister, 177.
47 Quote by Milwaukee Journal reporter Alex P. Dobish. Alex P. Dobish, “Former Officers Named in Bell Killing
Coverup,” The Milwaukee Journal, September 6, 1979, Part 1, 1.
48 The Bell family hired civil rights attorney, and former partner of Lloyd Barbee, Tom Jacobson to pursue the case. He
brought in outside attorneys Curry First and Walter Kelly, who handled much of the work. The plaintiffs sued the
defendants on the grounds that the traffic stop, killing, and cover-up violated Daniel Bell’s and the Bell family’s civil
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its brutal behavior. At issue now was determining the extent to which the MPD’s 1958 cover-up
extended to the dozens of other police killings that occurred since. Despite pursuing the John Doe
case, DA McCann refused to prosecute or even name those who participated in the MPD cover-up,
citing a statute of limitations that protected offenders who lived in the state at least six years after
their offense.49 To pressure McCann and local officials, more than two hundred fifty demonstrators
joined a “March for Justice” in September 1979.50 The march wound its way through Milwaukee’s
north side, from New Hope Baptist Church to N. 6 th St., where Bell was murdered. Rev. R. L.
Lathan, who organized the city’s first Black-led civil rights march after Daniel Bell’s death in 1958,
symbolically rode at the front of the procession in a hearse and casket.51 Protesters aimed to indict
and convict Grady, expose others involved in the alleged cover-up, compensate the Bell family, and
secure an investigation into all racialized police killings in Milwaukee. As radio host O. C. White
commented, the Bell case raised “a question about some of the other ‘mistakes’ and ‘accidents’ that
have happened in the community.”52
Because of the Bell case revelations, momentum built for a federal investigation into
racialized police violence in the city. On September 28, 1978, a hearing on police-community
relations was held at North Division High School.53 Organizers invited Black Alderman Roy Nabors,
who supported a federal investigation into Milwaukee police shooting deaths. Black fire and police
commissioner William Gore attempted to force the Milwaukee County DA to reveal more about the
rights. Liberal District Court Judge John W. Reynolds presided over the case. A federal jury found the defendants guilty
and awarded the family $1,795,000 on December 16, 1981. However, Mayor Maier and the city appealed, dragging the
case on for another couple years before a smaller settlement was reached. Thomas J. Hagerty, “Award Doesn’t End Bell
Family’s Battle,” The Milwaukee Journal, December 17, 1981, Part 1, 1; White and LePage, Sister, 229-231.
49 White and LePage, Sister, 227.
50 D. Michael Cheers, "Twenty-one Years Later, White Cop Admits Killing Black Milwaukee Man," Jet Magazine,
September 27, 1979.
51 Cheers, "Twenty-one Years Later, White Cop Admits Killing Black Milwaukee Man”; White and LePage, Sister, 229.
52 Gregory Stanford, “Doubts Raised by Slaying Case,” The Milwaukee Journal, August 30, 1979, Part 1, 16.
53 North Division High School was the heart of Black Milwaukee’s community control movement around public
education. Howard Fuller, an alum, led the Coalition to Save North Division. The group ensured that it would continue
as a neighborhood school, serving primarily Black students. Box 140, Folder 8, “Police Department, January-August
1978,” Records of Mayor Henry W. Maier Administration.
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officials’ actions in the cover-up using a special procedure.54 White officials went on the defensive, as
Black political leaders used their limited, if growing power to secure justice. City Attorney James
Brennan informed the MFPC that it had no legal right to conduct an investigation into Bell’s
shooting death or potential police cover ups.55 Nevertheless, on October 2, 1979 the Milwaukee
Common Council, led by Alderman Nabors, passed a resolution (9-7) to ask the U.S. Department of
Justice to investigate all police shooting deaths occurring in the city since 1965.56 Mayor Maier was
reluctant to sign the resolution, given the upcoming primary election and a desire to appease white
south and northwest side voters who actively supported Chief Breier and the MPD.57 Breier offered
Maier a safety valve, confidently writing him that he had “no fear” and “strongly urged” the mayor
to sign the resolution, which he did shortly thereafter.58
Fortunately for both Maier and Breier, a federal statute of limitations narrowed U.S.
Attorney Joan Kessler’s 1980 investigation into the MPD’s “use of deadly force and other violent
conduct” to between 1975 and 1979.59 This negated at least eight Black in-custody deaths, some of
which were controversial, high-profile cases that drew community protests. Kessler’s investigation
identified zero deaths that “appeared likely to be developable into prosecutable cases.”60 Only the
1976 police shooting death of white “Outlaw” motorcycle club member Roger Lyons evidently
neared “criminal misconduct.”61 Of twenty-two lives lost between 1975 and 1979, eight were African

White and LePage, Sister, 228.
James F. Brennan to Milwaukee Fire and Police Commission, September 27, 1979, Box 140, Folder 9, “Police
Department, January-August 1979,” Records of Mayor Henry W. Maier Administration.
56 Joan F. Kessler, “Milwaukee Common Council Resolution, Observations and Recommendations,” March 27, 1980,
Box 140, Folder 12, “Police Department, January-May, 1980,” Records of Mayor Henry W. Maier Administration.
57 Ronald H. Snyder, “Chief for Life: Harold Breier and His Era” (Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee,
2002), 80.
58 The vote was 9-7. Chief Breier to Mayor Maier, October 3, 1979, Box 140, Folder 9, “Police Department, JanuaryAugust 1979,” Records of Mayor Henry W. Maier Administration.
59 Kessler, “Milwaukee Common Council Resolution, Observations and Recommendations,” 3.
60 Kessler, “Milwaukee Common Council Resolution, Observations and Recommendations,” 16.
61 The U.S. Attorney’s office conducted a nine-month grand jury investigation that was “unable to develop sufficient
admissible evidence of federal criminal misconduct to justify requesting an indictment.” Kessler, “Milwaukee Common
Council Resolution, Observations and Recommendations,” 16.
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Americans.62 The rate of Black citizens who died in police custody, as compared to white, almost
matched the rate of Black arrestees.63 Kessler counted 45 of 137 total complaints had made to the
MFPC as “excessive force.”64 However, these complaints did not include racial identification,
making it difficult to find “a pattern of racism.”65 Incomplete data collection limited the study, as did
Chief Breier’s refusal to cooperate without being subpoenaed.66 In the end, the federal government
found “no factually sufficient basis” to investigate police misconduct in Milwaukee on a wider
scale.67 Unless other officers came forward and said they lied, Kessler saw no need to open inquiries
into previous shooting deaths. On the issue of accountability, however, she wrote that the MPD “is
effectively free to ignore articulated public policy,” which “contribute substantially to the feeling of a
significant portion of our population that they are in fact treated differently because of race.” While
the MFPC had power to, as of 1977, “review department policy annually,” it lacked the authority “to
impose policy, or enforce policy already adopted.” The police accountability issue was a “political
problem” to be solved by elected officials, not “criminal civil rights prosecution.”68

Fourteen in-custody deaths between 1975 and 1979 were white citizens. Six of the total deaths were suicides in
Milwaukee County Jail. Only one “Hispanic” died in police custody during this span (1979). Kessler, “Milwaukee
Common Council Resolution, Observations and Recommendations,” 8.
63 Despite comprising “only about 20% of the population,” Black citizens accounted for “more than 40% of all arrests”
in Milwaukee from 1975 to 1979. Kessler, “Milwaukee Common Council Resolution, Observations and
Recommendations,” 7.
64 Seventy of these incidents involved injuries, resulting in 37 lawsuits. U.S. Attorney Joan Kessler to Henry Maier and
Robert Anderson, Box 140, Folder 12, “Police Department, January-May, 1980,” Records of Mayor Henry W. Maier
Administration.
65 Kessler, “Milwaukee Common Council Resolution, Observations and Recommendations,” 1, 11.
66 The MFPC and City Attorney cooperated fully. Kessler, “Milwaukee Common Council Resolution, Observations and
Recommendations,” 4.
67 A leak of Kessler’s report to the U.S. Justice Department to the press in Milwaukee angered the Maier administration
and Milwaukee City Attorney’s office. The latter asked the DOJ for an investigation into Kessler’s conduct, citing “an
unprofessional attempt…to influence the outcome of our local political elections.” Maier was up for reelection and
Kessler’s report allegedly went beyond the scope of investigating police shooting deaths exclusively and suggested
internal discrimination on the police force that City Hall was, by her account, doing little to resolve. The City Attorney
referred to her as “a political activist.” City Attorney James B. Brennan to Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., U.S. Department of
Justice, Office of Professional Responsibility, April 17, 1980, Box 140, Folder 13, “Police Department, June-September,
1980,” Records of Mayor Henry W. Maier Administration.
68 Kessler, “Milwaukee Common Council Resolution, Observations and Recommendations,” 15-17.
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Residents Integrating Law Enforcement and the League of Martin Lawsuit
A second federal report written by U.S. Attorney Kessler in 1980 did necessitate action from
the city. This one involved the employment of “minorities”—African American, women, and Latinx
officers—on the MPD. Stepping backward, on May 31, 1978, a newly formed organization called
Residents Integrating Law Enforcement filed a complaint with the Civil Rights Division of the U.S.
Treasury Department’s Office of Revenue Sharing (ORS). George Sanders, a Black Milwaukee
journalist, drafted the letter.69 RILE comprised an anonymous roster of active and former MPD
personnel. Most were members of the city’s Black police association, the League of Martin. RILE’s
mission was “the integration of Hispanics, Blacks, and women into the MPD.” The group acted
anonymously out of fear of harassment or retaliation from police administrators and rank-and-file
officers.70 Their whistleblower complaint alleged “discriminatory practices” in violation of the U.S.
Eastern District Court of Wisconsin’s 1975 consent decree mandating the hiring of two “minority”
officers for every three white officers on the MPD.71 RILE called for a federal investigation into
how Milwaukee officials used federal revenue sharing funds and for “a determination” as to whether
federal aid should be withheld, suspended, or withdrawn as a result of internal police
discrimination.72 The group cited five specific areas of concern. First, “no Blacks, Latinos, or
Females” had been assigned to work at the MPD’s training academy. Second, Chief Breier had

Sanders also mailed a copy of the letter to President Jimmy Carter’s offices, as well as those of U.S. Attorney Griffin
Bell, Housing and Urban Development Secretary Patricia Hayes, and Wisconsin Fifth District Congressperson Henry
Reuss. Sanders did not sign his name on the document. He served as RILE’s spokesperson, and believed integration
made for “a more humane police and a lower unemployment rate among minorities.” As Sanders commented, “It’s time
for accountability, and the police should be held accountable by the people they are supposed to be protecting. “Police
Misconduct,” The Milwaukee Courier, October 7, 1978, 12; George Sanders (Freelance journalist), in discussion with the
author, April 2018.
70 Charles J. Sykes, “City, US Make a Deal; Funds to Keep Coming,” The Milwaukee Journal, September 26, 1979, 1;
Gregory Stanford, “US-City Deal Called a Sham,” September 26, 1979, 1; Box 19, Folder 3, “Milwaukee Police
Department, 1978-1981,” National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Milwaukee Branch, Records,
Milwaukee Mss EP, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Archives.
71 Women were included among Black, Latinx, Native American, and Asian American officers.
72 RILE specifically charged the MFPC, MPD, “and any other section, group or agency of the City of Milwaukee” with
“engaging in discriminatory practices” while utilizing federal economic assistance.
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assigned no minority officers to specialized police units, “particularly the so-called Tactical Squad.”
Third, as of 1978 “no Latino or Female Lieutenants, Captains or Sergeants,” and zero “Black
Lieutenants” served in the department.73 Fourth, Black officers comprised less than four percent of
the MPD’s nearly 2,200 sworn personnel. Finally, RILE noted the high Black attrition rate.
Numerous African American officers had “resigned or quit the force with unusual frequency
because of racism, intimidation, and other unfair conditions.”74 RILE signed its complaint “on
behalf of the citizens and residents of Milwaukee,” suggesting the city as a whole suffered from the
“discriminatory conditions” advanced by police bureaucrats.
About two weeks later, the Civil Rights Division of ORS notified the mayor’s office that it
would investigate RILE’s complaint.75 The federal government revealed its findings to the city on
August 21, 1979, reporting that Chief Breier had failed to comply with Title VI of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act, which prohibited discrimination by parties receiving federal revenue. According to
investigators, the MPD “used promotion selection procedures” and “engaged in assignment
practices that adversely affected the employment opportunities of black police officers.” The report
cited evidence that Black patrolmen were concentrated in predominantly Black districts and
“excluded” from mostly white areas. At the time of the investigation, the MPD was assigning no
Black officers to Districts Two and Six on the city’s white south side.76 Consequently, the ORS
threatened to withdraw the city’s federal aid after finding “probable cause” for racial discrimination
in the MPD. By late September, the matter was apparently resolved through “conciliation,” or

The department employed only one Black captain at the time, Dewey Russ.
George Sanders to Robert Clark, May 31, 1978, Box 19, Folder 3, “Milwaukee Police Department, 1978-1981,”
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Milwaukee Branch, Records, Milwaukee Mss EP,
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Archives.
75 ORS notified the city on June 16, 1978. Box 140, Folder 9, “Police Department, January-August 1979,” Records of
Mayor Henry W. Maier Administration.
76 Respondents for the city designated these police precincts as white residential areas. As of June 1980, the city
submitted three police assignment rosters. The rosters showed a complete absence of Black officers assigned to District
Two and Six.
73
74

410

settlement through a neutral third party.77 However, Black officers filed additional complaints with
the U.S. Attorney.78 The city’s 1982 report to ORS showed improvement in the distribution of Black
police officers to the other five districts. Still, half of all Black officers were assigned to District Five
and District Seven.79 Chief Breier continued to exclude Black police from the Tactical Squad until
1982.80 The city only appointed two African Americans to the squad in July 1982 in response to
community pressure as a result of the Lacy case and a U.S. Justice Department communication.81
The groundwork laid by RILE set the stage for the federal litigation filed by Black police
officers in 1981. It showed that a viable outlet existed for Black police to challenge racism that
circumvented Chief Breier’s state-sanctioned power. Needing evidence to challenge internal
discrimination in the U.S. District Court, League of Martin members documented work practices
that they believed violated their civil rights. They maintained separate memo books, one for daily
work and another for documenting racism. When Black officers began filing complaints in the mid1970s, their supervisors “started watching…to see who was keeping two sets of memo books.” 82
The ORS wrote City Attorney Brennan on September 24, 1979 that its investigation into police hiring and promotion
practices was resolved. Brennan to Shaheen, Jr., April 17, 1980.
78 On June 6, 1980, DOJ’s Civil Rights Division wrote City Attorney Brennan stating that the U.S. Attorney had received
additional complaints “relative to assignment, promotion, and termination practices” on the MPD. James B. Brennan to
Joan F. Kessler, February 2, 1981, “Police Department, January-February, 1981,” Records of Mayor Henry W. Maier
Administration.
79 “Additionally, the 1979 notice of non-compliance cited the City for the circumstance wherein only one black officer
held a special assignment on the district level, while no black detectives were assigned to the Special Assignment Squad.
The City’s June 1982 annual report showed three black officers holding special assignments on the district level. The
ORS has subsequently learned that at least two of these officers no longer hold such assignments and that black officers
continue to allege discrimination in this area.” The MPD’s 1982 Annual Report continued to show that zero Black
detectives worked the Special Assignments Squad.
80 Black officers Earl Ridgway and Leslie Barber became the first Black officers assigned to the Tactical Squad in June
1982, after the U.S. District Court of the Eastern District of Wisconsin forced Breier to integrate the unit. Cheikh T.
Sylla, “US After Breier, Wants More Blacks on Tactical Squad,” The Milwaukee Courier, September 11, 1982, 1; “Tactical
Squad Officer Shifted,” The Milwaukee Sentinel, October 1, 1983.
81 Treadwell O. Phillips to Mayor Maier, August 21, 1979, Box 19, Folder 3, “Milwaukee Police Department, 19781981,” National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Milwaukee Branch, Records. Milwaukee Mss EP,
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Archives.
82 Quote in: Lenard Wells (Lecturer, University of Memphis), in discussion with the author, November 2016. The
League of Martin’s first president and future MPD Chief (1996-2003) Arthur Jones filed the first discrimination
complaint by a police officer with the State Department of Industry, Labor and Human Relations on March 16, 1976.
The complaint alleged that MPD District Five Lieutenant James Marx, Jones’ “early shift” commander, engaged in racial
discrimination when he denied Jones’ request for a plainclothes assignment. Notwithstanding recommendations from
multiple sergeants, District Captain Duane Casey selected five white officers for promotion ahead of Jones, two of
77
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According to former LM president Lenard Wells, “That hit the police department like a barn fire.”83
Largely at issue for the League was Breier’s control over internal assignments and promotions.
Although the MFPC approved who got hired and promoted, the chief determined who filled
“exempt positions.”84 For instance, he controlled who made “Acting Detective,” an informal
prerequisite Breier bestowed before any officer could advance through MFPC channels to
“Detective.” Breier empowered loyal district-level subordinates to nominate officers for these
roles.85 Supervisors denied exempt assignments to Black officers, some of who worked at the same
precinct for over ten years.86 In November 1981, the chief directed the involuntary transfer of seven
“outspoken” Black patrolmen from the MPD’s District Five station.87 With the support of the

whom had less seniority. Jones was passed over for a plainclothes assignment in 1973, despite having more seniority and
experience than selected white officers. After receiving Jones’ 1976 complaint, the state mailed Chief Breier a letter
asking him to attend a conciliation meeting to discuss the issue further. Later that year, Jones filed a second complaint
alleging retaliation by MPD officials for complaining about racial discrimination. In 1979, the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission found “probable cause” to believe that the department, indeed, had retaliated against Arthur
Jones based on his race and for filing his initial complaint. By this point, Jones had made Detective. However, as he
argued in the League of Martin’s 1981 lawsuit, the MFPC should have promoted him to Detective in 1976. As a result,
he missed out on two years of eligibility towards becoming Lieutenant of Detectives, which required three years of
service in the Detective Bureau. Scott Anderson, “Black Officers File Federal Suit; Seek Promotions, End to
Retaliation,” The Milwaukee Courier, November 28, 1981, 1, 10; “Black Officer Files Bias Complaint,” The Milwaukee
Journal, March 17, 1976, Part 2, 9.
83 Lenard Wells (Lecturer, University of Memphis), in discussion with the author, November 2016.
84 These included the Tactical Enforcement Unit, Special Assignments Squad, and Acting Detectives (AD). According to
MPD rules, being an acting detective for a year was required to make full detective. The Chief of Police had the
authority to downgrade AD’s before they reached their year requirement. Arthur Jones’ experience working in District
Five reveals the extent to which Black police officers were excluded from special assignment promotions, which
prevented them from earning the “Acting Detective” designation: “Every Special [Assignments Squad member] that
worked at District Five became an acting detective, and the only way you could become a detective is if you were an
acting detective for at least one year. Then you could take the exam for detective…So the only way you could become a
detective on the Milwaukee Police Department was to become an acting detective...The only way you became a detective
at District 5 and a lot of other districts was if you worked special. See, you went from beat to squad, to plainclothes, to
detective.” Arthur Jones, “Duncan Group, Inc.: Through One City's Eyes Video Recording and Interview Transcripts,
1998-1999,” Milwaukee Mss 202, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Archives.
85 Other exempt positions included Administrative Sergeants, the Auto Squad (auto thefts), the Tavern Car (tavern
violations), and the Special Car (general felonies and misdemeanors).
86 According to Arthur Jones, “The department did assign Black officers to weekend squad patrols, when taverns stayed
open late, on a temporary or ‘loan’ basis…I thought that was terrible…There were young white officers who damn near
came out as contemporary with me, coming out of the academy, who were assigned to squads.” These assignments were
important, as they signaled a path to professional achievement. Breier himself became Chief of Police after serving as a
full detective, then rising to the rank of Detective Inspector—the head of all detectives. As Jones reiterated, “everything
centered around the Detective Bureau in the Milwaukee Police Department. Everything. That’s where the power was.”
Arthur Jones, “Duncan Group, Inc.”
87 Thirty-four Black officers worked at the station; only six percent of the MPD was Black. Gregory D. Stanford,
“Reassignments Anger Black Officers,” The Milwaukee Journal, November 8, 1981.
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Milwaukee Urban League and NAACP, LM President Arthur Jones announced the filing of a classaction lawsuit against Breier, District Five supervisors, the MPD, the MFPC, and the City on
November 18, 1981.88 Among their allegations, the officers said a white sergeant told them to issue
more jaywalking and traffic tickets in the mostly Black district as retaliation for the Coalition for
Justice for Ernest Lacy’s protests that summer.89 Here, the internal ramifications of the Lacy killing
within the MPD intersected with the external implications for policed Black residents. Both Black
police and civilians were ensnared by racist double-standards.

Forging a Grassroots Movement
Against this backdrop of renewed protests and pending lawsuits, Milwaukee’s Black-led
movement for police accountability coalesced around the July 1981 police killing of 22-year-old
Ernest Lacy. With his family’s support, the Coalition for Justice for Ernest Lacy (CJEL) formed on
July 13, 1981 at the N. 3rd St. offices of the United Black Community Council (UBCC).90 About forty
people attended the initial meeting, representing dozens of community and civil rights organizations.
Most attendees were Black; however, white and Latinx voices were also present. A sense of urgency
pervaded the gathering. “These people (the officers who killed Lacy) are still on the street, and they
could do the same thing tomorrow night,” activist Michael Rosen exclaimed.91 The UBCC’s Michael
McGee was nominated to lead the umbrella coalition. All present agreed that the first step would be
to pressure the MFPC to suspend Officers Eliopul, Dekker, and Kalt until an investigation was
completed; then seek prosecution.92 Each of the officers had pending brutality claims filed against

Karen Rothe, “Minority Officers Plan Discrimination Lawsuit,” The Milwaukee Sentinel, November 19, 1981; Gregory
D. Stanford, “Harassment Alleged in Black Officers’ Suit,” The Milwaukee Journal, December 17, 1981, Accent, 1.
89 Sergeant Phil Eccher denied the allegations, as did his union representatives. Black officers also alleged receiving
“bottom-rung chores, suspensions, threats of discipline and orders to get haircuts,” as written in federal affidavits.
“Transfer of Officers Defended,” The Milwaukee Journal, December 11, 1981, Part 2, 1.
90 Gregory D. Stanford, “Coalition Urges Suspensions,” The Milwaukee Journal, July 14, 1981, Part 2, 1.
91 Gregory D. Stanford, “Coalition Will Seek Officers’ Suspensions,” The Milwaukee Journal, July 14, 1981, Part 2, 4.
92 The commission did so, with pay.
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them by Milwaukee citizens. The MFPC had scheduled a hearing for all three officers just hours
before they encountered Ernest Lacy on Wisconsin Ave. However, it was postponed for health
reasons.93
The CJEL immediately channeled existing frustrations over decades of racialized police
violence into concerted action.94 To do so, it drew on grassroots momentum harnessed during
recent mobilizations for racial justice, more specifically the effort to save a predominantly Black
neighborhood high school from being closed down and reopened as an integrated magnet school,
the Bell movement for accountability, and the “Coalition to Oust Breier” as Milwaukee police chief.
Marquette University Equal Opportunities Program director Howard Fuller co-chaired the CJEL
alongside McGee. Both men were respected community activists with experience leading grassroots
campaigns and directing non-profit organizations. Fuller was a civil rights turned Black Power
activist with an international profile. He led the “Coalition to Save North Division High School.”95

Dekker, along with two other police officers, was accused of police brutality by four complainants in February 1978.
The city was forced to pay each individual $750. In the postponed case, 45-year-old Rexnord Corporation machinist
Hercules Brown filed a complaint against Dekker, Kalt, and Eliopul after he was arrested and allegedly brutalized on
June 21, 1980. According to the officers’ attorney, the hearing was postponed because one of the officers was recovering
from surgery. “3 Officers in Lacy Case Face Brutality Charge in ’80 Arrest,” The Milwaukee Journal, July 14, 1981, Part 1,
1. The MFPC dismissed the Brown case in October 1982. Patricia Wirth, “Brutality Case Dismissed,” The Milwaukee
Sentinel, October 26, 1982, Part 1, 1.
94 For a list of Black Milwaukee police brutality victims, see Appendix A.
95 Howard Fuller was born on January 14, 1941 in Shreveport, Louisiana. He moved with his mother to Milwaukee’s
Hillside Terrace housing project in 1947. Fuller attended North Division high school, where he excelled both
academically and on the basketball court. In high school, Fuller says he learned the fundamentals of community activism:
teamwork, organization, and effort. After earning a bachelor’s degree in Sociology from Carroll College in Waukesha,
Wisconsin, he moved to Cleveland, Ohio. There, Fuller got married, obtained a Master’s degree in Social Work from
Western Reserve University, and found employment as a job placement coordinator at Chicago’s Urban League branch.
After a protest in Cleveland for school integration as a member of the Congress on Racial Equality (CORE),
Fuller discovered a newfound sense of purpose as a grass-roots organizer. He spent the next decade serving in North
Carolina at the Operation Breakthrough community action agency. Fuller democratized higher education by founding an
all-Black college, Malcolm X Liberation University. He crisscrossed the globe as a sought after leader, speaker, and
organizer in the national Black Power movement. Known to his peers on the African Liberation Support Committee by
his Swahili name, Owusu Sadauki, Fuller’s embrace of revolutionary Pan-Africanism brought him to the coast of East
Africa, where he marched with anti-colonial Mozambican freedom fighters in a war to oust the Portuguese.
After working as a business agent for the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees’
Union Local-77, Fuller moved back to Milwaukee in 1976. There, he successfully organized against the busing of African
American students living in the neighborhoods surrounding North Division High School (1979), mobilized against
police brutality following the death of Ernest Lacy (1981), and led the college division of the Educational Opportunity
Program at Marquette University (1979-1983). Howard Fuller (Distinguished Professor of Education, Marquette
University), in discussion with the author, March 2013.
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McGee was a former Black Panther and co-founder of the UBCC, which spearheaded the city’s
movement for community control of the police and Black self-help in the 1970s. He also founded
Project Respect—an anti-crime project focused on youth diversion and neighborhood crime control
that partially relied on block grant funding.96 Project Respect defied the notion that Black
community activists were solely concerned about police violence and not intra-communal violence
as well, which, for McGee, fit hand-in-hand. Despite seemingly opposing leadership styles—one was
discreet and philosophical, the other spirited and tenacious—Fuller and McGee made a strong team.
“People thought we weren’t going to be able to work together,” Fuller recalled in 2013. “I had a
Master’s degree, [and was] college educated. Mike was…a Panther…a lot more militant acting…he
functioned in a certain way, I functioned in a certain way.”97 The two eventually had a notable falling
out over the proper course of Black political action. However, from the late 1970s through mid1980s, Fuller and McGee combined to form the vanguard of Milwaukee’s Black protest politics.98
While Fuller and McGee played prominent roles as co-chairs of the CJEL, helping to set the
movement’s tone and direction, it was Ernest Lacy’s mother, Myrtle, who was the real face of the
struggle. She served as a powerful symbol of Black women’s resistance to racialized police violence,
particularly during protest marches and pickets, at the MFPC’s disciplinary hearings and in federal

Gregory D. Stanford, “A Question of Power," The Milwaukee Journal, October 16, 1983, 4. A portion of Project
Respect’s grant funding came from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration and Wisconsin’s state criminal
justice council.
97 Howard Fuller (Distinguished Professor of Education, Marquette University), in discussion with the author, March
2013.
98 The onetime revolutionary Black nationalist, Fuller, opted to “work within the mainstream” of state and local politics.
McGee called Fuller a “lackey” and “hypocrite” after he moved into conventional politics. However, McGee also
entered the political arena when he won an aldermanic district seat in 1984, following two failed tries in 1976 and 1980.
Jonathan Coleman, Long Way to Go: Black and White in America (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1997), 37-38. Leaving
his days of radical adventurism behind, but remaining focused on uplifting poor and working-class people of color,
Fuller entered the public sector. After serving as Secretary of Employee Relations (1983-1986), Dean of General
Education at the Milwaukee Area Technical College (1986-1988), Director of Milwaukee County’s Department of
Health and Human Services (1988-1991), and Superintendent of Milwaukee Public Schools (1991-1995), Fuller became a
leading proponent of Wisconsin’s school voucher program; he founded an inner city charter school, and took a job as
the Director of the Institute for the Transformation of Learning at Marquette University’s College of Education.
Howard Fuller (Distinguished Professor of Education, Marquette University), in discussion with the author, March 2013.
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court amid the legal battle for civil justice.99 Her agency as an “emerging leader” in Milwaukee’s
police accountability movement was, to some extent, contingent on the success of the 1970s
Women’s movement and an implicit desire to complete the work of previous Black mothers forced
into the spotlight after police killed their children.100 Myrtle Lacy’s constant presence in all aspects of
her son’s death provided an emotional reminder of police brutality’s less visible collateral
consequences, especially for poor and working-class Black families whose mutual survival relied on,
in part, emotional and monetary support provided by children and extended kinfolk.101 The needless
loss of Ernest’s life instilled a righteous anger and deep sadness in Myrtle Lacy. “It is as if I have
lived another whole lifetime in these months since Ernest died…And I feel that life will never be the
same…He was innocent…and nothing has been done about it,” she told reporters.102 Still, she never
lost faith in her community. “Every time we would go before the people, we would always get
justice. When we went to the judiciary system, that’s when everything broke down.”103 In addition to
calling for the “just punishment” of the officers who killed her son, Lacy sought “redemptive”
justice for Black families. Police were “not above the law.” It was incumbent upon her and the CJEL
to communicate this message through direct action. The stakes were high for all Milwaukee
residents, not just African Americans. As she remarked, “It is my duty and my strong conviction that
if nothing happens out of this Lacy case, it will be a sad day for the white community and the black
community. People could be hurt.”104 While Lacy retained faith in the criminal-legal system, she was

Dorothy Austin, “Myrtle Lacy Emerges as Leader,” The Milwaukee Sentinel, February 8, 1982, Part 1, 8.
Sarah Ford, mother of Jaqueline Ford, is a good example of a Black mother compelled to publicly seek justice.
Jacqueline Ford, was killed by Milwaukee police detective Snead Carroll in 1972 when he purportedly tripped climbing a
set of stares and accidentally fired his gun. See: Chapter Five.
101 The family struggled financially and Myrtle Lacy received county welfare benefits and medical assistance, which she
actually chose to pay back after her civil case concluded in 1985. “I feel that, as far as I’m concerned, this is the right
thing to do…when people have the money, they should pay,” Lacy told reporters after receiving a $600,000 settlement.
Larry Sandler, “Lacy's Mother to Repay County for Welfare,” The Milwaukee Sentinel, October 24, 1985, Part 1, 1.
102 Dorothy Austin, “Myrtle Lacy Emerges as Leader.”
103 Laura R. Woliver, From Outrage to Action: The Politics of Grass-roots Dissent (Urbana: The University of Illinois Press,
1993), 86.
104 Woliver, From Outrage to Action, 86.
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dismayed when it operated by a dual standard: “I just want people punished like I would have been
punished if I had killed somebody on Wisconsin Ave.”105
A broad assemblage of civil rights organizations, social justice non-profits, labor unions,
houses of worship, neighborhood associations, professional groups, university programs, political
parties, and student alliances comprised the CJEL. At its height, the coalition totaled over one
hundred twenty-five groups. An umbrella coalition, according to political scientist Laura Woliver,
allowed for “supportive and parallel” units to commit “time and energy to larger issues and different
tactics.”106 The CJEL was diverse, representing a range of political, cultural, and identity-based
interests, yet complimentary in approach. From the AFL-CIO to the Workers World Party, Women
Against Rape to the Latin American Union for Civil Rights, the National Association of Black
Veterans to the People’s Anti-War Mobilization—it wagered that Milwaukee police bureaucrats
could ill afford to ignore such a unified swath of stakeholders. As leaders, Fuller and McGee
maintained a clear, “modest agenda.”107 The coalition overcame competing interests and
subordinated participants’ ideological differences by establishing “principles of unity” and focusing
on the common goal of prosecuting the officers responsible for Lacy’s death.108 They also hoped to
establish new statutory first aid protocols for police and more reliable accountability structures.
Open lines of communication facilitated the mobilization of thousands of citizens for
demonstrations at a moment’s notice. The CJEL demanded transparency—not only in terms of
clarifying the process of events leading up to Lacy’s death, but also in terms of how the city
responded to yet another tragic police killing. The twenty-year cover-up of Daniel Bell’s murder was
on their minds when Lacy perished. But so too were the police killings of Clifford McKissick (1967),

Dorothy Austin, “Myrtle Lacy Emerges as Leader.”
Woliver, From Outrage to Action, 80.
107 Woliver, From Outrage to Action, 68.
108 Karen Rothe and Marilyn Kucer, “Better Milwaukee for Blacks Is Aim of Activists,” The Milwaukee Sentinel, August
17, 1981, Part 1, 12.
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Lee Wilson (1967), Jacqueline Ford (1972), Andrew Friend (1973), Johnny Starks (1974), Mary
Pendleton (1974), Jerry Brookshire (1974), Charles Dailey (1975), and Steven Gaston (1975). The
coalition attracted “significant support” from the community, in part because Lacy was such a
“sympathetic victim.” He was innocent of the violent crime he was stopped for and witnesses saw
the police abuse him. This communal empathy was manifest when more than 2,500 people paid
their respects at Lacy’s wake and hundreds attended his funeral on July 18, 1981.
The CJEL’s actions shaped and reflected the twists and turns of official responses to Ernest
Lacy’s death from the MPD, District Attorney, Milwaukee County Medical Examiner’s office,
Milwaukee Police Association, and City Hall. The coalition pursued non-violent direct action protest
and civil litigation to secure justice for the Lacy family. As a secondary aim, it hoped to leverage
public pressure and effect procedural changes in Milwaukee’s police accountability system. All told,
the coalition led three marches and rallies in July and August 1981—the city’s largest protest
mobilizations since 1967-1968—and a final march and rally on the one-year anniversary of Lacy’s
death in 1982. The demonstrations spotlit Milwaukee’s ongoing policing crisis and the dual
accountability system Black residents were forced to navigate. The CJEL also held smaller
demonstrations at City Hall and outside the MFPC offices.109 It engaged in a one-day boycott of
downtown commerce in 1981, a sit-in at District Attorney McCann’s office, and, in 1982, a monthlong boycott of the downtown Gimbels and Boston Store, as well as the Capital Court shopping
mall on the northwest side.
In negotiating established police accountability structures, the CJEL experienced several
delays and set-backs, as well as some victories that helped coalition members persevere. The
movement began when the Lacy family, represented by Milwaukee civil rights attorney Alan
Eisenberg, sought relief through formal municipal channels. First, Myrtle Lacy submitted a citizen’s
109
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complaint with the MFPC on July 15, 1981. It alleged “agonizing, horrible police brutality”
committed against her son and called for the immediate suspension and timely disciplining of the
officers involved.110 In it, she identified the three Tactical Squad officers who subdued her son as “a
potential threat and danger to the safety of other citizens.” Police officers Kenneth Kmichik (van
driver) and Robert Enters (van attendant) were added to the complaint in October 1982.111 Having
received letters from CJEL organizations, the Greater Milwaukee Conference on Religion and
Urban Affairs, and another group, Citizens for a Democratic Police, William Gore—the MFPC’s
first African American chairperson—and colleagues voted to suspend the three officers pending
investigation.112 Breier and MPA President Robert Kliesmet “strongly opposed” the suspensions,
arguing they violated the officers’ constitutional rights.113 The police complaint review process
moved slowly, with the Lacy’s allegations first reviewed by an MFPC “Rules Committee,” then
investigated by staff before going on to the commission for a hearing. Years of appeals by the
officers and their union representatives caused delay. The MFPCs final decision on the Lacy case did
not come until June 1983, illustrating why so many in Milwaukee’s activist community considered
the board’s quasi-judicial function to be inefficient.

The Special Advisory Monitoring Committee
The MFPC temporarily suspended Officers Eliopul, Dekker, and Kalt with pay on July 25,
1981 pending investigation. Two days later, the MPA filed a complaint on the officers’ behalf with
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the U.S. Attorney’s office alleging the violation of their civil rights.114 The CJEL picketed outside
Milwaukee’s federal building as the union filed its grievance, carrying signs that demanded the
officers’ prosecution. The mayor carefully observed the brewing controversy. Given the Bell case
revelations, risking a cover-up in the Lacy matter, or simply appearing apathetic, was not an option.
Responding to the entreaties of venerable civil rights organizations, like the Milwaukee NAACP,
Maier agreed to form a “blue ribbon panel” to monitor developments in the Lacy case.115 The CJEL
was skeptical. The mayor had a history of forming study committees following politically volatile or
racially charged events. Rather than act on their most urgent recommendations, he often claimed a
lack of authority.116 This time around, Maier called for a special citizens committee to analyze
institutional responses to civilian deaths in police custody. He urged Chief Breier, MFPC Chair
Arlene Kennedy, and DA McCann to meet with the Milwaukee NAACP to discuss policecommunity relations and issues surrounding Lacy’s death.117
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On the same day that the MPA filed their federal complaint, the mayor announced
appointments for his “Special Advisory Monitoring Committee” (SAMC). The group’s charge: to
examine “the various processes involved in investigations into” Lacy’s death. 118 Former Maier aide
Alex LeGrand and Mt. Zion Baptist Church Pastor W. J. Calvin chaired the eleven-member body. It
was racially diverse, if politically loyal to the mayor.119 No CJEL members were asked to serve. In a
press conference, Maier expressed reservations about the “recycling of recent history” and
perceptions among residents that he was not taking civilian demands for police accountability
seriously.120 The CJEL’s rhetoric and legal filings had named previous MPD killings and alluded to
potential cover-ups that went beyond the Bell case. They also publicly charged Breier with hiding the
facts of Ernest Lacy’s death after the chief exonerated the three arresting officers in an internal
investigation.121 Black SAMC members were themselves wary of being seen as yet another municipal
committee that takes no action.122 “I must go back to the black community…and keep the venom
from flowing,” one member commented.123
In Maier’s view, the special committee functioned as “a mechanism to observe the workings

Mayor Maier instructed the SAMC to interrogate four questions: “1. Do the existing processes and procedures
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of the legal processes in the Lacy case” and to “recommend ways to improve the system.”124 The
group clarified in the press that they were “not here to investigate the Lacy case,” as they lacked “the
authority.” The SAMC met as a full body twenty-five times, holding sub-committee meetings as
well. At Maier’s instruction, they reached out to the mayor’s offices and police departments of the
thirty largest U.S. cities in an effort to learn more about the procedures they followed when citizens
died in police custody. The SAMC heard testimony from twenty-seven local people, including Chief
Breier, DA McCann, City Attorney James Brennan.125 The committee spoke with CJEL members
Howard Fuller, Lacy family attorney Alan Eisenberg, the Wisconsin Civil Liberties Union’s Eunice
Edgar, and Russell Stamper of Wisconsin Black Lawyers Association. Breier testified before the
SAMC on August 17, 1981. He strongly defended his officers, claiming they “were not involved in
any way.” Breier refused to address Lacy’s death or police “techniques” or “procedures,” arguing
they are “not to be discussed with the general public.”126 He maintained that investigating in-custody
deaths was the MPD’s role. “We won’t share that function with anyone,” he insisted. Based on the
chief’s track record of defending illegal police stops and searches, violent beatings, and slayings, the
CJEL anticipated his response. Police accountability advocates, having experienced two decades of
reaction and resistance from Breier, believed that repairing police-community relations was
impossible with him in charge of the MPD. Breier favored a “siege mentality” that divided his
officers from the people and “further exacerbated police community tensions.”127 As Howard Fuller
put it, Breier “had everybody under his fist…he was like a local Hoover.”128
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Mayor Maier approved the SAMC’s twenty-six recommendations in “concept,” if not
entirely in “substance.”129 The committee focused on procedural reforms that could get passed at the
state and municipal levels of government. Most of their recommendations targeted Breier’s insular
and reactionary leadership, his response to the use of excessive police force, his unwillingness to
cooperate fully with outside investigators, his lack of support for the mental health and well-being of
rank-and-file officers, and his unwillingness to promote personnel of color. Former police union
president Jerome Dudzik had a clear hand in devising recommendations favoring rank-and-file
officers, their health and well-being. While the SAMC recognized “police have a tough, often
dangerous and unpleasant job”—one that that should transcend “petty criticisms”—they also
observed that police work sometimes “harmed” individuals, who “deserve justice and means of
recourse.”130 The committee surmised that “procedures must be in place” whereby “the rights of all
are protected.” Moreover, they had to “safeguard against even the remote possibility of a coverup.”131 At the top of the committee’s recommendations list was passage of a state law that advanced
“safeguards into the cause of death or great bodily harm to persons in police custody or involved in
police action.”—A reform that the legislature ultimately accomplished in 1983.132 The SAMC called
for disciplinary action when the police chief refused to work with state and county investigators.
Most other recommendations regurgitated the liberal police reforms of the era, largely emphasizing
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training improvements and police working with community groups to resolve crime.133 No SAMC
proposals addressed the CJEL’s explicit demand for the firing and prosecution of the officers who
killed Ernest Lacy, largely because the criminal-legal system made it so.

Marching Towards an Inquest Hearing
The Coalition for Justice for Ernest Lacy’s first step in achieving the officers’ prosecution,
systematically speaking, was the inquest called by District Attorney McCann. The MFPC was not
authorized to file criminal charges in the Lacy case. “The only way to achieve justice,” CJEL leaders
insisted, was “to let the evidence come out in a court of law.”134 That meant District Attorney
Michael McCann prosecuting the men who killed Ernest Lacy, “using the abundant evidence already
before him.” In order to determine the legitimacy of pursuing criminal indictments, McCann
ordered Milwaukee County Medical Examiner Chesley Erwin to conduct an inquest.135 Such
hearings were not civil or criminal trials, but rather juridical investigative proceedings used to
determine whether filing criminal charges was necessary or not.136 The CJEL opposed McCann’s call
for an inquest, citing eyewitness testimony as more than sufficient to file criminal charges. As of July
17, 1981, Examiner Erwin was still determining a cause of death. The DA authorized an inquest
start date in mid-August, anticipating “in excess of thirty witnesses” to testify before a six-person
jury selected by Milwaukee County Sheriff William Klamm. That same week, Milwaukee state
The committee called for fairer, more comprehensive complaint review procedures; implementation of communityoriented policing and citizen involvement in crime prevention; achieving a more diverse rank-and-file; establishing a
public relations unit to communicate with community groups; raising the educational standards of new police recruits;
engaging in psychological screenings, evaluations, and counseling for all officers; and expanding human relations training
in the academy. The SAMC called for the integration of the Tactical Enforcement Unit and for the promotion of “five
or more minority officers with five or more years of experience” to “command positions.” The SAMC’s final
recommendation called for an amendment to state law that would create “a Milwaukee-only office of public safety
director.” Mayor Maier to MFPC Chairperson Arlene Kennedy, June 14, 1982, 6-8.
134 Scott Anderson, “Inquest Process ‘Hopelessly Flawed,’ Justice Means Prosecution: Coalition,” The Milwaukee Courier,
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136 Gregory D. Stanford, “Court Drama Seeks Truth in Lacy Case,” The Milwaukee Journal, September 20, 1981, part 2, 1.
133

424

legislators called for a “full investigation” into Lacy’s death.
The Lacy Coalition, unwilling to sit idle while the Erwin and McCann deliberated, hit the
streets demanding that officials move faster. They organized three demonstrations in the period
leading up to the inquest. The first march and rally took place on July 20, 1981. One news report
characterized the crowd as “bitter, but orderly.” Demonstrators focused on the filing of criminal
charges against Officers Eliopul, Dekker, and Kalt and for the MFPC to swiftly administer lasting
discipline. About four thousand protesters moved at mid-day from the scene of Lacy’s murder on
N. 23rd St. and Wisconsin Ave. to Milwaukee’s Civic Center Plaza.137 Myrtle Lacy, conversely,
counted upwards of five thousand people “walking with power and strength.”138 “We are the
aggrieved family, but we’re looking for justice—and we will get justice,” she told the crowd. As
people marched, they chanted the names Daniel Bell and Clifford McKissick—two young Black
men shot and killed by Milwaukee police.139 Roll calling the names of the deceased in this way
represented a potent political act, as it re-inscribed their humanity into a contested public space
devoid of any memorialization to police brutality victims. At the downtown plaza, Rev. R. L. Lathan,
Alderman Roy Nabors, State Representative Annette Polly Williams, and Howard Fuller also
addressed rally goers.140 The MPD was prepared for civil unrest. More than one hundred officers,
most adorned in riot gear and wielding batons, enveloped the non-violent demonstrators. Chief
Breier made himself visible throughout the protest. Organizers viewed his presence as “an act of
provocation to incite trouble.”141 Demonstrators chanted in the chief’s direction, “Fire Breier, he’s a

Civic Center Plaza was located in front of the Milwaukee Public Safety Building, also the MPD’s District One
headquarters. Chester Sheard, “Bitter, Orderly Marchers Denounce Police,” The Milwaukee Sentinel, July 21, 1981, Part 1,
1.
138 Chester Sheard, “Bitter, Orderly Marchers Denounce Police,” The Milwaukee Sentinel, July 21, 1981, Part 1, 1.
139 Bell, as described above, was murdered by police in 1958. College student Clifford McKissick was killed on August 2,
1967 amid Milwaukee’s civil disturbance. Karen Rothe, “Chanting Crowd Recalls 3 Deaths,” The Milwaukee Sentinel, July
21, 1981, Part 1, 5.
140 “Rally,” The Milwaukee Courier, July 18, 1981, 8.
141 Anderson, “Community,” 1.
137

425

liar” and “Hell no. We ain’t taking it no more.” When Fuller spoke, he called on the federal Law
Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) to withhold funds from the city, which were to be
allocated for a “police-community relations program” that would have police lecturing citizens at
shopping centers and community association meetings. This was “hypocritical,” he said, “when the
police are out killing our people.”142 After the rally ended, the coalition registered its own complaint
with the Fire and Police Commission, alleging that Breier “deliberately tried to provoke an incident”
when he marched into a peaceful crowd of demonstrators.143 McGee and Fuller filed it as a First
Amendment violation and act of discrimination “against members of the Black community,”
demanding an investigation and the chief’s suspension or resignation.
With little movement on the case, the CJEL held a second protest march and rally, this time
in the evening. The demonstration attracted an estimated 5,000 participants, the largest of the
group’s protests.144 Demonstrators again rallied in Civic Center Plaza, in front of the Milwaukee
Safety Building. Most participants were young Black contemporaries of Lacy, with white and Black
middle-aged faces also dotting the crowd.145 Protesters jeered at Breier, who strode alongside the
marchers with a “stoney expression,” guarded by plainclothes officers.146 Twice the number of police
were on hand, with a “phalanx” of at least one hundred officers wearing helmets and carrying
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batons. Some rode on motorcycles, others in squad cars and vans.147 The CJEL’s own cadre of field
marshals—members of ABATE, a motorcycle rights organization—helped ensure an orderly
demonstration.148 Rally-goers carried signs that read, “Lacy: Innocent & Dead”; “Justice for Ernest
Lacy”; and “Prosecute the Officers.” Chants of “Fire Breier. He’s a liar” and “No more killing”
could be heard.149 Eleven people spoke at the rally this time. Most of them called for the prosecution
of Eliopul, Dekker, and Kalt.150 Some condemned the media and MPD for false portrayals of Lacy
as a mentally ill drug addict. As Ernest’s father, Leonardo Lacy, told reporters, the police were “only
trying to cover up [Ernest’s] death. My son had no record. He was not a drug addict…He was a
straight young man. The police killed him because a white woman said she was raped.”151
While the CJEL’s marches and rallies reflected the community’s clear outrage and desire for
justice, it knew that additional protest actions would be necessary if city leaders were to take their
voices seriously. Official responses, thus far, had failed to bring lasting disciplinary action or criminal
charges against Lacy’s killers. Therefore, the coalition broadened its target audience beyond police
bureaucrats, elected officials, and the courts and focused on the city’s business interests. To do so, it
turned to another “traditional tactic of the Civil Rights Movement”: organizing “an active economic
boycott of downtown merchants.”152 Boycotts represented a confrontational civil rights strategy that
relied on aggrieved citizens pressuring reluctant civic leaders to take action based on a shared value
as consumers.153 Black residents comprised a major portion of Milwaukee’s retail customer base.
At least sixty cops were also ready when the march convened at Civic Center Plaza. “Thousands March, Rally for
Lacy,” The Milwaukee Sentinel, July 31, 1981, Part 1, 12.
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Downtown outlets were the “symbol of a revitalized Milwaukee.” Ending “business as usual,” by
attracting patrons to the coalition’s “picket lines,” would theoretically lessen retail profits and
threaten the economic security of the city’s latest development: The Grand Avenue Mall.154 Gimbels
and the surrounding shops on Wisconsin Ave., such as Boston Store, were integral to Mayor Maier
and the business community’s “redeveloping downtown” project.155 What is more, national
corporations, with markets in New York, Philadelphia, and other northeastern cities, owned both
Gimbels and Boston Store. This carried the potential of a broader ripple effect and added
publicity.156
The CJEL held its first economic boycott on August 8, 1981.157 A picket ran along
Wisconsin Ave., from the Milwaukee River west to N. 5 th St. Protesters carried signs, wore
provocative t-shirts, and passed out leaflets. One of their goals was to compel business elites to
publicly support an outside investigation of the Lacy incident.158 As Michael McGee put it,
Milwaukee’s commercial interests were “the real power brokers in this town.”159 Unfortunately for
the coalition, the action received a cool reception from shoppers and business leaders. Grand
Avenue Mall developer Mathias DeVito saw “no connection” between his glossy new shopping
center—what he called an “economic boon” to “groups plagued with high rates of joblessness”—
and “the regrettable Lacy case.”160 Consequently, the coalition lost some editorial support in
Milwaukee’s mainstream dailies, who condemned the boycott as harmful to innocent bystanders. The
CJEL had “somehow perceived” the downtown business community as an extension of “a largely
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white police department,” according to The Milwaukee Sentinel editorial board.161 The coalition, by this
logic, lost focus of remediating a tragic instance of police misconduct. Instead, it was framing police
violence as entwined with issues of race and class, violating implicit principles of Milwaukee’s liberal
capitalist order. CJEL boycotts presumably turned off white residents, who had grown tired of
Sixties-style protests and Black accusations of racial prejudice.
On August 15, 1981, the CJEL’s third march and rally cut through Milwaukee’s north and
near west side. It followed a new route: N. 4 th and Chambers St. to N. 15th and Vliet St. Around eight
hundred marched, with another couple hundred people waiting at Martin Luther King, Jr. Park to
rally.162 Chief Breier and his police officers, again, made their presence felt. At one point the chief
stepped out of his unmarked vehicle and walked directly into a crowd of protestors, surrounded by
six uniformed officers. Demonstrators “swirled” around him, chanting, “Fire Breier, he’s a liar!”163
Michael McGee reasoned the chief was trying to intimidate and provoke a violent response from the
crowd. “Breier is not crazy…He knows exactly what he’s doing. He is an old, senile, dangerous man,
and we have to understand that,” Howard Fuller said. Latinx activist Tony Baez called police
brutality “a national menace.”164 James Groppi also spoke at the rally. The widely known activist
once again decried police brutality, only now as it related to Ernest Lacy’s violated civil rights. 165
Meanwhile, the Medical Examiner’s inquest hearing—initially scheduled for August 18,
1981—was derailed another month. Warren Hill, a deputy examiner, had publicly commented that
there was not enough evidence to justify criminal charges against the officers. Hill’s apparent
prejudging of the case angered CJEL leaders and the Lacy family, who lobbed charges of a
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“whitewashing” at county officials.166 They called for further protests and for Hill’s dismissal.
Chesley Erwin asked retired liberal Appeals Court Judge Robert C. Cannon to preside over the
inquest as a special medical examiner.167 The CJEL demanded Black representation on the jury,
which they received in equal number after Cannon verified that Black inquest jurors could be
deliberately placed without violating state law.168 The hearing began on September 14, 1981, lasted
about a month, and was broadcast live on local television.169 Leading off the inquest, Medical
Examiner Erwin reiterated his belief that Lacy died from a lack of oxygen. Yet he found no signs of
“excessive force.” It was unclear, he said, what precisely “keyed off ” his death.170 Witness Fred
Kolde had an answer. He testified to standing ten feet from Lacy and the officers, where he saw the
22-year-old forcibly tackled by police to the ground. While pinned down, his body convulsed until
he stopped moving. The arresting officers swore Lacy was alive, if unconscious when placed in the
police van and that he did not require medical attention.171 In testimony, they framed their arrestee as
a drug-crazed criminal with superhuman force.172 One officer, for example, testified that their
combined weight of over 600 pounds was not enough to subdue the 145-pound Lacy.173 According
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to Officer George Kalt, people who “are either high on drugs or mentally disturbed…sometimes
possess an inordinate amount of strength.”174 Regardless of the officers trafficking in racist,
dehumanizing tropes, Lacy was not on drugs and had received no psychiatric treatment.
After listening to more than one hundred people testify for over three weeks, the medical
examiner’s inquest jury stunned the city when, on October 17, 1981, it recommended “homicide by
reckless conduct” charges be filed against Officers Eliopul, Dekker, and Kalt for using “unlawful
means” to subdue Lacy.175 It was the first time in Milwaukee’s history an inquest jury had ever
recommended prosecuting city police.176 Since 1967, six inquests involving the deaths of Black men
or women at the hands of Milwaukee police had failed to result in criminal charges.177 The jury also
recommended lesser misconduct charges be filed against the two officers who drove the police van
for “failure to render first aid” and “inform medical persons of Lacy’s condition upon request.” 178
Perhaps the most damning testimony came from pathologists, like Robert W. Huntington III, who
argued Lacy died because of “the physical application of force” combined with a nerve reflex in his
neck.179 The inquest affirmed that Lacy had died three to five minutes after Eliopul applied pressure
to his upper back, interrupting the flow of oxygen to his brain.180 Referring to the inquest jury’s
decision to recommend charges, Myrtle Lacy told reporters, “I feel like screaming. Every day…I
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prayed it would happen.”181 Chief Breier, on the other hand, called the inquest jury’s decision “a
terrible miscarriage of justice” that would “handcuff the police even more” and hurt morale. MPA
President Robert Kliesmet called it “a perversion of the system,” the officers were “grossly
mischarged.”182 He later appealed the ruling on behalf of the five officers. Both Kliesmet and Breier
accused DA McCann of “going out of his way to attack police.183 Local conservatives in a John
Birch Society-sponsored group, Support Your Local Police, claimed a trial against the officers would
only result in Black people rioting “for the fun of it.”184 On October 16, 1981, Judge Cannon signed
the arrest warrants.185
And yet, any elation the CJEL, Lacy family, and sympathetic residents felt dissipated when,
during the 1981 holiday season, DA McCann requested that the Circuit Court dismiss the homicide
and misconduct charges. Right when progress on the officers’ prosecution felt within reach, Judge
Joseph Callen voided the inquest jury’s historic decision, withdrawing the arrest warrants. The
District Attorney essentially used the logic of “reverse racism” to argue that Special Examiner
Cannon had chosen an inquest jury “partially by race.” Doing so, McCann said, violated the
constitutional rights of the officers.186 The DA’s late-breaking decision to ask the court for a
dismissal was, in part, based on his mistaken belief that the inquest jury’s recommendations would
be “advisory” and not “mandatory.”187 DA McCann then promised a devastated, if still determined
Lacy family that he would file new criminal charges against Officers Eliopul and Kalt, which he did
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on January 12, 1982.188 Myrtle Lacy signed a fresh complaint and the police arrested both officers
the next day.189 A special prosecutor separately charged and arrested Dekker on a “misconduct in
public office” charge, but not “reckless homicide” as recommended by the inquest jury. The
misconduct charges stemmed from the officers not providing lifesaving aid to Lacy. This victory,
too, was short-lived. Judge Callen again dismissed the pending charges against Officers Kalt and
Eliopul on January 30, 1982.190 This time, the Circuit Court cited a lack of probable cause. The
criminal-legal system sent the Lacy’s hopes for prosecution into a second free fall. Irate but not
discouraged, the CJEL held an “around the clock” sit-in in McCann’s Milwaukee Safety Building
office.191 They demanded he again file criminal charges against Officer Eliopul, whose case, the DA
said, would require federal prosecution.192 Despite McCann’s promise to the Lacy family, the officer
most directly responsible for Ernest Lacy’s death would not be charged again for “homicide by
reckless conduct.”193 The District Attorney did issue a second “misconduct in public office” charge
against Kalt.194 It too was dismissed.195 Myrtle Lacy persisted nonetheless: “In my mind, what
happened is negligent homicide…some charges have to be filed.”196

Police Deaths and the “Blue Flu”
With the inquest hearing in the rear view, and the officers who killed Ernest Lacy escaping
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prosecution, the widespread support enjoyed by Black-led police accountability advocates appeared
to decline in winter 1981-1982. In December, a 19-year-old Black male, Robert Lee Collins, tragically
gunned down two young police officers, Charles Mehlberg (25) and John Machajewski (24). 197
Invoking the racialized circumstances of Lacy’s death, Aldermen Roy Nabors suggested that Collins
likely feared for his life when confronted by the police and shot in self-defense. The alderman—long
an ally in the policing struggle—was already in the MPD’s cross-hairs for recently proposing a city
ordinance that would have placed the police chief under the mayor and city council’s control.
“Milwaukee can ill afford to hide behind the laws of 1911 and dodge moral and political
responsibility for its police department,” he stated at a Common Council meeting.198 “Irresponsible
actions” and “procedures,” including “Red Squad” spying and unwarranted surveillance needed
reining in. Breier responded to the alderman’s comments, saying it was “unthinkable that an
alderman would defend a criminal who has just killed two police officers…that shouldn’t happen in
this law-and-order city.”199
Nabors’ comments about the late officers incensed the Milwaukee Police Association. The
rank-and-file responded by walking off the job for a sixteen hour “blue flu” strike that ended on
Christmas Eve.200 Many Black officers chose not to participate.201 Invoking the Lacy killing,
MNAACP President Christine Belnavis called the strike politically motivated— “a political act
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designed to win immunity from punishment for police officers who break the law.”202 Belnavis and
Howard Fuller said the “fear” Nabors’ comments referenced was real in the Black community.
Regardless, the MPA flexed its mounting political power, proffering twelve demands. They included
a “comprehensive police-community relations program” and “a public relations program to improve
the image of the police.”203 The MPA’s two most immediate calls, necessary for ending the illegal
strike, were for a ban on issuing reprisals against striking officers and that City Hall disavow Nabors’
statement. The alderman apologized, saying he was taken out of context. But making the statement
was his constitutional right. Chief Breier was critical of the MPA’s “blue flu,” arguing that the
officers’ “credibility with the citizens will certainly diminish. The good citizens are suffering.” MPA
leaders were critical of both Nabors and Breier.204 The MPA always had a tempestuous relationship
with the chief. Upon his retirement, union president Robert Kliesmet called Breier “a racist” who
“emulates the community he serves.”205 The union also criticized DA McCann, who Kliesmet said
was “piling straw on the camel’s back for the last six months.”206 He was referencing the “overly
aggressive” criminal charges pending against the officers who arrested Ernest Lacy.

1982 Boycotts and the Class Question in Milwaukee’s Police Accountability Movement
The CJEL renewed its direct action protests as the drama surrounding District Attorney
McCann and the Milwaukee County Circuit Court unfolded. Judge Janine Geske delayed the legal
process once again, citing uncertainty around whether Officers Kalt and Dekker’s “misconduct in
public office charges” were constitutional according to state law.207 The CJEL planned a retail
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boycott in response to the delay. Throughout the spring of 1982, the coalition protested outside of
Milwaukee’s downtown Gimbels and Boston Stores, as well as the Capital Court Shopping Center on
the city’s northwest side. These retail boycotts, to some extent, reflected a last ditch effort. As
Howard Fuller warned, “This is the only non-violent thing left…since we have no intention of
calling for a violent solution, we’ll go to the maximum on non-violent tactics.”208 That meant drifting
into questions of race and economics. The coalition wagered that retailers, pressured by angry
consumers and diminishing profits, would pressure City Hall and the MFPC to take action in
disciplining the officers who killed Lacy. In addition to the support he drew from labor unions, real
estate developers, and city contractors, Mayor Maier had close ties to local business magnates, like
Harold Sampson and Ben Marcus. Their commercial enterprises extended into Milwaukee’s suburbs
and surrounding states.209 The coalition hoped the boycotts would generate enough of a backlash
that Maier would have to honor his corporate allies’ demands for assuaging dissatisfied consumers.
Similar to the previous year’s actions, the 1982 boycotts garnered mixed results for the Lacy
movement. Some businesses indirectly retaliated. For example, several Capitol Court retailers united
in refusing to comment on sales information to the press. This undercut the CJEL’s goal of
publicizing the boycott’s effectiveness. More directly, the shopping center barred demonstrators
from carrying signs or distributing leaflets with political slogans. In response, the CJEL donned Tshirts with messages asking patrons to join the protest. Downtown, Michael McGee reported that
the coalition’s boycotting of Gimbals and Boston Store had slowed business.210 Ultimately, the
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boycotts failed to produce substantive justice for the Lacy family as intended. Dismayed by the racial
implications raised by the CJEL, which was now obstructing their relationship to the marketplace,
business leaders and retail consumers alike balked at offering tangible support. While the coalition
engaged in a months-long action that, in a narrow sense, disrupted the retail shopping cycle, they
struggled to persuade the Circuit Court not to dismiss the misconduct charges pending against
Officers Dekker and Kalt. The coalition decided not to prolong its boycott “with no clear negotiable
point” for victory or to force residents “to lose good shopping access.” 211
The practical effects of the CJEL’s boycott was one question, but what those actions meant
for the umbrella organization as a grassroots political collective was another. More specifically, they
touched on important questions about race and class as they relate to police violence and social
control via law enforcement. The boycott ultimately revealed limitations as to what the wider society
deemed an acceptable protest politics. A majority white public remained either unwilling or unable
to connect larger issues of racial capitalism to Ernest Lacy’s death.212 Milwaukee’s, and by extension
America’s, white supremacist capitalist system has and continues to prioritize corporate profits and
consumer access to the marketplace ahead of accounting for the (presumed) disposability of Black
lives. Racism has always been essential to maintaining that system, and organized law enforcement
has long served as its primary enforcement mechanism, dating back to the 1830s. 213 That Lacy was
Black and poor, i.e. disposable in the eyes of the above order, matters contextually in terms of the
Consumer business was already slow due to construction, street blockages, and recent bus route changes. Targeting
Capitol Court Mall proved questionable because of a property rights issue.
212 See Chapter One for a definition of racial capitalism.
213 Critical geographer Ruth Wilson Gilmore defines “racism” broadly as “the state-sanctioned or extra-legal production
and exploitation of group-differentiated vulnerability to premature death.” Ruth Wilson Gilmore, Golden Gulag: Prisons,
Surplus, Crisis, and Opposition in Globalizing California (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007), 28. As sociologist
Alex S. Vitale writes, “…police exist primarily as a system for managing and even producing inequality by suppressing
social movements and tightly managing the behaviors of poor and non-white people: those on the losing end of political
and economic arrangements.” Alex S. Vitale, The End of Policing (New York: Verso, 2017), 34. On the founding of police
departments in Antebellum America, see: Sam Mitrani, The Rise of the Chicago Police Department: Class and Conflict, 18501894 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2013), 2. Boston formed the nation’s first professionalized police force in
1838. Wilbur Miller, Cops and Bobbies: Police Authority in New York and London (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1977), 17.
211

437

public discourse, political deliberations, and criminal-legal processes surrounding his death.
However, the boycott and the coalition’s implicit invoking of the role that class plays in racialized
police violence, subtly revealed latent ideological divisions within the CJEL. To be clear, the
coalition, throughout its existence, remained squarely focused on the goal of achieving justice for
the Lacy family. At the same time, however, its members expressed varied opinions about the case
and its relationship to society writ large that are worth exploring. They help explain the persistence
of racialized police violence, as well as the elusive nature of police accountability for Milwaukee’s
Black-led movement going forward.
Michael McGee and Howard Fuller’s primary focus—beyond securing compensatory justice
for the Lacy family and the criminal prosecution of the officers—was building Black political power
and economic self-sufficiency. Each CJEL leader had formal political aspirations, too, which they
partially realized based on the images they cultivated while shepherding the Lacy movement and
other grassroots political campaigns. McGee and Fuller seemed less interested in building crossracial working-class solidarity with a set goal of restructuring the city’s police bureaucracy so that it
stopped serving exploitative racial capitalist ends. Fuller had drifted from the radical Marxist politics
that once typified his Black Power organizing, and McGee had always framed his pro-Black
arguments for community control of the police in race-conscious terms that fit within the broader
parameters of an existing law enforcement paradigm. McGee was not, what scholars people refer to
today as, an “abolitionist,” at least based on his public commentary. Both Fuller and McGee’s larger
political objectives dealt with preserving and serving Black life, through more equitable police
protection and criminal-legal processes and a more racially democratic municipal system overall.
They saw law enforcement as a legitimate concept in its own right, but rejected the MPD’s racist
leadership and structure.214 Through community organizing and the budding potential of Black
214
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electoral power, it became more possible for activists like Fuller and McGee to realize procedural
and substantive justice, to advance community control of the police and other municipal institutions,
and to hire more Black police personnel. These were, for the better part of this history, the key
reform elements for Black and allied police accountability advocates seeking to transform an unjust
and racist policing system.
And yet, this framework of accountability, justice, and reform bypassed some inherent truths
about the U.S. policing mission that merit further analysis—namely that its fundamental purpose was
upholding white middle-class and corporate elite interests. While the CJEL was unified in its core
objective, the group’s size and ideological diversity ensured the presence of divergent understandings
of the policing crisis. Some individuals, for instance, made explicit linkages between racialized police
violence, or “terror,” and the unaccounted for economic injustices that pervaded Milwaukee’s
terrain. Such injustices—racialized and entrenched as they were—ran contrary to prevailing national
myths of meritocratic individualism and the perfectibility of the U.S. capitalist system. Joan
McManus, Director of the Mid-Town Neighborhood Association, offered the most succinct
example. As she addressed rally goers in July 1982, “Ernie Lacy’s unjustifiable death is a terrible
symbol of the blatant refusal of America’s political and economic system to provide what we all
grew up believing was ours: ‘Liberty and justice for all.’” She continued:
What the people who taught us that…are most afraid of is that sooner or later we
will see through all those fine words about the American Dream, about the classless
society where all of us are equal. And that’s exactly what’s happening now…And the
truth we’re seeing is that they’ve been running a game on us for better than 200
years. It’s a game that talks a good line about justice and equality, about a democracy
where anyone can make it, but somehow only a few ever do…it’s a game that
encourages the few of us who do manage to “make it” to think we did because
somehow we’re different…The whole point of the game is to keep us divided
against each other…from acting together, in our collective self-interest…It’s a game
that tries to keep us in line when we start [protesting] like we’re doing now—by
telling us to calm down, back off, be reasonable, and give the system a chance to
was not new in Milwaukee, as this dissertation attests.
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work…And above all it’s a game where the ultimate weapon is the constant threat—
and the periodic use of—police terror.215
Indeed, for McManus, Milwaukee’s policing system relied on racial and class repression
operating in tandem. Economic inequality was a fault line that divided metropolitan residents, white,
Black, and Brown. It was evident during the boycotts and also reflected in deteriorating economic
conditions for poor and working-class people in the early 1980s. “As the economy gets worse and
worse, the ‘problem’ will affect more and more of us every day.” McManus ended her speech by
affirming the class implications of Lacy’s death and the victims of police terror who came before.
Their deaths symbolized “the injustice and the inhumanity of [the capitalist] system’s game.” Police
brutality stemmed from a white-controlled power structure that relegated Milwaukee’s working poor
to hyper-segregated, under-resourced neighborhoods. The central city not only lacked the jobs and
investment people needed to survive, but was becoming a breeding ground for Milwaukee’s nascent,
highly racialized carceral regime. Wisconsin’s developing system of mass incarceration was lubricated
by aggressive police contacts with poor and working-class citizens of color. Sometimes, as was the
case for Ernest Lacy, these encounters resulted in death.
The CJEL was focused on “Lacy’s death, the implicated officers, and showing massive public
support around that.”216 McManus herself deemed it “tactically unwise” to expand the coalition’s
demands or scope of its moral argument beyond that goal. She believed the time would come for
addressing the larger socio-political and economic ills that disproportionately affected Black and
Brown residents, as soon as the courts resolved the “immediate issue of [the officers’] prosecution.”
However, one of McManus’ critiques of the CJEL was that its leaders, though “strong,” allowed the
issue of police brutality to be framed as “a black one” alone.217 “It is to the advantage of a capitalist
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system to allow and encourage the misperception that police brutality is an issue of discrimination
rather than a class issue,” she wrote. McManus regretted that the coalition had not built multiracial
working-class solidarity around the issue of police violence, particularly following the October 1981
beating of James Schoemperlen—a white male severely brutalized by police after being arrested for
an alleged indecent exposure incident and high speed chase on the south side.218 She also noted that
the coalition could have better leveraged traditional “splits” between the MPA and other “labor
councils,” or even between the fire and police unions. The relationship between “police repression”
and the “crisis of capitalism” undermined “real democratization” and “accountability of police.” A
“united,” “common analysis and direction” was sorely needed.219 In keeping “the accountability
question muddy,” city officials deflected from the truism that “the current role of the police is
essential to the existence of capitalism.” This was “not a local problem,” but “a national one,”
“directly related to changes in economic conditions.”
McManus agreed with other CJEL members that Milwaukee’s policing crisis went beyond
individual bad actors and a malignant chief administrator. She articulated three “fundamental
problems.” The MPD was “particularly brutal to minorities,” it was “not effective in preventing
crime,” and it functioned in “a totally closed system.”220 However, for too long police accountability
advocates had framed racialized police violence as “‘simply’ racism, rather than racism for a reason.”

Schoemperlen filed a civil suit and eventually received a $500,000 settlement. Walter Fee, “Judge Orders Probe of
Alleged Beating,” The Milwaukee Journal, October 14, 1981, Part 1, 1; John Fauber, “Beating Recounted by
Schoemperlen,” The Milwaukee Sentinel, March 31, 1983, Part 1, 5.
219 Despite a widespread “anti-police” “mood” in the early 1980s, McManus conceded it was difficult to mobilize people
without a “specific brutality case to organize around.” Struggles “ebbed and flowed,” and the work had to continue
during down periods. During a “lull,” as the Lacy case moved through the MFPC’s quasi-judicial system and the courts,
she and others worked on developing a tactical response when the issue “moved again,” so that the coalition could “act
as a network” and “move respective constituencies along in concert [sic].” This required clear communication among
member groups so that people knew where they were “likely to be going on [the] issue.” Another ongoing task was to
encourage and include “emerging leaders,” “systematically raising the class issue.” CJEL leaders wanted to build a “black
political machine,” but what did that mean from a perspective of working-class, multiracial solidarity. McManus,
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They rendered arguments about brutal and inept officers and criticized the police chief as “too oldfashioned to use modern or community-based crime prevention methods.” But Breier’s “total
control” was not at the root of the problem, she argued. Ousting the chief and integrating the
Tactical Enforcement Unit would not resolve an essential flaw embedded in law enforcement’s
mission: a design to suppress poor people, especially criminalized groups of color. McManus
believed that a grassroots approach was necessary that could move people “beyond the ideas that
integration of the department, better policy guidelines, a new chief ” would alter “the basic role of
the police.” This was critical to “our work in the neighborhoods and in unions.”221 She was not alone
in connecting police violence, racism, poor and working-class suppression, and the urgent need for
cross-racial solidarity. The Communist Party of Wisconsin, another coalition member, demanded
multi-racial working-class unity to bring justice to police brutality victims and to defeat police
policies “imbedded in racism.”222 “As economic conditions worsen—problems of police brutality
and harassment will increase,” Party Chairman Fred Blair wrote to Milwaukee officials. The MPD’s
“repressive and brutal policies” extended to both white blue-collar workers and white-collar
professionals, including Sugar Dee Tates—an adult dancer shot and killed by Milwaukee police after
fleeing a road block in November 1981—and James Schoemperlen.223 “White people in our
community place their own well-being in jeopardy,” Blair insisted, “when they remain silent in the
face of injustice to minorities.”224 Long-standing narratives about race, crime, and policing in
According to McManus, the police system was dependent on misperception, “clouding” the real issue. Only multiracial working-class solidarity was the answer to Milwaukee’s policing crisis; that solidarity had to extend “beyond the
white left.” Another “misperception” was that “crime prevention” was “the job of the police.” Their responsibility was
ultimately class and, thus, racial suppression. “Democratizing” the MPD’s “closed system” had to occur alongside
structural changes to the police bureaucracy. The existing system’s “closed nature” is central to its “survival.” McManus,
“Summary of Party Work/Lessons of Police Issue in Milwaukee, 2-3.”
222 Fred Blair cited policies that “allow police to terrorize the community, with liberties to stop and search citizens under
any pretense; enter any home; make any comment no matter how offensive…the freedom to commit any act in the
community up to and including taking innocent lives, with no fear of penalty.” Fred B. Blair, “An Open Letter to
Elected Public Officials, August 24, 1981, Box 19, Folder 3, “Milwaukee Police Department, 1978-1981,” National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Milwaukee Branch Records.
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Milwaukee directly undermined cross-racial working-class solidarity and helped perpetuate racialized,
unstable myths about crime and safety in the city.225
The Milwaukee Fire and Police Commission Hearing and Federal Civil Rights Lawsuit
About seven hundred people marched down Wisconsin Ave. to rally at Civic Center Plaza
on July 10, 1982 to commemorate the one-year anniversary of Ernest Lacy’s death. Responding to
the smaller turnout than previous demonstrations, organizers cited community frustration with the
drawn out criminal-legal process in the case. By this point, the courts had dropped all criminal
charges against the arresting officers. Michael McGee also noted the threat of police intimidation.226
Once again, Chief Breier responded to protesters by making sure his presence and that of his riotready department was felt. The demonstration’s theme was calling for the dismissal of the officers
who arrested Ernest Lacy and failed to provide him medical attention. The MFPC had finally
scheduled a hearing on Myrtle Lacy’s police misconduct complaint. “We are still, one year later,
demanding justice,” Howard Fuller told the crowd.227 “Finally they’re doing something,” Myrtle Lacy
observed.228
The MFPC hearing did not start for another month. MPA attorneys forced a delay through

For example, as McManus argues, Mayor Maier and Chief Breier perpetrated a myth—that they ““saved” the good
people of Milwaukee from being harmed by the bad people” during the 1967 civil disturbance. An extended police
occupation of Black “Inner Core” neighborhoods—well after the MPD and Wisconsin National Guard had tempered a
minor uprising—left “the clear impression that the entire city continued to face grave danger at the hands of the
northside black community.” Chief Breier’s leadership was premised on the false dichotomy that “there are the ‘good
people’—your hardworking, law-abiding white worker and the ‘bad people’—shiftless criminals who are blacks and
radicals.” This “effectively prevented any unity among the diverse elements of Milwaukee’s working class.” Breier
willfully “set himself up as a lightning rod” and “forced a polarization that invariably broke down on neighborhood and
racial lines.” When the economic recession of the 1970s began eroding both Maier and Breier’s primary base of support,
the combination of plant closures, job losses, diminishing federal aid, and increasing taxes combined with worsening
police-community relations to create a serious public image problem for Milwaukee and the MPD. Negative media
coverage gave rise to “growing dissatisfaction on the part of downtown investors,” whose political support was vital to
the Maier regime. Opposition to Breier’s “oppressive rule” grew more broad-based and better organized, including
Latinx, women’s, and largely white neighborhood groups. McManus, “Summary of Party Work/Lessons of Police Issue
in Milwaukee.”
226 “March, Vigil Recall Lacy’s Death,” The Milwaukee Journal, July 10, 1982, Part 1, 3.
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the Circuit Court.229 When it began, the commission notified all five officers—Eliopul, Dekker, Kalt,
Enters, and Kmichik—that they were being charged with failing to render first aid. The three
arresting officers faced charges of using excessive force.230 The hearing was held in the police
administration building—hardly neutral territory. Michael McGee cited an “intimidating”
atmosphere.231 On the contrary, MPA officials complained about Commissioner William Gore
barring off-duty officers from carrying their service weapons into the courtroom. Over the course of
three months, the MFPC heard from attorneys, the accused officers, police co-workers, Lacy friends
and family, and additional witnesses. As the hearing proceeded, State Representative Spencer Coggs
(D-Milwaukee) worked to muster support for a bill in the Wisconsin legislature that would make it
illegal for the police to use excessive force while making an arrest, or to allow other officers to abuse
a person in custody.232 The measure also rendered it a criminal offense if police failed to administer
first aid to persons in their custody who required medical attention. Coggs specifically introduced
the bill in response to the Lacy killing and Schoemperlen beating. While the measure was tabled in
April 1983 (56-41 vote), the freshman assemblyman successfully attached a compromise version that
included only the first aid provision in the legislature’s budget bill.233 Democratic Governor Tony
Earl signed it, making the “Lacy Law” official in July 1983.234
On May 20, 1983, the MFPC announced a verdict in its disciplinary hearing, finding only
Thomas Eliopul guilty of using excessive force. All the commission ruled all five officers, however,

“Judges Clear Way for Lacy Hearing,” The Milwaukee Journal, January 27, 1983, Part 2, 10.
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guilty of “failure to give aid.”235 Nearly another month went by before the MFPC provided
disciplinary terms. Not firing the officers, Myrtle Lacy said at a final hearing, “would be the worst
miscarriage of justice since Reconstruction.”236 If a touch hyperbolic, Lacy’s comment signified the
depths of her family’s pain and the profound mistrust they felt towards a criminal-legal process that
once began hopeful and had gradually devolved into a prolonged spectacle of injustice. MPA
attorney Gerald Boyle countered Mrs. Lacy by arguing his clients did their jobs properly— “If you
don’t want anarchy, you better have good police officers, and a good police department, which I
think we have.”237 In the end, only Eliopul was terminated for “using excessive force”—a first for
the city and MFPC on a complaint of racialized police violence. Myrtle Lacy called the decision “a
measure of justice.”238 The other four officers received sixty day suspensions.239 The commission
also removed Dekker and Kalt from the Tactical Enforcement Unit. The MPA, naturally, appealed
the ruling to the Circuit Court, only to lose their case a year-and-a-half later in a final victory for the
Lacy family. With the disciplinary process behind her, Myrtle Lacy filed a federal civil rights lawsuit
against the City of Milwaukee, Chief Breier, and the five officers involved in her son’s death. The
case was eventually settled for $600,000 in the fall of 1985, on the same day that jury selection in the
federal trial was set to begin.240 It was the third major settlement City Hall made in resolving an
alleged civil rights violation in an eighteen-month span, including a $1,600,000 payout to the family
of Daniel Bell. The City Attorney’s office insisted the Lacy settlement did not indicate an admission
In a final victory for the family, Judge Ralph Adam Fine upheld the MFPC’s dismissal of Eliopul and suspensions of
Dekker, Kalt, Kmichik, and Enters in December 1985. It was not “in the public interest to paralyze police officer action
by second-guessing decisions made in the field in good faith under hazardous conditions,” the judge stated.” However,
the public must be protected from those few officers who abuse their authority.” Dave Hendrickson, “Officers in Lacy
Case Lose Appeal,” The Milwaukee Journal, December 2, 1985, Part 1, 1, 12.
236 “Officers, Lacy Family Plead Cases,” The Milwaukee Journal, June 14, 1983, Part 2, 17.
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240 The Lacy family’s attorneys received $150,000 of the settlement. Walter Fee and Mark Ward, “Lacy Suit Settled for
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of guilt. It was merely a less expensive means of ending “an emotional case.”241

The “Breier Bill” and the End of Reactionary Law-and-Order in Milwaukee
The Coalition for Justice for Ernest Lacy’s efforts to garner police accountability occurred at
the tail end of a roughly ten-year process of recalibrating the administrative terms of police power in
Milwaukee. Citizens, the courts, federal agencies, state and municipal legislatures all contributed to a
complex process of shifting law enforcement power from the police chief to the MFPC and elected
officials. In 1984, this transition manifested in Senate Bill 56 (SB56), or what local newspapers
dubbed, the “Breier Bill.” SB56 was a revision to the 1911 policing statute that bestowed politically
independent, lifetime authority on Milwaukee police chiefs.242 Since 1964, at the outset of his tenure,
Harold Breier relished in having the power to write, revise, and interpret all police rules and
regulations for the MPD.243 SB56 ensured that those powers and privileges belonged to the MFPC.
An overarching purpose of this dissertation has been to explain the wider trajectory of this
shift in police authority, highlighting the central role that Black citizens, community activists, and
civil rights organizations have played in bringing it to pass. The CJEL’s campaign for police
accountability—combined with a reopened Bell case and the legal activism of Black police
officers—added to a chain of events that ended what had long been the core element of
Milwaukee’s narrative of policing exceptionalism: the seemingly untouchable state power invested in
police administrators. This confluence of forces, which sprang from the people, not only compelled
Chief Breier to retire in 1984 at the age of seventy-two, but established a new playing field for police
accountability advocates eager to guarantee a more racially just and humane policing system.244
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The first noticeable chinks in Harold Breier’s armor appeared in 1977, when, at a public
hearing, State representative Edward McClain (Wausau-D) requested a copy of the MPD’s “General
Rules and Regulations.”245 Breier declined to provide the manual. Two circuit court judges
subsequently ruled it was a “public record” and admissible for review. Legislators then passed a bill
authorizing the MFPC to annually inspect all police rules and regulations. While Breier remained
empowered to write and implement rules, the commission could now apply a “civilian review of
police conduct and efficiency.”246 Around this time, Milwaukee state representatives Warren Braun
and Marcia Coggs authored separate measures that limited the terms of police and fire chiefs to ten
years or less, with the Common Council authorized to set tenure limits.247 A compromise version of
the bills passed and the Milwaukee Common Council decided on seven-year terms for police and
fire chiefs, with expiration dates in off-election years.248 However, the new law featured an important
caveat: the current chiefs’ tenures would remain indefinite.249
Liberal police bureaucrats and the press sensed a new era of accountability. After the bill
passed, a headline in The Milwaukee Courier read: “FPC Finally on Side of Citizens.”250 The MFPC’s
only Black member, William Gore, called the 1977 law “long overdue.” The commission, under
Gore’s leadership, began flexing its state-sanctioned powers. It formed a Rules and Complaints
Committee. For the first time ever, the MFPC suspended hundreds of police regulations.251

This particular set of rules originated in 1950 and were last updated in 1968. Daniel P. Hanley, Jr., “Legislature,
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249 Breier remained politically powerful. Reaching a deal on the legislation meant leaving his personal length of tenure
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weapons at home when they drank in bars, so as to prevent violent incidents. It was previously required that all off duty
police carry their service weapons at all times. “Ban on Off-Duty Police Guns While Drinking Sought,” The Milwaukee
Courier, August 9, 1980, 1; David M. Novick, “Breier’s Iron Fist Opened Slightly,” The Milwaukee Courier, September 30,
245

447

Chairman Gore specifically looked to address the MPD’s use of deadly force regulations (or lack
thereof). Police rules, many believed, granted police officers too much discretion. The commission
wanted to establish a mechanism for conducting external audits of Special Assignment Squad
dossiers. Doing so, Commissioner Gore added, would “keep people from having their rights
violated by the police.”252 Civil rights activists then sued the MPD to release secret dossiers on their
actions.253 Two Black aldermen voiced their opposition to funding “all-white” Tactical and Special
Assignment Squads and called for a public budget hearing.254 The MFPC also addressed Breier’s
strict internal regulations. For example, they reinstated a mixed-race police couple he had fired for
violating a policy on unmarried “cohabitation.” Gore was careful not to make it appear as if the
MFPC wanted to take over all police operations. Their objective was to “write rules where there is a
void, where we suspended something and the police chief doesn’t come up with a new rule. That’s
more limited than writing whatever we want to.”255 Nevertheless, sorting out police power remained
complicated, as Chief Breier refused to recognize the MFPC’s new rule-making authority.
Grassroots efforts to revise police rule-making and oversight converged with related
campaigns to remove Breier from office. A number of member organizations in the CJEL spent the
better part of the 1970s trying to implement community control of the police, pushing for state
legislation that would redefine the terms of police power, and attempting to “oust” Breier from his
elevated perch. Black and allied accountability advocates began a petition to remove him from office
in November 1979.256 Their goal was to reach 50,000 signatures by the 1980 primary election.257
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Activists were prepared to sue if city officials balked at the petition. The ad hoc Committee for
Democratic Police said it would use the petition to spell-out a revised strategy for hiring a
replacement chief. The petition called for an end to Detective Bureau and Special Assignment Squad
spying on activists; compliance with MFPC review protocols; cooperation with the Common
Council on budget review processes; an immediate end to police targeting of racial minorities; and
an expanded affirmative action policy for police hiring. The UBCC’s Michael McGee argued that
Breier engaged in “malfeasance of office” when he refused to cooperate with the DOJ’s 1979
investigation into police shooting deaths. “It is not only the minority community that is oppressed,”
he stated, “but a wide cross section of the community is upset.”258
The MPD, on the other hand, framed the petition as a direct threat to Breier.259 The chief
had officers investigate the petition campaign. But the support Breier had long received, almost
reflexively from city officials, was starting to wane. Mayor Maier wrote to the MFPC that Breier
might no longer be up to the task of developing a modern police force.260 The chief’s replacement
would, the mayor said, have to deal effectively with affirmative action mandates, work with
neighborhood association block clubs on community-oriented policing, and be skilled at navigating
police labor relations. Momentum was shifting among the people too. A public opinion survey
found that fifty-four percent of residents were now dissatisfied with Chief Breier’s performance.261
Participating members of the renamed Coalition to Oust Breier (COB) comprised the
backbone of the CJEL in 1981.262 The group was “more than just ‘militants and radicals,’” Michael

than 38,000 signatures. “Common Council Members Urged to Act against Breier; Public Hearing Set,” The Milwaukee
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McGee remarked. It included the UBCC, Milwaukee Women’s Coalition, United Worker’s
Organization, Committee for a Democratic Police, Gay Peoples Union, Project Respect, and
Progressive Student Forums of the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee and Marquette University.263
The COB fought to include a ballot referendum on the chief’s resignation in November.264 Among
its motivations were Breier’s refusal to allow for community input on policing issues, his tolerance
for police abuse of African Americans, Latinx residents, and Native Americans, and “his callous
disregard for the safety of women in the city.”265 Spokesman John Hagedorn called the petition “the
only option we have” considering the high level of opposition to passing a state law that would
compel police chiefs to retire at age seventy.266 The COB quickly surpassed 30,000 signatures, with
organizers collecting names at public events, like the annual Summerfest concerts. Still, they missed
the 50,000 signature mark. The Common Council voted down the referendum, 11-5.
Although Breier remained in power, the COB contributed to “a growing atmosphere” of
pressure for the state legislature to “change the 1911 law” empowering Milwaukee police chiefs for
life.267 Senate Bill 56—“relating to the powers of the Milwaukee Fire and Police Commission”—
passed the Wisconsin Assembly’s criminal justice committee on February 3, 1984.268 The measure,
according to the Greater Milwaukee Conference on Religion and Urban Affairs, compelled police
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administrators to “conform to basic standards of good public administration.”269 Governor Tony
Earl signed the bill into law in March.270 The measure signaled the end of city officials claiming they
had no authority to hold police accountable. The statute better explained the intent of the 1977 law
that revised Ch. 586 by granting the MFPC the “authority to make and revise department rules” and
review policies that regulated police operations.271 Milwaukee police chiefs reported to the MFPC,
and the MFPC to the Mayor and Common Council. The police chief was in charge of running their
department, but with enhanced political oversight. The new law also delineated that the mayor and
Common Council were in charge of the police budget, which had reached $97 million by 1984.
Frustrated by a changing public safety landscape, Harold Breier announced his retirement
from the MPD on May 1, 1984.272 “The special interest groups and the leftists” won this time, he
said in a press conference. But he denied that police accountability activists alone had influenced his
decision: “There wasn’t any one thing that made me retire…This is the time when the department is
at the top…There’s going to be changes—changes which I will have no part of…In my opinion,
[politicizing the police department] is a terrible mistake. We’re going back to the days of 1911.” 273
Breier’s retirement spelled the end of unrestrained reactionary law-and-order as a strategic approach.
Subsequent MPD chiefs came to embrace “community-oriented policing” as a crime prevention
strategy and utilized more proactive enforcement tactics. But they also continued to apply aggressive
discretionary practices in low-income Black and Brown “high crime” areas. It took time to supplant
the generation of officers trained under Breier’s “us-versus-them” mentality. As of 1991, three out
of four had served under him.274 Harold Breier’s legacy remained powerful.
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Conclusion
For decades, police accountability advocates had demanded increased Black representation,
community input, and civilian oversight within Milwaukee’s police bureaucracy. The revived Daniel
Bell case, the CJEL’s movement, and a related campaign to oust Chief Breier from office brought
them closer than ever to those long-standing demands. For the first time in the city’s history, a lethal
act of police violence committed against a Black citizen led to a guilty inquest jury verdict and the
firing of the officer responsible. Coupled with the revision of the 1911 statute that authorized public
safety chiefs with policymaking authority and the settlement of a lawsuit filed by Black officers to
establish a more equitable hiring, assignment, and promotions process, the mid-1980s marked an
apparent turning point in Milwaukee’s struggle for police accountability.
Senate Bill 56 redirected policymaking authority away from the police chief and located it
with a, theoretically, more accountable, mayor-appointed public safety board. The MFPC was, many
believed, better equipped to take on the city’s civilian complaint review function. For instance, it
could now improve police rules for conducting independent internal investigations on public
complaints against allegedly abusive officers. The law also delivered a blow to the long-standing
narrative of policing exceptionalism that, for a century, had bolstered the MPD’s outward sense of
legitimacy. That persuasive story of crime control efficiency, reform innovation, and professionalism
was rooted in a virtually all-white, politically-independent police force that drew strength from
exploiting Black peoples’ economic precarity and ongoing criminalization. The revised statute
suggested a more racial- and gender-inclusive narrative was in the offing.
At the same time, policing remained the most viable method for answering urban problems
rooted in economic racism, Black joblessness and poverty. Shifting police power from one agency to
another did not address the structural issues that engendered crime on Milwaukee’s north side and,

452

thus, communal demands for preventative law enforcement. The CJEL did not focus on the
economic underpinnings of racialized police violence. Instead, the group narrowly focused on
securing justice for Ernest Lacy’s family. That kept the public’s attention on issues of police brutality
and racism’s harmful impact on Black lives. The coalition’s strategy worked in terms of garnering
officer discipline, a monetary sum for the family, and a procedural change to how police responded
to arrestees in need of medical attention.
But it avoided a more far-reaching analysis of the economic conditions and racial politics
that justified “get tough” policing and punishment in America’s Black urban spaces.275 CJEL
members were sure to find themselves in the streets once again challenging police racism and
violence as future incidents occurred in Milwaukee’s hyper-segregated streets. Like most police
accountability coalitions that preceded them, the CJEL did not question the legitimacy of law
enforcement as a public good. This limited more far-reaching solutions within the collective
movement. Imagining a world without police was not only unthinkable, it was undesirable; most
Black citizens longed for equitable police protection for their families, communities, and property.276
As such, police accountability advocates tended to frame demands for police reform in procedural
terms that continued to validate the MPD’s crime control and order maintenance functions.277
Nevertheless, that Howard Fuller and Michael McGee kept such a large, ideologically diverse
coalition grounded, so as to achieve a common goal, is commendable. Myrtle Lacy, too, provided

On “get tough” politics, see: Julily Kohler-Hausmann, Getting Tough: Welfare and Imprisonment in 1970s America
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017).
276 On Black demands for more and fair policing, see: Michael Javen Fortner, Black Silent Majority: The Rockefeller Drug
Laws and the Politics of Punishment (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015); James Forman, Locking Up Our Own:
Crime and Punishment in Black America (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2017).
277 Demands included the punishment of abusive officers; the revision of police oversight structures so that all residents
could access formal complaint reviews; the expansion of minority representation so as to effect more culturally
responsive policing; and ensuring that citizens of color gained a meaningful voice in law enforcement rule-making.
Victories were rare, mostly because the city’s white power structure was unwilling to share authority, despite often
drawing mutual interest from both aggrieved Black citizens and liberal power brokers. Milwaukee’s shifting racial politics
moved slowly, despite a growing Black and Latinx population.
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inspirational and consistent leadership as a proud Black woman willing to lay her own vulnerabilities
on the line after experiencing the heartbreaking loss of a son. This provided a model that Maria
Hamilton, Sonia Moore, and other Black mothers have followed amid subsequent campaigns for
justice and procedural reform after losing children to police violence.278 Black women like Lacy,
indeed, often served as both the organizational backbone, “bridge” and front-facing leadership of
grassroots campaigns for police accountability, much as they did in ancillary civil rights struggles.279
Whether the reforms garnered by the Lacy coalition translated into fairer, more culturally
responsive and just policing on the north side was mitigated by contextual factors. The movement
cohered at a historical juncture when the economic bottom was falling out from under Black
Milwaukee. Rising poverty, drug addiction, youth gang formation, and surging joblessness; a
shrinking social safety net; and diminishing political support for rehabilitative measures ensured that
both crime and police brutality would go on unless sweeping structural changes were advanced.
Combined with the Reagan administration’s budget austerity and retributive federal criminal justice
policies, a more robust policing presence saturated Black Milwaukee neighborhoods and racially
transitioning urban communities, leading to fresh conflicts and lethal encounters.

Sonia Moore was the mother of Derek Williams, who was killed in police custody in 2011. Marti Mikkelson and
Associated Press, “City of Milwaukee Reaches Tentative Settlement with Derek Williams’ Family,” WUWM, May 7,
2019, accessed May 7, 2019, https://www.wuwm.com/post/city-milwaukee-reaches-tentative-settlement-derek-williamsfamily. Maria Hamilton, mother of Dontre Hamilton (killed by a Milwaukee police officer in 2014) founded the
organization Mothers for Justice United and led the 2015 Mothers March in Washington D.C., which challenged
racialized state violence and called for institutional accountability from the U.S. Justice Department. Ashley Luthern,
“For Memory of Sons, Maria Hamilton Plans Mother’s March on D.C.,” The Milwaukee Journal-Sentinel, March 28, 2015,
accessed May 22, 2020, http://archive.jsonline.com/news/milwaukee/for-memory-of-sons-maria-hamilton-plansmothers-march-on-dc-b99469703z1-297847921.html/.
279 On “bridge” leadership, see: Belinda Robnett, How Long? How Long?: African-American Women in the Struggle for Civil
Rights (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997). On Black women in the Black Freedom Struggle, see: Barbara
Ransby, Ella Baker and the Black Freedom Movement: A Radical Democratic Vision (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 2003); Peter B. Levy, Civil War on Race Street: The Civil Rights Movement in Cambridge, Maryland (Gainesville:
University Press of Florida, 2003); Peter J. Ling, Peter John Ling, Sharon Monteith, Gender and the Civil Rights Movement
(Newark: Rutgers University Press, 2004).
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EPILOGUE
From the hiring of the Milwaukee Police Department’s (MPD) first Black patrolman in 1924
through the passage of a state law that reset the administrative terms of police power in 1984,
Milwaukee’s Black-led struggle for police accountability stayed broadly reformist in nature. Altering
the dominant law enforcement system so that it better served and worked more effectively for
minoritized citizens was its main objective.1 As such, the goal was not to fundamentally transform
how the city imagined and advanced public safety and the distribution of resources, free of all racial,
class, gender, and sex coercion, surveillance, and violence. Instead, the movement’s reformist agenda
upheld the common assumption that “policing,” as a concept, keeps people safe. Accountability,
access, and transparency were necessary, but law enforcement also had important crime control and
order maintenance functions to sustain. Otherwise, society would devolve into chaos and harms
against law-abiding citizens would proliferate.
A diverse, mostly middle-class-led police accountability movement coalesced in mid- to late20th century Milwaukee. Mobilizations and organizing often followed racialized police killings and
moments where the MPD had failed to abide by either racial liberal or progressive-left expectations.
The movement placed its faith in changing a state criminal-legal apparatus and municipal police
bureaucracy that had always defended white supremacy, property rights, hetero-patriarchy, and the
traditional civic order at the expense of a growing poor, low-income and working-class minoritized
population. Most community organizations and political allies collaborating in the city’s struggle for
police accountability pursued an updated “liberal law-and-order” vision that embraced diversity,
human relations training, community-oriented policing, and civilian review of police actions.2 While

“Effectively,” in this context, means that Milwaukee police equally respected the needs and rights of economically
upright, middle, working, and professional-class non-white citizens. BIPOC youth and the poor largely stood on the
outside looking in, as they negotiated the city’s revised liberal law-and-order system of the late-20th century.
2 On post-1960s liberal law-and-order policing, see: Max Felker-Kantor, Policing Los Angeles: Race, Resistance, and the Rise of
the LAPD (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2018).
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liberal law-and-order incorporated democratic principles, it also grew police power. The approach,
as historian Max Felker-Kantor has argued, “combined a commitment to police accountability while
enabling the expansion of [law enforcement’s] crime-fighting role.”3 Liberal law-and-order operated
according to the postwar “harm principle” that the aggressive policing of crime that threatened lives
and property was justified. After the 1960s, the theory integrated the more conservative idea that
offenders, chiefly the Black urban poor, deserved harsh punishments.4 Rehabilitation, anti-poverty
resources, and second chances only indulged, what came to be known as, “rational” crime actors. 5
That said, some within Milwaukee’s Black-led struggle for police accountability, including the
city’s first iteration of its short-lived Black Panther Party chapter, recognized the uneven power
dynamics at play. They made connections between law enforcement and the exploitative racial
capitalist arrangements that preserved Milwaukee’s color line. While unchecked police repression
and a complicit criminal-legal system curtailed Black Power’s ideological potency within the city’s
police accountability movement, articulations of community control of the police and selfdetermined visions of public safety at the neighborhood level signified a progressive undercurrent
that still flows beneath the city’s conventional political waters. Present demands to defund the MPD
and invest taxpayer resources into BIPOC (Black, Indigenous, People of Color) community health
and housing initiatives are a legacy of this grassroots, progressive-left thread. Such radical visions
persist despite PIC (Prison Industrial Complex) abolitionism’s subordinated place within an overall
accountability struggle more content to co-opt Black radical perspectives than center them outright.6

Max Felker-Kantor, “Liberal Law-and-Order: The Politics of Police Reform in Los Angeles.” Journal of Urban History
46 (5) (September 2020), 3.
4 On the “harm principle,” see: Christopher Lowen Agee, The Streets of San Francisco: Policing and the Creation of a
Cosmopolitan Liberal Politics, 1950-1972 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014).
5 Sharon Dolovich, “Exclusion and Control in the Carceral State,” Berkeley Journal of Criminal Law 16 (2) (Fall 2011), 290.
6 As scholar Miriame Kaba writes, PIC abolition is not only an effort to rid the world of policing, prisons, and
surveillance systems. It is also “a political vision, a structural analysis of oppression, and a practical organizing strategy.”
Hence, abolition is a worldview, a way of being in a restructured society. Miriame Kaba, “So You’re Thinking about
Becoming an Abolitionist,” Democracy for the People, LEVEL, October 30, 2020, accessed October 31, 2020,
https://level.medium.com/so-youre-thinking-about-becoming-an-abolitionist-a436f8e31894.
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This epilogue interrogates why reformism has predominated in Milwaukee, and by extension
the U.S. To do so, it touches on intersections of police accountability activism, social scientific crime
control discourses, and the carceral political turn that exemplified policymaking around public safety
issues in the “long 1970s.”7 This historical moment matters, in part because BIPOC leaders in
2020—amid endemic police violence and a volatile COVID-19 pandemic—are reckoning with the
racist criminal punishment system that came to fruition in this under-studied period. After decades
of attempting to reform Milwaukee’s police bureaucracy, a transformed movement is demanding
and experimenting with abolitionist solutions. Defunding the police and removing law enforcement
from public spaces intended to generate learning, promote health, and build community are steps
that build towards what Angela Davis has called “abolition democracy.”8 These actions defy the
limited reformist solutions of the past in Milwaukee, like the 1984 “Breier Bill,” or Senate Bill 56
(SB56). While that measure shifted police policymaking authority to a more representative, mayorappointed civilian review commission, it also maintained the police department’s state-sanctioned
legitimacy, refashioned the MPD’s impunity, and ensured an expanded police budget that drew
funding away from urgently needed social and economic programs that would have better fostered
health, wellness, and employment for African Americans and other minoritized groups.9
On the emerging “crime problem,” see: Stuart Hall, Chas Critcher, Tony Jefferson, John Clarke, and Brian Roberts.
Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State, and Law and Order (London: The Macmillan Press LTD, 1978),
23. As the authors note, “The crime problem referred to here is not the problem of ‘white-collar’ frauds and tax evasion,
nor even the problem of professional organised crime, and the legendary Mafia. What crime ‘means’, in these reports, is
something completely different: the sudden attack, the brutal assault, the brazen threat; the ‘amateur’, uncouth and
arrogant ‘face-to-face’ street and apartment encounters with young blacks/drugtakers desperate either for cash or a quick
fix…” On the “long 1970s,” see: Bruce J. Schulman, The Seventies: The Great Shift in American Culture, Society, and Politics
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 2001), 4.
8 Invoking W. E. B. Dubois’ framing of what was required of U.S. institutions to incorporate newly freed Black people
into the national order during Reconstruction, Davis has called for the “creation of an array of social institutions that
would begin to solve the social problems that set people on the track to prison.” Police racism is among the most visible
of social problems. Angela Y. Davis and Eduardo Mendieta, Abolition Democracy: Beyond Empires, Prisons, and Torture;
Interviews with Angela Y. Davis (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2005), 95.
9 The 1984 “Breier Bill,” or Senate Bill 56, tangibly shifted the terms of police power in Milwaukee. It enabled the
MFPC—which had slowly become more representative of Milwaukee’s population—to set all public safety regulations
for the city. In addition to vesting the nation’s oldest civilian-led fire and police review board with policymaking
authority, the 1984 law granted Milwaukee mayors veto power over rule changes and gave the Common Council the
right to suspend policies. SB56 also empowered City Hall with the ability to appropriate funds for special law
7
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Squaring Police Accountability and Crime Control in the Long 1970s
Archival evidence suggests that police accountability advocates in Milwaukee during the long
1970s tended to conceive of public safety through a moderate political lens that framed law
enforcement as institutionally vital to addressing urban ills—from crime, to poverty, to joblessness,
to mental health crises. The most pressing problems for police reform advocates were the MPD’s
outmoded leadership and racially oppressive function. They were frustrated by Chief Breier’s
rejection of community-oriented policing concepts, which he viewed as a threat to his autonomy. To
most reformers, the MPD required liberalization, oversight, and a renewed commitment to working
with diverse public and private community partners—organizations, non-profits, and commercial
enterprises. Implementing such changes would lead to a more useful, less racist law enforcement
system. Movement actors championed integration and promoted a return to the renowned era of
policing exceptionalism that prevailed in the 1930s and 1940s, before postwar Black migration, white
racism, and civil rights insurgency re-shaped the MPD as a reactionary law-and-order regime.
Perfecting law enforcement liberalism via technocratic adjustments, expanded diversity, and
enhanced oversight would, in theory, result in fewer opportunities for racialized police violence to
occur. It would also impose tangible consequences when police abused their authority and help
guarantee a more orderly and productive city.
This liberal law-and-order framework called for regulating crime in a more culturally
responsive, competent, and procedurally just way. According to MPD crime reporting, law
violations disproportionately transpired on Milwaukee’s predominantly Black north side and in

enforcement projects and to determine the number of officers assigned to them. Such projects included a neighborhood
“foot patrol” pilot program, which drew heavy support from Milwaukee’s growing community association movement.
Paul Bargren, “Breier Bill: Control or Chaos?” The Milwaukee Journal, March 22, 1984, Part 2, 1; Gregory Stanford, “Bill
May End Police Tyranny,” The Milwaukee Journal, March 7, 1984, Part 2, 6.
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adjacent, racially-transitioning urban neighborhoods. While Black families historically felt
disrespected and threatened by the mostly white, hostile police force occupying their communities,
they also shared concerns about the MPD’s longstanding neglect in dealing with interpersonal crime.
The latter unduly harmed Black people living in the city’s most under-resourced and criminalized
areas. Flagging economic conditions and the federal government’s retreat from investing in liberal
social welfare programs and community action agencies throughout the long 1970s compounded
crime fears, generating broad public support for more efficient policing when, for instance, drug and
gang-related crime started to increase in the early 1980s.10 State budgets began to deliberately
prioritize the policing of criminalized urban spaces and building new prisons to warehouse freshly
convicted arrestees ahead of social welfare improvements and protections of the social wage.
In this revanchist context, easing public anxieties around crime grew as a concern for many
liberal police reform advocates. It became a more persuasive issue for middle-class community
organizations, some of whose members had joined campaigns for police accountability in the late
1960s and 1970s. Well-meaning liberal social reformers, in addition to conservative voices, filtered
rising crime fears through a fraught “colorblind” discourse that located Black behavioral failings and
cultural pathologies as principal causes of disorder. Demands for preventative policing strategies that
targeted the comportment of poor and low-income residents, especially youth of color, and focused
on mitigating racialized police violence merged as two sides of the same reform coin.
Reform legislation in this period took into account interrelated worries about policing and
crime. Transferring police power in Milwaukee via the 1984 Breier Bill was as much about ensuring
that the MPD effectively and responsibly addressed illicit behavior as it was about eradicating the
rampant, racialized police violence at the heart of the city’s police accountability movement. After

See: John M. Hagedorn, People and Folks: Gangs, Crime and the Underclass in a Rustbelt City (Chicago: Lake View Press,
1988).
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nearly two decades of pressuring city officials and filing federal civil rights claims and lawsuits to
limited avail, police accountability advocates anticipated that garnering a fairer, more reliable public
safety system was only possible through a state-level reform measure that relocated police policymaking authority from the MPD to the Milwaukee Fire and Police Commission (MFPC). Reform
groups lobbied the Wisconsin legislature to make this happen.11 Removing power from an autocratic
police chief in Harold Breier, many believed, would increase the likelihood of enacting the
procedural changes needed to prevent another tragic “Lacy-type incident.”12
After the Wisconsin legislature passed SB56, the MFPC had the power to determine who
was best suited to police and where; how MPD personnel should approach their jobs; and the type
of disciplinary actions officers should face if found to have engaged in misconduct. At best,
empowering the commission, accountability advocates hoped, would translate into more antidiscriminatory policing; enhance institutional oversight and transparency; and facilitate greater access
and opportunities for Black, Latinx, and women police personnel. On this liberal law-and-order
basis, communities would also be valued as contributing partners in Milwaukee’s evolving crime
control and order maintenance program. As Governor Tony Earl commented at the Breier Bill’s
signing ceremony, this law “simply restores the kind of accountability that any public official ought
to feel.”13 A Black Milwaukee senator, Gary George, likewise reassured his mostly African American
constituents that the reform statute guaranteed “citizen input into policy decisions.”14

The lobbying of police accountability advocates helped to get Senate Bill 56 passed. For example, the Greater
Milwaukee Conference on Religion and Urban Affairs formed a Criminal Justice Task Force in 1982. In Fall 1983, the
task force assisted community associations and faith congregations on the improvement of “police-community
relations,” “crime prevention,” and “police accountability.” Joan McManus served as the CJTF’s program manager.
Among other duties, she rallied support for the bill in Madison. Citywide Anti-Crime Coalition, “Accomplishments,”
Box 1, Folder 13, Citywide Anti-Crime Coalition, 1983-1985,” Joan McManus Papers, 1970-2003, UWM Manuscript
Collection 267, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Archives, Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
12 James Cameron, “An Open Letter to the Milwaukee Fire and Police Commission Regarding the Ernest Lacy
Complaint,” 12.
13 “Earl Signs Bill to Increase City’s Power over Breier,” The Milwaukee Journal, March 22, 1984, Part 2, 6.
14 “Earl Signs Bill to Increase City’s Power over Breier,” The Milwaukee Journal, March 22, 1984, Part 2, 6.
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Liberal police accountability advocates saw value in statutory police reform for good reason:
no institutional or political mechanisms existed at the municipal level to meaningfully check the
discriminatory actions of the MPD’s “chief for life” or the discretionary decisions of officers. 15 The
MFPC, established in 1885 as a civil service hiring board with quasi-judicial authority to discipline
public safety personnel, historically co-signed the police chief’s prerogatives and helped cool dissent
through a slow-moving bureaucracy. The commission served as a plumb patronage position that
conferred civic prestige. When it ruled on complaints filed against the MPD, the MFPC normally
aligned with other units of Milwaukee’s criminal-legal system, questioning the validity of Black
complaints in particular. The commission had no influence on crafting police rules and regulations
until 1978.16 As such, the potential for even tactical or procedural modifications was contingent on
the whims of a racist and reactionary police chief in Harold Breier. This dynamic began to shift after
Milwaukee’s 1967 “civil disturbance.” As the Wisconsin Advisory Committee to the U.S. Civil
Rights Commission reported in 1972, Chief Breier’s reactionary law-and-order approach eroded the
MPD’s national “image as a pioneer in progressive police measures.”17 Mayor Henry Maier began
appointing more diverse, reform-minded candidates to help improve the police image, meet federal
diversity requirements, and satisfy potential Black voters. The MFPC was still loyal to City Hall’s

Ronald H. Snyder, “Chief for Life: Harold Breier and His Era” (Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee,
2002).
16 While a 1978 law authorized the MFPC to review, suspend, and rewrite police policies it found “objectionable,”
Milwaukee police chiefs retained the power to make all department rules. They also controlled internal conduct reviews.
In 1978, a Milwaukee County Circuit Court judge ruled that the MFPC did not have the authority to initiate policies.
That changed with Senate Bill 56’s passage. “Commission Raps Police Regulations,” The Milwaukee Journal, July 7, 1978;
“Breier Rejects 14 Proposed Rule Changes,” The Milwaukee Journal, September 20, 1978, Part 1, 1, 10; Gregory Stanford,
“Bill May End Police Tyranny,” The Milwaukee Journal, March 7, 1984, Part 2, 6. Moreover, a 1977 state law had addressed
the tenure of future public safety chiefs in Wisconsin’s only “first class” city, imposing seven-year term limits on all new
appointees. However, the law did not apply to Harold Breier, as Milwaukee legislators were fearful of the political
repercussions. Chief Breier’s reactionary law-and-order approach to crime control extended well into the 1980s. “New
Chiefs on Good Terms,” The Milwaukee Journal, December 31, 1977, Part 1, 8. On Breier’s “gestapo tactics,” see: “What
Can We Expect from Passage of the Brier [sic] Bill?” The Milwaukee Courier, April 7, 1984, 4. A 1979 campaign to “oust”
Chief Breier from office gathered 32,000 signatures. The Common Council refused to put the measure on the ballot in
1980. “Chief ’s View on Black Crime Roils Milwaukee,” The New York Times, March 4, 1984, L24.
17 Wisconsin State Committee of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Police Isolation and Community Needs (Washington,
DC: Government Printing Office, 1972), 7.
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interests, but more willing to embrace contemporary police reforms that flouted the police chief’s
approach. Over time, this included measures like SB56.
And yet, as historian Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor has argued, “statutory changes alone are
rarely, if ever, enough to undo deeply ingrained cultural, social, economic, and political assumptions
that shape our society.”18 Writing in reference to federal housing policies, her assertion is no less
salient when it comes to reforming law enforcement. In fact, part of the problem for police
accountability advocates in Milwaukee was that the 1911 statute they looked to revise helped mold
and strengthen conventional interpretations of policing and race in the city. Deep-seated, mutually
reinforcing concepts of “police legitimacy” and “Black criminality” demarcated public contests
around police violence, crime control, order maintenance, and institutional reform.19 Naturally,
accountability advocates found it challenging to disentangle these co-existent ideas. The 1911 law
outlined the MPD’s legitimacy as it pertained to an overwhelmingly white ethnic populace. Under
the banner of reform, white social and corporate elites reconstructed municipal police power on
racial and class terms. In the process, they cloaked the MPD in an outwardly depoliticized and valueneutral cover. This fed the dominant narrative of policing exceptionalism that developed in the mid20th century. It fortified common understandings of police legitimacy and Black criminality. Vaunted
ideas around the police department’s independence, its openness to innovation, and the efficiency
with which it nobly controlled crime and prevented disorder—i.e. labor and racial unrest—
supported political decisions in City Hall, influenced outside perceptions of Milwaukee as
“America’s safest city,” and inflected street-level interactions between police and residents.
Of course, such police-citizen exchanges tracked differently across lines of race and class, as
this dissertation has illustrated. Poor and laboring African Americans came to experience a different,

Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor, Race for Profit: How Banks and the Real Estate Industry Undermined Black Homeownership (Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2019), 254.
19 Black criminality largely supplanted white radical-labor criminality in the 1930s and 1940s. See: Chapter One.
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more heavy-handed and negligent brand of policing than their white counterparts. Extensive postWorld War II Black migration, coupled with forceful white resistance to Black mobility and
citizenship claims, exacerbated Milwaukee’s disparate law enforcement system, as it did in other
sectors. Containing Black residents translated into disproportionate surveillance, stops, arrests, and
killings. The policing of race and class on the city’s near north side, in particular, reciprocally
informed the MPD’s narrative of policing exceptionalism, which highlighted the department’s ability
to effect swift citations, arrests, and prosecutions on comparatively minor nuisance offenses,
including vagrancy, disorderly conduct, and drunkenness.
Differential police “boundary” and “violence” work in poor and low-income spaces of color
gave the exceptionalism narrative cogency, while also hardening perceptions of racialized
criminality.20 Administrative and enforcement innovations embraced by the MPD in the 1930s,
1940s, and 1950s interpolated racist ideas about poor and working-class Black and Latinx migrants.
The department’s Youth Aid Bureau, for example, monitored Black youth behavior, as white society
broadly perceived them as more prone to “delinquent” behavior. Meanwhile, the department’s Vice
and “Red” squads scrutinized interracial socializing and closely watched activities among left-leaning
political organizations. Such approaches remained broadly supported and progressed into the Civil
Rights era 1960s and 1970s. Even in 1984, most residents “admired” the MPD; a slight majority
supported Chief Breier, despite rising opposition to his unlimited authority and prolonged tenure. 21
Stuart Schrader, “To Protect and Serve Themselves: Police in US Politics since the 1960s,” Public Culture 31(3)
(September 2019), 604; Micol Seigel, Violence Work: State Power and the Limits of Police (Durham: Duke University Press,
2018).
21 The authority gained by non-police civilians irked Breier, who saw SB56 as dangerous and irrational political meddling.
He was right, to a degree, when he argued that many people still supported the MPD. When the law was enacted in
1984, most residents “admired” the department. A Milwaukee Journal survey found that a wide majority of participants—
77 percent—believed that the MPD was doing an “excellent” or “good” job.” Fifty-six percent even viewed the chief
positively. Respondents were about evenly split as to whether elected officials should have more control over the MPD,
with 45 percent in favor and 44 opposed. Surveyed residents favored the MPD’s crime control program (67 percent) but
were less impressed by its “police-community relations” efforts (43 percent) and “work with minorities” (38 percent).
However, the survey also reflected nagging racial divides. Black respondents were far more critical of the police. A slight
majority “backed the department,” “but not Breier,” with 75 percent rating the chief as “fair or poor.” Similarly, 83
percent of African Americans said Breier should retire, while 77 percent called for “new controls” over the MPD.
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Elected officials still feared the political repercussions of crossing the police chief in the early-1980s.
This helps explain why SB56 received fairly mixed support from the mayor and Common Council.
That said, negative opinions of the police chief and reactionary law-and-order tactics grew in
Milwaukee’s burgeoning neighborhood stabilization movement as the long 1970s progressed.
Controlling crime under a “community-oriented policing” framework had emerged as a focus of
community associations nationwide.22 In Milwaukee, these grassroots organizations formed in Black,
white, Latinx, and racially transitioning sections of the city. Their development was, in most cases, a
response to 1960s social and political upheavals, as well as the democratization of the local housing
market. Despite being largely comprised by white middle-class homeowners, some community
groups deliberately supported racial integration.23 However, they also called for more beat patrol
officers and advocated for community relations units that would partner with residents to resolve
property and nuisance offenses, like burglaries, auto thefts, sex work, and noise violations.
By the time the SB56 passed in 1984, neighborhood organizations had assumed greater
responsibility in keeping their communities safe and their property values secure. In part, that meant
attracting grant funding for home improvement projects that helped people maintain their
properties, investing in community-based infrastructure programs, and shoring up private enterprise
at the local level. But it also meant increasing neighborhood surveillance. Groups like the Sherman
Park Community Association (SPCA) formed block clubs that connected residents and addressed
social fragmentation. These block clubs established “neighborhood watches,” which monitored illicit
behavior at street-level and proactively alerted the police when perceived crimes occurred.24 On

Elizabeth Hinton and DeAnza Cook, “The Mass Criminalization of Black Americans: A Historical Overview,” Annual
Review of Criminology (June 2020), 14.
23 James Parks, “High Crime Area Alter Living Patterns of Big Cities,” The Milwaukee Journal, December 19, 1974, Part 2,
14.
24 “SPCA Mobile Watch Program Narrative,” 11, in “Anti-crime Project, 1982,” Box 1, Folder 5, Sherman Park
Community Association Records, 1971-2002, UWM Manuscript Collection 72, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
Libraries, Archives Department.
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Sherman Park’s east side, which was adjacent to the city’s north side, that often meant surveilling the
activities of poor and low-income Black youth, the poor, and low-income renters.25 The SPCA’s
residential surveillance program counted seventy-five block clubs as of 1982.26
Yet, the SPCA and other neighborhood watch groups struggled to generate support from
the MPD. Supervising officers, following the chief’s lead, continued to resist community-oriented
policing interventions that called for sharing authority with residents. Police resistance made it
harder for community associations to preserve order and control crime on their terms. Concurrently,
index crimes rose, prompting Milwaukee’s neighborhood movement to actively demand reform.27 In
1983, neighborhood organizations joined under the banner of the Citywide Anti-Crime Coalition
(CAC). The CAC championed preventative crime fighting initiatives and lobbied for communityoriented policing in local and state legislatures. The coalition advocated for citizen input on public
safety matters, a more diverse MPD, and the deployment of proactive crime control strategies.28
Regarding police oversight, the CAC demanded a more vigorous MFPC complaint review function.
The CAC also pushed the city to implement a “comprehensive neighborhood foot patrol program”
in two “high-crime areas,” including Sherman Park, in addition to creating two “crime prevention
projects” monitored by the coalition’s Neighborhood Advisory Councils.29
CAC member Joan McManus, a leader in Milwaukee social justice movements, advocated for

John Hagedorn, “Dreams of the Seventies, Facts of the Eighties, Report, Undated,” 4, Box 2, Folder 35, Sherman
Park Community Association Records, 1971-2002.
26 For more on the SPCA, see: Juliet Saltman, A Fragile Movement: The Struggle for Neighborhood Stabilization (New York:
Greenwood Press, 1990).
27 “Index crimes,” as classified by the Federal Bureau of Identification’s Uniform Crime Report, in this span included
murder (homicide), forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, theft, and auto theft. Reported index crimes rose
annually in Milwaukee, from 33,748 in 1974 to 47,711 in 1983. “Crime in the City of Milwaukee, 1983,” 1-2, 6, Box 1,
Folder 13, Citywide Anti-Crime Coalition, 1983-1985,” Joan McManus Papers.
28 When it came to crime prevention, the CAC helped establish the MPD’s “Crime Prevention Division,” formed a
“Special Committee on Crime Prevention” within the MFPC, and participated in proactive policing sessions at the
MPD’s training academy. Citywide Anti-Crime Coalition, “Accomplishments,” Box 1, Folder 13, Citywide Anti-Crime
Coalition, 1983-1985,” Joan McManus Papers.
29 The areas were around the Capitol Court Shopping Center in Sherman Park and along Lisbon Ave. in the Washington
Park community. The program was financed with $750,000 earmarked by the Common Council for police overtime.
Bruce Gill, “Foot Patrols Begin Today in Two Areas,” The Milwaukee Sentinel, November 11, 1983, Part 1, 1, 7.
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both responsive crime control and enhanced police accountability structures. She did so through the
Greater Milwaukee Conference on Religion and Urban Affairs’ (GMCRUA) Criminal Justice Task
Force (CJTF). Along with the CAC, the task force made its presence felt at MFPC meetings, asking
tough questions, scrutinizing the police budget, and raising concerns about the Special Assignment
Squad’s spying on activists.30 The CJTF also provided input on the hiring of Milwaukee’s next police
chief.31 Liberal community associations, the League of Martin, and even some MFPC members
backed the task force’s efforts to keep police accountability issues at the forefront of civic discourse.
Ongoing incidents of racialized police violence galvanized the CJTF’s advocacy. The 1983 police
killing of Percy Joiner, for example, embodied the life or death stakes of police responding to
mental health incidents that required sensitive de-escalation.32
The Criminal Justice Task Force extended Milwaukee’s police accountability movement into
the post-Breier era when it co-organized a national conference with the Chicago-based organization
Citizens Alert.33 Held in Milwaukee in November 1984, the event convened police brutality victims
and families, social activists, interfaith leaders, and criminal justice professionals. 34 Sessions covered
victim family networking, filing civil rights litigation, strategizing policy, and enacting legislation.35
Conference attendees completed joint projects, established regional networks, and formed a
The MPD’s “Red Squad” historically maintained secret files on left-leaning activists and civil rights organizations.
Accountability groups recommended someone from outside of the department. However, the MFPC appointed a
former Breier lieutenant, Robert Ziarnik.
32 The 38-year-old Black male was shot and killed by a white Tactical Squad officer on October 20, 1983. Two police
“investigating reports of strange behavior” ticketed Joiner’s car for parking in a tow-away zone. After police called for a
tow truck, and partially secured the vehicle, a shotgun blast rang out from a nearby home. The officers crouched behind
the tow truck with its driver and called for backup. Dozens of MPD cruisers converged on the scene. At one point,
Joiner apparently exited the home with an axe. Within an hour-and-a-half, he was shot dead. No one else was injured.
Witnesses testified that Joiner had exhibited “odd behavior” in the days leading up to the incident, “standing on his front
lawn waving a knife at traffic.” He had “raged and yelled” at neighbors, according to witnesses. “Man Killed after Firing
Shotgun,” The Milwaukee Journal, October 20, 1983, Part 1, 1; Mike Christopulos and Anne Waukau, “Neighbor Says Slain
Man's Behavior Odd,” The Milwaukee Sentinel, October 21, 1983, Part 1, 5
33 On Citizens Alert, see: Baer, Beyond the Usual Beating.
34 The GMCRUA, Citizen Alert, the New York-based Center for Constitutional Rights, and United Black Community
Council sponsored the conference. “Conference to Discuss Police,” The Milwaukee Journal, November 12, 1984.
35 Howard Fuller gave a keynote address. One conference session was titled, “Milwaukee: From Bell to Lacy and
beyond.” Myrtle Lacy was active at the conference. “Conference to Discuss Police,” The Milwaukee Journal, November 12,
1984.
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National Police Accountability Network (NPAN).36 Overall, the conference aimed to “organize and
mobilize community support for families of victims and for changes in police policy and practice,”
to establish national accountability standards, and to “decrease police abuse of force.” 37
Milwaukee and Chicago agreed to host demonstration projects that would provide research,
advocacy, and education outreach. However, securing funding proved challenging in a recessed
economy.38 McManus worked to develop a “Center for Police Accountability” in Milwaukee—a
“separate and independent agency” from the GMCRUA that was modeled on Citizens Alert.39 She
stressed four objectives: Acting as a “watchdog” over police operations and the conduct of officers;
providing “public policy analysis on law enforcement related issues”; serving as a “resource center”
to “neighborhood groups, the Citywide Anti-Crime Coalition, and others”; and establishing a
regional police accountability network.40 Unfortunately, McManus was only able to secure limited
funding and her vision for a Milwaukee Center for Police Accountability died before it started. 41
National Police Accountability Conference participants sought to combat the rising power

Citizens Alert Special Report, Spring 1985, Box 1, Folder 14, “National Police Accountability Network Project, 1985,”
Joan McManus Papers.
37 Eighteen representatives from ten states, “mostly low-income, women, and minority,” joined the NPAN’s steering
committee. “Problem Statement,” Box 1, Folder 14, “National Police Accountability Network Project, 1985,” Joan
McManus Papers; “National Police Accountability Network,” Box 1, Folder 15, “Greater Milwaukee Conference on
Religion and Urban Affairs, Police Accountability, 1984-1985, 1991,” Joan McManus Papers.
38 McManus proposed a budget of $92,650, including funding for four staff salaries and program expenses. She and
GMCRUA Executive Director Father Patrick Flood reached out to donors like the Max and Ana Levinson Foundation
and the General Reconciliation Committee of the Christian Church, which helped fund the 1984. “National Police
Accountability Network, 1985-1986 Proposed Budget,” Box 1, Folder 14, “National Police Accountability Network
Project, 1985,” Joan McManus Papers; Joan M. McManus to Mr. Sidney Shapiro, June 12, 1985, Box 1, Folder 14,
“National Police Accountability Network Project, 1985,” Joan McManus Papers; Ernest J. Newborn to Mr. Patrick A.
Flood, May 6, 1985, Box 1, Folder 14, “National Police Accountability Network Project, 1985,” Joan McManus Papers.
39 They hoped for funding from the “Methodist’s national office.” July 11, 1984, Box 1, Folder 15, “Greater Milwaukee
Conference on Religion and Urban Affairs, Police Accountability, 1984-1985, 1991,” Joan McManus Papers.
40 “Objectives,” Box 1, Folder 14, “National Police Accountability Network Project, 1985,” Joan McManus Papers.
41 McManus did secure some funding through the Vanguard Public Foundation and Wisconsin Community Fund. The
GMCRUA dissolved the CJTF in October 1985, citing a “need to focus on other, economic issues as their top priority.”
According to Monica King, of the Milwaukee Community Fund, police accountability was becoming less of an issue,
with “no “blatant” incidents of police harassment and/or brutality” occurring under new police chief Robert Ziarnik’s
watch. Joan McManus was also laid off by the GMCRUA in 1985. June Makela to Joan McManus, July 31, 1985; Joan
McManus to Eileen Luna, August 7, 1985; Monica King to Joan McManus, October 22, 1985, Box 1, Folder 14,
“National Police Accountability Network Project, 1985,” Joan McManus Papers.
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of police “unions, lawyers, professional associations and lobbyists,” who defended the rights of
officers alleged to have engaged in violence and misconduct.42 This was another outcome of the
SB56: it charted a path for the Milwaukee Police Association (MPA) to become an even greater
institutional hurdle for future police accountability advocates to clear.43 During the long 1970s, the
MPA framed its movement for bargaining rights and political recognition as akin to civil rightsbased struggles. The association expanded its political power, supporting law-and-order candidates
and lobbying state, county, and city officials on pro-police policies. After eight years of negotiation,
the legislature passed an officer’s “Bill of Rights” law in 1980. This measure softened internal police
policies and better-protected MPD personnel accused of misconduct by the public. It defined law
enforcers as a protected class of citizens.44 The law also granted rank-and-file officers the same
privileges amid in-house investigations as criminal defendants received in the criminal-legal system.45
The police “Bill of Rights” law became a steady barrier to police brutality victims seeking
compensatory relief and criminal prosecutions, as it empowered individual officers with legal
protections. These protections transcended the 1911 statute. For decades, police chiefs had
safeguarded MPD officers accused of abusing their authority, even to the point of covering up
murder.46 However, rank-and-file personnel resented the imposition of strict internal rules set by the
police chief. The Breier Bill’s passage in 1984 changed this dynamic. In turn, the MPA became the
principal defender of police officers accused of misconduct or civil rights violations. It also

The NPAN would enable “families, victims, and others concerned about police conduct and true community justice
to organize themselves together to advocate for their needs from a more…equal basis.” “Reconciliation Application
Form No. 101,” Box 1, Folder 14, “National Police Accountability Network Project, 1985,” Joan McManus Papers.
43 The Milwaukee Police Association was renamed from the Milwaukee Professional Policeman’s Protective Association
in 1977. “Gets New Name,” The Milwaukee Sentinel, November 12, 1976.
44 The MPA identified a lack of “due process rights” when the police department’s Internal Affairs Bureau investigated
officers alleged to have violated the MPD handbook.
45 The law afforded officers the right to an attorney “for any reason” when under investigation. Accused officers were to
be informed of the nature of all inquiries before questioning. Failure to do so meant the nullification of subsequently
gathered evidence. Charles J. Sykes, “Frequent Foes Join Forces in Opposition to Police Rights Bill, “The Milwaukee
Journal, May 13, 1980.
46 See: The 1958 Daniel Bell case, discussed in Chapter II.
42

468

obstructed policy changes that allegedly coddled “criminals” at the expense of “law abiding” citizens.
Overall, the Breier Bill never translated into the level of accountability Black and allied civil
rights activists envisioned in the 1960s and 1970s. The statute offered little relief to those overexposed to police violence, crime, and poverty. Rather than install mechanisms for input, oversight,
and representation, SB56 entrusted a part-time, then mostly white MFPC with improving the police
function in a soon-to-be “majority minority” city.47 While the statute revised the terms of police
power in ways that better aligned the MPD with federal civil rights provisions, the commission’s
authority still derived power from the state legislature and City Hall. Control was not in the hands of
historically “overpoliced and underprotected” people.48
In truth, SB56 could never have adequately resolved the totality of a policing crisis that was
as much economic as it was political. Public and private resources had simply eroded too greatly on
Milwaukee’s north side, reinforcing poverty and criminalizing perceptions. The law, more than
anything, repurposed municipal liability for delineating police actions. The legislature did so without
acknowledging the MPD’s racialized class imperative: to defend the property and commercial
interests of, first and foremost, white and, since the 1960s, minoritized civic elites. A more liberal
MFPC gained control over the policymaking and complaint review process. Still, accountability
barriers remained. Citizens filed fewer complaints than reformers likely anticipated, with only 203
registered from 1985 to 1990.49 The reasons why were at once structural and cultural. The
commission took up only grievances that its “Committee on Rules and Complaints” identified as
necessitating review and conducted hearings only on claims that explicitly violated police policy.50

Margo Anderson, “Peoples,” Encyclopedia of Milwaukee, accessed June 29, 2020, https://emke.uwm.edu/entry/peoples.
Joe W. Trotter, Jr. Black Milwaukee: The Making of an Industrial Proletariat, 1915-45 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press,
1988), 118. Dave Umhoefer, “Ticket Blitz Has Winners, Losers,” Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, June 18, 2000, Part 1, 1.
49 Wisconsin Advisory Committee to the United States Commission on Civil Rights, Police Protection of the African American
Community in Milwaukee (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994), 45.
50 As legal scholar Richard Jones observed, “The commission can decide that a complaint should be dismissed because it
is outside its authority, that the complaint should be referred to the chief of the fire or police department for
investigation, or that the complaint should be referred for conciliation, which is a one-on-one meeting with the citizen
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Fears of police retaliation dissuaded many African Americans from filing complaints, as they
did prior to SB56. Ten years after the bill passed, MFPC investigator Joan Dimow observed that
Black people were still “very uncomfortable about coming to police headquarters.” Those who did
had to meet “the same burden of proof as in a criminal trial: beyond a reasonable doubt.” As former
UBCC member Jeanetta Robinson told the U.S. Civil Rights Commission, “people…are literally
afraid to go down to the fire and police commission and fill out these complaints…they have
experienced such discrimination that even though it is a new day” with the MFPC, they “do not have
faith based on past atrocities.”51 Aggrieved parties were not awarded monetary judgments. At most,
they received “the satisfaction of seeing the officer punished.” Time and again, however, the
commission failed to apply discipline. The MFPC gained the “authority to impose sanctions and
change policies in 1984,” just a year after it had fired, for the first time, an officer who killed a Black
citizen.52 But it refrained from enacting sweeping changes. MFPC trials rarely resulting in dismissals
or strict rebukes; some officers persisted in abusing their power, insulated by the MPA.

The Punitive Turn and its Local Impact
While SB56 portended a more democratic police rule-making process and oversight
structure, the law was not passed in a vacuum. Its enactment reflected national social, economic, and
political transformations taking place over the course of the long 1970s. Milwaukee’s police
accountability movement had, alongside related battles over employment, housing, and education,
confronted and disrupted white supremacy. The national response to BIPOC claims for rights,
equality, and self-determination in the 1960s and 1970s manifested in what historian Julily Kohler-

and the accused officer.” Richard S. Jones, “Processing Civilian Complaints: A Study of the Milwaukee Fire and Police
Commission,” Marquette Law Review 77 (3) (Spring 1994), 514.
51 Wisconsin Advisory Committee, Police Protection of the African American Community in Milwaukee, 45.
52 Jones, “Processing Civilian Complaints,” 515-517.
470

Hausmann has called “tough politics.”53 America’s punitive turn “degraded the citizenship” of the
very people “making forceful demands on the state and challenging their subordination…” The
nation’s rightward political drift positioned the urban Black poor, in particular, as pathological and
wallowing in a “culture of poverty.”54 Conservatives and erstwhile liberal policymakers argued that
Black behavioral dysfunction sourced an intensifying urban “crime problem.” They rejected that
systemic racism and class exploitation were any longer to blame. The framers of America’s “get
tough” politics argued that “subordinated groups forfeited their rights and claims on the state by
breaking the law or drawing state aid.”55 As the long 1970s progressed, policy analysts increasingly
favored crime control solutions that placed the needs of victims and “the community” ahead of socalled street criminals, “welfare dependents,” the homeless, “juvenile delinquents,” and the drug
addicted.
Although police accountability activists on the left in Milwaukee, like Joan McManus, saw
both “the root cause” of crime and “police abuse of force” in Black, Brown, and racially-mixed
spaces as “poverty and racism,” this argument ran counter to the views of national policing experts
in the 1970s and 1980s.56 Social scientists researching effective means of crime control had moved
from a liberal emphasis on addressing structural conditions and improving social welfare to a
conservative emphasis on mediating the “disorderly” behavior of Black welfare state beneficiaries
and the poor. Neoliberal and neoconservative policy agendas alike demonized poor and low-income

Julily Kohler-Hausmann, Getting Tough: Welfare and Imprisonment in 1970s America (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2017), 292. As Taylor writes, “the concept of revanchism describes the punitive turn away from the social welfare and
consumption-side Keynesianism that underpinned the 20th century concept of the social contract.” It used race to undo
the social contract for African Americans and other BIPOC citizens who receive its benefits. Taylor, Race for Profit, 231.
54 Acting on a law and order agenda that centered racialized suburban fears of urban disarray, the Republican Nixon
administration framed urban crime as an outgrowth of liberal permissiveness and a “disintegrating social order.”
Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor, “We Should Still Defund the Police,” The New Yorker, August 14, 2020,
https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/defund-the-police.
55 Kohler-Hausmann, Getting Tough, 292.
56 “Project Narrative,” Box 1, Folder 14, “National Police Accountability Network Project, 1985,” Joan McManus
Papers, 1970-2003, UWM Manuscript Collection 267, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Archives, Milwaukee,
Wisconsin.
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residents of color in cities, who conservative pundits and academics referred to as the “underclass.”57 In the late-20th century, the alleged criminality of dangerous “rational actors” was met by the
state with huge taxpayer investments in funding police militarization, upgraded surveillance
capacities, advanced computerization, and data science to analyze, map, and predict crime trends.58
The nation’s carceral turn, which scholars tend to originate with Nixon, was bipartisan. The
Johnson administration’s War on Crime from 1965 to 1968 reflected, on the one hand, the need to
better coordinate police agencies, ameliorate police-community tensions, and instill more democratic
and competent police administration. On the other, it expanded police power and resources, so as to
more effectively combat and then prevent lawlessness in America’s rebelling cities under the guise of
liberal law-and-order. Ensuing Republican administrations focused deliberately on penal responses
to the “urban crisis,” which Nixon declared over in 1973.59 Yet they did so without the same
compulsion to also alleviate poverty conditions. More technologically savvy and militarized policing
blended with racist media imagery and stereotypes about Black urban life to heighten public fears
about inner city crime. This cycle fed an ever more racialized and punitive backlash politics that
proved popular with white suburban and exurban constituencies and other conservative voters.
Even before Milwaukee-native George Kelling and collaborator James Q. Wilson published
their influential “Broken Windows” treatise in 1982, police agencies were investing millions of
dollars in controlling low-level misdemeanor offenses in urban neighborhoods. They did so under
the controversial premise that public fears of “disorder” bred serious crime.60 Broken Windows
helped buttress popular conceptions of the nation’s crime problem as urban and racial. It further
justified the financing of law enforcement agencies as catch-all emergency responders, and it helped
Taylor argues, they did so “to undermine the legitimacy of a welfare state perceived to be prioritizing the care of
‘undeserving’ African Americans.” Taylor, Race for Profit, 232-233.
58 Hinton and Cook, “The Mass Criminalization of Black Americans,” 14.
59 Taylor, Race for Profit, 211.
60 The disorderly behaviors that proactive, community-oriented policing addressed were, as Schrader puts it, “simply
signifiers of marginalized political and economic status.” (1:57:35)
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rationalize the growing network of jails, prisons, and detention centers needed to warehouse criminal
offenders. Expanded preventative policing capabilities and surveillance encouraged more policeBlack citizen contacts, which meant more hostile interactions, some of them deadly. All of this
shaped perceptions about how to maintain order and determine who required punitive control.61
Broken Windows policing was theorized against the backdrop of the Reagan administration
ushering in an even more draconian “War on Drugs” in the early 1980s. As historians have noted,
President Reagan’s drug war enlarged “the scale of the raids, stings, and tactical police units”
introduced by earlier administrations.62 Congress passed harsh legislative measures that expanded
“domestic surveillance, the criminal code, and mandatory minimum sentences”—policies that failed
to pass under liberal congresses in the 1970s. The bipartisan Comprehensive Crime Control Act of
1984 established more direct relations between law enforcement and military agencies, upgrading
police weapons capacities.63 The law also created more severe mandatory minimum sentences and
imposed three strike provisions on violent crimes. A Justice Department clearinghouse administered
block grants for new state prison construction to facilitate the human caging of convicted drug
offenders. The law introduced civil asset forfeiture penalties on drug crimes, which proved lucrative
for local police departments, as well as corrupt officers and civilian whistle blowers on watch. 64
The national expansion of police power over the course of the long 1970s facilitated more
racially disparate enforcement and higher reported crime rates and arrests in Milwaukee. Racialized
crime fears fed an evolving set of proactive order maintenance policing initiatives led by citizens.

Stuart Schrader points to the example of “911 policing,” which allowed the public to call police to specific areas
quickly. It brought law enforcement into private homes and businesses in new ways. Police encountered behavior that
now registered as crime in ways it had not previously.
62 Elizabeth Hinton, From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime, 309.
63 The act also reinstated the federal death penalty and eviscerated the federal parole system. Hinton, From the War on
Poverty to the War on Crime, 309-310.
64 That the Reagan administration ended the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration in 1982 did not matter; police
power, as Vice President George H. W. Bush observed, continued to be funded by “criminals’ own property.” Hinton,
From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime, 311-314. Quote on p. 313.
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Community associations and non-profits concerned about both rising crime and the ongoing threat
of police violence, assumed a powerful voice in the city’s public safety discourse. They embraced
ideas developed by criminologists in public and privately-funded government think tanks, like the
National Police Foundation. Community-oriented policing concepts shaped their advocacy.
Proponents eschewed the hierarchical, isolated, reaction-oriented crime control tactics of the
“reform era.”65 Proactive policing valued liberal law-and-order concepts, like community relations,
racial diversity, and, to an extent, civilian oversight.66 Proactive, community-oriented policing
devotees adopted law enforcement strategies written in collaboration with social scientists at the
neighborhood level. In some cases, academics carried out grant-funded patrol experiments that
aimed to enhance police service and crime prevention techniques and clarify patrol and surveillance
capacities. “Respectable” community representatives, whose investment in the status quo ensured a
positive working relationship with law enforcement, played a central role in advancing crime control
prerogatives. Crime reduction through community-oriented policing took precedence over ensuring
accountability to over-exposed poor and low-income BIPOC citizens.
That said, community-oriented policing’s democratic intent has remained dubious at best.
Police often “stoke older residents’ fears about gangs, violence, and crime.”67 This aggravates
generation gaps within communities and pushes the comparatively affluent to align with law
enforcement at the expense of the poor and vulnerable. Citizen-police listening sessions often
feature homeowners, business people, clergy, and retirees who are eager to maintain a conventional
order that benefits their social and economic interests. Excluded are the young, unhoused, poor,

As Hinton and Cook write, the “revival of police research and development…undergirded the dissemination of new
internal (police administration) and external (interagency cooperation) techniques under the umbrella of proactive
policing and crime prevention.” Hinton and Cook, “The Mass Criminalization of Black Americans,” 14.
66 As Hinton and Cook observe, proactive policing “incentivized police officers and administrators to experiment with
community-policing initiatives and police–community task forces in conjunction with “respectable” residents and local
partners.” Hinton and Cook, “The Mass Criminalization of Black Americans,” 16.
67 Maya Schenwar and Victoria Law, “The Problem with ‘Community Policing’ Reforms,” Slate, July 30, 2020, accessed
July 30, 2020, https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2020/07/prison-by-any-other-name-book-excerpt.html.
65

474

drug dependent, and formerly incarcerated, whose legitimate stake in the social relations of their
community go ignored. Police mobilize the affluent to surveil their blocks and report on
presumptive safety violations. This community-based reportage sharpens racial and class divisions.
Rather than strengthening urban neighborhoods, community-oriented policing fractures already
tenuous social ties. Long-standing community residents, some pushed out by gentrifiers in search of
more affordable urban living, are ensnared in a surveillance system that too often identifies them as
inherent criminals rather than comrades. Meanwhile, wealthier newcomers are perceived as lawful.
Community policing, moreover, negates critical scrutiny of law enforcement’s racist, violent past. It
bolsters popular support for the police among “docile and dependent” middle-class residents.68 The
strategy has largely provided police with enhanced resources, without imparting equitable security.

The Saga Continues
Administrative control over police policymaking, indeed, shifted in 1984, but to what end?
Black human and civil rights remain far from settled in Milwaukee, especially as they relate to a state
criminal (in)justice system that incarcerates more Black men per capita than anywhere else in the
U.S.69 Federal consent decrees monitoring interdepartmental racism on the police force, diversity
hiring, and procedural changes to police-citizen interactions have done little to alter the essential
“ungovernability” of the MPD.70 Placing Black faces in high places, moreover, has not ended police
violence and racist enforcement practices in the city’s still segregated, low-income and criminalized
BIPOC neighborhoods. For example, Arthur Jones, Milwaukee’s first Black police chief and a co-

See: William T. Lyons, Jr., The Politics of Community Policing: Rearranging the Power to Punish (Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press, 1999), 9.
69 A 2013 study found that Wisconsin incarcerated more Black men per capita than any other in the country. John
Pawasarat and Lois M. Quinn, “Wisconsin’s Mass Incarceration of African American Males: Workforce Challenges for
2013” (University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, ETI Publications, 2013).
70 Phrase borrowed from: Melanie Newport, “The Ungovernable Carceral State,” Black Perspectives, African American
Intellectual History Society, April 9, 2020, accessed April 10, 2020, https://www.aaihs.org/the-ungovernable-carceralstate/.
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founder of the League of Martin, was also the first MPD administrator to fully implement Kelling
and Wilson’s Broken Windows theory in the late 1990s. Officers disproportionately cited poor
residents of color on petty offenses—panhandling, jaywalking, vandalism, speeding, excessive noise,
etc.—throughout his tenure (1996-2003). Broken Windows style policing continues to aggravate the
region’s inflated incarceration totals, while extracting money and resources via fines and seizures. 71
Municipal police accountability structures remain anemic. In the 2000s, a good many
Milwaukeeans continued to view the MFPC as “weak and ineffective.” Police officers, too, have
positioned the commission as “harsh and unfair.” A 2006 study found that the MFPC was not
actively investigating complaints from either citizens or police. When the commission did, few
grievances went to trial or resulted in “sustained findings of officer misconduct.”72 From 2000 to
2005, only eight of 437 total MFPC complaints saw adjudication. Two cases involving police were
“sustained,” meaning the commission upheld the MPD’s disciplinary ruling. Conversely, the MFPC
conducted 44 trials on complaints from 1992 to 1999.73 Aggrieved citizens and police personnel
both expressed frustration about “long delays in the complaint process.” Different factors explain
the low rate of sustained cases, “insufficiency of the allegations and difficulties in proving the alleged
violations” chief among them.74 The MFPC has monitored complaints, but too often stops short of
instilling lasting justice. This allows for further abuses of power. “Conciliation,” researchers found,
worked in ten percent (45 cases) of the 437 cases filed from 2000 to 2005. That meant the dismissal
of charges against some police officers.75 No investigations were conducted unless complaints went

As of 2000, Jones’ Broken Windows approach had racked up about $10,000,000 in fines on roughly 500,000 tickets.
“Blacks, Hispanics and other minorities” received three of four tickets on average.
72 Richard Jerome, Promoting Police Accountability in Milwaukee: Strengthening the Fire and Police Commission (Los Angeles: Police
Assessment Resource Center, 2006), 1-2.
73 Jerome, Promoting Police Accountability in Milwaukee, 49.
74 Jerome, Promoting Police Accountability in Milwaukee, 22.
75 During “conciliation,” commission mediators encouraged complainants and accused police personnel “to come to a
mutual resolution.” Jerome, “Promoting Police Accountability in Milwaukee,” 2, 50.
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to trial, an outcome the board avoided.76 When it comes to holding the police accountable for
institutional and interpersonal racism, the stakes remain high in Milwaukee.
State politics has played an important role for residents locally. Since the 1980s, Wisconsin
has served as a laboratory for revanchist, market-oriented policy experiments in public education,
social welfare reform, and the expansion of penal authority, with initiatives tested in Milwaukee.77
The city’s conflicting reputation as both the “worst city for black Americans” and an under the radar
“tech hub” for mostly white professionals and culture entrepreneurs is attributable to neoliberal
policy decisions that have engendered racially uneven rates of economic development, public-private
investments, and asset accumulation.78 The city’s hyper-segregated landscape and class-based
inequities continue to hit Black and Latinx residents the hardest. Meanwhile, its liberal political
leadership, backed by many corporate and middle-class elites, has called on the MPD to perform the
often-harsh boundary and violence work ostensibly required to manage the deleterious mental health
impacts of deep-seated income inequality and budget austerity.
Today, Milwaukee’s police budget comprises more than forty percent of the city’s general
revenue fund. Police accountability advocates see this allocation of public tax dollars as especially
detrimental to the health and well-being of poor and low-income BIPOC citizens. This recognition
on the part of advocates matters, as it marks a departure from the repeated faith Black and allied
community organizations and activists have placed in police bureaucrats to resolve issues of crime
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and safety. Groups like Wisconsin Voices’ African American Roundtable, Black Leaders Organizing
Communities, and Leaders Igniting Transformation have pursued abolitionist objectives to help
transform society. Organized under the banner of “Liberate MKE,” they are now calling to defund
the MPD by $75 million and to re-direct taxpayer dollars towards housing, education, and public
health interventions. Their call is urgent, as the city’s police budget has grown by nearly that same
amount ($70,000,000) in the five years leading up to 2019.79 Liberate MKE reflects an updated
demand for community control of law enforcement—one that recognizes policing, punishment, and
surveillance as inherently racist functions that have historically prompted unequal outcomes and
aggravated metropolitan inequality structures. The campaign, led by Black women and youth leaders,
has altered the public safety discourse.80 It has also changed the underlying approach of activists,
who see reforms that shore up police power as defective in building security and resolving problems
rooted in racial capitalism. Addressing Milwaukee’s racist policing system through electoral politics,
statutory change, federal lawsuits, and revised inter-departmental policies has remained a dominant
approach. But the 2019-2020 Liberate MKE campaign signals an important turn to keep an eye on.
Racialized police violence, as this project suggests, has never ended in Milwaukee. Recent
campaigns to curb police brutality have centered on building new systems of community control,
while also enacting procedural reforms. Accountability groups have focused, as they did in previous
decades, on making the MPD a more culturally responsive and democratic policing agency that
applies the law fairly. However, they have also reimagined communal self-determination and the
capacity of Black north side residents themselves—people with credibility in the community—to
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intervene in crisis situations before involving the police.81 A series of MPD killings of young Black
men in Milwaukee during the 2010s renewed demands for racial justice in City Hall and the courts.
The names of the deceased ring loudly in the city—Derek Williams, Dontre Hamilton, and Sylville
Smith.82 Each case saw Milwaukee County District Attorney John Chisholm, a noted liberal who is
widely recognized as a progressive DA, refrain from criminally charging the officers for their deadly
actions, justifying the use of lethal police force. In the wake of the killings, activists, youth, and
family-led coalitions dragged the city’s long, Black-led struggle for police accountability into the new
millennium. Their movement mobilized against the backdrop of larger democratic struggles, such as
Occupy Wall Street (2011-2012) and the initial phase of the Black Lives Matter Movement (20132016). These national protest battles addressed violent outcomes of global-financial manipulation
and racialized policing, respectively. The killings of Williams (2011), Hamilton (2014), and Smith
(2016) by the MPD evoked Black Milwaukeeans’ long history of confronting police racism and
violence, but also their class exploitation. Groups like the survivor-led “Coalition for Justice”—a
nod to the movement organized by the 1981 Coalition for Justice for Ernest Lacy—drew on similar
tactics of political negotiation, coalition-based mobilizing, and street-level protests to push for
procedural changes, like requiring officers to wear body cameras and receive mental health and crisis
intervention training, as well as federal civil rights interventions.83
Milwaukee’s ACLU, meanwhile, has exposed the limits of liberal law-and-order and the
racism embedded in proactive, Broken Windows style policing. In 2017, the organization filed a
federal lawsuit that challenged the MPD’s “high-volume, suspicionless” stop and frisk program.84

A prominent example was the 2015 Safe Zone initiative, led by Khalil Coleman and Shawn Moore. Ashley Luthern,
“Milwaukee Woman Brings Street Level Credibility to Safe Zone Plan,” Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, June 8, 2015.
82 The police killing of Smith in August 2016 sparked several nights of unrest in Sherman Park.
83 Ashley Luthern, “Federal Lawsuit Filed in Dontre Hamilton Case,” The Milwaukee Journal, April 28, 2016, A2.
84 Collins, et al. v. City of Milwaukee, et al., 17-cv-00234-JPS, United States District Court, Eastern District of Wisconsin,
Milwaukee Division. The Milwaukee Common Council approved the lawsuit on July 10, 2018. “Milwaukee Common
Council Approves Historic Settlement with ACLU,” July 10, 2018, accessed February 9, 2019, https://www.acluwi.org/en/news/milwaukee-common-council-approves-historic-settlement-aclu.
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Analyzing data on more than 350,000 pedestrian and traffic stops from 2010 to 2017, the ACLU
outlined a “vast and unconstitutional” racial profiling agenda. Former Police Chief Edward Flynn—
a noted advocate of data-driven, “problem-oriented” policing—introduced the policy in 2008.85 The
City of Milwaukee, MFPC, and Chief Flynn’s replacement, Alfonso Morales, settled the case in 2018
on behalf of a class of Black and Latinx residents.86 The courts found that the program had violated
plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights, which bans unreasonable searches and seizures, as well as the
“prohibition of racial and ethnic profiling” under the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI of the
1964 Civil Rights Act.87 Milwaukee police bureaucrats denied that the MPD’s tactics were
discriminatory or illegal. “Saturation patrols” deployed in “economically depressed,” high-crime
neighborhoods, police held, reflected a sound “crime deterrence” strategy, regardless of whether
stopped individuals committed an offense or appeared reasonably suspicious.88
The settlement agreement marked a critical juncture in Milwaukee’s police accountability
movement. Not only did it obligate the MPD to change its order maintenance tactics, data collection
methods, supervisory practices, and officer training criteria, but it included long sought after
disciplinary procedures for violators. Police personnel who breached the consent decree faced
reprimand by superior officers. The settlement agreement also required stop and frisk data to be
released to the public on a regular basis and the MFPC to expand and improve civilian and internal

Flynn was recommended for chief by Broken Windows theory co-author George Kelling, who served as an advisor to
the MFPC as it searched for a new MPD leader. Kelling, Policing in Milwaukee.
86 The initial lawsuit identified then MPD Chief Edward Flynn as a defendant. Collins, et al. v. City of Milwaukee, et al., 17cv-00234-JPS, United States District Court, Eastern District of Wisconsin, Milwaukee Division. The Milwaukee
Common Council approved the lawsuit on July 10, 2018. “Milwaukee Common Council Approves Historic Settlement
with ACLU,” July 10, 2018, accessed February 9, 2019, https://www.aclu-wi.org/en/news/milwaukee-commoncouncil-approves-historic-settlement-aclu.
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Milwaukee, et al., 73.
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complaint procedures. A new city-backed organization, the Milwaukee Community Collaborative
Committee, served as a means for citizens to provide input on police operations and envision
alternatives. The Common Council authorized the committee to review a U.S. Justice Department
Collaborative Reform draft report in 2017 and solicit feedback from the public.
Indeed, not all police accountability advocates today agree with abolitionist proposals, like
defunding the MPD. Reformist voices support investing in “good” policing. As such, they continue
to influence policy debates. Elected officials are more receptive to liberal coalitions that advocate for
procedural changes that maintain police power, while seeking to modify or “improve” police
capabilities. The Community Collaborative Commission, for instance, has called on the city to shore
up the MPD’s approach to “community policing,” as outlined by the Obama administration’s
“President’s Taskforce on 21st Century Policing” (2015) report and the “New Era on Public Safety”
(2019) study. Yet, these liberal proposals replicate many of the same reform fixes that have failed to
hold police departments accountable since at least the 1960s. They incorporate policies enumerated
by accountability groups in Milwaukee during the long 1970s, like garnering community input on
police operations with the goal of “improving trust;” conducting annual surveys on “policecommunity relations;” evaluating “progressive policing strategies in other cities;” and regularly
communicating public concerns over “police policies, procedures, and practices” to City Hall. 89
Events in the summer of 2020 pushed this already polarizing conversation around public
safety in all directions. Since May 29, 2020, four days after a Black man named George Floyd was
asphyxiated by a white Minneapolis police officer, thousands have protested in Milwaukee against
police violence and systemic racism.90 New organizations formed amid the demonstrations, like the
Common Council President Cavalier Johnson, “New Appointments to Community Collaborative Commission,” Urban
Milwaukee, June 10, 2020, accessed July 27, 2020, https://urbanmilwaukee.com/pressrelease/new-appointments-tocommunity-collaborative-commission/.
90 Sophie Carson and Evan Casey, “‘The Whole Country’s Watching Now’: After 100 Days Marching, Milwaukee
Protesters Want to Live Up to the Past and Change the Future,” Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, September 5, 2020, accessed
October 31, 2020, https://www.jsonline.com/story/news/local/2020/09/05/milwaukee-wauwatosa-protesters-hit-10089
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People’s Revolution and Milwaukee Alliance against Racist and Political Oppression. Latinx
coalitions joined in solidarity, demanding justice in the streets, criminal-legal system, and MFPC for
Joel Acevedo, a Latinx man killed by a white off-duty MPD officer in April. New protest strategies,
like car caravans, which block entry points and have kept social distancers safe amid the COVID-19
pandemic, have facilitated larger and longer demonstrations. Clashes between protest leaders on
freeway bridges and militarized police riot suppression tactics, including the use of chemical irritants,
further galvanized crowds demanding justice. The MPD’s show of force during peaceful protests
exacerbated unrest. It also led to legal challenges and served to expedite the MFPC’s subsequent
demotion of embattled Police Chief Alfonso Morales, who soon retired.91
Milwaukee’s movement has extended beyond the city’s borders. Community leader Frank
‘Nitty’ Sensabaugh led a 750-mile march to Washington, D.C. in August. He and a contingent of
Wisconsin protesters rallied with allied organizations and national voices.92 While they did not intend
to initially, demonstrators in Milwaukee expect to surpass the 200 straight nights of protests that
NAACP Youth Council (YC) activists led in support of an open housing ordinance in 1967-1968.
Like the YC, contemporary activists understand that marching into the city’s majority white suburbs
carries symbolic power. They have challenged police impunity in the adjacent city of Wauwatosa,
where a now-suspended Black patrolman shot and killed three Black males in five years.93 Activists
also marched in Kenosha, Wisconsin in solidarity with demonstrators there after a white police
officer shot a Black father, Jacob Blake, seven times in the back. As of this writing, Milwaukee’s
2020 movement against police violence and systemic racism has not ceased. As community leader

days-marching-look-future/5707624002/.
91 Carson and Casey, “‘The Whole Country’s Watching Now.’”
92 Sensabaugh spoke to thousands of people and national media on the same hallowed grounds where Dr. Martin Luther
King Jr. delivered his “I Have a Dream Speech” in 1963. Carson and Casey, “‘The Whole Country’s Watching Now.’”
93 The most recent, Alvin Cole, was only 17-years-old. Ricardo Torres, “‘The Police Are Making Us Look Bad’:
Protesters March through Wauwatosa Calling for Change,” Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, November 1, 2020, accessed
November 3, 2020, https://www.jsonline.com/story/news/local/milwaukee/2020/11/01/protesters-march-throughwauwatosa-calling-change/6118725002/.
482

Khalil Coleman observed, “The whole purpose is civil disobedience. The whole purpose is to be a
disruption. Because injustice has been a disruption in the lives of many Black and brown people.” 94
Ultimately, the query posed by James Cameron at the outset of this project—“How can a
people be brought to respect a government that constantly oppresses and exploits them?”—lingers
as an abiding one.95 And not just in Milwaukee. Endemic police violence continues to harm Black
people nationwide, even as 2020’s COVID-19 emergency offers its own racially disparate and deadly
outcomes. The police murders of George Floyd, Breonna Taylor, and other BIPOC citizens have
again exposed the racist underpinnings of U.S. law enforcement, as well as the inability of America’s
criminal-legal system to administer justice. These killings have driven an international reinvigoration
of the Movement for Black Lives—now the largest social movement in U.S. history.96 Millions are
demanding discipline for offending officers and calling to defund the police. White people, no
longer comfortable with standing on the sidelines of political struggle, have joined Black, Latinx, and
Indigenous folk in pressuring elected officials to move beyond symbolic gestures and expensive
reforms that only expand police power with little pay-off for poor and working people. Studying
over a century of policing history in Milwaukee tells us that both liberal and reactionary law-andorder will not solve far-reaching problems we know to be embedded in capitalism and racism.
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Appendix A
Select Milwaukee Police Department Killings/In-custody Deaths
Date Name

Age

Race

Cause of Death

1948 Emeit Clemons

27

Black

Shooting

1950 Murray Henry

22

Black

Shooting

1958 Daniel Bell

22

Black

Shooting

1959 Roscoe Simpson

29

Black

Shooting

1967 Clifford McKissick

18

Black

Shooting

1967 Lee Wilson

44

Black

Shooting

1970 Randolph Anderson

26

White

Shooting

1972 Jacqueline Ford

19

Black

Shooting

1973 Andrew Friend

22

Black

Shooting

1974 Johnnie Starks

54

Black

Shooting

1974 Mary Pendleton

42

Black

Asphyxiation

1974 Jerry Brookshire

16

Black

Shooting

1975 Steve Gaston

21

Black

Shooting

1975 Charles Dailey

20

Black

Shooting

1977 Roger Lyons

32

White

Head injuries

1981 Ernest Lacy

22

Black

Asphyxiation

1991 George Brown

15

Black

Shooting

2002 Larry Jenkins

31

Black

Shooting

2002 Samuel Rodriguez

24

Latinx

Shooting

2002 Edward Pundsack

28

White

Shooting

2003 Justin Fields

21

Black

Shooting

2005 Wilbert Prado

25

Latinx

Shooting

2010 Tony Bean

43

Black

Lost consciousness

2011 Derek Williams

22

Black

Asphyxiation

2014 Dontre Hamilton

31

Black

Shooting

2016 Sylville Smith

23

Black

Shooting

2020 Joel Acevedo

25

Latinx

Asphyxiation
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With Robert S. Smith. “Brew City Bellwether: The Changing Landscape of the Black Family in
Milwaukee.” In Contemporary African American Families: Achievements, Challenges, and Empowerment
Strategies in the 21st Century, edited by Dorothy Smith-Ruiz and Sherri Lawson-Clark, 123-140. New
York: Routledge, 2016.
Public Scholarship
In Encyclopedia of Milwaukee, edited by Margo J. Anderson and Amanda I. Seligman. Available online
through the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee at emke.uwm.edu:
“Betty Quadracci,” “Beulah Brinton,” “Blood Center of Wisconsin,” “British,” “City of Pewaukee,”
“Digital Milwaukee,” Dorothy Enderis,” “Filipinos,” “Germantown,” “Hartford,” “Junior League of
Milwaukee,” “Mary Blanchard Lynde,” “Milwaukee Magazine,” “Milwaukee NAACP,” “Milwaukee
Press Club,” “Nelson P. Hawkes,” “Newhall House Fire,” “Public Service Building,” “Television,”
“Village of Menomonee Falls,” “Village of Pewaukee,” “Village of Slinger,” “We Energies,”
“Wisconsin Center,” “Yankee-Yorkers,” “YWCA Southeast Wisconsin,” and “YMCA of
Metropolitan Milwaukee.”
Op-Eds
“Long before Sterling Brown’s Arrest, Milwaukee Struggled with a Policing Problem.” The
Washington Post. June 3, 2018. https://wapo.st/2z6o92I
“‘Not Examined, but Rectified’: Let Milwaukee Heed Khalif Rainey’s Advice.” Milwaukee
Neighborhood News Service. August 17, 2016. https://milwaukeenns.org/2016/08/17/not-examinedbut-rectified-let-milwaukee-heed-khalif-raineys-advice
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FELLOWSHIPS & AWARDS
2019
2019
2018
2017
2013
2012
2011
2010
2010
2006
2005

R1 Distinguished Dissertation Fellowship, UW-Milwaukee
Governor’s Archives Award in Archival Achievement, Wisconsin Historical Society
Distinguished Dissertation Fellowship, UW-Milwaukee
Graduate Student Excellence Fellowship, UW-Milwaukee
Graduate Student Travel Award, UW-Milwaukee
Chancellor’s Graduate Student Award, UW-Milwaukee
Top Graduate Student Poster, National Council on Public History Annual Meeting
Graduate Student Fellow, National Museum of American History
Academic Merit Award, College of Arts and Sciences, American University
History Department Book Prize, Suffolk University
History Department Book Prize, Suffolk University

TEACHING EXPERIENCE
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, History Department
2018
Teaching Assistant (Instructor: Chia Youyee Vang), Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam:
History and Culture
2016
Teaching Assistant (Instructor: Robert S. Smith), Multicultural America
2016
Instructor of Record, History 446: African American History since the Civil War
2015
Teaching Assistant (Instructor: Robert S. Smith), Multicultural America
EMPLOYMENT
Marquette University, Center for Urban Research, Teaching, and Outreach, Milwaukee, WI
Project Lead and Web Designer, Documenting Black Lives Matter Archive, Milwaukee, WI, 2020
Northwestern Mutual, Milwaukee, WI
Archivist, 2014–2020
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, History Department, Milwaukee, WI
Project Assistant, Hmong Diaspora Studies Program, AY 2017–2018
Project Assistant, Cultures & Communities Program, AY 2014–2015, 2015-2016, 2016-2017
Research Assistant, The Encyclopedia of Milwaukee, AY 2013–2014
Project Assistant, The Encyclopedia of Milwaukee, AY 2012–2013
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, Golda Meir Library, Milwaukee, WI
Archives Technician, American Geographical Society Library, 2012–2014
Web Developer, Digital Humanities Lab, 2013–2014
American University, Washington, DC
Senior Library Assistant, Bender Library, 2010–2011
Web Developer, History Department, 2011
Smithsonian Institution, Washington, DC
Anacostia Community Museum, Web Developer, Paid Internship, Summer 2011
National Museum of American History, Web Developer, Paid Internship, 2010–2011
501

INVITED TALKS
2020
2020
2020
2019
2018
2017
2016
2016
2015

“Milwaukee Fire & Police Commission: Accountable to Whom and for What? A
Historical View,” Wisconsin ACLU, Milwaukee National Lawyers Guild, Milwaukee,
Wisconsin, September 29
“Smart Justice during COVID-19: The History of Policing,” Wisconsin ACLU,
Milwaukee, WI, July 22
“Why the Nation Erupted? Historicizing This Moment,” Panelist, Center for Urban
Research, Teaching, and Engagement, Marquette University, Milwaukee, WI, June 11
“Doing Public History in Milwaukee across Institutional and Grassroots Settings:
Challenges and Opportunities,” Washington College, Chestertown, MD, December
19
“Lessons from the Long Black Freedom Struggle,” March on Milwaukee 50 th
Anniversary, Body & Soul Healing Center, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, November
“A Prince Among Slaves,” Film Discussion Facilitator, UW-Milwaukee Muslim
Student Association, February 22
“Civilian and Police Relations in Milwaukee,” Medical College of Wisconsin,
Wauwatosa, WI, August 1
“The Black Panthers: Vanguard of the Revolution,” Film Discussion Facilitator,
John Michael Kohler Arts Center, Sheboygan, WI, February 9
“Museums and Memory on the Internet: Creating the Stitching History Digital
Exhibit,” with Rachel N. Baum, E.J. Basa, and Allain Daigle, Jewish Museum
Milwaukee, Milwaukee, WI, February 25

CONFERENCE ACTIVITY & PARTICIPATION
Conferences Organized
2016
Communications and Logistics Assistant, Imagining America National Conference,
Milwaukee, WI
2014
Co-Coordinator, The Humanities and Technologies Camp, UW-Milwaukee,
Milwaukee, WI
2014
Co-Coordinator, UW-Milwaukee History Graduate Student Conference, “Racial
Formation, Racial Blindness,” UW-Milwaukee, Milwaukee, WI
2013
Co-Coordinator, Midwest Labor and Working-class History Graduate Student
Colloquium, UW-Milwaukee, Milwaukee, WI
2012
Local Outreach Coordinator, The Humanities and Technologies Camp, Organization
of American Historians and National Council On Public History Joint Annual
Meeting, Milwaukee, WI
Panels Organized
2021
(Pending) Co-organized with Ian Toller-Clark, “Towards a Liberated Black
Milwaukee: The Strategic Evolution of Police Accountability Mobilizations in a
Midwestern City,” Urban History Association Conference, Detroit, Michigan
2012
“Public History Online: Using the Web to Collaborate and Share,” Working Group
Facilitator, Organization of American Historians and National Council on Public
History Joint Annual Meeting, Milwaukee, WI, April 21
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Papers Presented
2020
“Black Cops, Cream City: Oral History and African American Policing in
Milwaukee,” Oral History Association, Baltimore, Maryland, October 9
2020
(Canceled) “Beyond the Grave: African American Resistance and the Deceased,”
Organization of American Historians Annual Meeting, Washington, D.C.
2018
“In King’s Name: The League of Martin’s Struggle to End Police Racism in
Milwaukee,” Association for the Study of African-American Life and History,
Indianapolis, IN, October 5
2016
“Brew City Bellwether: Lessons from Milwaukee, WI,” National Council on Black
Studies Annual Conference, Charlotte, N.C., March 17
2014
“All Eyes on the Block: Racial Liberals and Community-based Crime Control in
Milwaukee during the Mass Incarceration Era,” Urban History Association Annual
Meeting, Philadelphia, PA, October 10
2014
“‘Fighting Back against the Crime Menace,’ Liberal Integrationists and the
Criminalization of Milwaukee’s Urban Spaces during the Reagan Era,” Organization
of American Historians Annual Meeting, Atlanta, GA, April 13
2014
“A Conflicted Reality: Liberal Integrationists and the Criminalization of Urban Space
in Milwaukee,” University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Graduate History Conference on
Race and Ethnicity, Milwaukee, WI, February 15
2013
“The Fight to Make Higher Education Relevant to Black College Students in
Milwaukee,” Association for the Study of African American Life and History Annual
Meeting, Jacksonville, FL, October 3
2013
“Perceptions, Strategies, and Consequences: Addressing Crime in Milwaukee’s
Sherman Park Community, 1980-1992,” UW-Milwaukee Urban Studies Program
Annual Student Forum, Milwaukee, WI, April 27
2013
“‘Partiality Invested with Power:’ Race, Police Brutality, and the Death of Ernest
Lacy,” Midwest Labor and Working Class History Graduate Student Colloquium,
Milwaukee, WI, February 15
Roundtable Discussant
2019
“Federalism and Policing under the ‘First White President,’” The Labor and
Working-Class History Association, Durham, NC, May 31
2017
“To Defuse a ‘Powder Keg’: Historicizing the 2016 Milwaukee Uprising,”
Roundtable Organizer, The Labor and Working-Class History Association, Seattle,
WA, June 23
2015
“Historicizing the Channels and Landscapes of Power and Struggle in the Neoliberal
City,” The Labor and Working-Class History Association Annual Meeting,
Washington D.C., May 30
2013
“Teaching Digital History and New Media,” Working Group, National Council on
Public History Annual Meeting, Ottawa, ON, April 19
2013
“University-NPS Partnerships and the Benefits of Creative Space: Placing Arlington
House in Transnational History,” Roundtable, The Future of Civil War History:
Looking Beyond the 150th Conference, Gettysburg, PA, March 14
2011
“Interpreting the Lives of People of Color at Arlington House,” Poster Session,
National Council on Public History Annual Meeting, Pensacola, FL, April 8
Service
2013

Digital Drop-in Consultant, National Council on Public History Annual Meeting,
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Ottawa, ON, April 19
CAMPUS PRESENTATIONS
2019
2015
2014

“Doing Public History Across Grassroots and Institutional Settings: Challenges and
Opportunities,” UW-Milwaukee Libraries Digital Humanities Lab, Milwaukee, WI,
December 16
“Directions in Digital Humanities: ‘Stitching History from the Holocaust: A Digital
Humanities Lab Project,’” with Rachel Baum and Ann Hanlon, UW-Milwaukee
Libraries Digital Humanities Lab, Milwaukee, WI, March 4
“Digital Humanities Methods: Omeka and Neatline,” UW-Milwaukee Libraries
Digital Humanities Lab, Milwaukee, WI, November 12

COMMUNITY OUTREACH
2016

“From Marshall Clark to Dontre Hamilton: Connecting Racial Terror Lynchings and
Anti-Black Police Violence in Milwaukee,” Walking Tour, Milwaukee, WI, August 15

ORAL HISTORY COLLECTION DEVELOPMENT
2017-2018

2016-2018

“March on Milwaukee 50th Anniversary: 200 Nights of Freedom” Oral History
Committee Chair. Developed in partnership with the Wisconsin Historical Society,
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Libraries, Wisconsin Black Historical Society,
Marquette University Libraries, and Milwaukee County Historical Society
“African Americans in the Milwaukee Police Department Oral History Project.”
Developed in partnership with the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Archives and
Wisconsin Black Historical Society and Museum

DIGITAL HISTORY PROJECTS
2020
2017
2015
2014
2014

2014
2013
2012

(In Progress) Documenting Black Lives Matter Demonstrations in Milwaukee,
Digital Archive, UW-Milwaukee and Marquette University, Design Lead
“200 Nights of Freedom,” March on Milwaukee 50 th Anniversary Project, Design
Team Member, http://200nightsoffreedom.org/
UW-Milwaukee Cultures & Communities Program Website, College of Letters &
Sciences, Web Designer, https://uwm.edu/cultures-communities/
“Stitching History from the Holocaust,” Online Museum Exhibition, UWMilwaukee Digital, Humanities Lab, Jewish Museum Milwaukee, Project Lead and
Web Designer, http://liblamp.uwm.edu/omeka/stitchinghistory/
“Transforming Justice: Rethinking the Politics of Security, Mass Incarceration, and
Community, Health,” UW-Milwaukee, Center for 21st Century Studies
Transdisciplinary Challenge Award project, Web Designer,
https://uwm.edu/transformingjustice/
Technology & Humanities Camp Milwaukee 2014, Web Designer,
http://milwaukee2014.thatcamp.org/
“The Milwaukee Crime Map Project,” Web Designer, Final Project for History-717,
History and the New Media (defunct)
Technology & Humanities Camp NCPH 2012, Web Designer,
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2011
2010

http://ncph2012.thatcamp.org/
“Community Documentation Initiative,” Smithsonian Institution, Anacostia
Community Museum, Co-Web Designer,
https://web.archive.org/web/20150221223711/http://cdi.anacostia.si.edu/
“American Enterprise,” Smithsonian Institution, National Museum of American
History, Pre-Exhibition Website, Co-Web Designer,
https://web.archive.org/web/20121023002210/http://americanenterprise.si.edu/

PUBLIC HISTORY INTERNSHIPS
Smithsonian Institution, Washington, DC
Anacostia Community Museum, Web Developer, Paid Internship, May 2011–October 2011
National Museum of American History, Web Developer, Paid Internship, August 2010–May 2011
Milwaukee County Historical Society, Milwaukee, WI
Processing Assistant, Brewery Collection, June 2010–August 2010
Arlington House, The Robert E. Lee Memorial, Arlington, VA
National Park Service, Furnishing Plan Developer, January 2010–May 2010
Chesapeake & Ohio Canal, Great Falls, MD
National Park Service, Historical Interpreter, September 2009–December 2009
Museum of African American History, Boston, MA
Research Assistant, Gathering Place for Freedom exhibit, January 2006–May 2006
UNIVERSITY SERVICE
UW-Milwaukee Libraries Digital Humanities Lab Advisory Board, 2015-2016
Associate Developer/Consultant, UW-Milwaukee Libraries Digital Humanities Lab, 2013-2015
Graduate Student Liaison, UW-Milwaukee History Graduate Affairs Committee, 2012-2013
Consultant, UW-Milwaukee Digital Futures Grant, 2012
LANGUAGES
English, fluent / Spanish, conversational
DIGITAL SKILLS
Proficiencies: HTML, CSS, WordPress, Omeka, CommonSpot CMS
PROFESSIONAL MEMBERSHIPS OR AFFILIATIONS
Organization of American Historians
Urban History Association
Association for the Study of African American Life and History
Labor and Working-Class History Association
National Council on Public History
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